

**UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, TAMALE**

**MULTI-PARTY ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE JIRAPA MUNICIPALITY.**

**FRANCIS KWASI AMOAH**

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THE JIRAPA MUNICIPALITY**

**BY**

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## DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family for their care and love, and to all those, ‘who have allow me to look far, not because I am tall to look far but because, they have allow me to stand on their shoulders to look far’



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## ABSTRACT

Ghana has witnessed significant democratic progress over the past two decades with remarkable success in the country's electoral history. Regardless of the achievements in the consolidation of democracy, elections in Ghana are invariably plagued by localized violence that threatens the peace, security and stability of the country. The aim of this study was to investigate electoral violence and socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality. The research design was cross sectional approach, the study adopted the mixed method approach with residents of the municipality of voting age, various political party executives, the Electoral Commission (EC), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Security Council as its units of analysis. Cluster sampling techniques Questionnaire were used to select 188 voters while semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 other stakeholders (Party executives, Electoral Commission, NCCE and the Security Council). The questionnaire was analyzed using central tendencies (means, standard deviations, frequencies) with the assistance of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Again, to test for linearity of variables, Chi-Square and cross-tabulations were performed. The results of the study revealed that most of the electoral violence was caused by youth employment, also laws of punishment for electoral is not deterrence. The study recommends the need to give sustainable jobs to the youth to discourage them from engaging in electoral violence. Again, vigilantes' groups should be disbanded by government and political parties as they appeared to be the conduit of electoral violence. Again, interparty advisory committee must be formalized and becomes authoritative for all political process recommended.



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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

According to European Commission (EU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance (2018) multi-party elections have remained very regular and highly patronized in the world. Elections are generally accepted as the hallmark of democracy in the political contestation. For a democracy to thrive, election becomes the cornerstone and inevitable for the transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another or one party re-elected. Elections has assumed international dimension as a vehicle by political parties, individual to handle or lead the mantle of political governance (EISA, 2020). Elections have therefore remained critical foundational part of representative democracy advocated to be embraced by every government across the world (CODEO, 2020). As a result, the new wave of governance in creeping across the globe in modern societies is the representative democracy which is underpinned by elections as the main way of choosing political leaders. Thus, democracy and elections are bedfellows and inextricably intertwined (Chiroro, 2005).

Nonetheless, United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2020) and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2017) observed that elections often come with high levels of inciting, humiliation, coercion and intimidations, the quality or efficacy of elections in demonstrating true democracy and leadership that augment socio-economic development that is conflict free, and free from fear has mostly been doubtful. Thus, the conduct of elections does not indicate that a country is democratic (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa [EISA], 2020). Notwithstanding, various governments conduct elections to enable the electorates



choose their political leaders towards consolidating the gains of a nation's democracy as a way of mobilizing citizens support and inclusion in the governance process as well as sustaining the democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Contestation for political power through periodic multi-party elections in Africa has become more often than not a violent process (Biegon, 2009). According to Arriola and Johnson (2012), violence plagued one out of five contests in about 600 elections that sought to select leaders of countries between 1985 and 2005. Also, it has affected at least one general election in 68 out of 154 countries within same period of time where majority of those affected countries were within Africa (Arriola & Johnson, 2012). It is no longer possible to plan elections without adequate attention to the issue of violence in Africa. For many politicians, evolving strategies for using violence and counteracting some marks the first step to determining how serious a candidate is about contesting a forthcoming election. Conflict and tensions have therefore been palpable during election years in nearly all Africa's new democracies (Bekoe, 2010).

National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) statistics showed that 23% of democratic elections of low income and lower-middle income countries between (1990-2012) has been dogged by riots or protests (Hyde & Marinov, 2012). About 80% of such violence are disputes during post-election periods where the disputants protest and riot because of allegations of electoral fraud in Africa (Africa Union 2020). The 83% in the continent continues to witness election violence, where Round 5 Afrobarometer survey data from 35 African countries in 2011 affirmed that 48% of respondents reported some fear of election violence (Wallsworth, 2015). Violent competition for power seems to have become an acceptable practice in the political process in states of Africa.





For instance, since the early 1990s, contestation for power had turned into armed conflict and civil war in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo Democratic Republic, Rwanda and Somalia. Indeed, where contestation had not resulted in armed conflict, violence became an inevitable part of the electoral process (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2018). Even though wars arising from multi-party elections seems to have greatly dwindled over the years, electoral violence is on the increase in most parts of the developing world (Hickman, 2005). In recent times, the world has witnessed electoral violence in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Iran, Sri Lanka, India and in many other countries mostly in the developing world even though electoral violence is not exclusive to developing countries (Fischer, 2002; Bekoe, 2011).

The reintroduction of competitive politics brought Ghana's concern of ensuring democratic consolidation as a solid ground for development under the Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992, (Bob-Milliar, 2014; EISA, 2019). Through the consolidation of democracy, it has inspired very successful conduct of eight (8) consecutive national elections, which witnessed the incumbent party smoothly transfers power to the opposition party for three (3) uninterrupted times. These have not come on a silver platter, The Electoral Commission (EC), the Judiciary and security agencies of the state have played very critical and significant roles in ensuring this tremendous achievement for the last almost three decades (1992-2020) (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). The urbanization of communities that came with the role of the media to propagate growth and development saw the proliferation of vibrant media houses with its attendant of increasing civil society organizations championing the voiceless in communities all collectively contributed to deepening Ghana's democracy (Debrah, Alidu and Owusu-Mensah, 2016).



Irrespective of these developments, it is a fundamental concern for state institutions to continue to ensure the relative peace and security the country has enjoyed over the years in order to harmonious peaceful co-existence. But in more recent times, there have been issues of uncertainty in Ghana's democratic dispensation where the country has witnessed hike in election related disputes which is undermining the stability of the Ghana's democracy (CODEO 2018 and CDD, 2020). It has become quite apparent that all national elections have experienced election related violence which often destabilized the peace and security which had the tendency of undermining Ghana's democracy. Notably, are intimidations, insults, instigations, rampaging, attacks and riots? Besides, destruction of properties individually-owned or owned by government, gun fires, burning of tires including seizure of ballot boxes and stampede of political rallies by political opponents, these can mar electoral processes and become good conduit to armed violence (Aning, 2012; Gyampo, 2016; CODEO, 2020).

Ghana's electoral violence has reached an alarming rate with the emergence of political parties' vigilante groups who are trained to give protection to the leadership of the political parties but mostly end up causing mayhem during electoral periods (Bekoe, 2010 and UNDP 2020). Electoral violence statistics in Ghana compiled by CODEO (2020) indicated that the 2008, 2016 and 2020 election witnessed electoral violence in the country. Again, the author found that during the 2008 general elections, 121 electoral violence were recorded on the voting day in the country, majority (about 65%) of the incidence took place in the three regions of Northern Ghana. The election of the 2012, 2016 and 2020 respectively, recorded 137, 113 and 105 election related violence including voter intimidation, tearing posters of opponents, insults, inciting, intimidation, travesty of justice, and obstruction of campaigns and rallies of the opponents (CODEO Report, 2012, 2016 and 2020). The high number of cases in 2016 and 2020 was an indication that violent acts have



crept into Ghana's democracy in its electoral process and has had national and international attention such as Ayawasu West Wugon Parliamentary bye election on 29<sup>th</sup> January, 2019 at Greater Accra Region,, Techiman South constituency General Elections in 2020 at Bono East Region, the killing of citizens by security without fair justice, General Elections 2020 at Ododiodio constituency, the violence that kills innocent citizen in the Greater Accra Region, (CODEO Report, 2012, 2016 and 2020)

Electoral violence has been reported in almost all electoral activities conducted in Ghana since 1992. These incidents manifest in intra and inter-party elections particularly between the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) which has the potential to negatively affect Ghana's democracy. Fischer (2013 and UNDP, 2020) study on election violence between 1992 to 2020 found that Ghana recorded 5,707 electoral violence with various categorizations such as assault, violent intimidation, seizures of public property, protests or public disorders, inciting people against their opponent, ballot box theft and party property destruction). Out of these electoral violence rate, the Jirapa Municipality recorded the highest in the Upper West Region making the Municipality a hotspot area during elections. According to the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) (2018) survey, as well as Police Report on Election (2020) out of 105 electoral violence hotspot in Upper West, Jirapa Municipality had 35, making highest among Eleven (11) constituencies in the Upper West Region. The Municipality often recorded the highest number of security personnel in their deployment in most of the recent elections (2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020) which is a sign of an area prone to violence (Police Election Report, 2020)). In spite of fact that we have independent institutions such as independent judicial system, security services, civil society organization, Electoral Commission, and other various credible agents, Jirapa Municipality is still experience electoral violence. It is based on

this that this research sought to build on existing body of research on the causal factors of electoral violence on democratic development and also gain more understanding about the motivations and dynamics of electoral violence within the Jirapa Municipality since it has a unique contextual dimension on election as a major hotspot in the Upper West Region.

## 1.2 Problem Statement

According to the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) (2019), Ghana is seen as a model of democracy which is an enviable achievement since the country began multi-party democracy in 1992. Thus, Ghana having successfully conducted eight successive but peaceful general elections led to three smooth transfers of power from one party to another in 2001, 2009, and 2017 respectively (CDD-Ghana, 2019). Notwithstanding the feat chalked, there had been undercurrents and recurrent electoral violence continue to disturb the electoral cycle of Ghana (Bob-Millar, 2014), although this has not slip into civil war as in other jurisdictions.

The Election violence is a danger to the nation's democratic stability that makes Ghana the oasis of peace (CODEO, 2017) in a sub-region that is increasingly becoming volatile (Ayelazuno, 2010). Boafo-Arthur (2006) observed that in each election year, the election is usually conducted on very hostile and unfriendly environment where politicians take the electorates to ransom and marred the elections with all forms of violence which puts the image of Ghana Multiparty electoral democracy in serious doubt. It is therefore very imperative to address these impeding issues of electoral violence that usually occur in every election year which has become a crucial concern for many including for security, Electoral Commission, Judicially, civil society organizations and other public interest or stakeholders. Though Ghana has been rated a country with best democracy in the conduct of elections and the smooth transition of power from one political party to another





by many election observers including diplomatic or international community, its elections have witnessed a number of activities and events that stifled the country's democracy as electoral violence has been recorded in almost all regions (Van Rompuy, 2010; Ayelazuno, 2010). The level of skirmishes about agitations, misunderstanding, humiliations at funeral or public grounds, inciting against each other, closing down of local information Centre in 2016 by the orders of powers that be, the reason of rival candidates shall not be given opportunity to articulate his views on issues about election in the information center, as even District Assembly has been used as a vessel for undermine freedom of expression by not given license to information Centre to operate, gives cause of high temperamental assembly decision to thwart the effort of free speech (GPS Report on Elections, 2016). Both NDC and NPP as a major rival political parties holding political rallies within the same geographical area at Jirapa before general elections was called for concern of first sign of early warning sign of electoral violence (NESTF Report, 2016 and 2020)

According to the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) (2019) survey, as well as Police Report on Election (2020) out of 105 electoral violence hotspot in Upper West, Jirapa Municipality had 35, making highest among Eleven (11) constituencies in the Upper West Region. The Municipality often recorded the highest number of security personnel in their deployment in most of the recent elections (2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020) which is a sign of an area prone to violence (Police Election Report, 2020)). Regardless of independent institutions such as independent judicial system, security services, Traditional authorities, local Authorities,, civil society organization, Commission on Human Rights, Electoral Commission, and other various credible agents in the Jirapa Municipality who are capable of ensuring peaceful atmosphere in the



Jirapa jurisdiction, still municipality continuous to experience all forms of electoral violence ( Electoral Commission Election Report, 2020).

Thus, incidences of these electoral violence led to several scholars undertaking research works on electoral-related violence in Ghana and for that matter Upper West Region. For instance, Amankwaah (2013) worked on violence in election in Ghana. Asekere (2019) also studied on exploring the Mahama- NDC's Defeat in the 2016 election insights from pre-election surveys. Bob-Milliar (2014) studied on "Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana. Aning and Danso (2012) studied the management of election stability of democracy in Ghana. Again, Kodjo (2015) looked at tackling electoral violence in the Upper West Region. These studies emphasized on election and electoral violence without focusing on Democratic Development and Multiparty Electoral Violence in Jirapa Municipality.

According to a report by (CODEO Report, 2017) the five regions of Northern Ghana have not been exception when it comes to electoral violence (Aning and Danso, 2016). In 2016 Northern Ghana recorded the highest incidence of electoral violence (about 65%) in Ghana with majority erupting from the Northern, Savannah and North East Regions (CODEO, 2017). However, the Upper West Region has generally remained one of the most peaceful Regions in Ghana. Nonetheless, the region cannot be exonerated from pockets of electoral violence which have been recurrent during both inter and intra-party elections (CODEO, 2020). According to the Electoral Commission Report (2017), National Election Security Task Force (NESTF) and a Technical Committee (TC) classified four constituencies of the Upper West Region (Jirapa, Lawra, Wa Central and Sissala East) as electoral violence prone constituencies both during the 2016 and 2020 general Elections. During the 2020 general elections, the Jirapa Constituency as the study area recorded 35 cases of electoral violence cases out of 105 in the region, which made the constituency the highest violent

prone area in the region and one of the highest in the country (Electoral Commission Election Report, 2021). Jirapa constituency is considered as one of the major hotspot constituencies of the Region during elections. The Ghana Police Service has identified Jirapa constituency as an area where chaos, intimidation, misunderstanding, humiliations, confrontation disrupts electoral activities and as a result always have a large number of security personnel during elections (Ghana Police Service Report, 2015; 2017 and 2020).

Notwithstanding that the Jirapa constituency witnessed the highest election violent in the region, however, there had not been any research on this phenomenon let alone on how multi-party electoral violence affects democratic development. This therefore attracted scholarly attention. It is based on this context that this study sought to analyze multi-party electoral violence and democratic development in the Jirapa Municipality

### **1.3 Main Research Question**

To what extent do electoral violence affect multi-party democratic development in the Jirapa Municipality?

#### **1.3.1 Specific Research Questions**

The study seeks answers to the following specific research questions:

1. What are the forms of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality?
2. What are the causal factors of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality?
3. To what extent does electoral violence affect inclusive multi-party democracy and development in the Jirapa Municipality?
4. What are the possible practical solutions for the prevention of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality?



## **1.4 General Objective**

To analyze the effect of electoral violence on the multiparty democratic development in the Jirapa Municipality?

### **1.4.1 Specific Objectives**

The study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives;

1. To identify the forms of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality.
2. To examine the causal factors of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality.
3. To analyze the effect of electoral violence on inclusive multi-party democratic development in the Jirapa Municipality.
4. To assess the practical solutions for the prevention of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality.

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The study was conducted at a time when Ghana has become test case for multi-party democratic country in Africa in which its consolidation has not been in doubt. A cardinal observation of elections organized in Ghana's 4<sup>th</sup> republic will inform an independent opinion that general elections from 1992-2020 has surrounded itself with violence, from all facets of ten to now sixteen region of Ghana, such as Akwatia, Odododiodio Constituency death that occurred due to 2020 General Elections, Ayawasi West Wugon Bye-election on 2019, the murder of innocent citizen at Techiman South constituency on 2020 counting of voting, the opposition parties unacceptable declaration of Presidential election results by the Returning officer, The Supreme Court unanimously decision on 2020 presidential elections, hence, The current study would therefore be of great importance to the judicial, Electoral Commission of Ghana, the Ministry of Interior,





Traditional council, other security outfit, development partners, international election observers, investors and civil society organizations about how well they will tactically, strategically and technologically prepare well for foreseeable free and fair elections, and free from fear electoral activities in Ghana that will be acceptable by all stakeholders.

This study would also establish the root cause of election violence in the Jirapa Constituency which would serve as early warning sign for the National Security, the National Peace Council, the Electoral Commission, and the Ministry of Interior to anticipate, strategize and prevent electoral violence of any electoral activities in the area and beyond.

The findings from this study would bring to the attention of development partners the state of election violence in the Jirapa constituency and Ghana in general. This may help them and the donor communities to plan and send their interventions to areas which are most needed in order to ensure peaceful elections devoid of mayhem and violence that will enhance good governance through inclusive participation.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The study was conducted in the Jirapa Municipality of the Upper West Region of Ghana. Contextually, the study covered all presidential and parliamentary including local government elections held under the 4<sup>th</sup> Republican Constitution of Ghana thus from 1992 to 2020. The study focused on electoral violence including intra and inter-party elections and all types of violence that were related to elections before, during and after elections.



## **1.7 Organization of the Study**

This study was organized into five chapters. Chapter one looked at the introduction of the study which is made up of background information, statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives, significance, and the scope of the study.

Chapter two reviewed literature on concepts and theories relevant to topic.

Chapter three focused on methodology of the study. It looked at the study design, study area, population, sampling techniques, instruments for data collection, data analysis and presentation and ethical considerations.

Chapter four dealt with analysis of data and discussions. This chapter analyzed data gathered from the field with the research objectives of the study.

Chapter five looked at the summary, conclusion and recommendation of the study.



## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviewed both empirical and theoretical related literature. The chapter began with definitions of relevant concepts including election and electoral violence. The section also discussed the global outlook of electoral violence, role of public institutions in electoral violence, types and nature of electoral violence, factors fueling electoral violence, perpetrators of electoral violence and Clientelism. The theory underpinning the study is further discussed and concluded in this chapter.

#### 2.1 Concepts

##### 2.1.1 Election

Elections are generally accepted measure of democracy and participation in elections forms part of the fundamental human right of citizens in such democratic societies (Molomo, 2006). Election is democratic means of selecting political leadership through which people give their consent legitimacy to a government. Kodjo (2015) sees election as a process where electorates exercise their power to elect people into offices to represent the electorate in governing or making administration. To Ibrahim (2020), election is a tool used electorate to choose people into offices. Election is a process where eligible electorates cast their votes to choose political contestants that vie for various elective positions (Impraimk, 2020). Elections come with intensive competition with each candidate doing everything possible to outweigh the other by pressing on the electorates. The stiffer the competition, the greater the chance of it degenerating into election violence, more especially within the winner-takes-all electoral system (Attah-Boahene, 2012).



### 2.1.2 Electoral violence

Violence is the hostile contestation between two or more persons or groups over claims to status, power and scarce resources or value that each prize (Coser, 1968). In other words, conflict arises when two or more persons (or groups) seek to occupy the same position, play incompatible roles, maintain incompatible goals or undertake mutually incompatible means for achieving their purposes. The cause of every conflict is what is at stake is scarce and cannot be shared. Some conflicts are easily resolved through legal, customary or conventional norms and procedures. Nonetheless, there are conflicts which defy such solutions and they progress to assume violent dimensions. Within the political system, such conflicts could be rightly classified as electoral violence. Electoral violence is a mere subset of political violence and it is differentiated by its timing around elections activities with desire to impact electoral process by altering its outcome or simply disrupting elections ( Bakoe 2017). Electoral violence can be physical to threaten and intimidate voters, opponents, snatch or destroy election materials (Ibok & Ogar, 2018). Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence as any unplanned or planned act with the intention to control, delay, or obstruct an electoral process through verbal or non-verbal threats, hate speech, propaganda, physical attack, forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination to gain undue advantage.

The ultimate goal of electoral violence is to interfere the process of election, either by altering the outcome of elections or by undermining the electoral system and process throughout the election cycle; that is, before, during, or after election (United Nations Development Program, [UNDP], 2020). Electoral violence denotes any organized acts or threats (physical, psychological and structural) intended to intimidate harm, blackmail political stakeholder before, during and after election with the hope of skewing, delaying, or otherwise influencing the outcome of the election



(Omotola, 2009; Albert et al, 2007). Electoral violence is not only dynamic and multi-dimensional it also occurs in the build up to elections. Bekoe (2011) conceives electoral violence as a violence of political actors targeted at the electoral process seeking to win a political contest or power through violence, by subverting the ends of the democratic process.

Gyamera (2018) defined electoral violence as any sporadic or planned act by candidates of political parties, party apparatchiks, sympathizers, activists, election officials, electorates, or any other stakeholder, that occurs with the aim of undermining the electoral process. This may occur from the date of voter registration to the date of inauguration of the victors. The violence may be in the form of physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other coercive gerrymandering acts intending to explore and exploit, disrupt, influence, hasten, delay, reverse, or otherwise of the process and outcome of an election. Igbuzor (2010) sees electoral violence as any act of violence including thuggery, disruption of political campaigns, meetings, and voting or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters or cause injury to persons connected or not connected with the elections. These acts are been perpetrated in the course of electioneering from the pre, during to post-election periods.

Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence as any spontaneous or organized misbehaviors that seeks to skew, delay, or disrupt an election through threat, intimidation, hate speech, propaganda, physical assault, forced “protection,” blackmail, disruption of property, or assassination. In the view of Ijon, (2020) electoral violence encompasses any harm or threat targeting election materials, at persons who are linked with election. Electoral violence can be physical,



psychological or structural. Whereas the physical violence is much seen and globally reported, the psychological which is mainly predominant are less conspicuous hence less reported and the structural violence remains less talked about (Ijon, 2020; Genyi, 2013).

Bekoe (2010) contends that factually speaking, the occurrence of electoral violence is unavoidable in every democracy, particularly the absence of its non-violent and low intensity state. This is because elections are mainly on the contestation for some limited political offices where the competitors have varied political ideological orientations and traditions. Impraimk (2020) contends that election disputes are inevitable in every electoral process and ought not to be misconstrued as converse to liberal democracy. It should rather be taken as proof of the tenacity, robustness, test of the accountability and sustainability of the democratic system (Impraimk 2020). This showed that election becomes a form of harm or threat often meted out to a person or property owned individually or by government basically to have an electoral advantage over their opponents either before, during or after the election period. Electoral violence in this regard encompassed physical and psychological violence that harms an individual or group. Some of these occurrences include but not limited to harassment of electorates, pelting of objects at political leaders, electoral officials, burning and/or damaging of party offices, and political assassinations of party leaders. In many cases, electoral violence occurs at all stages of the electoral process, from the point of registration and exhibition of voter cards, open of nomination polls, picking and submission, campaigning, voting to the declaration of results. A more complete definition provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2012) refer to electoral violence as acts or threats of force, intimidation and harm perpetrated through an electoral process, or that occur due to the competition for political position. When this occurs, violence may be used to derail the integrity of the election (Adolfo et al, 2012; UNDP, 2020).





Electoral violence requires particular responses (Höglund, 2009). Election related violence has peculiarities and different context requiring difference approaches in resolving them. As such, this lies in the motive, timing, actors, consequences and patterns of the violence (Bekoe, 2012). The desire for electoral violence is to skew the electoral process and/or its results (Höglund & Anton, 2009). Thus, the basis for the violence is rooted in the social, political or economic grievances or greed of the perpetrators (International Peace Institute [IPI], 2012; Laakso, 2007). As a result, electoral violence is cause of politicians who use their access to resources to lure party activist who belong to and support their political lineage to ferment troubles and thereby, perpetrate violence in the contexts of patronage (Badasu, 2018; Aniekwe & Kushie, 2011). Therefore, these occurrences have the chances to trigger an environment of rivalry and antagonism (EISA, 2010). Election violence manifestations is a phenomenon that happens at any given time in the electoral cycle (before, during and after the elections) (Straus & Taylor, 2012; EISA 2010). This indicates that elections needs to be seen as a process rather than an event (IPI, 2012) in a way that the election-related interventions that target in foiling tension and violence are not one-off activity. Therefore, promoting sustainable democracy, protecting political participation and good governance requires the continuous support of stakeholders of election rather than their ad hoc and sporadic involvement.

A narrow conception of electoral violence however, only takes account of the physical and direct attacks resulting from electoral exercise. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP) (2015) in their pre-assessment of risk of the then impending 2015 Nigeria General Election highlighted some of these violent trends on the eve of elections to include the disruption of political rallies, negative and inciting statements by political actors, complaints of over voter registration, arson

and destruction of party secretariat and campaign billboards of rival parties, availability and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and bomb explosions including shooting at campaign grounds and party primaries (WANEP, 2015; Norris, 2012).

### **2.3 Global Overview of Electoral Violence**

Studies indicate that in Africa, the high level of violence reported in elections affect between 19 and 25 percent of African elections generally. A number of nations have witnessed an increasing amount of electoral violence which has a recurrent effect and the repercussions have destabilized the peace and democracy of these countries (West African Network for Peace [WANEP], 2015). Straus and Taylor (2012) studied African nationwide elections between 1990 and 2008. It was discovered that nearly 10 percent of African elections were characterized with a significant elevation in the level of violence and a further 10 percent has also complicated extensive, though lesser, violence. About 38 percent recorded some few violence and another 42% had little substantial violence (Straus and Taylor, 2012). The 1992 elections that was organized in Angola was recorded as one of the most abused elections that took the country into civil war which lasted for over ten years. The introduction of multi-party system in Ethiopian elections in the year 2005 witnessed a very competitive race where post-election violence took the lives of 193, many others were severely wounded and an estimated 30, 000 people were surreptitiously picked by the security and detained; Kenya elections were no different. The 2007/2008 elections which were meant to peacefully approach the polling stations and cast a ballot as a constitutional right met an intense pre-election violence which culminated into loss of lives and property (WANEP, 2015; Ijon, 2020).





These authorities wrote that, the 2007/2008 post-election violence experienced in Kenya characterized by the mass slaughter of over 1,500 people and endangering the lives of an additional 660,000 was known to have retarded the growth of Kenya. The International Criminal Court (ICC) pressed charges against some four persons who were involved in electoral violence with misconducts against humankind. Similarly, the 2010 presidential election conducted in Ivory Coast brought about an effusive contested outcome where both Gbagbo and Quattara installed themselves as presidents. It brought a protracted tension and hostility for over five months with the formation of parallel government which finally took the intervention from the international communities to persuasively remove Gbagbo. However, the consequences of these actions saw the death of over 3,000 lives and the obstruction of the stability of the democracy (Straus and Taylor, 2012). It is documented that, 100 elections that were conducted in 44 African countries, in the period of January 2000 and December 2015 were all marred with violence. These 100 elections consist of 5 referenda, 26 presidential elections, 21 general elections, coupled with 35 parliamentary elections including 5 local/municipal elections all witness some form of election violence with different levels of effects (Straus and Taylor, 2012; Höglund, 2009).

Similarly, the Guinea Bissau violence reaction as presidential elections that were conducted took them into two rounds and led to the infestation of coup d'états. Mali as pre-election was also surrounded itself with violence, that occurred preceding into the main elections. Niger elections too were marred by electoral violence which even led to the military takeover in February 2010 when president Mamadou Tandja's decided to hold on to power after serving his mandated stipulated constitutional term. The use of political power to enforce a constitutional referendum which was on August, 2009 in order for him to stay long on the throne caused brutalities and



tensions. Just as the situation in Niger, Burkina Faso was not different as Compaoré's flagrantly revised the constitution to enable him run a third term but met an uproar from electorates and this called for the immediate intervention of the military, Christian Kabore became president on 29<sup>th</sup> December, 2019 (UNDP, 2020). In the wake of the massive third wave of democratization since the mid-1990s, the introduction of democratic reforms in Africa after the 1980s, has been characterized by violence. Electoral violence both well-orchestrated by armed gangs and those upon spontaneity occurred in Lesotho in 1998 and 2007, Zimbabwe from 2002-2008, Nigeria in 2003, 2007 and 2011 (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; IDEA, 2018).

The presence of electoral violence often systematically orchestrated has produced and sustained fear, panic and insecurity among politicians and the electorates in nearly all of the transition electoral democracies in Africa (AU 2020). This situation has created problems of instability and fragility in African states (Biegon, 2009). African democracies have also been tarnished by the criminalization of the electoral process with electoral violence. This has appeared largely in sub-Saharan Africa. In East Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe are replete with frightening incidences of electoral violence that consist of assassination, thugery, arson, destruction of properties, kidnapping, beating, killing and maiming (Arthur, 2014; Omotola, 2009).

The introduction of multi-party democratic electoral reforms in Africa in the 1990s saw heightened political repression in elections and almost all electoral process have been awash with violence (Ghana Police Report on Election, 2020). Similarly, in Ghana and for that matter the Jirapa municipality has been identified as one of the most violence prone areas during electoral activities and has received significant attention both from the EC and that of the Ghana Police Service (Okolie and Enyiazu, 2021; Agyemang, 2013) and also Ghana Police Service Report on Elections,



2020 ). In Zimbabwe for example, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2008 were plagued by state sponsored intimidation and violence in which over 253 deaths were recorded (Smith, 2011). Many Zimbabweans were left homeless and displaced. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) broke the global political agreement in 2008 which laid the framework for power sharing that MDC produced Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. ZANU-PF has raised youth militias that operated in rural areas and urban slums (IDEA, 2018). In the Ivory Coast, since the death of Felix Houphet Boigny the country has battled with electoral violence which plunged the country into a civil war in 2000 after the widespread post-election violence (Bekoe, 2017). Togo presents another case of widespread post-election violence in 2005 when Faure Gnassingbe took over from his father and became a victor in the presidential election. The violence that followed recorded 500- 800 deaths (Bekoe, 2009). In Zanzibar, where electoral phases frequently aggravate violence, the incumbent party characteristically involves in negotiations to appease both the opposition as well as external donors (Heilman 2009).

Election violence is not limited to Africa but its prevalence is worldwide especially in autocratic regimes. According to Human Right Watch (2018), election violence took place in Bangladesh before, during and after the 5<sup>th</sup> January, 2014 General Election in the country. Election violence has also been recorded in countries including Philippines, Pakistan and Russia (Pak Institute Peace Studies, 2013). The 2013 election in Pakistan encapsulated a minimum of five separate forms of violence: Pakistani Taliban intimidations of campaign gatherings and massacres of politicians, suppression by security forces in Baluchistan as pre-election “pacification,” terrorization by hooligans associated to parties, the seizure of ballot containers by party supporters, and bomb explosions and firings by armed political parties in Karachi all can believably be implied as

electoral violence, but with different offenders, goals, and strategies (Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2013).

In 2001, occurrences of tensions or violence were acknowledged in a total of 14 countries (24.5% of the total survey) (EISA, 2004); of those 14, three of the elections transpired in countries well-thought-off free (21%) and 11 arose in countries recognized partly or Not Free (79%). In the containment of the current electoral abusiveness and violence, it is crucial to comprehend the motivations, victimization, and perpetration (Bekoe, 2017).

In Thailand Parliamentary election, vote counting was abruptly interrupted by violent protests in numerous constituencies, of which majority were in the Southern provinces (IDEA, 2018). In Yemen, twenty (20) people were murdered, together with ten people on Election Day alone, in the first municipal elections since unification. Clashes happened amongst enthusiasts of the opposition party, Al-Islah, and the governing General People's Party (Höglund, 2009; Höglund and Anton, 2009). On 11<sup>th</sup> of November, 2019, President Evo Morales of Bolivia had to forcibly resign and seek asylum in Mexico due to disputed election when it was disagreed that the November 2019 election that declared him winner was not free, fair and transparent. The violence occasioned the death of over 20 people in La Paz the capital alone, aside the anarchy, power vacuum and destruction of properties (Aljazeera News, November 12, 2019). Even in advanced and powerful countries like the United States of America and that of the United Kingdom, there has been reported cases of structural election violence in recent elections (UNDP, 2020), signifying that election violence is widespread even though indubitably the magnitude of the physical violence in developing countries always stand very huge.



### 2.3.1 Overview of Electoral Violence in Ghana

Since 1992, following the reintroduction of competitive electoral politics under its fourth republican Constitution, Ghana has taken significant strides towards the consolidation of democracy that has brought significance hope, transformational development and freedom to the people as well as growth of competitive politics (UNDP, 2020)

Notable among these efforts has been the successful conduct of eight successive national elections, which have resulted in three uninterrupted transfers of power from the incumbent party to the opposition. These electoral advances over the almost last three decades (1992-2020) have taken place alongside considerable improvements in the performance of key institutions of state such as the Electoral Commission Ghana (ECG), the judiciary and the security agencies (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Whitfield, 2009). During the same period, Ghana has also witnessed the emergence of a vibrant media and a multiplicity of civil society and interest groupings, which are all integral to the process of democratization (CODEO, 2021). In spite of these developments, the future of Ghana's democracy remains uncertain, as it continues to grapple with persistent and multiple challenges that threaten to subvert the peace and security being enjoyed by Ghanaians (CDD, 2020). Perhaps the most insidious of these challenges is that posed by the phenomenon of election related violence, which invariably accompanies all national elections in Ghana. These acts or forms of violence, which usually involve threats and intimidation, physical and verbal assault, burning and looting of property, seizure of ballot boxes, and disruption of party rallies and polling stations, can cripple electoral processes and give rise to armed violence (CODEO, 2009; Aning, 2001; Gyampo, 2008). True, each election year', as Boafo-Arthur (2006) observes, 'generates its own defining issues and political undercurrents'. But electoral violence has been a recurring issue that continues to push Ghana towards the brink of all-out violence each election year. Such is the





seriousness of the problem that it is difficult to predict with certainty if Ghana was able to survive the general elections in 2020 with major political upheaval. While some observers, particularly in the diplomatic community, portray Ghana as the 'bastion of democracy' in the West African sub region, the level of violence and tension that is beginning to emanates from electoral activities from two major political parties of NPP and NDC call for much deeper reflection and concern in order to curb the menace on the bud (AU, 2020)

Characterize its elections is a measure of the frailty or fragility of this incipient democracy and its institutions (Van Rompuy, 2010; Ayelazuno, 2010). Examines the phenomenon of electoral violence and its multiple implications for the processes of democratic consolidation in Ghana. Political power and influence among the individuals within a polity. When political rights the rights embodied in the idea of political equality are exercised through the electoral choices that citizens make, they confer authority on governments and legitimize the institutions of democracy while ensuring, at the same time, their resilience, credibility and stability (Ninsin, 2006:187). As such, elections serve as a critical instrument for conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the facilitation of peaceful transfers of power from one political party to another or re-election of same party. This helps to minimize the violence and general state of instability that often characterize undemocratic means of acquiring political power, such as military coups d'état. For elections to produce peace, security and stability, however, the electoral choices of citizen need to be made in a free, fair, credible and violence-free atmosphere. If they are not manipulated, the electoral choices of citizens can also influence the character of public policy to reflect popular will as a preferred-policy bearing candidate or party gets elected into office. In this way, elections can serve as a platform for broadening participation (albeit indirectly) in the governance process while enabling the citizen to shape the forces that govern collective life. In short, elections serve as a

critical mechanism through which citizens can advance their interests. Also, the decisions that citizens make in their choice of leadership are inextricably connected with the demand for accountability (Anebo, 2001). This is most visible when the electorate freely exercises its franchise to renew or terminate the mandate of an incumbent government at the polls while they are central to the process of democratic stability and longevity, elections can also serve as catalysts for armed conflicts and democratic reversals (African Union, 2010). This can happen especially when election candidates fail to play by the rules of the game and rather resort to illegitimate tactics, such as ballot fraud and violence, to obtain electoral advantage. All things considered, elections are about power; more precisely, the acquisition and maintenance of political power. They are, therefore, highly competitive processes that are often characterized by disharmony of interest among key competitors. Electoral competitions are particularly fraught in contexts where the process is abused Ghana is a 'beacon of hope' in Africa for its democratic laurels since it entered into multi party democratic elections in 1992. However, this enterprise have come along with its own effects (positive and negative) including Election related Violence (EU. 2018).

Election related violence has socio-cultural, political and economic consequences on nations if not managed well. These include for example loss of cultural identity; break in family ties; possible economic recession and hunger among others. Even though elections are not desired to end in conflicts and violence, it sometimes does and the ability to deal with it is very crucial to the stability of democracy in a nation. This book deals with how to manage election related violence. It examines the concept of electoral violence and its consequences on society. It also analyses inter and intra party conflicts and further looks at the linkage between politics and violence in Ghana. It looks at the use of abusive language in politics, election observation, gender related violence and the role of the youth in Ghanaian politics. The electoral process in many of Africa's 'new'

democracies has been characterised by violence. However, recent manifestations of electoral violence have assumed an unprecedented magnitude and changing form and character with negative implications for democratic stability and consolidation. This electoral violence in Ghana, with emphasis on its manifestations, causes, implications and possible solutions. It argues that rising electoral violence in Ghana is closely connected with the neo-patrimonial character of the African state, the nature of contestation for power, the weak institutionalisation of democratic architectures, including political parties and electoral management bodies (EMBs), and the fascinating political economy of electoral violence. This is complicated by the absence/paucity of democrats, with democratic mind set, to play the game of politics according to established rules. Worse still, avenues for democratic redress, including the judiciary and civil society, are also deeply implicated in the deepening contradictions of the state. The result is the institutionalisation of the people in the democratisation process. Electoral violence is thus a major source of democratic instability with palpable threats of deconsolidation. These contradictions will have to be redressed to tame the monster



In Ghana, it was recorded that the 2020 voter registration had its share of violence from the registration of eligible voters. Such a simple and constitutional requirement which needed to be conducted in a friendly and peaceful environment rather met with acts of destruction and physical and verbal or physical abuse of political parties' agents, the media people and some other citizens (Ghana Web news, 30<sup>th</sup> July, 2020). In some other instances, there was a clash between surrogates of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) commonly in the traditional Northern, Volta and Ashanti regions (Asmah, 2008; Alhassan, 2008). According to Gyampo (2018), there have been recorded incidents of politicians busing children



under age for registration, the denial of some people to register on some eligibility issues with the intention of avoiding their opponent a political advantage in terms of numbers, acts of intimidation and fear including sporadic gunfire.

In Northern Region for example, it was observed that there were sporadic gunshots by both enthusiasts of the NPP and NDC who destroyed registration centers on the bases of the fairness and integrity of the registration exercise (Akpap, 2019; Alhassan, 2008). This manifested into the voting day where tensions are heightened and in escalated retaliation attacks orchestrated during the voting day by jobless youth both of NPP and NDC youth which regularly involved jobless youth, party macho men and foot soldiers (CDD, 2020). In some cases, land and chieftaincy disputes exacerbate the violence particularly in northern Ghana notably, where supporters of both NDC and NPP realizing their differences and having issues with land or chieftaincy or both tend to develop a feud. It was also established that a political rally that was organized by the NPP in August 2008 and also Ayawaso bye-elections on January 2019, Tachiman general election on December, 2020 for instance, came to a sudden end subsequent to a gunfire incident supposedly to have been arranged and unleashed by supporters of an opponent party (CDD, 2020).and this is no different from the Jirapa municipality where party foot soldiers become the main perpetrators of electoral violence in all elections and also with allegations of chiefs involvement in active politics, the innocent people were inhumanly subject all forms of violent treatment because, they want to satisfied patron-client contractual agreement (Amankwaah,, 2013; Center for Democratic Development [CDD-Ghana] and United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2019).

#### **2.4 Conflict and Electoral Violence Analysis**

In the last decades, we have witnessed an increase of conflicts of different nature all over the globe. From international crises to civil wars, the world is scourged by violence affecting the lives of millions of people





across political globe and putting in serious danger the possibility for societies to recover, develop and flourish has become situational and developmental challenge (UNDP, 2016). Conflict and Electoral violence analysis is a structured process of analysis to understand conflict and electoral violence. It focuses on the conflict *profile*, the *actors*, *financier*, *influencers*, and *conflict engineers* involved and their perspectives, the causes of conflict, electoral violence and the dynamics of how these elements interact among themselves. Conflict involves a clash or struggle between groups who perceive that their needs, goals or strategies are incompatible, mutually exclusive or antagonistic. Conflict can involve contestation around demands, interests, collective memory, emotions, perceptions, values, beliefs, history, culture, behaviours, actions, symbols and power, therefore, Conflict can manifest from micro interactions to macro systems of crisis (EISA, 2020). It is a natural outcome of normal human interaction. Conflict is obviously often powerfully destructive to individuals, organization, institutions, relationships, groups, societies and nations if root cause is not brought to the fore for attention and redressed. However, research and observation show that the expression, process and outcomes associated with conflict may alternately be destructive, constructive or both, in any given social context. (UNDP, 2016).

The Human Needs Theory, grievance-greed and Clientilism argues that conflicts are caused by basic “universal” human needs that are not satisfied. The needs should to be analysed, communicated and satisfied for the conflict to be resolved. The Conflict Transformation<sup>4</sup> approach sees conflicts as destructive or constructive interactions, depending on how conflicts are dealt with or “transformed”. Conflicts and electoral violence are viewed as an interaction of energies to achieve their intentions (UNO, 2015). Emphasis is given on the different perceptions, and the social and cultural context in which reality is constructed (WORLD BANK, 2016). Constructive conflict transformation seeks to empower actors and support recognition between the various international actors, stakeholders, from governments to multilateral and non-governmental organizations, are today committed to end conflicts and electoral violence by intervening directly or indirectly in areas of crisis, but technical approaches to peacebuilding are no longer considered a viable solution. The answer is and must be political and a more transformative approach has to be adopted if we want to achieve sustainable and durable conflict and electoral peace



(WORLD BANK, 2016). This is the priority for the United Nations, AU, ECOWAS, Government, Election Observers, Political Parties and all interested stakeholders in electoral politics to understanding that peace is not just the absence of violence, but the creation of the serene atmosphere of political, social and economic conditions necessary for peace to last is cardinal ingredient (UNDP, 2016).

Quite surprisingly, despite decades of conflict assessments, many of these experiences have not been documented systematically and relevant information is still very much dispersed. This initiative hopes to contribute to better knowledge management of a discipline that has grown unevenly and has often struggled to adapt itself to the rapidly evolving nature of armed electoral conflict (WILKE, A. and MATA R. (2012). The key drivers of electoral conflict have not changed radically in the past decades; control and arrogant use of resources by political power, cultural hegemony, and social exclusion, discrimination against marginalized group and economic marginalization, influencing judicial, legislative and executive to take inordinate decision continue to feature conceivably in different combinations, among the root causes of most electoral conflicts. On the other hand, a change has occurred with respect to the conflict players. Today a much wider spectrum of stakeholders is capable of and keen on resorting to violence to pursue their inordinate objective (EU, 2018). Preserving peace has become more complicated because of an increase in influence of violence, no longer perpetrated exclusively by national security forces and conventional armed oppositions but also by an increasingly wider and assertive range of hybrid actors, such as violent extremists, criminal organizations, political vampires, transnational networks of illicit traffickers and private security companies (WELLENSTEIN, 2002). Their impact is so significant that the violence resulting from these unconventional players exceeds that of many ongoing civil wars, and must be added to the role of revolutionary mass movements, such as the popular uprisings in the Arab region. Given its magnitude, this is a phenomenon that can hardly fit into any traditional political science classification of conflict players. The patterns of social mobilization witnessed in the past few years in the Middle East, North Africa and West Africa are unprecedented and, to date, cannot be fully explained by analysts and experts on the region (UNDP, 2016). Ghana as a state is hailed as a beacon of peace, harmony and haven of exemplary democracy compared to its neighboring countries in the West African Sub-region and in



Africa in general. It has never experienced a violent nationwide civil war involving any two dissident groups, or between dissident groups on the one hand and the state army or state agencies on the other. Also, Ghana has, since 1992, established and maintained a viable democratic rule ushered in by the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution. Since then, the nation has successfully conducted eight mandatory regime change elections, thereby establishing itself as a potentially consolidated democracy in Africa and in the West Africa region, Electoral processes are very important for the successful establishment and sustenance of a democratic electoral government in any country. The weight of the Electoral Commission (EC), as constitutionally mandated is to fashion out cooperation, coordination, consensus building electoral activities with organized, well-accepted electoral process, procedures, rules and regulation, therefore, inability to institute the appropriate processes for the conduct of free and fair multi-party elections which results are acceptable to all stakeholders, will be questionable by the success of democracy in Ghana. The consistent electoral mismanagement and electoral process abuses have led to electoral violence in many parts of the country from 199-2020 general elections. Despite the elections are relatively peaceful and accepted by stakeholders by the sake of the nation's development. Besides, conflicts peak in election years happen when the stakes are high for elections, Political Parties and their supporters try to undo their opponents by all means possible, it behoves, the appropriate system such as court, security, parliament and other institution decisively handle electoral issues disproportionately when the issue brought to their attention for fair justice (Musah Halidu, 2018). These conflicts, though localised and confined, have accompanied every election in Ghana, especially under the Fourth Republic democratic constitution, occurring before, during, and after elections (Aning and Kwaku. 2011). Election-related conflicts usually take the form of threats, intimidation, physical assault, vandalization of electoral materials, as well as the use of hate speeches and incendiary language (Aning and Kwaku, 2011).

In Ghana, election-related violence is caused by lack of adherence to electoral rules and procedures by both political parties and their supporters, as well as officials of the Electoral Commission or their representatives. Sometimes, lack of education and ignorance of electoral laws, procedures and regulations are also causes of electoral violence (Aning and Kwaku, 2011). When individuals get euphoric about their

chances of winning and want to do everything possible to ensure or increase their chances, they deliberately or ignorantly undertake actions that are contrary to the procedures, leading to protests from the opposite side of the political divide, and sometimes physical engagements that turn bloody or deadly as were the cases of numerous electoral violence between two dominant parties general elections (CDD, 2020).

Conflict analysis activities can present and create unique opportunities for profiteers, actors, engineers, interventionist, stakeholders to learn about their counterparts' views and interests, help build trust and empathy, and potentially help identify hidden opportunities for building peaceful and credible electoral system and process in Ghana (EU, 2018).

Conflict analysis processes can also strengthen collaboration between United Nations actors across humanitarian, development, political and security domains, as well as between the United Nations family and external actors. Overall, conflict analysis brings a range of benefits for political parties and democratic electoral development in Ghana, and should continue to be mainstreamed into activities and programmes across all sectors. Actors, interest group, to understand possible solution to conflict, be it independent judicial system, legislature, executive, security services, or alternative dispute resolution to able to adjudicate justice without fear or favour. Conflict analysis processes can effectively help to generate policy dialogue and inform decisions made at the institutional and national levels. Conflict analysis is not merely an internal exercise. The findings of a conflict analysis can profoundly influence national and sectorial processes, development and electoral decision, if the process itself involves mapping out sustained consultative, collaborative, consensus, cooperative, and inclusive mechanism, engaging local political influential, traditional authorities actor, financiers and policymakers, in all spheres of the process, supporting confidence electoral system, capacity and ownership or taking part of the electoral activities by stakeholders, actors, political parties, donors and observers mission this advance the course of multi-party democratic electoral development in Ghana, this will allays fears of suspicion and reduce electoral conflict (WORLD BANK 2015).



## 2.5 Role of Public Institutions in Electoral Violence

Mueller (2008) argued that political leaders mostly deliberately orchestrate violence in order to pursue their political interests. Mebrie (2018) study showed evidence of state sponsored acts of violence on opposition parties in Ethiopia during the aftermath of the 2005 election in the country. His study revealed that state security was used to unleashed disillusionment to the opposition party mainly calculated at targeting of opposition supporters, leaders and their campaign rallies as well as gatherings. According to Hickman (2009) the use of state machinery to instigate election violence in Zimbabwe had been in force since 2000 and was much pronounced in the 2008 election, when the Zimbabwe National African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) invoked historical sentiments and unleashed war veterans on anti-ZANU-PF members. War veterans and the military and police fear accountability that may follow should ZANU-PF loose power to MDC. Thus, electoral Violence was systematically used to close the political space with the thinking of having a control on the outcome of the election and guarantee political power for ZANU-PF (Kurebwa, 2014; Kebonang, 2012).

Uganda presents another classical example of state sponsored electoral violence arising from a culture of violence due to Museveni style of military rule and the militarization of politics in the additional wake of prolong military rule (Bekoe , 2017). The elections of 1962, 1980, 2001, 2006 and 2011 were all marred with widespread violence and intimidation including kidnapping. The 2001, 2006 and 2011 general elections witnessed torture, extrajudicial executions, undiscerning custody, abduction and kidnapping, arrest without warrants, whippings, and personal embarrassment by striping to nakedness, killings, gunfire, bereavement threats and intimidations



of walloping (Bob-miller, 2014). Chasing away voters from polling stations on the grounds that they were foreigners or under age and deliberate destruction of possessions all characterized the elections in 2011 (IFES, 2014). Superficially, the Ugandan state has permitted multi-party politics, the ruling party however does not believe in electoral competition (Foley, 2001). In the work of Hafner-Burton, E.M, S, D Hyde, and R. s. Jablonski, (2013) when they compiled and analyzed elections from 1982 to 2004, it was conspicuously clear that state-sponsored electoral violence was at the peak. This kind of electoral violence is mostly orchestrated by the incumbent government and its associated allies through the foot soldierism, and it is often more noticeable in the situation where the incumbent government is afraid of losing the election because people have the tendency to vote against the government in power during elections (Höglund 2009; Straus & Taylor, 2012). Despite many studies have observed the association of electoral violence by the incumbent government, it is conceivable that the opposition parties also sometimes challenged the status quo particularly where the government in power appeared to put in a plan of cheating the electoral system (Strauss and Taylor, 2012), NPP and NDC for instance challenged legitimacy of former President John Mahama and NDC at Supreme Court in 2016 general elections while NDC also challenged the 2020 Presidential election results declared by Electoral Commission of Ghana. (CDD, 2020)).

Literature has demonstrated the prominence of electoral violence largely from the incumbent government in Africa (Straus and Taylor, 2009; Hilker & Fraser, 2009). It is interesting to know that the wielding of state power by the government in power with the use of the state security apparatus might have benefited from such violence to the ascension of power would most likely pass through the same conduit to retain power. So, it is therefore no news to see the misuse of state security in many African elections which sometimes leads to electoral violence (Omotola, 2010).



Regrettably to say, in many cases the inability of the constitutional bodies charged with responsibility to promote peace and good democracy are themselves weak and incapable of carrying out their mandated roles which affects many developing countries elections (Collier, 2009; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). It is on this yardstick that the losing parties or candidates have always doubted the credibility and integrity of the free, fair and transparent nature of all elections in election violence prone areas (Kuntz and Thompson, 2009; Daxecker 2012). In Kenya, the introduction of multi-party system in 1991 did not affect control by Moi because the emerging parties were too fragmented (Joel, 1993). For the first time however, Moi's grip at the polls was marred by electoral violence in the Rift Valley, Western and Coast provinces orchestrated by state sponsored militias (Biegon, 2009).

The violence was designed to prevent opposition voters from casting their ballots from the polling centers thereby altering substantially the outcome of the election. With that incident, violence was introduced into the electoral politics of Kenya and the process of institutionalization of ethnically induced violence during elections firmly begun (Ayemang, 2012). It was obvious that there was a deliberate intension by government and its non-state allies to manipulate the elections to their favour and this usually develops into two most common types of electoral violence. Intra-systematic violence and anti-systematic violence are the two most common types of election violence observed. The first concerns itself with how violence erupts due to the fragile nature of the electoral system and processes as a result of the weak structures and institutions in place (Taylor and Strauss, 2017). The other basically emanates from the use of state apparatus and non-allied groups in the manifestation of electoral violence (Ryan, 2013). The intentions are usually that, the actions are meant to ensure and enhance the democratic principles and values, some ostensibly, are triggered to destroy the existing peace and tranquility of the country (Newman,



2004). However, these two types of violence have been established to more often come from the incumbent government once the state power is under their custody (Steven and Way, 2010).

In Africa, it has become common for the state sovereign security to be in bed with the incumbent government and unleashed intimidation, terrorization, threat of murder on the opposition political party supporters, candidates or its allies, this is called a direct government suppression (Anderson and Lochery, 2008). The intention of the intra-systemic state violence is primarily meant to win the election. Violence is perpetrated by security forces, agencies within the security machinery, and affiliates of the reigning government.

The proliferation of inciting violence and its association mainly with numerous African countries have not spared Ethiopia of its precarious attributes. The 2005 elections saw the heightening of intimidation, inciting and brutalities meted against the opposition party by state security forces who recklessly abuse the state power to the disadvantage of the minority group of people (UNDP, 2010). According to Sisk (2016) the National security service of Sudan also became a victim of abusing state power as this was evident during the Sudan's 2010 elections where the violent use of state power by the state apparatuses became unconstitutionally unfortunate. Direct state suppression, however, is not the only way that régimes can use violence. The privatization of violence by government in power to the foot soldiers has remained an embedded electoral strategy (Bardall, 2011). They inspired the foot soldiers to cause mayhem and harm to their political rivals then apparently pay some lip-service to the use of vigilantism. The formation of political parties' own internal security has brought about the growing interest of foot soldiers' system among all political parties, but one cannot squarely blame this on the political parties alone because in some





instances the independent state security is not protective of the opposition party and in other cases the government in power recruits its party boys and girls into the state security system. These party boys and girls now clandestinely operate with the face of an independent security but only protective of their kind at the expense of the opposition members (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2014).

The Kenya government in 2007, went on a targeting spree of their political rivals through the use of the national security under the disguise of the explosion of local ethnic tensions through electoral violence (ICG, 2014). The delegation of violence to non-state actors is particularly thought-provoking because it can lead to an emergent formation of armed group power and political influence, sometimes armed groups escape the control of the government and either turn against it or establish their particular sovereignty, even as such a scheme may allow the government to repudiate or complicate its duty (Straus and Taylor, 2012).

Non-state electoral violence come in two distinct variations, the support provided to the foot soldiers and politicians by government is one form of this violence. There are two variants of this form of non-state electoral violence. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Pakistan's Karachi, certain strategies were put in place to restrict the formation of these allies which has a substantial impact of causing instability and therefore central government was restraint from that (UNDP, 2009). The used of foot soldiers who sometimes are known as macho men are generally strongmen and the Philippines also received their share. Notably, these people according to some literatures are industrious as they do all kinds of work for their survival, so they equally help political parties to mobilize resources from their networks to influencing elections through vote-buying. So, it is not surprising to know that they are acknowledged to provide security to their kind



than the state security. The infiltration of the party boys and girls into our national security is of serious concern but the politician supreme interest is to win and retain power through all means possible even if lives would be loss so be it. These actions breed the increasing number of militias and vigilantism groups which are used to provide security for top party faithful'. They are the people often associated with election violence. Hickman (2009) has also supported other study on the targeting of violence on opposition party as the second variant. It is an undeniable fact that the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) government openly supported the formation of youth militias in Cote d'Ivoire to perpetrate violence against ethnic backgrounds (Mbaku, 2015), Similarly, Nigeria groups like the Bakassi Boys were formed and sponsored by individual politicians as well as political parties for purposes of protecting their base and inciting, instilling fear and causing mayhem in elections (Abah and Nwokwu, 2015). The Shiite parties in Iraq were also another clear example where the paramilitary created a system to enhance the manipulation of elections to their advantage. The monetization of elections has made it difficult for political parties to solely fund without the support of their allies. So, these allies are valuable asset to many political parties as they do not only protect and cause tension but also provide funding. However, looking at the nature of these allies, it is therefore a dangerous expedition to lose control to them because the slightest mistake will see a complete state capture. This will lead to the opposition security to resist the take of power from them hence the prevalence of violence (Abah & Nwokwu, 2015).

In Burma/Myanmar in 1990, there was vote related fierceness as the military cruelly repressed the democratic successes of the National League for Democracy (NLD (Raleigh, C, 2016)). In Indonesia and the Philippines, armed forces and security apparatuses under authoritarianisms ostensibly sponsored provocateurs to activate violence that may possibly be a fertile ground for thwarting or retrogressing the consolidation of democracy (Burchard, S, M, 2015). In the worst-

case scenario, the armed forces of the state can hold the state to ransom and launch a coup to assume to the realm of political power, as experienced in Thailand in 2006 (Animashaun, 2015).

Boone and Kriger (2010) showed that the 2000s violence in Cote d'Ivoire convoluted a fragmented state machinery that from time to time was at war with itself. Non-state, pro-government actors may also be endangered by democratization and likewise marshal, frequently in agreement with state privileged few. These occurrences were motivated by the anxiety of elections and their aftermaths (Animashaun, 2015). Electoral violence as a mechanism of altering electoral outcomes through militia gangs is not a strategy deployed predominantly by the opposition or the politically weak as suggested by Collier (2009). Straus and Taylor (2009) in a continent-wide study of African elections concluded that desperate incumbents seeking another term in office are principal perpetrators of violence.

## **2.6 Nature of Electoral Violence**

The nature of electoral violence has been largely underscored by many authors in several conceptualization understandings. These scholars have identified violence in their unique way as either being more or less. This conceptualization was explained by Straus and Taylor (2012) in which they decided to divide violence into three clear levels of severity. That is, the lower level, the second level and the highest level of severity. The lower end violence deals with the stampede of political rallies or campaigns by the state security forces, the stampede caused by party supporters in the streets through fighting, the deliberate closure of opposition media houses including newspapers, the unlawful and flagrant disqualifications of candidates, and the political equalization arrangement through the form of political vindictiveness and victimization of political opponents. The pervasiveness commission of violence, torture, intimidation and harassment





intended to weaken the opponent through assassinations and targeted murders and the “Rambo-style” of rest of political figures fall within the second level of violence (CODEO Report, 2018). Within the spectrum of the highest level of severity, violence actually takes place and lives are lost or impaired in a recurrent manner through the deliberate physical attack of the opponent with the intention of weakening their base and inflicting fear and panic in order to have an advantage over their opponent (Bardall, 2015).

There is documented evidence particularly in the print and electronic media on violence and electoral related violence in the world and some studies have relied exclusively to draw the parameters of measuring severity of electoral violence mostly during political activities and events (Goldsmith, 2015). It can also be differentiated by the length of the event, how extensive the physical damage is and if the event has a resultant effect of harming, maiming or loss of life as events of electoral violence.

In another breadth, election violence has been categorized by Mochtak (2017) as according to severity, but he opined that this violence can be disaggregated even more beyond their severity and of short-term damage, and the magnitude of coordination amongst violence performers. Electoral violence can also be a wild spread and collective violence both explicitly or implicitly use of greater force relative to the arrangement of an election. It is usually hitched by coercion and intimidation, which may lead to physical damage of targeted persons or property state owned or individual or the deliberate imposition of fear and panic on people. This conceptualization has the prospective intent of adding a dimension of organization and planning to the brutality of the violence somewhat than just the perceived impairment or bodily damage (Bekoe, 2010).



The disaggregation between ‘‘incidental’’ and ‘‘strategic’’ violence must be clearly delineated according to Burchard (2015). The author observed that strategic violence has the tendency to occur through an elaborate and extensive plan usually orchestrated by political surrogates. Pre-election violence is primarily meant to influence the voting behaviour, which could be carried out either by discouraging voters from turning out to cast their ballot or coercing them into supporting specific candidates not of their choice. Post-election violence is often for the purpose of protesting an election result or suppressing protests by enthusiasts of the losing party. Experimental works show that pre- and post-election violence do have a penchant of displaying different underlying forces (Gyamera, 2017).

In the work of Straus and Taylor (2012) in sub-Saharan Africa, they observed that election violence are often committed by government in power before the elections due to fear of losing the election. Conversely, they acknowledged post-election violence occurrences as associated with opposition parties and its supporters mostly during election results declaration. Harish and Toha conducted a study in Indonesia concerning electoral violence. It was established that there is a significant relationship between pre-election violence and separatist movements which their history has come further to support this, while post-election violence is associated with ethnic lines which threaten international peace and security. Majority of violence takes place before the election and is perpetrated by officialdom (Taylor et al., 2013).

Pre-election violence mostly take place Three months before the actual election day. In the African setting, violent conflicts, typically at election times, are a common cause of volatility and disruption in economic growth (Bates, 2001; 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, in the period of 1990

and 2007, 19% of the 213 elections that were recorded witnessed an escalating nature of electoral violence (Straus and Taylor, 2009). Electoral fraud, violence, and terrorization of opposition followers, opposition aspirants, and journalists risk torment, Rambo style arrest, and political incarceration on the bases of political vindictiveness (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014).

The context and nature of electoral violence reflect in different forms. This range from assault to murder of opponents, wanton destruction of property, arson, threats to violence, disruption of political campaigns, hooliganism and fighting. These forms can be scaled up to reflect the degree of determination to influence election outcomes and organizational capacity of the perpetrator especially the perceived relationship to the state (Brady, Johnston and Sides, 2006). The build up to election violence may be low scale but once election day (s) are approaching again depending on the strength of the opponent and chances of victory, forms of violence may be scaled up and range and regularity accelerated. At this point bombings or widespread thuggery can be orchestrated to disrupt well attended campaign rallies (Chaturvedi, 2005). Here, hijacking, kidnaping and even assassination of candidates and suspected financiers and backers of a given candidates can be undertaken. Considerable number of the electoral violence experienced by women is psychological in nature which is terrorization and provocation (Brancati, D, and J. Snyder, 2013). Despite the fact that women suffer psychological violence at homes in the form of domestic violence, they also become victims of electoral violence which make them more vulnerable and susceptible to electoral violence (Ouedraogo and Ouedraogo, 2019).

In a typical African parlance where men are seen as the head and decision makers of the family, their decision is self-imposing and influences the decision of the wife and therefore women are forced to vote in a certain pattern and refusal has led to many spousal challenges including





divorces, rejections from their marital house, inciting the family against her (Christensen, M. M. and M. Utas, 2008) Commonly, parents instruct their children to vote in a way for political motives particularly those from political homes, the influence of their parents is irresistible. Putatively, women and children are usually in the disadvantage group during elections (Bardall, 2011). Psychological intimidation is seen as a political manipulation tool that is often associated with men against women in circumstances of power disproportions and control in domestic arrangements. In Bangladesh, this kind of political manipulation tool is meant to prevent women's political involvement and it has become very pervasive as women have to undergo this in each political cycle. The resultant effect is the fact that women are relegated to the background their voting do not reflect their preference (Caprioli, 2005).

Electoral violence has a stimulating effect primarily during presidential elections mostly in new democracies and of recurrent nature (Bekoe 2012; Straus and Taylor, 2012). The development of multi-party democracies in 1993 particularly in Ghana and for that matter the African continent as oxygen of democracy regrettably has come with its attendant consequences of fear and war mongering and destabilizing the democracy (EISA 2010; Bekoe 2012). A report by a body responsible for electoral violence statistics; the African Electoral Violence Dataset (AEVD), had a compilation of data set from 1990 to 2008 where it was observed that 20 percent of electoral contests in the continent have been marred with electoral disillusionment among war mongering (Straus and Taylor 2012). It is again recorded that an overwhelming 60 percent of African countries who operated a multi-party system of governance have their elections punctuated with a significant number of electoral violence in the year 2011 alone (Bekoe, 2012). Usually, perpetrators of electoral violence often more than not have their intended targets. It could be voters, political



parties' candidates, electoral observers, as well as journalistic establishments, it could also be objects, where ballot boxes, campaign materials and ballot papers are damaged (Höglund 2009; UNDP 2020). Intended target could equally be places with the abusive intention of damaging political party offices, polling centres and closing down of local information centre by the opposing parties (GPS Election Report, 2020).

The manifestation of electoral violence and the forms in which it comes with has been extensively examined. The application of bodily violence and targeted murders have been identified to constitute the tertiary level, Intimidation, torture, harassment have also be looked at as within the space of the second level. Besides, the backward Rambo style of rest, belligerence of voters, closure of opposition newspapers, stampeding of campaign or electoral materials or any act that anticipates to impede the participation of the opposition or a specific constituency can be considered as the lower level and are election-motivated violence (Straus and Taylor 2012; Bekoe 2012). Conceivably, electoral violence is an all-encompassing strategy that contains coercion, intimidation of voters and candidates, and or obstruction of public engagement, hence thwarting the oasis of peace and good governance. Finally, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus (2013) agreed with the other authors that majority of the violence is punctuated by officialdoms of the incumbent particularly when seeking re-election in Sub-Saharan Africa and it is mostly intense leading into the elections. The authors also found a distinguishable variation in the pre and post-election violence, where they alluded that the nature of financing of elections contribute to pre-election conflict and commonly known as pre-vote violence, while the stability of democratic establishments and fragile economic progress form post vote violence.



## 2.7 Forms of Electoral Violence

Staniland (2014) observes that election violence can be categorized into four broad thematic areas which are; Sexual, economic, direct physical violence and social-psychological election violence. It has been observed that voters, electoral officials, candidates, political aspirants particularly those seeking nomination, political party members and leaders, journalists, individuals engaged in civic and voter education and electoral security providers are usually the common victims of all the forms of electoral violence. This is mainly due to their relative roles and responsibilities that come with the profession or by rights. They are sometimes targeted at and oppressed violently to obstruct their participation in the process (Ballington et al., 2015). According to Albert (2007) electoral violence could be defined as a well-orchestrated plan intended to abuse physically, psychologically and structurally through hurting, peddling falsehood, intimidation, character assassination, either before, during or after an election with the hope to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process (Albert, 2007).

Given this grand objective, electoral violence occurs in multi-faceted ways it could be at the election time, or during the counting of the ballot, or even before the elections or just into the elections or after the election. Electoral violence could also occur after declaration of results. Anifowose (1982) in a more elaborate manner defined electoral violence as when an individual or group have a malice plan to physically visit torture, abuse, or threat with the use of a political system on opponent supporters, individuals or groups, through the intention to cause injury or death to persons, damage or destruction to property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstance, implementation, and effects have political implications, that have a tendency to adjust or change the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement for the political system. Tamuno (1991) placed electoral violence into two categories, pre-electoral





violence and the post-electoral violence. The former arises when the electoral laws that become the rules of engagement seem to be flawed and in support of a particular political party or candidature. It could also occur when the referees of the game are in bed with the opponent party and deliberate manipulations are in place to cheat the system for a particular candidate; this candidate becomes overly ambitious and influences their supporters to riot when the signals are not favouring them. The latter on the other hand most likely may tend to be impulsive. It could be plotted by individuals or group of individuals who had the perception of being cheated, alienated or disadvantaged by the injustice of the electoral process. This alienation may be real or alleged. Afolabi (2007) contends that the main aim of such violence aside seeking redress through illegal means is also to destroy the credibility of the election, if we cannot have it, then its cannot be accepted as credible. The Jirapa municipality appeared to have witnessed some form of electoral violence through intimidations, physical abuse of people, closing down of local information centre and psychological attacks. The victims usually are; the supporters of the political parties, innocent voters, candidates of the elections, Journalist, electoral officers and women including children. The main reason why people involved in these activities is basically to delay the electoral process, or to influence the elections or in support of a preferred candidate (GPS Report on Election, 2020).

### **2.7.1 Physical Violence**

According to the Ghana Police Service Election Report (2020), out of 105 hotspot violent cases 35 cases of electoral violence were recorded in the Jirapa municipality in the 2020 elections as the highest in the Upper West Region and majority of these violence were physical violence. Physical violence causes direct physical harm to a person relative to their participation in an electoral process, and or bodily harm to a proxy (child, family member, relatives etc.). Forms of physical



violence include walloping and attack; inciting, manslaughter, murder or attempted murder; abduction or attempted abduction; grenade attacks; gunfire, stabbing, armed or unarmed battery and mugging; fierce dispersal of protests and public gatherings including mass rape; obliteration or destruction of property; political or arbitrary, arrest or detention/imprisonment, excessive use of force, cruelty and maltreatment of prisoners by police and intelligence agencies including virginity tests and sexual exploitation; domestic violence and child abuse, and all other action resulting in physical abuse (Burchard S, M, 2015). Physical violence is the commonest of the form used by perpetrators in the political arena (Staniland, 2014). Physical electoral violence according to Albert (2007) include the kind of physical assaults politicians or their enthusiastic followers perpetrates on one another at party rallies and activities, during political campaigns, during elections and when election results are declared most of which lead to loss of lives. Realistically, the most prominent and noticeable form of violence, physical violence has remained a repeated theme in general elections across the African continent and most part of the globe including developed countries. For instance, Orji and Uzodi (2012) argued that Nigeria's 2011 presidential election experienced the elevation of bodily violence with more than 800 losses of life alongside possessions that were demolished largely in the central northern states.

### **2.7.2 Social-Psychological Violence**

Social-psychological violence comes in the form of inflicting fear and causing harm on the victims as punishment for their behaviour or to coerce their behaviour. It comes in many forms but notably are; character assassination, family pressure, social sanctions and punishment and psychological intimidation. It may perhaps be perpetrated on its own, or in connection with another form of violence. Convincingly, women are the most vulnerable in society thus their experience of



psychological violence is the most prevalent form of election violence, accounting for one third of all incidents of violence against women which has a significant impact on their development (Boone, 2011). In the household settings, where major decisions are usually taken by the male dominant relegating women and children to the background political manipulation is an intense form of intimidation largely due to power imbalance. Flagrant disrespect, rejecting, demeaning, terrorizing, isolating, and exploiting in a sustained or repetitive manner are some forms of psychological/emotional abuse. It is a known fact that these forms are prevalent within the domestic context and largely constitute to domestic violence while terrorizing or demeaning may take place openly by public political actors (Kebonang, 2012).

With the occurrence of this, certain mechanisms in the form of social sanctions and punishment were advanced precisely to regulate individual behaviour. These mechanisms are in two folds, formal and informal control measures, the latter viewed systematic ridicule, ostracism, shame, criticism, exclusion, discrimination while the former also examined laws, statutes, regulations against deviant behaviour, all these are control measures put to regulate the behaviour of people. It is documented that election violence within our traditional parlances often takes the form of social and outright condemnation which has dramatically affected women in particular. That is, a community may turn against openly, politically active women who are perceived to break with traditional roles, not only through limits on movement and speech that may be imposed by husbands and male community or religious leaders, but also relegation, exclusion and rejection imposed by older female relatives as well as by other community leaders (Dunning, 2011).

Psychological electoral violence manifest in many forms and ways, and applicable are; how campaign posters are indiscriminately pasted, the use of insulting slogans, terrorization of political



opponents, poor media reportage, abuse of statutory responsibilities by the electoral bodies and institutions. The rest are; the unprofessional nature of the security agencies and the judiciary, uneven accessibility to state media by political parties of varying status, and abuse of office by traditional leaders in terms of inciting the masses to perform their electoral rights against their political will (Alanamu, 2005; Ladan, 2005). Albert (2007) was of the view that violence of these nature explains why there is apathy in elections which affects democracy building in many countries particularly of Africa origin. It therefore become quite a daunting task for many to contest for political position or to throw in their support for a particular political party or declare openly their support for a political candidate in an election for fear of intimidation and victimization. In furtherance of this, voters are denied their inalienable constitutional and fundamental human rights to vote as the heavy presence of armed security officers at various polling stations affect them psychologically. So, they recoiled to their abodes for fear of victimization which the Jirapa municipality elections have seen similar occurrences due to the volatile nature of elections. The problematic nature of electoral psychological violence becomes phenomenal, according to Albert (2007) the political parties do not trust officers of the Electoral Commission, the judiciary, the media and the security to ensure the sanctity of the elections as well as the safety and security of the voters which has a destabilizing effect among women, children and the electorates which is of significant concerned where Jirapa happened to be a victim.

Family pressure has also been identified as a form of intimidation in which force is used to prevent some family members from participating in elections. It could be the husband or parents' pressure imposed on the family member their choice of political party or candidate in an election, a deliberate exclusion of some people to vote in elections or contest elections, refusal of relatives to watch over children for women to cast their ballot, family or society sanction or rejection for a

woman candidate or aspirant (Freedom House, 2010). Igbuzor (2010) study of controlled voting observed that, the predominant control of women and children decision on their choices of vote by male household heads and split voting refers to the deliberate allocation of a family's vote across two or more political candidates highlights the coercive nature and demonstrates instances like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Gabon, Guatemala, India, Israeli Bedouins including Macedonia, Niger, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Uganda. It was noted that in these cases, "the ballot cast is not a manifestation of the controlled voter's choice. In fact, vote control is regularly accompanied by violence or threats of violence. Women from various parts of the world, for instance, have been assaulted, divorced or murdered for flouting their husbands' electoral instructions (Freedom House, 2010).

### **2.7.3 Sexual Violence**

Electoral violence is also associated with sexual abuse where women and young females are tortured sexually. Politically-motivated rape committed by people is often meant to traumatize and intimidate their targeted victims. Additionally, some men also engage in marital rape as a tool of repression when the wife disobeys their instructions. All forms of sexual harassment, assault and abuse are meted out with the intention of controlling, intimidating, humiliating and disenfranchising the victim. It might come in the form of both a physical attack and/or a psychological assault. It may be committed by party supporters, foot soldiers or strangers unknown to the environment and sometimes it could be in public position or also by domestic partners and members of the victims' family or community known to the victim (Freedom House, 2010).



It has also been established that sexual abuses and rape in which women and young females were the majority of victims in Bosnia, Uganda, Burma and the Democratic Republic of Congo have confirmed that rape can be a tool of political violence that not only suppresses political action, but also suppresses, disgraces and embarrasses the political actor. It is not to justify the fact that Rape is mainly associated with electoral violence but in non-conflict states, with instances like Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 also experienced mass rape among women and young females (Human Rights Watch, 2014). There appeared to be a literature gap where it is under documented on sexual abuse committed by some public actors, unfortunately it is woefully researched on private abuse for political or electoral purposes as there is a non-existence of documented literature. It is therefore underscored how rape as political intimidation and dissuasion has a significant effects specifically on gender through political molestation during an electoral process (Democracy Digest, 2011).

#### **2.7.4 Economic Violence**

Economic violence manifests in all forms and affects all facets of human life, of significant concern is the employer and employee relationship where the employer sometimes cause economic distress to the employee due to reasons of divergence in political ideologies. It is also observed that this practice is common among public institutions as well as heads of state organizations who usually attack suspected members of a political party. In some cases these employees are forced to either resign or being dismissed from the position they hold particularly during change of government. These acts are committed with the intention to influence voting or political behaviour as intimidation and victimization becomes the order of the day. These acts occur in the home, and they excessively affect women, not only within the patriarchal societies but



also in the traditional common parlance, it is experienced in all societies where men principally are in charge of household financial resources. The commonalities in such societies are that women are enemies to themselves and rival their colleagues where they sometimes espoused the actions and inactions of some male population in the society against other women particularly the younger ones through elopement, betrothal and many others. Even when it comes to household and domestic responsibilities the younger women face all kinds of violence.

Economic violence comprises damage or threats to harm a business, termination or threat of termination of employment, or other threats or theft related to one's source of livelihood. In families or between spouses, it may consist of circumstances where one member or spouse partner deliberately repudiates access to financial resources to another to impose dependence and coercion her or his electoral choices and/or participation. It could include theft, avoiding a spouse from acquiring resources, compulsorily preventive of spouse's spending on essential goods, creating debts or spending a spouse's resources without his or her permission, preventing a spouse from employment or seeking employment or education or access to assets (Adams et al, 2008).

### **2.7.5 Structural Violence**

Structural violence is embedded in the structure of society that is it is inherently and indirectly linked as part of the society and has been identified as another dimension of electoral conflict. According to Albert (2007) he observed that structural electoral violence occurs through the discrimination of social groups. The discrimination comes in many forms which could be on gender, religious differences or even ethnic differences where the excludability of these groups is done on the bases of access to some opportunities that come with the support for a particular political party or community. This activates the Clientelism system in elections where some crop of people would like to destroy the elections to the advantage of their ideological party because of



the enormous benefits that winning an election comes with. Structural electoral violence in a simpler conceptualization concerns exclusionary or discriminatory strategies, procedure and practice prevalent in the electoral process. Aside these, the rising fees one must pay to obtain a nomination form to contest an election, coupled with the cost associated with endorsement of the nomination form by the party's support and the overall cost of running an effective campaign is a clear knock-out strategy imposed for the privilege few to contest. In effect, the inherent monetization of politics discourages some opinioned, qualified and interested people with good foresight and vision for the forward-match of the country and therefore stifles good democracy practices.

Other forms of structural electoral violence comprise the logistic challenges oftentimes intentionally planned into the electoral process with the intent to circumvent the rules and undermine the will of the people. Through the vigorous involvement of some politicians, officials of the electoral management body and security agencies. Another instance of structural electoral violence is the attempt to purposefully create challenges in the electoral process such as padding the voters register with nonexistent names usually at their strong holds with the objective of attaining pre-determined outcome (Molomo, 2006). These are some of the reasons why the Jirapa municipality records the highest electoral violence in the region largely because the integrity of the electoral body is seriously impaired as political parties are always quick to attack the integrity of the Electoral Commission with all sorts of allegations mostly from the opposition parties.

## **2.8 Factors Fueling Electoral Violence**

Straus and Taylor (2012) have fashioned out a data system on electoral violence that occurred from 1990 to 2008 in sub-Saharan Africa. In their first analysis of the data, they found that of the 221



elections that were included in the dataset, 42 percent were non-violent, 38 percent produced low levels of violence and 20 percent experienced large-scale violence. These results are consistent throughout the time period examined, even though the level of democracy has risen steadily since 1990. Furthermore, they observed that a greater number of violence occurs usually before the elections and that most violence is perpetrated by the incumbent government and their surrogates (Straus & Taylor, 2012). They argued that the variation between different countries and different elections, is not fully comprehended and that a critical next step is to examine this variation; why some elections cause violence whilst others do not. This brought to the existence of another gap in literature. This is examined by Daxecker (2012), debatably claims that elections where election fraud and international election monitoring is present, such elections are very likely to produce electoral violence.

Hafner-Burton et al (2014), on the other hand, examined what causes incumbents to use violence as an electoral strategy. They argued that the bigger the risk of the incumbent losing power, the bigger risk is it that he or she will resort to pre-election disturbances since it upsurges the incumbent's government chance of winning. Kurebwa (2014) outlined a few structural conditions, under which electoral violence is more common. Additionally, they examined how certain characteristics of the elections themselves affect the risk of electoral violence. Fjelde and Höglund (2016) in their study were able to observe that the practice of Clientelism which is a form of majoritarian where the political parties are interested in maintaining the status quo when in power is a significant cause of electoral violence. The authors argued that the practice of the kind of political system with the winner-takes-all syndrome has actually brought about the high stakes in every election as state power is captured and dispensed by only the government in power and

nothing more, this precludes the inclusive government and therefore the rising tensions in elections.

Fischer (2002) provides five means in which electoral violence can take place. These are; Identity conflict refers to individuals or group of people or migrants or refugees who have suffered a certain condition and are unable to substantiate their identities, these people oftentimes are prevented from registering to participate in an election and can be a leading cause to electoral violence. The confiscation of documents from the ethnic-Albanian refugees escaping from Kosovo through “identity cleansing” in very recent times is a clear example of identity conflict. Identity conflict does not only disfranchise the person from political participation but the lack of regard and utmost disrespect of the rights of these people are all precursors to electoral violence. Aside this, electoral conflict can also arise when political parties’ campaigns are stamped by opponent political parties’ supporters and the use of vulgar and profane language among intimidations, threats and physical abuse (Quedraogo and Quedraogo, 2019). It is recorded particularly in the 2001 electoral survey that political parties’ rivalry is rampant and the most common form of electoral conflict. Balloting conflict is yet another form of electoral conflict where there is disagreement between the candidates which feeds into the main body of election violence thereby escalating the electoral conflict. The repercussions of these conflicts are always dire to the community and the nation, so it is therefore imperative for significant steps to be taken to address these electoral challenges where balloting could be done in a very transparent manner devoid of cheatings and all interested parties’ assent to it and move on (Hyde & Marinov, 2012). Conflict can again spike during results declaration particularly where the candidates feel cheated at some polling stations and contest the results of those polling stations. Usually, the legal processes and procedures delineate how such issues could be addressed unfortunately the slow pace of the justice system coupled with the





practice of Clientelism sometimes cloud the timely, transparent and fair justice dispensation. Additionally, conflict can arise through the manner in which election results are being reported either by the electoral officers or a journalistic report where the occurrence of deliberate changing of figures are churned out. Lastly, representation conflict is another form of conflict that can occur on the basis of the winner-takes-all syndrome where losers of an election feel aggrieved and realizing their inability to participate in the leisure of the country. These people often feel left out and hence their non-participation in government and some few elites are usually appointed to government positions (Aning, 2001; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Bekoe, 2012).

Hafner-Burton et al. (2014), similarly observed the incumbent government is always afraid of losing political power to its opponent and the opposition party is also interested in changing the status quo where they usually campaign on the premise of “Change”. That fear by the incumbent and also on the access to state resources makes elections very competitive and highly volatile. Again, Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) believed that election violence is a political tactic employed to win election. Often than not, the incumbent government on losing the elections might not be mainly responsible for causing violence but the Clientelism kind of political system in place is principally behind some of the electoral disturbances occasioned in many elections. The penchant for the practice of the majoritarian rule by the incumbent government leads to the fear of losing elections thus, the rising cause of conflict which marred all elections (UNDP 2020). The capricious drives by the government in power as they practice of the winner-takes-all becomes the order of the day; it has an impact on how elections are fiercely fought due to the thirst for political power (UNDP, 2018). On the contrary, losing an election by the incumbent government to the opposition with its inherent effects make it more elusive for the incumbent to accept the election results when



not in their favour (UNDP< 2020). The total neglect for an all-inclusive governance at the expense of the Clientelism kind of political system continue to promote electoral violence as the incumbent government on losing an election completely loses everything to a different government (CDD, 2021). This has a devastating effect on the political party structures as the new appointing authority would not appoint people from the other divide which has a dire consequence on the socio-economic development of the country where experienced hands are relegated to the background and party apparanchiks get appointed to top notch positions (Reilly, 2002). In opposition too, the longing for power associated with the non-access to the resources of the country fuels bitterness, hatred, envy, and name calling. This would lead to electoral conflict as the next election is meant to change the status quo for the opposition and to be reelected for the incumbent, the cascading effect obviously will be the propagation of violence, tensions and conflict (Birch, 2007).

The practice of the majoritarian rule irredeemably has a resultant effect where political parties are more interested in manipulating the elections to their advantage because power is concentrated at one hand leaving the other hand in penury (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). Moreover, political parties in proportional representative system are able to name and shame culprits of electoral violence and prescribed certain modicum of punitive measures to serve as deterrence (Taylor,c and Straus, S 2017). The feeling is that, the perpetration of electoral tensions is largely associated with the incumbent government due to fear of losing elections and so the image of the government would be marred and therefore they government's commitment to admonish and punish offenders of these crimes is not mundane an example could be that of the case of Malam Issah in Ghana (Birch, 2007). Electoral violence in Africa can be attributed to military takeover after independence (Genyi, 2013). Been entrenched due to decades of military rule in Africa. The use of military

language of “capture”, “defeat” and “take over” by politicians against opponents is evidence of this militarization of African democratic politics. Military regimes in Africa that opposed political reforms but were pressured into introducing transitions to democratic programs sponsored violence to justify slow pace of transition and then buy more time to remain in power. According to Khadiagala (2010) electoral violence may occur by leaning on elections as a platform to manifest underlying and societal issues especially in plural societies. Hence, he underscored three central causative factors to electoral vehemence to include “socio-economic decisions, regimes without a stake in political change, and weak institutions and institutional rules governing competitive elections.”

Poverty has unfailingly been acknowledged as a disrupting factor in the existing literature on electoral fierceness (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). According to recent study, other factors that cause electoral violence in developing countries are greed, electoral abuse and corruption of electoral practices or processes, thuggery and abuse of power. Election campaign is associated with thuggery, fake promises, deceit, insults, confrontations and intimidation which fuels pre-election and post-election tensions in the developing world (Ehinmore and Ehiabhi, 2013). The Spread of falsehood and the use of incendiary messages about an election can easily breeds violence as people buy into the falsehood information either on the outcomes of the election or the entire electoral process and commit crimes as the case of Nigeria’s 2011 elections (Harwood & Campbell, 2010; Ofili, 2011). Illiteracy and public lack of knowledge on elections and its purpose also contribute to election violence in the developing countries (Abah and Nwokwu, 2015). Kirimi and Njuguna (2014) revealed that the high number of unemployed youths in most African countries serve as a fertile ground for election violence since these unemployed youth are mostly used to cause mayhem. Undoubtedly, the unemployed youth who have no livelihood packages

remained reliant on the politician to provide for them, so they become vulnerable and susceptible to the dictates of their pay master who obviously are seen as the provider of their livelihoods. In the Jirapa municipality, there are a number of unemployed youth and they often than not appeal to the politicians for sustainable jobs as a result, they unscrupulous ones used these boys for their political gains (Laakso, 2007).

## **2.9 Implications of Election Violence**

The passion to remain in power by the incumbent government strategized to ensure being retained at all cost. They do this by perpetrating violence to scare off voters from coming out in their numbers to cast their ballot on elections day particularly when it is their opponent strong hold. They also sometimes use force and intimidation towards opposition voters to cast the ballot in their favour. In the incumbent strong hold, they are often likely to have exceeded the total registered voters as ballot papers are thump printed and stuffed in the ballot box and sometimes too voters unwittingly prefer to abstain into turning out to vote for the incumbent (Adesote and Abimbola, 2014). These strategies that favour the incumbent government and those that affects the opposition party leads to electoral fraud as they also involved by pouching the managers of the elections to their side (Lehoucq, 2003; Adesote and Abimbola, 2014). The consequences of electoral violence are destructive as it affects the relative peace, tranquility and stability of the country as well as how marred the democracy of the country would appear to the local and international communities (Birch and Muchlinski, 2017). It stifles political participation whereby some candidates are unlawfully disqualified to participate in the elections due to fear of losing the elections by the incumbent government and sometimes the used of the party foot soldiers to stampede political







opponent campaigns and rallies make voters not to participate in decision making through the electoral process.

Voters sometimes feel doubtful to openly back the candidature of a certain political party; candidates, on the other hand, might feel endangered to run for elections. Emotionally, citizens who experience recurrent or intense electoral violence may view democratization in a less favorable light Bekoe (2012) which can create an atmosphere of annoyance with egalitarianism which is gradually being witnessed in Ghana. Thus, efficient apparatuses to avert and alleviate electoral violence are an essential step towards the consolidation of sustainable democratic administrations. Elections that witnessed a high prevalence of violence can suffer little voter turnout, lesser registration, and resignation of candidates, which indirectly impact the all-inclusiveness and representativeness of the polls and, subsequently, the lawfulness of the democratic administration. When it comes to security repercussions, electoral violence can deepen social and political divergences, prompting conflicts and opening space for revolutionary ideologies (Höglund, 2009). Bratton (2008) contends that election violence is connected with a decrease in voter turnout, especially among doubtful voters who are yet to decide how to cast their ballot which is a clear indication of the Jirapa municipality elections with increasing voter apathy.

Undecided voters are the most sensitive to political disturbances, they are the only group who will abstain from voting in the occurrence of fierceness even if they do not show a bigger personal fear of violence (Wallsworth, 2015). Specific targeting of violence is a potentially effective approach to cause nonparticipation, nevertheless the fear of being targeted for political affiliation by the political opponent can discourage the interest of voters to cast their ballot. Wallsworth (2015) further revealed that people who belonged to the minority political groups and shared the same ethnic background are many a time specifically targeted at during electoral violence (Wallsworth,



2015). Various empirical studies exist on the impact of election violence. Hickman (2009) examined how electoral violence had a negative impact on voter turnout and election results in Sri Lanka and discovered that violence committed by people connected to one political party, warranted a decrease in voter turnout for the opposition in that constituency. The author further argued that although the impact was insignificant and did not change the election results, the use of tensions marred the credibility of the election. Empirically, Bratton (2008); Collier and Vicente (2014) provided the greatest resounding causal confirmation of the impact of violence on political participation.

Bratton (2008) used dissimilarity in experience to violence in Uganda, which he argued to be exogenous, to approximate the effect of that experience on political involvement. He contends that a person's experience in election violence over a sustained period of time has the tendency to influence the person's decision to be more involved in political activities and events. In the work of Collier and Vicente (2014), they used random placement of anti-violence campaigns during the 2007 Nigerian election to examine exogenous variation. It was obvious that election violence was identified in their campaign which was in the regions of implementation, violence was also underscored as having a causal effect negatively on voter turnout. The type of violence each group was exposed to have the likelihood to do with how two studies are carried out, both with plausibly exogenous variation, can come completely opposite conclusions.

In Bratton (2008), the author influences the random nature in which young Ugandans were kidnapped and forced to join the rebel group. They found this past exposure to violence escalations in political participation. In Collier and Vicente (2014), the violence is greater during the election



campaign, and they found it declines voter turnout. There appeared to be a significant difference that could be explained by differential long and short run effects. As a result of the experienced of electoral violence by an individual, it is argued that such individual become more interested in political activities and events on the long run, while, it may make the act of voting far too dangerous or costly to be worth participating in the short run. In post-conflict elections, voters frequently decide to practice the inadequate power of their franchise either to conciliate the greatest dominant group in the hope that this will prevent a return to war or to select the most patriotic and opinionated candidate who convincingly pledges to protect the voter's community. Outside observers often regard these leaders as warlords or war criminals (Boone, 2009). But to vulnerable voters they are seen either as powerful protectors capable of protecting the voter from opponent forces or as intimidators to be conciliated in order to prevent a return to the violence that they loomed to unleash if they lose (Ryan, J 2013). Civilian aspirants and those who do not have a convincing answer to the issue of post-election security are improbable to triumph (Lyons, 2004).

Alfa and Otaida (2012) in a study discovered that, violence dwindled exports mostly through employees' absenteeism and had heterogeneous effects. The authors further argued that firms with direct contractual associations in export markets and members of the business association had advanced incentives and lesser costs of responding to the violence and suffered reduced production and workers losses. According to Abah and Nwokwu (2015), election violence affects peaceful coexistence, law and order. In addition to security concerns, election violence affects the consolidation of democracy and social coexistence. This in turn influence on the social and economic well-being of the nation and causes inequalities in social relations (Bekoe, 2010; Aver, Nnorom, & Targba, 2013). Election violence brings complex set of events such as poverty, ethnic

or religious grievances which affect the social relationship of the people in the society. Political violence manifest in acrimony, assault, assassination, intimidation, harassment, maiming and killing, consequently these affect the existing social relationship in the society (Aver et al., 2013). The political violence is an ill wind of social phenomenon, which blows no one any good. In its aftermaths both its wrongdoers and victims are losers (Aver et al., 2013). There is no substitute to election violence without hostility (Aver et al. 2013).

## **2.10 Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework has been clearly discussed under the Clientelism theory which underpinned the study.

### **2.9.1 Clientelism**

Clientelism is an informal political institution, consisting of interpersonal relationships and exchanges between patrons and their clients (Van de Walle, 2003). Clientelism as a system allows a patron to buy the support of his or her clients by providing various forms of patronage to the clients (section of the citizens/electorates). It means that the patron invests resources to keep the loyalty and support needed to remain in power or to gain further power, and that his clients are dependent on him to remain in power, in order to secure the patronage, they have gained (Hyden, 2013). Being influenced by the various benefits which may include position given to kinsmen or persons based on tribal lines, land redistribution, contracts, political as well as governmental positions among others, the clients may use violence as a strategy to make sure that their patron stay unto power.



Various studies have identified Clientelism as the main cause of electoral conflicts in Africa. An illustration by Boone and Krieger (2012) examined the sources of electoral violence in Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe and argued that incumbent government used land rights as patronage to marshal support in communities they risked losing. They used the discriminatory apportionment of land, like the discriminating sharing out of government positions, to offer benefits to potential voters in exchange for political backing. In both cases, government officials and pro-government militias used violence to make the land transfer a reality. In some instances, the patrons do not even instruct their clients to use violence but the clients knowing the danger of the patron losing the election resort to it. Boone and Krieger (2012) argued that the conditions which allow for this tactic, are found in many African countries. Mueller (2012) also asserted that the pervasive nature of Clientelism in our electoral system triggered electoral violence in Kenya elections from 1992 to 2007.

In the case of Ghana, Clientelism has become very prevalent and 'lucrative' for the few who are always willing and ready to support the course of their so-called big men. The introduction of foot soldiers has gained notoriety in more recent times where there is change of government and foot soldiers drive out some workers of public institutions like the National Health Insurance Authority [NHIA], National Youth Employment Programmed [NYEP] and among seizing public toilets (Van de Walle, 2003). Clientelism is well manifested particularly during the parliamentary primaries of both political parties (NDC and NPP) where the sitting member of parliament doled out gifts and money to the voters to ensure his/her being reelected. Similarly, the confirmation of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives [MMDCEs] has seen the distribution of items like flat screen television sets, motorbikes and giving out of envelopes among others for a good confirmation from the assembly members mostly from people from the same political party.


This has been the prominence of electoral violence in Jirapa coupled with the unemployed nature of the youth (CDD, 2020).

Taylor et al (2013) argued that since electoral violence is particularly a costly strategy to use in elections, it will only be employed if the stakes of the election are particularly high. This study also argues in the same manner that Clientelism will lead to violence in elections where the cost for losing is much higher than resorting to violence like the case of Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Ghana. This is because a lot of people have been dependent on a certain outcome in elections to secure the positions, they held in states with strong Clientelist institutions. This study also argues that the risk of both pre- and post-election violence will increase in highly competitive elections, since violence can be used before, during and after elections to affect the outcome of the results.

Figure 1.1 The Conceptual Framework



2.9.2 Conceptual Framework





From the Figure 1.1 above, the primary risk factors are the high risk of incumbent losing an election, the majoritarian election rules, high youth unemployment and weak state institution including mistrust of state institutions. The underlying factor has to do with Clientelism, the modes of violence are; physical, psychological and structural. Its outcomes are; political manipulation, voter apathy, integrity of election results, loss of life or property and retards development. In every election, before an electoral violence would spike there must be an incumbent government seeking reelection and wants to win the election at all cost and so therefore, they recruit the youth and other interesting parties in the form of Clientelism due to the weak status of the electoral bodies and institutions. Clientelism will contribute to the mistrust of state institutions as the electoral institutions also appear weak and where opposition parties have mistrust for election officials. Clientelism becomes conspicuous in a competitive election as the patrons promised more of the people to support their agenda by ensuring a reelection by hook or by crook. The resultant effect will be physical, psychological and structural violence as depicted in the diagram above.

The outcomes obviously will be political manipulation, where both political parties would want to outsmart each other and the weak nature of the electoral institutions would influence the promotion of violence. Again, as political manipulation is becoming pervasive and leading to conflicts, many voters will not patronize the elections thereby setting voter apathy which would also lead to the integrity of the election results seriously impaired. In many instances these results into loss of life and the destruction of public and private property. Ultimately the name of the constituency will be marred and it retards development.



## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

The research examines Multi-party Electoral Violence and Democratic Development in the Jirapa Municipality. This chapter presents the profile of the Municipality followed by the research design, target population, sample frame and sampling technique, the instrument of the study, data collection procedure, data processing and analysis, validity and reliability of the research instruments all have been discussed here.

#### 3.2 Profile of Jirapa Municipality

The Jirapa Municipality is located at the north western corner of the Upper West Region of Ghana and lies approximately between latitudes 10.25<sup>0</sup> and 11.00<sup>0</sup> North and longitudes 20.25<sup>0</sup> and 20.40<sup>0</sup> West with a territorial size of 1,188.6 square kilometers representing 6.4 percent of the regional landmass (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Jirapa Municipal is bordered to the south by the Nadowli-Kaleo District, to the north by the Lambussie district, to the east by the Lawra District and to the east by the Sissala West District. The district capital, Jirapa, is 62 km<sup>2</sup> away from Wa, the Regional capital.

According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2010), as at 2010 the Jirapa Municipality had a population of 88,402 representing 12.6 percent of the region's total population. Males constituted 47 percent whereas females represented 53 percent. About 85.6 percent of the population lived in rural localities. The municipality has a very youthful population with the total age dependency ratio been 99.0. With youth unemployment rate high, the Municipality may not stand a chance




should election violence erupt in the Municipality. Majority of the inhabitants (about 45 percent) in the Municipality aged 11 years and above are none-literates (GSS, 2010).

The economy of the Municipality is largely agrarian with about 83 percent of the populace engaged in agriculture with the majority been subsistence crop farming (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014).

The political administration of the Municipality is made up of the Municipal Assembly which consists of a secretariat headed by the Municipal Chief Executive as the political head and the Municipal Co-ordinating Director as the administrative head and principal advisor to the Municipal Chief Executive.

Following the last national Municipal Assembly Elections December, 2019, the Municipal Assembly is made up of 55 members (49 males and 6 females) comprising 37 elected members, 16 government appointees, one Member of Parliament and the Municipal Chief Executive. The sub-committees in the Jirapa Municipal Assembly include; Finance and Administration sub-committee; Development sub-committee; Social service sub-committee; Works sub-committee; Justice/Security Sub-committee and Micro and Small-scale Enterprise Sub-committee. The Jirapa Municipality has one constituency, 37 electoral areas and 137 polling stations, and the voter population of 44717, making the Municipality the highest electoral area in the Upper West Region (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2020). Even though the Municipality is extremely peaceful mainly due to ethnical homogeneity, election violence is common in the Municipality and this may be attributed to the large size of the electoral area, growing population and new settlements, emerging diversity and divergent view of interest groups, (Debrah, Alidu and Owusu-Mensah, 2016). Plate 3.1 shows the Map of the Jirapa Municipality indicating the major settlements.





**Plate 3. 1: Map of the Jirapa Municipality**

**Source: Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2010).**

### 3.3 Research Design

Bhattacharjee (2012) describes research design as a roadmap which guides a researcher to collect and analyze data in social science research. It functions as a “blueprint” for social science research meant to address the specific research questions intended to unravel and must cover the data collection process and procedure, the development of the specific instruments and how the sampling process would be conducted (Bhattacharjee, 2012). Yin (2003) also contends that a research design basically refers to a set of action plans designed to address a certain phenomenon. In simple terms it is an approach that answers the question how to get from here to there where ‘here’ seek to identify the initial plans designed to answer the specific questions and ‘there’ implied what has been ascertained.

Descriptive cross-sectional survey design was adopted for the study with a one-time snapshot of data collection approach. Bhattacharjee (2012), defines descriptive survey as a method of collecting data from respondents through the use of standardized questionnaires or interviews. Descriptive cross-sectional survey designs collect data about respondents’ attitudes, perception, beliefs, knowledge, practices or situations from a sample in a field setting. Descriptive survey aims to generate knowledge claims on realistic grounds, it is problem centered, situational oriented and cross-sectional survey research which offers both qualitative and quantitative description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population. This design was appropriate for the study because cross-sectional data describe and interpret current trend of practices that prevail attitudes and perceptions on the pattern of election violence, causal factors affecting election violence and effects of election violence on political inclusion in the Jirapa Municipality. Descriptive cross-sectional survey was employed because the design offers



opportunity for both texts and numeric data (mixed method) to be collected in a single questionnaire, thereby saving the researcher's time and money.

### **3.4 Research Philosophy**

The Pragmatism research philosophy underpinned the entire research. The chosen research philosophy underpins a mixed method research approach where both quantitative and qualitative in this study are permitted (Birks, 2014). The determination of the research philosophy must be consistent with the adopted research design. It is grounded on the advantages of the pragmatism research philosophy that this research was further aligned to the Descriptive Cross-sectional survey design.

Research philosophy can be defined as a method of beliefs and expectations about the growth of knowledge (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Birks (2014) also explains research philosophy as “a view of the world encompassing the questions and mechanisms for finding answers that inform that view”. Ryan (2018) explains that research philosophy is what the investigator recognizes to be real and the truth. It summarizes the values and beliefs that guide the research design, as well as collection and examination of information.

### **3.5 Target Population**

Target population refers to the participants who meet the specific standards stated for research (Mohsin, 2016; Creswell, 2014). The target population is the participants who meet the set of standards (Creswell, 2009). The target population of the study included all residence in the Jirapa Municipality from 18 years and above who are considered as eligible voters, the officials of the Electoral Commission, all Registered Political Parties, the Municipal Security Council (MUSEC),



and officials from the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in the Jirapa Municipality.

### 3.6 Sampling Frame

The sampling frame of the study consisted of all residence in the Jirapa Municipality of voting age (18 years and above) and have either voted before or not. This was done using the Electoral Commission Voter Register, 2020 voters register. The study used the number of the registered voters as the sampling population since it was the latest available authentic data and also because the study is concerned with elections. It was therefore more appropriate to use the data provided by the Electoral Commissioner than any data available.

### 3.7 Sample size and Sampling Techniques

#### 3.7.1 Calculation of Sample Size

The sample size was generated with the application of the sample size formulae  $n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$ ; where  $n$  = sample size;  $N$  = Target population and  $e$  = error of margin, which was (0.05) for the study (Yamane, 1967). The sample size formular was employed in order to minimize bias in the sample selection.

$$n = \frac{44717}{1 + 44717 (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = 188.259 \text{ Respondents}$$

$$n = 188$$

where;

$n$  = Sample size

$N$  = Target population (44717)

$e$  = Margin of error

1 = constant





### Breakdown of the various Respondents

Respondents	Frequency
Electoral Commissioners	3
Registered Political Parties Chairmen (NPP, NDC, PPP and CPP)	4
MUSEC	2
NCCE Officers	2
Electorates	188
Constituency party Youth Organizers	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>203</b>

The sample size of the study was 203 comprising of 188 registered voters which was arrived at from the voters register, four (4) chairpersons of the registered political parties in Jirapa constituency which are; the New Patriotic Party (NPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Convention People’s Party (CPP), and the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), four (4) constituency youth organizers of the four major political parties, two (2) members from MUSEC, three (3) staffs of the Electoral Commission and two staffs of the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) from the Jirapa Municipality.

#### 3.7.2 Sampling Techniques

The research adopted both random and non-random sampling methods (Creswell, 2014).

Cluster sampling was used in this study. This sampling technique was applied by clustering the Jirapa constituency into 37 Electoral Areas. These Electoral Areas were further clustered into the 137 polling stations in the constituency. Simple random sampling was used to select 15 polling stations, one in each Electoral Area. The simple random sampling was to select the respondents who had registered in the 2020 elections. These were the respondents who were studied for their

experience on electoral violence. These respondents were in a better position to offer reliable and accurate information that pertains to the issues under study. In simple random sampling, every individual of the population is given the equal and independent chance to be included in the sample (Birks, 2014).

Purposive sampling technique was used in the study. This sampling technique was used in selecting the Electoral Commission officers, the registered political parties' leadership, the MUSEC committee members and the officials of the National Commission for Civic Education. This sampling technique being a non-probability sampling technique allowed the researcher to use his own discretion to select respondents with key elements within the sample frame with unique characteristics that are relevant to the study (Babbie, 2004). According to Kusi (2012) in purposive sampling, researchers deliberately select individuals and sites to under study the central phenomenon. The standard used in choosing participants and sites is whether they are information rich (Kusi, 2012). Therefore, this sampling allowed the researcher to select people with requisite expertise and competencies to share their in-depth intellect, thoughts and opinions on the issues under enquiry (Creswell, 2013).

### **3.8 Data Collection**

#### **3.8.1 Sources of Data**

Primary data was gathered through the use of questionnaires and semi-structure interview guide. Secondary data relating to historical records of election violence in the Municipality were accessed from the Electoral Commission's Reports and the Ghana police service.

Both quantitative and qualitative data were concurrently collected though they were independently analyzed but their interpretation was merged to strengthen the study. One advantage of this





procedure was the fact that it has save time and resources instead of visiting and revisiting the field many times to collect data for the study.

### **3.8.2 Primary Data Collection Method**

Structured and semi-structured interview guides and questionnaires were the instruments used for the data collection.

### **3.8.3 Questionnaires Administration**

Questionnaires were used as tools in the data collection process. The questionnaire had Five-Point-Likert Scale ranking, close-ended and open-ended questions. The open-ended questions were structured in a way to induce flow in the narration of people's opinion. This solicited rich and more detailed information that offered an in-depth knowledge from the respondents than that of the close ended questions in the questionnaires. This helped respondents to effectively carry their opinions across, more especially in relation to the open-ended questionnaires. The questionnaires were largely self-administered since majority of the respondents were literates. However, those respondents who could not read or write made the researcher to conduct the questionnaires in an interviewer administered. The use of the questionnaires was appropriate in this study due to the easy comparison of responses, confidentiality of responses and covering of many respondents who spread over a wide geographic area. Thus, this made the questionnaires very effective for assessing the knowledge of electoral violence.



### 3. 8.6 Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Semi-structured interview guide was used to collect data from the officials of EC, MUSEC, NCCE Registered Political Parties' chairmen and that of their constituency youth organizers. The interview was structured based on the objectives of the study. The interview was recorded with the consent of the interviewees and was replayed and transcribed. The interview was conducted for these respondents because of their in-depth knowledge in electoral campaigns and communication, their expert knowledge in handling electoral violence and the influence of the NCCE sensitization role on the electorates. Also, these respondents were interviewed for the reason that the researcher needed to get their views and opinions as well as their experience on electoral violence usually perpetrated by party boys. So, it was very necessary to involve them in the research process by interviewing them. Thus, the researcher moved round to identify the respondents and then booked time that was convenient for each of the respondents. The researcher then followed the scheduled time with the respondents to mark the integrity and respect for the respondents. The interview took 15-20 minutes with the respective respondents. The meticulous articulation to the issues that were under investigation determined how early a respondent interview could either use the least time of 45 minutes or the maximum time of an hour. The research managed the conversation and engagement with the respective respondents to a fruitful interview. This instrument was used for the data collection which Kusi (2012: 45-46) indicated it offers "interviewees the opportunity to express their views, feelings and experiences freely, and the interviewers the freedom to divert from the items or questions in schedule to seek clarification". Respondents share their views, feelings and experiences on specific issues that are under study (Babbie, 2010; Kusi, 2012). Semi-structured interview schedule afforded the researcher to ask a follow-up question(s) or vary the



order of questions from respondent to respondent as a way to clarify answers and for information-rich to be solicited from respondents.

### **3.9 Data Analysis**

Both quantitative and qualitative data were concurrently collected though they were independently analyzed but their interpretation was merged to strengthen the study. Quantitative data were edited, coded and fed into the computer software statistical package for the service solution (SPSS) and analyzed with both inferential and descriptive statistics. The statistics of frequencies, percentages, mean, mode and standard deviation were employed. The results were presented on charts and in tables for better comprehension. The data were aligned to the research objectives. The quantitative data were analyzed using thematic analysis. As a result, the data the qualitative data were gleaned, categorized into themes where contradictions, common themes or pattern were identified. The themes were then supported by direct quotes and narratives were applied in the analysis.

#### **Ethical issues.**

There was the need to maintain trust, fairness, honesty and confidentiality, and above all respect for the respondents particularly the electorates. Thus, the researcher sought and was granted a written permission by the University for Development Studies as part of the ethical clearance for data collection. A written permission again was obtained from the Electoral Commission in order to establish information relevant to the study which met the cooperation from almost all the respondents. MUSEC committee and Registered Political Parties were written to, for request of their participation the study. In the words of Neuman (2006), the implementation of these procedures ensures validity where ‘the degree to which a measuring instrument measures what it is designed to measure. Also,



(Hafner-Burton, E.M, S.D Hyde, and R. S Jbonski2013) upheld that validity is the extent to which a construct accurately measures what it is supposed to measure’’.

Again, Reliability on the other hand is defined as the dependability or consistency of the measure of a variable (Neuman, 2006). Reliability and validity of data are very essential as they help in triangulation of data analyzed. They again helped the researcher to crosscheck responses from the respondents for their accuracy and changes are therefore affected after the pre-testing. In order to test for validity and reliability of the research instruments, a pre-test was conducted by the researcher in Sissala East Municipality at areas that were classified as election violence flashpoint in 2016 and 2020 general election, It also an emerging municipality as Jirapa with different geographical location, language and different set of tribe (Ghana Police Service Report, 2016 and 2020). The researcher pre-tested the validity of the questionnaires and the tools for the data collection by administering them to few volunteers in the selected Electoral Areas of (Bujan. Challu/Pien, Dolibozin, Kong, Sakai, Wellembele) in the Sissala East Municipality. After the pre-test, all questions with ambiguity were either modified or removed entirely. The pre-test helped in ensuring validity and reliability of the data that was gathered as it validated the data and merged both quantitative and qualitative data.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussions on the study findings. The section analyzed the demographic characteristics of the respondents, the pattern of electoral violence, the causal factors of electoral disturbances, the impact of electoral violence on political inclusion, growth of political democracy and socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality. The study was conducted with 203 respondents using questionnaire and interview guide. The chapter was sub-sectioned into five; the demographic characteristics, the pattern of electoral tensions, the causes of electoral disturbances, the effect of electoral violence on political participation and growth of political democracy, and the effect of electoral violence of socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality.

#### 4.2 Socio-Demographic Background of Respondents

Addressing respondent's socio-demographic characteristics for the study, respondents' gender, age, educational level, residential status, religious distribution and number of times voted in the Municipality were looked at in relation to the problem understudy.

##### 4.2.1 Age Distribution of Respondents

Figure 1 presents the age distribution of the respondents. The results revealed that respondents age group of 18-30 years representing 25%. These respondents were in the majority age category of 31-43 years which represented 41%. Again, 19% of the respondents were also within 44-56-year category, followed by 9% were within 57-69 and 6% were above 69 years.



The responses were in agreement with the Ghana statistical Service population and housing census study conducted in 2010 which reported that majority of the people in the Jirapa Municipality are within the age category of 31-41 (GSS, 2010). What that means is that, the municipality has a youthful population and would be active in political activities. It is therefore important that the youth are given political education so as to minimize political violence in the municipality. Again, to ensure political participation, the youth should be targeted and encouraged to take up leadership position to bring development to their people.


#### Age Category of the electorates (Respondents)

**Table 4. 1: Age Category of the Respondents**

Age Category	Frequency	Percent
18-30	49	25
31-43	79	41
44-56	35	19
57-69	16	9
69 and above	9	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Field Survey (2021).





**Figure 4. 1: Age Distribution of Respondents**

Source: Field Survey (2021).

#### 4.2.2 Educational Level of Respondents

**Table 4. 2: Educational Level of Respondents**

Educational Level	Frequency	Percent
Basic level	61	32
Secondary level	57	30
Tertiary level	37	19
Others	7	4
No Formal Education	26	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Field Survey (2021).


Respondent's educational background was necessary to assess the extent of understanding and ability to reply to issues. Thus, the level of one's educational background influences his or her ability to be influenced by others. American Psychological Association (1992) opined that competence built from relevant scientific and professional knowledge is a necessary condition to





successful management of argument that would lead to conflicts or violence. On the level of education of the respondents, the results also indicated that most of the respondents had formal education constituting 85% while 15% had no formal education. From the specifics, the formal education is made of 32% of the respondents had basic education, 30% had secondary education while 19% had tertiary education. Also, 4% indicated others. The overwhelming level (85%) of formal education in the municipality could partly be an indication to the fact that majority of them know the relevance of formal education to their wellbeing.

What that means is that majority of the respondents could be with the formal employment sector who could help improve their livelihood and income status if all this being equal. The implication of that will be financial success and general good standard of living as almost all the respondents were/ are educated and could engage in multiple livelihood activities. This particularly depicts positive characteristics of a resilience and sustainable municipality.



**Figure 4. 2: Educational Attainment of Respondents**

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**





### 4.2.3: Gender Distribution of Respondents

Respondents to the study were categorized into male and female. This was done in order to establish the proportion of male to female respondents. From the analysis of the sex of the respondents, 76% of them were male while 24% of them were female. In general, the male respondents were more than the female respondents selected for this study. This implies that males in the Jirapa Municipality are to be the main actors of electoral violence since they are mostly considered as the best people to take 'hardcore' actions against other parties. This confirms the opinion of Ibrahim (2020) that male is more energetic and are therefore always prone to electoral violence as compare to the female counterpart.




Figure 4. 3: Gender Distribution of Respondents


Source: Field Survey (2021).

### 4.2.4 Number of Times Respondents Voted in an Election in the Municipality

This section sought to ascertain the number of times that respondents have voted in the Jirapa Municipality. It was necessary because it would help the researcher to determine how respondents



are familiarized with electoral violence issues in the Municipality. The results indicated that, majority of the respondents reported that they participated in general elections four times (19%), followed by 15% who also reported they voted five times. The assessment revealed that, 13% of the respondents indicated they voted twice while 11% reported that they voted once. Again, 3% of the respondents indicated that, they had participated in all the elections in Ghana since its return to constitutional democracy in 1992. The assessment connotes that, over 85% of those who took part in the study had participated in general elections more than once. This suggests that all those who took part in the survey had significant experience in the electoral processes in the municipality which reflected in their valid and accurate responses to the survey questionnaires.



**Figure 4. 4: Number of Times that Respondents had ever Voted in a General Election**


**Source: Field Survey (2021)**

#### **4.2.5 Residential Status of Respondents**

The residential status of respondents in the Municipality was determined to establish their experiences and knowledge levels about the problem under study and how well they have



experienced it in the Municipality. Akparep (2019) postulated that duration of time may not always reflect knowledge, but help adequately gathered so much knowledge and experience over time. One could therefore agree that, duration of stay in the Municipality has a strong link to how knowledgeable a person could be in dealing with human behaviour such as electoral violence. The study on the residential status of the respondents also revealed that 25% of the respondents had lived in the municipality between 21 to 30 years while 23% lived in the municipality between 31-40 years. Again, the study discovered that 23% of the respondents had live in the municipality between 10-20 years while 12% indicated that their stay in the municipality was less than 10 years. Moreover, 9%, 5% and 3% were those who have stayed in the Municipality between 41-50, 51-60 and 60 years and above respectively. **Figure 4.6 below**



**Figure 4.6 Residential Status of Respondents**

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

From the assessment, it was revealed that, all the respondents had lived in the municipality for more than 10 years. This implies that respondents would have known much of the political

conditions and processes in the municipality. The residential status of the respondents reflected the number of time respondents participated in a general election since 1992.

#### 4.2.6: Mean Years of Residing in the Municipality

**Table 4. 3: How long have you been leaving in the Municipality?**

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. D.
How long have you Stay in this Municipality?	188	1.00	70.00	25.5801	13.60476

**Sources: Field Survey, (2021).**

The mean of the residential status of respondents was 25 which indicates that respondents are old in the municipality and this suggests that they would have been familiar with structures and political system of the municipality. The results also agreed with the Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 population census which reported that the average mean of residential status of most residents in the municipality is between 20 to 25 years (GSS, 2010).

### 4.3 Forms of Electoral Violence in the Jirapa Municipality.

#### 4.3.1 Number of Respondents Who Ever Witnessed Electoral Violence

Objective one of the researches was analyzed under this section. The section looked at the pattern of electoral disturbances, period of election tensions, nature of electoral violence, perpetrators of electoral violence and how the violence is committed in the Jirapa Municipality. This was necessary because the researcher wanted to know the degree of seriousness associated to the electoral violence cases in the study area. Staniland (2014) has revealed that the forms of electoral violence can be scaled up to reflect the degree of determination to influence election outcomes and organizational capacity of the perpetrators especially the perceived relationship to the state.



In determining the pattern of electoral violence in the municipality, the study first of all found out from the respondents who have ever witnessed electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality. 66% of the respondents who took part in the survey indicated that they have experienced electoral violence before and 34% indicated that they had never experienced any electoral violence. Despite the fact that 66% of the respondents who have some experience of electoral violence appear to be the highest and the more reason why the municipality is an electoral violence hotspot area, they were quick to add that they have been somehow educated on the effects of electoral violence but the perpetrators many a time are the party boys. Interestingly, this revelation was not different from the 34% of the respondents who did not experience electoral violence. They indicated that they have also been informed about the effects of electoral violence by the NCCE and their community elders.

**Table 4. 4: Experience of Electoral Violence by Respondents**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Experience	124	66
Never Experience	64	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

#### **4.3.2 Period of Election Violence**

Election violence can occur before, during or after the election. Adolfo et al. (2012) were of the view that: “winning an election may be a matter of survival for the competing parties, as well as for entire communities within an area. The risk of electoral violence may therefore be higher in situations where there is real political competition between various parties and genuine possibilities to change existing power relations. All elections involve elements of uncertainty, but



with the winner takes all approach, the uncertainties of democracy come at a high price.” The results from the field are presented in table 4.5 below.

**Table 4. 5: Period in which violence occur**

OBJECTIVE	FINDINGS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
<b>Period in which violence occur</b>	During the election	182/188	97.0
	After the election (Post-election)	42/188	22.3
	Before the election (Pre-election)	40/188	21.3
	Compilation of new register	78/188	41.5
	During exhibition of a voter register	34/188	18.1

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

To determine the period in which election violence erupts in the municipality, 97.0% of the electorates interviewed reported that, they usually happen during elections. Again, 41.5% of the respondents indicated that when a new voter register is to be compiled while 21.31% reported that election violence occurred before elections. Also, 22.3% of the respondents mentioned that election violence usually happened after elections while 18.1% of the respondents indicated they experienced election violence during exhibition of a new voter register

The municipal Electoral Commissioner during an interview had this to say;

*Electoral violence over the years has affected many electoral processes in the municipality. Many electoral violence happens during or after elections when supporters of political parties always feel they are cheated or the electoral process lacks credibility. We have been experiencing such intermittent violence here anytime an election is to be conducted”. But most of the electoral violence happens during the election with the reason of disturbing and interrupting the electoral process (Source: Electoral Official Respondent, 2020).*



Literature has noted that democratic elections in Ghana and West Africa has remained a very problematic matter. Aning and Danso (2012) have indicated that this has become particularly the case because in many constituencies in Ghana and West African countries, elections have been observed to be violence by either at the point when they are taking place or after declaration of results. Election spectators have testified electoral anomalies in a number of elections in Ghana and Jirapa Municipality is not an exception.

During an interview session with a head of a Ghana Police Service, Jirapa postulated that, most of the electoral violence experienced in the municipality were pre-electoral violence (insulting one another during campaign, sabotaging one another) which usually occur when electoral rules or provisions are seen to favor a particular candidate at the expense of the other. Pre-electoral violence is most likely to occur where a politician is overly hopeful and become convinced of electoral victory but later on realized that the signals are not positive tend to cause mayhem by discrediting the electoral process.

The result of the finding is in line with Tamuno's (1991) work which revealed that electoral violence occurred mostly at the pre-electoral and post-electoral stages. Parties or political elites purposely arrange for violence in order to gain advantage over other. For instance, research has revealed that pre-election violence is often anticipated to sway voting behaviour, by ensuring that the electorates do not turn up on voting day and also by convincing them with the influence of materials to vote for a particular candidate. While post-election violence is experienced when a politician sees the signal of losing the elections or when the winning candidate supporters intimidate the losing ones. As confirmed by Aniekwe and Kushie (2011) that post-election

violence represents a challenge of electoral outcomes and spontaneous protest that turn violent as an expression of disappointment and despair with the management of elections.

### 4.3.3 Forms of Electoral Violence

According to the UNDP (2011) report, electoral violence can be physical to threaten and intimidate voters, opponents, snatch or destroy election materials. The context and nature of electoral violence reflect in different forms. These forms can be scaled up to reflect the degree of determination to influence election outcomes and organizational capacity of the perpetrators. The findings have been displayed in Table 4.6 below.

**Table 4. 6: Forms of Electoral Violence during the 2020 general elections**

OBJECTIVE	FINDINGS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE	
<b>Forms of Electoral Violence during the 2016 general elections</b>	Protest/demonstration	98/188	52.1	
	Intimidation/harassment	28/188	15.0	
	Used of state's security	6/188	3.0	
	Snatching ballot boxes	24/188	12.8	
	Election's boycott due to macho men	21/188	11.1	
	Accusations and counter accusations from politicians on social media	11/188	6.0	

Source: Field survey, 2021.

From the respondents' experience, election violence mainly takes the form of protest or demonstration as represented by 52.1% of those who responded to the questionnaires. Again, 15.0% indicated that intimidation/ harassment of individuals, group or political opponents is another form of election violence. 3.0% of the respondents also observed then use of state security to intimidate to vote in certain direction from politicians as one form related to election, another 12.8% mentioned that the snatching of ballot box become center of election, while another 11.1%





indicated the use of macho men to snatch ballot boxes are some forms of where election violence emanates from in the municipality. Further 6.0 % percent reported that, the accusation and counter accusation put fear of people which sometimes lead to widespread violence.

Analyzing reasons why majority (52.1%) of the respondents argued that protest and demonstration are the main forms of electoral violence in the Municipality, the Municipal Police Commander and the MUSEC remarked during an interview session thus:

*Protest and demonstration have always been the form of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality. This is where the protestors use placards, sticks and other dangerous objects to intimidate their opponents. This form of electoral violence always leads to the destruction of many properties.*

The finding corresponds with that of Aniekwe and Kushie (2011) that, electoral violence manifest in forms such as disruption of campaign rallies, assassinations, rigging by theft of ballot papers and boxes, disrupting elections on election day or chasing away voters, malicious and wanton destruction of property and arson require systematic and detailed planning and organization.

#### 4. 3.4 Perpetrators of Election Violence

Perpetrators in this context are the people who are involved in electoral violence. Respondents were asked to identify the category of people involved in the electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality. The results are presented in Table 4.7.

**Table 4. 7: Perpetrators of Electoral Violence in the Municipality**

OBJECTIVE	FINDINGS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
<b>Perpetrators of Electoral Violence in the Municipality</b>	Leadership of Political Parties	45/188	24.0
	Electoral Commission	27/188	14.3
	Political Party Agents	66/188	35.1
	Party foot soldiers/vigilantes' group	141/188	75.0

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**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

When electorates were asked about the perpetrators of election violence, 45/188 representing 28% of the respondents asserted that leadership of political parties were the main cause of election-related violence in the municipality due to the fact that they inspire their members to fight to protect the ballot box while 75.0 % (141/188) which is the majority of the respondents mentioned that party foot soldiers; who are always generally the young ones (115/141), especially the unemployed (98/141) were the perpetrators of election violence. Again, 35.1% of the respondents labeled Political party Agents were the main cause of election violence largely because during elections sometimes they usually call their party leadership and present a different picture of the electoral happenings at the polling stations. Further 14.3% (27/188) of the respondents were of the view that the Electoral Commission temporal staff of the municipality sometimes played a role in election violence particularly when the political parties' leadership and their agents seem to perceive or think that the EC wants to condone with their political rivals in the municipality.

In an interview with an officer of the Electoral Commission, he revealed that,

*Most of the electoral violence in the municipality are associated with the leadership of the various political parties and their party foot soldiers including their polling Agents in the municipality. The respondent reported that the use of the hungry unemployed youth, who often called themselves party foot soldiers in the municipality, by leadership of political parties for their personal gains stand tall in the wake to the causes of electoral disturbances in the municipality'.*



New Patriotic Party secretary in an interview affirmed to this statement but started to apportion blames to what other political parties previously did wrong to cause political mayhem in the municipality:

*No one is blind, we all know what normally cause electoral violence, Sometimes the use of political hooligans to cause trouble by one political party normally calls for immediate reactions from the other political parties*

In an interview with the Municipal Director, National Commission for Civic Education, the lamentation of the use of party foot soldiers by leadership of political parties was reemphasised as this was attributed by the officer;

*The presence of these groups (Foot soldiers) is the main cause of electoral disturbances in the Jirapa municipality elections. This is where the youth are been engaged and used as perpetrators of election violence by their political masters who usually instigate the boys to go on rampage during any electoral activity.*

A Crime Officer of Ghana Police Service at Jirapa Municipality, during an interview on why the use of party foot soldiers in elections, had this revelation;

*The elections are often besieged by macho men despite those macho men exist in the history of Ghanaian election-related violence as thugs, who political leaders commonly hire during elections to snatch ballot boxes and intimidate electorates and the electoral officers at polling stations in various places around the country including Jirapa municipality that made them confront and seize pump action gun from the one of the body guards of party executive during round up to campaign in 2020 elections*





Macho men generally and within the Ghanaian context refers to people who have passion in body building. However those who are typically involved in electoral violence and intimidation are young men with the perception from deprived zongo communities and certain ethnic groups. In the Ghanaian parlance, Macho men were originally used as land guards by the state or private institutions long before their association with the political arena (UNDP, 2019). The vulnerability nature of these macho men attributed to their use as conduit by some unscrupulous politicians as thugs in elections to foment and cause mayhem. The Jirapa Municipality in more recent times has been noted for notoriety in electoral disturbances and identified as one of the hotspots in Ghana and the highest in the region, and therefore very imperative to address the developing malignant tumor so as to enhance political democracy (Aning and Danso, 2012; CODEO, 2017).

This assertion by the MUSEC member on the use of macho men in politics and that of literature has confirmed what Aning and Danso (2012) indicated about some causes of electoral violence.

It was also noted during the interviews that some supporters and sympathizers of the various political parties sometimes also contribute to the hostile nature of elections in the Jirapa municipality. It was actually alleged that some of this electoral violence emanates from markets, lorry stations and drinking bars where sometimes supporters or sympathizers of the various political parties engaged in unnecessary conversations that lead to insults and heckling one another. These sometimes escalate in promoting anger and unfortunately where party lines are drawn it then becomes intense and uncontrollable.

This is not strange as literature has observed that political parties and their supporters are the main culprits of electoral violence. Bob-Milliar (2014) observed that in areas where there are many unemployed youths electoral violence could be deep seated as these young ones are good vehicles for fomenting trouble and tensions. Literature has also established this fact that where there is

rising youth population with its antecedent unemployment it becomes a recipe for electoral violence (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Hilker & Fraser 2009).

Buttressing the point, another respondent from MUSEC also made this remark during an interview;

*In Ghana, elections nowadays have experienced a number of electoral violence though this violence can be differentiated from some neighboring West African countries where their elections lead to war and many lives are lost. It is therefore very necessary for policy and decision makers to effectively manage electoral violence particularly in Jirapa as a number of elections here have not seen peace*

This submission by the MUSEC member clarifies the reason why Jirapa is seen as a hotspot area of electoral violence in Ghana and the Upper West Region at wide.

It has been observed Police Commander at Jirapa municipal that the youth also act as major perpetrators of electoral violence in Ghana. . Some political parties form violence groups normally composed of the youth and are therefore used by some unscrupulous politicians with their aim of supporting their political party to gain power through a wrongful means which could lead to cause of death was buttressed by NCCE Director at Jirapa. Contextually, young males in particular have been associated with electoral violence as they are mainly noted for committing crimes and causing problems (UNDP, 2011). In more recent times, studies have discovered the deliberate involvement of the youth in many electoral violence which has brought a lot of conflicts in many African countries (Akprep, 2019; Hilker and Fraser, 2009). A report by the Afrobarometer survey indicated that a majority (81%) of Ghanaians have a strong conviction that the destabilization of the country's democracy by party apparanchiks often known as foot soldiers cannot be entirely blamed on the foot soldiers as they are usually promised big opportunities by their masters and due to



bread and butter matter, they accept all instructions from their masters (Attah-Boahene 2012; Bob-Milliar, 2014). **Table 4.8 Respondants Estimation of Degree of Violence**

OBJECTIVE	FINDINGS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
<b>Respondents' Estimation of violence</b>	Widespread physical attacks	156/188	83.0
	None-physical attacks	94/188	50.0
	Targeted death	48/188	26.0

#### 4.3.5 How violence is perpetuated

**Table 4. 8: Respondents' Degree of Violence Estimation**

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

To estimate the extent of election violence when occurred, 156 (83.0%) out of the 188 respondents indicated that most of the election violence experienced in the municipality involved widespread physical attacks, 50.0% of the respondents indicated that most of the election-related violence involved none-physical attacks. These respondents (52/94) indicated that people who are perceived as members of an opposing political party are not consulted in any family matters. Further 37 respondents expressed that non-physical attack takes in the form of friends shunning your company. Another 26.0% of the respondents indicated that the use of violence associated with elections aimed to eliminate opponents especially in an odd hours of the night. A respondent exclaimed;

*I was narrowly saved. I returned to the house and found all my vehicle tyres deflated. The assailants also smashed my windscreen and dented most part of the vehicle. Only God knows what would have happened to me if I was in the house. My brother this occurred during the election campaign in 2016. I reported the matter to the police for investigation.*

A check from the police station confirmed that indeed such matter was reported. This information suggests that some form of electoral violence may be waged to eliminate opponents. An interview



with one of the chairmen of the political parties had this to say when asked about why the physical attacks by some of their members;

*Our opponents were first to attack us during the elections, this has become their nature as they usually physically abuse our members. They also sometimes rain insults and heckling to intimidate, humiliate and cause mayhem and it's illustrative of the Jirapa elections.*

This statement supports the assertion of Biegon (2009) that the contestation for political power in Africa has become more often than not a violent process. It appears from available evidence that violent struggle for power has become the norm which is a classified example of Jirapa municipality.

Another chairman of the political party during interview also explained this;

*We are peaceful people and myself and the party executives would not endorse electoral violence but our opponents are always ready to cause maim and abuse our supporters. We cannot sit down and allow this to happen each election year where our supporters are always beaten and abuse physical by our opponents.*

The disparate measure to win or retain political power by the political class has brought about electoral violence usually perpetrated by party foot soldiers which is adopted by all shades of politicians as mechanism for delivering electoral victories at all cost and this has been part of the democratic process since the return of democracy in the early 1990s (UNDP, 2020).





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#### 4.3.6 Type, Victims, and Duration of Electoral Violence in the Municipality

The study revealed the type of electoral violence which is prevalent in the Jirapa municipality, the victims and the duration of electoral violence.

In an interview with one of the Returning Officers of Electoral Commission, he alluded to the fact that,

*The inter-party elections have the highest occurrence of electoral disturbances than that of the intra-party elections as we have known from the Ghana Police Service. The Local government elections too have also experienced some electoral violence but was the least recorded.*

The MUSEC member who was also interviewed confirmed the assertion by the Electoral Commission and had this to say;

*“The main elections is always characterized by electoral violence in Jirapa than the political parties internal elections which sometimes we record few pockets of electoral violence and also the local government elections to choose the Assembly members also sometimes have some little electoral violence.”*

On the aspect of the duration of the electoral violence in Jirapa municipality, the officer from the Electoral Commission indicated that;

*“Most of the violence usually lasted for a day, some could go beyond a day to a week, others could go beyond a month and some could escalate even after a year. In situations where this electoral violence is not managed very well the sometimes escalate and become intense especially when close to another election.”*



The MUSEC member confirmed the statement from the officer of the Electoral Commission and that it has been a major challenge to the municipality as the often meet to discuss about the security of the municipality and ways of managing some of these issues during elections.

For victims of electoral violence when enquired from the NCCE officer during an interview has this to say;

*Majority of the victims are usually from the opposition political parties including their supporters and some few electoral officers together with media people. Sometimes it even escalates to burning houses of opponent political parties' members as well as destroying property of the opponent party including destroying shops, motorbikes owned by individual members of a political party.*

A MUSEC member said this in explaining the victims of electoral violence in the Municipality;

*“Women, youth and the vulnerable group within the scene of the violence suffered the more while some electoral officers and civil society groups were also victims of electoral violence in Jirapa.”*

The results agreed with Fischer (2013) who observed that electoral violence during Ghana's elections have had a bad experience as almost all presidential, parliamentary and local government elections conducted in Ghana since 1992 in the wake of the multi-party democracy that has resulted in chaos, political intimidation, and ballot snatching, delayed in electoral process and declaration of election results. In Fischer (2013) study, electoral violence has manifested in intra and inter-



party elections particularly between the NPP and the NDC with the potential to negatively affect Ghana's democracy. In his survey, from a recount of the 1992 to 2020 period have witnessed an increasing number of electoral violence at 5,707 with various categorizations such as verbal and physical attack, intimidation, destruction of public property, rioting or public disorders, ballot box theft and property of politicians and political party being destroyed.

#### **4.4 Causal Factors of Election Violence in the Jirapa Municipality**

The respondents in the study have identified a variety of causal factors for conflict before, during and after elections in Jirapa for transitional democracies. The discussions on the causes of electoral violence are associated with negative influence factors such as the use of hooligans, low education on the electoral processes, and unlawful disqualification of candidates, politics of exclusion, intimidation of free freedom, misuse of state power, the use of judicial system for travesty of justice, undermine freedom of movements, unemployment, the use political manipulative approach and machinations by political groups, incumbent government deliberate exploitation of the electoral system due to its fragile nature just for purposes of cheating and stealing the elections to their favour. In analyzing the causes of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality, the researcher asked respondents to list some of the possible factors of the causes of electoral violence in Jirapa municipality. The responses are presented in figure 4.9.



#### 4.4.1 Causal factors Electoral Violence in the Jirapa Municipality

**Table 4. 9: Causal Factors of Election Violence in the Municipality**

OBJECTIVE	FINDINGS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
<b>Causal Factors of Election Violence in the Municipality</b>	Inadequate political education/low political understanding	72/188	38.1
	High level of youth unemployment	174/188	93.0
	Political parties/politicians seeking reelection	150/188	79.0
	Electoral fraud and injustice towards opposition parties	36/188	19.1
	Use of Hooligans/vigilantes by political parties (Clientelism)	108/188	57.4
	Unlawful disqualification of candidates in a political contest	24/188	13.0

**Source: field survey (2021).**

Overwhelming majority of the respondents (174/188) representing 93.0% asserted that high level of youth unemployment is one of the major causes of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality.

A MUSEC member during an interview revealed that;

*High level of unemployment is a major factor when it comes to the contributing factors of electoral violence. Unemployed youth availability in the Jirapa constituency always give politicians the opportunity to recruit the youth to intimidate and cause mayhem in elections particularly when they know they are losing the elections.*

This statement clearly supported the electorates views as the majority of the causal factors of electoral violence is youth unemployed category.

The Ghana Statistical Service (2010) report indicated that the Jirapa municipality has a high level of youth, thus confirms the findings from the electorates' views that youth activities in electoral



violence are influenced by politicians with the hope of getting them jobs after been voted into power. These empty promises give the youth high hope to do everything to help the party member get into power through any violence means. The findings implied that increasing number of incidents of political violence in the Jirapa constituency is led by the aggressive recruitment of young people into the practice. The results affirmed with Aniekwe and Kushie (2011) findings.

When the electorates again were asked about the causes of electoral violence, 79% of the respondents reported that, political parties or politicians wanting reelection encouraged electoral violence. This was reflective of the Jirapa constituency elections because incumbent Member of Parliament always fiercely fight for reelection in the constituency. Again, 57.4% attributed the cause of electoral violence to political parties' support for hooliganism and political parties own nurture of political security or vigilantisms. Also, 38.1% of the respondents observed that, lack of political education among citizens on political activities, processes and participation over the years has resulted to electoral violence.

In an interview session with one of the political party's youth organizers of the Jirapa constituency, opined that;

*Sometimes electoral violence erupts from political parties and their supporters on the bases of an alleged electoral fraud. The proceedings into the elections like compiling a new register to exhibition and to the election itself sometimes appeared flawed. The integrity of the electoral officers and the appointment of polling officers all are embedded in rigging the elections for one political party or politician over another. Nobody will sit and allow any broad day cheating by the municipal Electoral Commission who has an indispensable role in ensuring a free and fair election.*





The assertion by the constituency youth organizer of one of the registered political parties was well supported by the electorates' respondents where thirteen percent (13.0%) of the respondents reported that political fraud or injustices has also resulted to electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality.

This is in line with the following authors' views (Norris, 2012; Posner, 2005; Mozaffar et al., 2003) that the flawed nature of elections is a recipe for politicians who want to win political power at all cost to profit from the exiting fault lines among all the facets of the electoral process. This upsurges bitterness hence prepares the ground for violence at the least exasperation.

Further, thirteen percent (13%) of the respondents mentioned that unlawful disqualification of people favorite candidate (s) in an election contest has also resulted to electoral violence in the municipality. The results concurred with literature as Aning and Dnaso (2012) observed that Ghana's elections currently is christened with localized disturbances, tensions and animosity that affects the relative peace, security and stability long enjoyed by the country.

*This was also supported by the NCCE officer who in an interview indicated that unlawful disqualification of candidates in an election breeds electoral violence as these disqualified candidates encouraged their foot soldiers to go on rampage causing mayhem.*

Electoral violence in many cases have the tendency to occur either before, during and after the elections. And are usually characterized with the issuance of bullying, intimidation, physical abuse, destruction of electoral materials, as well as the use of indecent speeches and provocative language. The causes of electoral violence usually, are triggered by multi-faceted reasons which the findings in the Jirapa municipality have underscored (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Høglund and Anton, 2009). Høglund (2009) categorized these reasons that cause electoral violence into three



thematic areas; the nature of politics, the nature of elections and the nature of electoral institutions. Bob-Milliar (2014) identified the nature of the political system which deals with the Clientelism and the ambience of centralization of state power by one political party at the disadvantage of all political parties as one of the causes of electoral violence. This could equally be in the case of Jirapa as some of these electoral disturbances occur during Jirapa elections.

A survey conducted by Agyemang (2013) in Akwatia and Odododiodio identified the following; unemployment and abject poverty, weak electoral security and management, politicization of ethnicity by political parties especially among the two main political parties (NDC and NPP), forceful registration of unqualified persons to vote, flagrant disregard for voter's rights and poor political education as the major causes of electoral violence in these constituencies. This is in clear support of the findings of the study.

#### 4.4.3 Reasons behind Election Violence

The underlying causes of electoral violence is rooted in social, high stakes process in which political parties won elections, weak governmental institution to enforce laws, high degree of uncertainty about the outcome of election results, political and divergent preferences, but not limited to delay in elections, favoritism and ability to discredit the election results. These are other several ways in which election trigger violence

**Table: 4:10 Reason for Election Violence**

Variable	Frequency	Percent
To delay an election	51/188	27.1
To cancel an election	33/188	18.0
To favor a particular candidate	132/188	70.0
In order to discredit election results	91/188	48.4

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**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

To determine the interest of people in electoral violence, 70% of the respondents reported that people go into electoral violence just to favor their preferred candidate. Again, 48.4% of the respondents reported that people involved in an electoral violence to ensure that election results are discredited, thus when they knew their preferred candidate was going to lose the election. Further 27.1% and 18.0% of the respondents indicated that people engaged in an electoral violence to delay election results and also to mastermind the cancellation of voting when they perceived that the outcome of the election would not favour their candidates. Literature has established that people engaged in electoral tensions to sub-change the electoral process, either by changing the outcome of elections or by disrupting the electoral process (UNDP, 2009).

Electoral violence has been noted to occur at different periods in the election cycle; that is, before, during, or after election usually with the purpose of jeopardizing the electoral process. Electoral violence as also always characterized with intimidation, hurting, threatening, abusing usually before, during and after an election always with the deliberate mind to either delay or influence the electoral process and if possible, discredit the elections as marred with electoral violation (Albert, 2007; Omotola, 2009). As revealed by the study most election violence target delaying, cancelling, favoring and discrediting election results. What that means is electoral violence is not a tool for winning an election but rather an approach to causing electoral violence by discrediting the entire elections. Mwangi (2001) observed that many people engage in electoral violence to protect the interest of their political parties and candidates and could go extra miles to do the wrong in favor of their philosophy. Afolabi (2007) explains that the sole aim of such violence contest is to destroy the credibility of the election.







#### **4.5 Effect of Electoral Violence on inclusive multi-party Democracy of the Jirapa Municipality**

This section of the research analysis looked at how electoral violence has affected political inclusion and the democratic nature of Ghana’s electoral processes. Various research has shown that electoral violence endangers democracy and undermines the relative peace, tranquility and the stability of a country. According to Birch and Muchlinski (2017) electoral violence can affect political participation through the interference of political parties’ rallies and campaigns by other political opponents which hitherto breeds peace and stability. The effects were discussed under the following themes or areas; voter turnout and education, participation in electoral processes, socio-economic development and growth of multi-party democracy.

##### **4.5.1 Effect of Electoral Violence on Political Inclusion**

On the consequence of electoral violence on political inclusion, respondents who were obtained from the voter’s register were asked whether electoral violence has ever led them abstain from voting or being denied on political education. Again, the section also considered the effects on vulnerable groups on participation. The findings were presented in Table 412 below.

#### **4.9 Effects of Election Violence on Voter turnout and Education**

**Table 4.11 Ever Abstained from Voting**

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Yes	32	17.1
No	156	82.9
Total	188	100

**Source: Field Survey, (2021)** From the table above, the study wanted to find out the effect of electoral violence and electorates participation in the election process in the Jirapa municipality and it revealed that the effect of electoral violence has an impact on electoral participation as 17.1% of the electorates alleged ever been abstained from voting even though they were required by law and age to vote and had registered. Again, the majority of electorates with 82.9% indicated that they have never been abstained from voting. What that means is that, electoral violence has an influence on the electorates' involvement in the electoral process. Even though the number of electorates who indicated been abstained from voting is low (17.1%) but it has implication on political inclusion of electorates, it also has a significant effect on the result of the elections. The findings remained quite clear that electoral vehemence in the Jirapa municipality serves as a constraint to some electorates to participate in decision making through voting for reasons of the volatile nature of the electoral process in the municipality

#### 4.9.2 Ever been Denied to Vote

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Yes	17	9.1
No	171	90.9.
Total	188	100

Source: Field Survey, (2021)



To find out if someone was ever denied to participate in any election process, Table 4.9.2 presented that 8.8% of the electorates' respondents responded in the affirmative while 90.9% of the respondents responded in the negative. This meant that some eligible voters are sometimes denied the opportunity to vote and this could be that the opponent knowing very well the electorates and being convinced to vote for their political rival will challenge the age or the eligibility of the electorates just to disqualify them from voting. This usually leads to electoral conflicts as the rival political party would also insist the person of his/her voting rights once he/she has been registered.

#### 4.9.3 Vulnerable Groups Voting

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Yes	127	67.4
No	61	32.6
Total	188	100

**Source: Field Survey, (2021)**

From Table 4.9.3 above, when respondents were again asked if vulnerable groups were assisted to participate in election process, 32.6% of the respondents responded No while 67% of the respondents responded in the affirmative. From the analysis, despite the fact that the findings recorded 32.6% of the vulnerable group not being help to participate in elections one could infer that, vulnerable groups in the municipality were found to be less involved in the electoral processes partly due to the characterization of elections with violence.





#### 4.5.2 How Election Violence Affects Participation

According to Mueller (2011), involving the public in decision making comes with some important reasons which among to ensuring a progressive democratic dispensation through enhance political participation. It is enshrined in the constitution that electoral process should be participated by all citizenry of sound mind and of age, it is therefore instructional that people should involve and adhere to the dictates of the constitution in the consolidation of the democratic principles. As Abraham Lincoln said, ‘our government is intended to be of people by the people, and for the people.’ In relation to the problem understudy, participation means involvement in the electoral process and democracy in Ghana. Involving the people in electoral process provides a vehicle for creating better citizens decision (Norris, 2012). In the electoral process, electoral violence plays a negative role in the participation of citizens in the democratic practice. This section details how electoral violence affects participation. Table 4.13 depicts the results.

**Table 4. 13: Effects of Election Violence of Political Inclusion**

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Reduction in voter turnouts	103/188	54.7
Reduce the voter choice	63/188	33.5
Low turnout during political education	51/188	27.1
Others	13/188	6.9

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

To determine how electoral violence affects participation, 54.7% respondents reported that, electoral violence had a negative influence on voter turnouts while 27.1% of the respondents indicated that low turnout of electorates during political education is associated with electoral violence. 33,5% of the respondents indicated that electoral violence deflates peoples’ interest especially reducing voter choice of selecting a preferred candidates, while 6.9% indicated others,



meaning there were more than three variables affecting political inclusion due to electoral violence which has reduced the interest of people to participate in political education and activities in the Jirapa municipality hence a high voter apathy. The findings of the section implied that electoral violence prevents citizens from exercising their franchise during election to help create better decisions for the public. The influence of poor socio-economic developments, freedom from fear of political influence arrest, the perception of citizen arrest by security services, as they goes by their campaign trail, the murder of journalist, haunting of journalist out of the country Ayawaso West Wogun election violence at January, 2019, Murder of government critic at Ejura by security forces without justices and Vigilantes who beats up public servant (Regional Security Coordinator at Kumasi but went free by the by court of law or Attorney General department refused to persecute them, Closure of some Radio and Television station by using issue of unpaid licensing fee and the Declaration of results as well as aftermath of security killing more than five people at Techiman (CDD Report on Election, 2020). This confirms the findings of Aver, Nnorom and Targba (2013) that, the culture of violence has not only been absorbed and sustained as part of the country's political outlook since independence it has been one of the compelling causes of the low involvement in Ghanaian politics and other social events.

#### **4.5.3 Effects of Election Violence on the Socio-Economic Development of the Jirapa Municipality**

According to Congressional Research Service [CRS] (2011), instability among many countries is a consequence of political violence which has a long effect on their socio-economic development. In some instances, resources and energy is wasted to improve tranquility and good democratic governance as electoral violence continues to rear its ugly head in almost all elections.

Respondents were asked to describe how electoral violence have affected the socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality and their responses are presented in table 4:14 below

**Table 4. 14: Effects of Electoral Violence on Socio-Economic Development of the Jirapa Municipality**

Variables		Frequency	Percentage
Election violence ever resulted in	Yes	66	35
destruction of properties	No	122	65
<b>Total</b>		<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>
Election violence ever resulted in	Yes	34	18
the close down of some facilities	No	154	82
<b>Total</b>		<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>
Election violence ever resulted in	Yes	45	24
chieftaincy conflict	No	143	76
<b>Total</b>		<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

To determine the economic implication of electoral violence in the municipality, 35% of the respondents reported that electoral violence has led to destruction of properties which invariably affect the economic progress of the municipality. Though 65% of the electorates disagreed that electoral violence never resulted in destruction of properties. However, some elections in Jirapa have witnessed some destruction of properties of government and individuals. It was recorded that the 2016 and 2020 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Jirapa saw the political parties threatening to burn Returning officer for Jirapa Constituency house, because, they suspect her of favoring a particular candidate under a full glare of police in 2016, and 2020 general election too, Parliamentary Candidates of NDC in the presence of Jirapa Police Commander at a meeting at





Commanders office, the candidate said he has held that the Returning officer is recruiting certain people from his opponent geographical area, therefore, if he loses the elections, he will drastically dealt with him. Destruction of ballot boxes, inciting people or supporters again the opponents, friends became norm, election materials including motorbikes and vehicles belonging to both political parties. Again, 18% of the respondents also indicated that electoral violence has resulted to the close down of some commercial facilities which was used as business centers for constituents. Some of these businesses included stores and shops belonging to some people who were tagged as offenders of electoral violence. 82% disagreed that electoral violence has cause the close down of some commercial facilities. From these respondents, they have not experienced any negative impact on their economic activities from electoral violence.

Finally, 24% for the respondents also observed that electoral violence has resulted to chieftaincy conflicts in Jirapa municipality. Some respondents who scored 24% of electoral violence resulting in chieftaincy disputes were of the view that sometimes unscrupulous people hide behind the issue of their chiefs' involvement in active politics to cause chieftaincy conflicts. Majority of the respondents with 78% reported that electoral violence has no association with chieftaincy conflicts. This implied that, though electoral violence may not affect the entire Municipality, however, it may be observed to have hard implications on commercial activities, businesses, individuals and government including chieftaincy disputes where the party apparanchiks tagged people and go hunting for them.

In an interview session with a respondent from MUSEC, this was his statement;

*Due to the nature of politics in Jirapa municipality, there is no respect for human beings, again.*

*The eagerness of politicians to gain power have influence our social norms and values.*

*They sometimes misinformed their surrogates to tag some key persons in the municipality*

wrongly simple because of political power. We have had reports of chiefs engaging in active politics by instructing their subjects to vote in a particular manner for various political motives. Many a time some of these reports are nothing more than empty and pure allegations usually leveled against these chiefs. And sometimes these allegations lead to a disconnect relationship between the traditional rulers and that of the modern and the resultant effect suffocates development. Most communities in the Jirapa Municipality are in dire need of schools, CHPS centers, roads and other social amenities but the nature of politics in Jirapa has not encouraged this development. Again, as we all know electoral violence does not give room for investors to set up businesses in violent communities due to fear of business failure and as a result deprives the community from developing.

**Table 4. 15: Cross-Tabulation of Electoral Violence and Socio-Economic Development of Jirapa Municipality**

Variable	Yes (freq.)	No (freq.)	Total	Correlation coefficient	Sign. Level
Election violence ever resulted in destruction of properties	63	<b>118</b>		<b>0.240</b>	<b>0.076*</b>
Election violence ever resulted in the close down of public facilities	32	<b>149</b>		<b>0.160</b>	<b>0.029</b>
Election violence ever resulted in chieftaincy conflict	39	142		<b>0.260</b>	<b>0.055*</b>

NB: \* = 10%, \*\* = 5% and \*\*\* =1%

To determine the relationship between electoral violence and socio-economic development, a cross-tabulation was performed. From the analysis, destruction of properties, closing down of







commercial businesses and chieftaincy conflict have a significant relationship with socio-economic development.

What that means is that, electoral violence can lead to loss of individual assets or assets that belong to society. For destruction of property as a result of electoral violence was significant at 5% with coefficient at 0.240 which implies that there happens to be a strong connection between destruction of properties and socio-economic growth. The correlation results indicated that, for election violence and close down of public facilities was significant at 10% with socio-economic development with coefficient value of 0.160. What that implies is that any time there is electoral violence, properties shared communally are affected. Finally, election violence and sectorial or chieftaincy conflict was also significant with socio-economic development which also connotes that when there is electoral violence, it degenerates into ethnic lines which affects the economic activities of the municipality.

In conclusion, the analysis shows that, destruction of properties, closure of public properties and sectorial/ chieftaincy conflict were all significant effects associated with socio-economic development in the Municipality. The non-parametric test agreed with the response's respondents gave during the survey and therefore important the Electoral Commission and the National Commission of Civic Education develop stringent measures to dealing with cases..

**Table 4. 10: Electoral Violence's Overall Effect on Socio-Economic Development**

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Negatively	143/188	76.1
Positively	51/188	27.1
Neutral	58/188	31.0
Total		1

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**



To sum up the general perspective of respondents on electoral violence on socio-economic development, 76.1% of the respondents observed that electoral violence has affected socio-economic development negatively while 27.1% held a perception that electoral violence has not affected socio-economic development. Also, 31.0% were in a quadrant, that is, did not know if it negatively or positively affects socio-economic development of the Municipality.

In a narration, a respondent who was interviewed as the chairman of one of the political parties opined that;

*Electoral violence influences socio-economic development in several ways; thus, it gives way for the constitution to consider certain issues which might not be stipulated in it. Some of the violence may even serve as a basis for deliberation of views from the political parties hence a gateway to review our electoral process decisions continuously.*

Even though the effects of electoral violence are negative according to the majority of the respondent but Khadiagala (2010) findings also affirmed with the views of the minority that, electoral violence ensues where there is uncertainty about the legitimacy and transparency of electoral rules” and may occur by learning on elections as a platform to manifest underlying and societal issues especially in plural societies.

#### **4.5.4 Effects of Electoral Violence on Democratic Development in Jirapa Municipality**

African democracies have been tarnished by the criminalization of the electoral process with electoral violence. In the Jirapa Municipality, electoral violence has affected the electoral process and has led to numerous effects. Table 4.12 presents the results.

**Table 4. 11: Electoral Violence's Effects on the Democracy**

Electoral Violence leads:	SA	A	N	D	SD	M	SE	ST. D
<hr/>								
To disregards for constituents								
voting rights	20%	40%	16%	16%	8%	2.52	.24576	1.2288
<hr/>								
To low interest in political								
activities	32%	54%	8%	6%	-	2.08	.20753	1.0376
<hr/>								
Affects consolidation of								
democracy and coexistence	-	24%	32%	28%	16%	3.36	.20720	1.0360
<hr/>								
To hatreds and prohibition of								
constituents from expression								
of political opinion.	4%	44%	16%	36%	-	2.84	.1973	.9865

**Source: Field Survey (2021).**

SA (strongly agree), A (agree), N (neutral), D (disagree), SD (strongly disagree), M (mean), SE (standard error) and ST.D (standard deviation).

On the effect of electoral violence on the development of political democracy, the results indicated that three of the statements had standard deviation of more than 1.0 which connotes that there were extremes in the scoring. The highest standard deviation for the statements was 1.228 which reveals there were extremes in the scoring. In the statement “Electoral violence leads to disregards for constituents voting rights”, 20% and 40% of the voting rights scored for strongly agree and agree while 16% each scored for strongly disagree and disagree respectively.

This reveals that respondents spread their responses to both the positive and negative direction of the effect of electoral violence on development of democracy, indicating a high standard deviation experienced. In contrast, one of the statements had standard deviations less than 1.0 which reveals there was no extremes in the respondents’ scores to the statements, hence statement was a good





measure. The statement “electoral violence leads to hatreds and prohibition of constituents form expression of political opinion” had the lowest standard deviation of 0.9865. The percentages show that 4% and 44% of the respondents scored for strongly agree and agree while 16% of the respondents scored for disagree.

Second, the results of the study revealed that 24% of the respondents agreed that electoral violence affects consolidation of democracy and coexistence. The findings too revealed that 86% of the elderly agreed that electoral violence has reduced interest of people in participation in political activities. The highest mean was 3.36 with the lowest mean being 2.08. This shows that respondents took a positive position (above 1.0). All the statements had a mean of 2.7. This indicates that the general position was that the respondents agreed with the prepositions presented on the effect of electoral violence on the development of democracy in the Jirapa Municipality.

On average, the scores of the responses of the respondents on the effect of electoral disturbances on the growth of democracy was 55% which implies that generally, respondents agreed that electoral violence affects the enhancement of democracy in the municipality. The results of the effect of electoral violence on political democracy concurred with wide literature. Agyemang (2013) observed that in every electoral process the rights of the major stakeholders (Voters) must be protected in deepening democracy.

In a situation where the electorates have no trust and confidence in the electoral process then the purpose of the practice of democracy is totally defeated and not necessary and of no importance to the development of the country. Once elections have been accepted as the surest way to have a good democratic governance it therefore becomes elusive if the electorates do not have the outmost opportunity to exercise their franchise devoid of any challenges. And so therefore the electoral

process must be free, fair, transparent and credible enough and where the best candidate wins the elections without any favour. By this, it is also important to protect the sanctity of the voters where their rights must be protected and upheld by the EC and the NCCE. For instance, it is a fundamental human and inalienable right of franchise by electorates unfortunately political participation is not well enforced as some people always deliberately refused to cast their vote and many others with reasons of the characterization of violence in the elections. The nature of Ghana's elections have discouraged a lot more people from participating to choosing their leaders to rule over them as elections have now become for the physically strong and energetic ones and not for the weak or vulnerable as witnessed in Akwatia and Odododiodioo in 2012 and 2020, Ayawaso west-wuogun 2019, Techiman, 2020, ( UNDP, 2020) and many others. This therefore places constraints on the growth of political democracy in Ghana. The results indicate that elections with high and varying degrees of tensions or incessant disturbances slows the consolidation of democracy.

**Table 4. 12: Cross-Tabulation on Electoral Violence and Democratic Development**

<b>Electoral Violence leads:</b>	Yes (freq.)	No (freq.)	Total	Correlation coefficient	Sign level
To disregards for constituents voting rights	113+	68	260	<b>0.174</b>	<b>0.003***</b>
To low interest in political activities	98+	83	260	<b>0.185</b>	<b>0.021*</b>
Affects consolidation of democracy and coexistence	97	84	260	<b>0.109</b>	<b>0.001***</b>

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To hatreds and prohibition of constituents from expression of political opinion.	134	47	260	<b>0.216</b>	<b>0.001***</b>
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NB: \* = 10%, \*\* = 5% and \*\*\* = 1%

Source: Field Survey (2021).

The cross-tabulation between electoral violence and development of democracy indicates that there is a significant relationship between disregards for constituents voting rights due to electoral violence and development of democracy. From the assessment, disregard for constituents voting rights and development of political democracy was significant at 1% which indicates that there is a strong association between the two variables.

Again, lower interest in political activities due to electoral violence and development of political democracy was found to be significant at 5%. What that means is that there is an association between development of democracy and lower interest in political activities. Furthermore, problem with consolidation of democracy and coexistence due to electoral violence and development of democracy was found to be significant at 1% which implies a strong association between the two variables. Hatreds and prohibition of constituent's form expression of political opinion as a result of electoral violence was significant with democratic development in the district.

In conclusion, the analysis shows that, all the variables measured against the development of democracy in the Jirapa Municipality were significant which implies that in any occasion electoral violence occurs in the municipality, it will affect the democratic development. As revealed by the test of linearity, electoral violence leads to poor consolidation of democracy and coexistence, decrease people interest in political activities, creates a room for hatreds and prohibition of



constituents from expressing their political opinion and disregard for constituents voting rights. Therefore, it is important that the responsible bodies entrusted to protect the rights of every citizen be socially and politically responsive.

Literature available indicated that electoral violence usually accompanies with hatred and prohibition of constituents from expression of their political opinion, downgrade the interest of constituents in participation of political activities, and thwart the effort of enhancing democracy and co-existence among the people (Agyemang, 2013). What that means is that, to promote the growth of democracy in Ghana and the Jirapa Municipality, it is important that political parties should be seen infusing peace talks in their campaigns and messages in their politicking particularly during their rallies, events and peace walks to inspire the youth and also through the involvement of all stakeholders to ensure the consolidation of peace before, during and after the elections. Political parties are formed with the intention of winning elections and so therefore without any democracy there certainly would not be the need for political parties.

Political parties have the strong likeness of using the unemployed youth in causing electoral violence, it is therefore important on political parties to desist from this act. The issue of the winner takes all is yet another reason why electoral violence occur. The promulgation of the 2008 Political Parties Code of Conduct which was supposedly meant to address a number of electoral violence issues appeared not in operation as there is still the existence of foul language in our body politics. The National Enforcement Body of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) need to live up to expectation.





#### 4.6 Practical Solutions for the Prevention of Electoral Violence in Jirapa Municipality

This section analyzed how electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality could be prevented. The researcher therefore asked the respondents to give an account of some practical solutions to this emerging issue of electoral violence. All the respondents agreed that the effects of electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality and for that matter Ghanaian societies are very bad hence requires an advanced management strategy.

The researcher conducted an interview with a Police Commander who shared this view;

*One practical way of ending electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality is creating employment opportunities for the many unemployed young ones who are oftentimes used during elections. We must also be interested in educating these teeming unemployed youth to rather engage themselves in more profitable ventures than roaming aimlessly and causing mayhem when being hired by their pay masters who usually will use them for their political gains at the expense of their development.*

The Constituency Chairman for National Democratic Congress, Jirapa during an interview appeared disturbed about the nature of elections in Jirapa and alluded that their opponent are masters of electoral violence and has a long history to that effect. He said;

*Our political rivals over the years have used the vigilante groups to cause mayhem and chaos in our elections, but it seems that the offenders of these electoral violence are usually left off the hook and so therefore the intensity of these violence. The law courts must be seen prosecuting these offenders who sometimes visit some form of distress to innocent*



*people during elections. For the future of these young ones, we must be interested in disbanding these vigilantes' groups for us to smoke the peace pipe.*

Municipal Director of the NCCE was also interviewed on his view on practical strategies of ending electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality.

*He vehemently lamented that the inadequate resource nature of their outfit makes it difficult to effectively sensitize the populace on electoral issues. Our organization is under resource and sometimes how to run the vehicle for public education is a serious challenge and thus affecting our work performance in sensitizing the electorates primarily on the electoral processes so as to advise them to eschew electoral violence particularly the youth. The hostile nature of elections in the municipality is a serious concern and all hands must be on desk to address these teething issues of worry.*

Convention Peoples Party Youth Organizer lamented over the nature of some local chiefs in their communities. He precisely indicated this;

*We have seen some chiefs involving in active politics in our communities. Some of these chiefs have been given motorbikes and other items from our opponents to galvanize votes from the community for them. Some chiefs have openly declared to their subjects to vote for a particular political party for development, even though we are aware that some of us the politicians have relatives who are chiefs but it's important that chiefs who are traditional leaders should desist from active politics. This is one way we can build unity in development of the constituency.*



When an officer of the Electoral Commission was interviewed concerning practical ways of solving the electoral violence in the municipality, it was obvious that this officer was bitter about elections in Jirapa and had this view;

*In fact, the escalation of electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality is a disturbing menace and giving all the electoral officers here sleepless nights. Any activity by the Electoral Commission is met with serious suspicion from the political parties even to the extent of taggery. We all have been tagged as either belonging to NDC or NPP from the two major political parties whose supporters largely are the cause of electoral violence in the municipality. One way of ending this electoral violence will be to engage the leadership of the various political parties more though education on the electoral systems and if people are aggrieved and how they can seek redress instead of rampaging. Again, the politicians contesting elections must have a round table discussion with the Electoral Commission officers and also be advised to be disciplined in their politicking.*

Progressive peoples party youth organizer for Jirapa constituency had this assertion about the Electoral Commission;

*The Electoral Commission of Jirapa should ensure that there is very effective electoral education to the people on what constitute an election; thus, the processes, systems and stages. The promotion of social integration is one of the most effective mechanisms to build trust in the electoral process and to curb tensions that can lead to the outbreak of violence. Key activities should include voter education, peer-to-peer advocacy, engagement with the media, creation of structures of dialogue among stakeholders and direct engagement with vulnerable populations. Again, disbanding vigilantism, provision of technical and*

*logistical support to NCCE and the EC, pressing charges against offenders in electoral violence and preaching peace by the various politicians are vital to ending the municipal electoral violence*

However, opinions shared by these respondents recognized that there are no existing laws that focus primarily on electoral violence, but that specific laws are in place to tackle crime and disorder. During the interview of the electoral officers, they disclosed that parliament had passed a law to tackle electoral violence and other related Offenses. This law now known as the Vigilantism and Related Offenses Act, 2019 (Act 999) following directives from the president on the back of the fallout from the Ayawaso West Wuogon constituency by-election violence. It was also revealed that engaging the youth through entrepreneurial skills and some form of education to enhance their livelihood instead of being recruited and exploited for electoral violence by the politicians was identified as one way of addressing the menace.

An engagement with another constituency youth organizer of one registered political party had this sad narration;

*Some of the youth engage in electoral violence as a result of unemployment. A friend was a victim of electoral violence from a different political party and we all advised him to desist from the act but he blatantly refused as he was promised loftily by their masters to work for them to win political power and sort them afterwards. Unfortunately, as we talk, he is no more, he lost his life during elections violence and was hit with an object, got admitted at the hospital and eventually died some days after the elections. These*



*unemployed young people are usually the conduit for some unscrupulous politicians to use to perpetrate crime and violence during elections.*

The findings implied that youth unemployment is a key driver to electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality and this was clearly delineated in the conceptual framework which has the underlying factor as Clientelism. It is therefore imperative for government and its development partners to create jobs for the teeming unemployed youth in order to avoid electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality as respondents' assertion confirmed IPI (2012) and Laakso (2007) that the presence of a large unemployed youth population increases the possibility of electoral violence.

NPP Political Party chairman in an interview expressed.

*I think that the Electoral Commission should ensure the recruitment of competent electoral officers to effectively conduct elections in a free, fair and transparent manner in the municipality instead of appointing apparanchiks of the incumbent political party. The electoral officers are seen as the overall judges when it comes to the final stage of election (declaration of results). At this stage any bad influence of the officer can lead to electoral violence and where corrupt electoral officers are been suspected, such people should be avoided from occupying positions in the Electoral Commission to avoid electoral disturbances.*

Municipal Cordinating Director was engaged in an interview for practical solution to electoral violence in Jirapa and the comments were;

*Electoral monitoring and observation must be frequently employed to help play an important role in ensuring accountability and reduce the chances of impunity. This would*



*aim to produce assessments concerning the fairness and legitimacy of the polls based on solid documentation.*

## **Conclusion**

In Conclusion, Multiparty electoral violence was throughout the electoral cycle, thus, before, during and after elections in the Jirapa Municipality of the Upper West Region. The perpetrators of this violence included the leadership of the various Registered Political Parties, Political Party Agents and Party Foot soldier through the vigilante groups who were used in the form of Clientelism. These people engaged in electoral violence to delay, cancel, or to discredit elections as a way of favoring their preferred candidate in an election in the Municipality. As a result, electoral violence negatively affected political participation and decision making in choosing the political leaders in the Jirapa Municipality. The concomitant effect of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality are injuries, destruction of properties and voter apathy.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the findings from chapter four (4) with the view to ensuring the research objectives designed to address the challenges identified in the study. A summary and conclusion section are drawn and recommendations have been offered in advancing practical solutions to ending the Jirapa municipality electoral violence.

Based on the research objectives, the literature was reviewed in areas such as the forms of electoral violence, causal factors of electoral violence, effects of electoral violence on inclusive multi-party democracy and practical solutions for the prevention of electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality of Upper West Region of Ghana. The study was grounded on the Clientelism Theory. The study adopted the descriptive cross-sectional survey design with a concurrent mixed method data collection approach, pragmatic as a philosophical worldview was considered. The population of the study included all residence in the Jirapa Municipality from 18 years and above, the officials

of the Electoral Commission, all registered political parties, the Municipal Security Council (MUSEC) and NCCE in the Jirapa Municipality. Both the probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed in this research. The cluster sampling technique, simple random, convenience sampling techniques and purposive sampling techniques were employed in this study. A total of 203 respondents were selected for this research. Close-ended, open-ended Questionnaires, structured and semi-structured interview guide were used for data collection under this research. Data collected was analyzed descriptively and thematically.

## **5.1 Major findings**

The overarching objective of the study was to analyze the effects of electoral violence on multi-party democracy in the Jirapa municipality of the Upper West Region. The findings are done under the specific research questions that guided the study.

### **5.1.1: Forms of Electoral Violence in the Jirapa Municipality.**

The study revealed that majority of the electoral violence occurred during the elections, some respondents indicated before and after elections. Further assessment revealed that electoral violence was also experienced during compilation of any new voter register and during exhibition of the voter register. The study revealed that most of the perpetrators of electoral violence were always party foot soldier through the vigilante groups who are used in the form of Clientelism. Leadership of the various registered political parties were equally identified as perpetrators of electoral violence including the political party Agents and the Electoral Commission officials.



The study revealed that majority of the electoral violence take the form of protest/demonstrations. Intimidation/harassment, snatching of ballot boxes, the use of state security, boycott of elections and accusation and counter accusation from politicians were all revealed. It was discovered that, none physical attacks, widespread physical attacks and targeted murder were perpetrated. Inter-party, intra-party and local government elections were identified as the types of electoral violence experienced in the municipality. Again, victims of these electoral violence were usually the opposition parties and their supporters, the EC and the media including women, the youth and the vulnerable group are the main victims of electoral violence. On the aspect of duration of electoral violence, it was believed that it could take one day, one week, one month or even more than a year.

#### **5.1.2: Causal factors of Electoral Violence in the Jirapa Municipality.**

Majority of the respondents revealed that people engaged in electoral violence to favour a candidate in an election. The study also revealed that people engaged in electoral violence to delay, cancel, or to discredit elections.

The results of the study showed that electoral violence in the municipality were as a result of high level of youth unemployment, incumbent party seeking reelection, inadequate education on electoral processes and procedures, electoral fraud and injustice towards opposition parties, support of hooligans by political parties and unlawful disqualification of candidates in a political contest.

#### **5.1.3: Effects of Electoral Violence on Inclusive Multi-Party Democracy.**

The study observed an overwhelming majority of the respondents asserted that electoral violence has negatively affected the Jirapa municipality and this has resulted into fear, panic, and intimidation and inciting people against the opponent. All these contribute to high voter apathy in



the Jirapa municipal elections. This negatively affects political participation and decision making in choosing their political leaders for development.

The study revealed that electoral violence in the municipality has led to destruction of properties, and close down of some commercial facilities which initially were used for economic activities invariably affects socio-economic development of the municipality.

It was also discovered that, despite the fact that some youngsters registered during the voter registration but they often refused to cast their ballot, also some were being denied the opportunity to vote on some eligibility issues and the vulnerable group are not patronizing the Jirapa municipal elections due to the hostile nature of elections.

The study revealed that electoral violence led to hatred and prohibition of constituents from expression of their political opinion, consolidation of democracy and co-existence, demoralizes the interest of peoples' participation in political activities and violation of constituents voting rights which invariable affects the growth of political democracy in the Jirapa Municipality.

#### **5.1.4: Practical Solutions for the Prevention of Electoral Violence in the Jirapa Municipality.**

Majority of the respondents revealed that creation of job opportunities for the youth will go a long way to enhance a more free, fair and transparent elections in the municipality. These jobs can even come in the form of entrepreneurial skills acquisition for the youth to discourage them from involving in electoral violence.

Again, the issue of ensuring punitive measures being meted out to culprits of electoral violence must be upheld. Some respondents believed that these perpetrators who sometimes are left off the hook influence other youth who are also desirous of committing such crimes.



Almost all the respondents agreed to disband vigilantes' groups which have been identified as the main cause of electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality. The NCCE low resource wise has also affected them to conduct effective sensitization on electoral processes and procedures to discourage people of involving in electoral violence.

It was also revealed that, some chiefs are engaged in active politics because of development in the communities, which sometimes bring agitations and breeds electoral violence in communities and so therefore their practical solutions were that chiefs should desist from active politics. It was also underscored that stakeholder engagement of the various political parties' leadership by the Electoral Commission would be one way of ending electoral violence in the municipality.

The Electoral Commission provided a practical solution of encouraging politicians to be disciplined in their politicking as one lasting way of also ensuring that their followers eschew violence. It was also revealed that logistical and technical support should be provided by government and other partners to NCCE and EC to enhance an improved electoral system.

The recruitment of competent electoral officers, preaching peace and effective and enhanced electoral monitoring and observation were discovered as practical solutions to ending electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality.

## **5.2 Conclusions**

It is an undisputable fact that Ghana has enjoyed the relative peace and stability in almost three decades now which marked success in the country's electoral history. However. There still exist some gaps. Previous elections have not been devoid of acts of violence. It is believed that for peace to continue to prevail there must be the need for everybody to be working towards it and so therefore state institutions and organizations cannot do it all. Individuals all need to put their hands

on desk to ensure the relative peace, tranquility and stability continue to be the promoter of Ghana's development (Aning and Danso, 2012).

The study made valuable understanding into the pattern, causes and implication of electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality of Ghana.

Majority of the respondents indicated that electoral violence has a retarding effect on the socioeconomic progress of the people of Jirapa municipality. Private investors usually will not like to do business in electoral prone areas and for that matter the Jirapa municipality. It is therefore pertinent for government to ensure adequate funding in terms of logistical and technical support to the offices of NCCE and that of EC to enable them to function effectively as it was revealed by the respondents.

One critical issue of worry has to do with political vigilantism as one main cause of electoral violence which suffocates good principles of democracy. 90% of the respondents believed that disbanding these vigilantes' groups will go a long way to enhance an all-inclusive governance as people will freely participate in decision making by choosing their leaders for sustain development.

It was also noted that a broader stakeholder engagement with all participating political parties' leadership and their candidates should be adequately engaged by the EC and NCCE on ways of addressing grievances so as to prevent electoral disturbances. It was also discovered that adopting an effective and enhanced monitoring and observation of elections will help reduce the biases, allegations on corrupt electoral officials so as to ensure a free, fair and transparent elections in the Jirapa municipality.



The effort shall be made to ensure that Electoral Commission has robust rules, regulation of the game of electoral activities fairly in the holistic interest of Ghana political democracy, There must be independence conduit for grievances to be addressed and appeals can be made, alternative resolutions system and opinion leaders must be engaged to curtail pre electoral dispute, Effort must be made to sensitize and strengthen District Inter Party Advisory Committee, this will reduced suspicion among Political Parties, Political elites in the society must use clientelism in a positive way to bring political developments as a rapid transformation of progress and development instead electoral violence in Jirapa municipality of the Upper West Region.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The study has offered some few recommendations and suggestions in order to prevent electoral violence and ensuring inclusive democracy in the Jirapa Municipality:

#### **5.3.1 Disbanding Political Vigilantism is strongly recommended.**

Once it was discovered that Political Parties have the penchant of remote using the unemployed youth in the orchestration of electoral violence, it is therefore incumbent on political parties to desist from this act. The issue of the winner takes all has also called for the ugly side of elections where politicians banked their hope and, in many instances, politicians are prepared to die or win at all cost. Some even verbally attacked others while others instigated people to cause mayhem, maim or harm others. Institutions obligated with electoral responsibilities should be seen operating within their confines by addressing these issues through the engagement of the various political parties. The arrival of the 2008 Political Parties Code of Conduct which was supposedly meant to address a number of electoral violence issues appeared not in operation as there is still the existence



of foul language which is used un-prohibited by politicians. This and many more are the leading cause of electoral violence which the National Enforcement Body of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) should be interested in solving.

### **5.3.2 Job Creation by Government is encouraged.**

It was an established fact that, many unemployed youths were used as conduit to perpetrate violence during elections. It is therefore important to government and its development partners to see the need of job creation through entrepreneurial or skills acquisition to discourage these young ones who are often used for illegal things in elections. This would lead to an improved growth and positive progress of the municipality.

### **5.3.3 Effective Stakeholders' (Political Parties, EC, NCCE and MUSEC) Collaboration is recommended.**

From the study it was conspicuously clear that there is a big gap between the different political parties and their leadership, their supporters and Party Agents and the NCCE including the EC as well as MUSEC. EC has neglected and relegated these stakeholders as not part of the stakeholders of elections in the municipality as some political parties' leadership have bemoaned this. It gives the impression that the EC is working against them in favour of their rivals. Therefore, a collaborative approach of working together harmoniously in elections would be advised. Besides, there must be institutionalization of inter-party advisory committee and its recommendation must bind all stakeholders involved in the said elections. However, there must be strict adherence to rules and formed committee membership so that resource parties will not sponsor poor parties to



work in their interest in order to abuse the committee decision. This was clearer when the political parties did not trust the EC and the EC also lamented about taggery of the electoral officers. This would equally go a long way to avoid the unlawful disqualification of political parties' candidates in elections.

#### **5.3.4 The Non-Inclusion of Chiefs in Active Politics.**

The study identified some chiefs who are being awarded handsomely by the politicians encouraging their subjects to vote in a particular way for certain political motives. Some of these chief clandestinely campaign and support individual political parties of their choice in order to demands development transformation in their communities as returns when they win power. Most of these chiefs engage in partisan politics suffocates development, because, they will engaged their subject with the same level of political measure as the study revealed and so, chiefs as traditional rulers are revered in our traditional parlance. The study still reinforces that chief stay away from active partisan politics and rather become ambassadors of unity, peace and reinforce development for their communities.

#### **5.3.5 Peace Education by all Political Parties.**

It is therefore significant that political parties demonstrate peace through the use of peace messages in peace walks and also through their rallies including other events where the opponent parties could join to preach peace to the supporters. This would strengthen peaceful co-existence as the youth with the realization that peace is a panacea for development for the Jirapa municipality. It is an undeniable fact that without peace, there is no democracy and no need for political parties. There is no substitute for peace and so therefore it's very necessary for all stakeholders especially,



National Peace Council to engage all interested factions in order to address their concerns before, during and after the elections. This is one way that people will come to the understanding that elections is not about war mongering.

### **5.3.6 Political Non-Involvement in the Affairs of the Electoral Commission.**

The Electoral Commission of Ghana is an independent body when discharges its constitutional mandate and must operate as such with an overarching role in ensuring free, fair and transparent elections. For elections to be free, transparent and fair, the Electoral Commission of Ghana should be credible, honest and transparent in the organization and supervision of elections which must be completely free from incumbent government control. Also, Government must employ people with integrity as electoral officers and managers to independently manage elections effectively without any tension. This encompasses and superseding all activities necessary from the compilation of voters register to the elections itself and the true declaration of results to ensure a transparent, free and fair elections with all interested parties inclusive. Again, the electoral management body must be given the necessary support by government in terms of resources and logistics to enhance their operations devoid of basic and simple bottlenecks. This indeed would build the image of the Electoral Commission and political parties would have the repose confidence and trust for free, fair and credible election.

### **5.3.7 Punitive measures must be adequately meted out to Offenders by the Courts.**

It was also discovered that many young people who commit electoral crimes are left of the hook and therefore sets a bad precedence for those who are also desirous of perpetrating such offences. Our law courts must be seen to be on top of such crimes and ensure the required punishment is



meted to such individuals to serve as deterrence. The Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999) must be duly enforced by law court. Laws are made by the people and sometimes people commit crimes to test the laws and for that matter it would be expedient for legal institutions that upholds the laws of the country to be interested in prosecuting such offenders. This would serve as one way of ending electoral violence in the Jirapa municipality.

### **5.3.8 Recruitment of Credible Electoral Officers for Voter Education is advised.**

The mandates of Electoral Commission to educate citizens on electoral process and procedures. There are many instances where there are allegations of appointing party apparanchiks into the Electoral Commission of Ghana. The study revealed further instances of thuggery and corrupt officials of EC who are part of the cause of electoral violence. In every election, the electoral process must be seen clean with the participation of the various major stakeholders in sharpening the democratic decadence in ensuring violence free elections. Credible officers of the Electoral Commission would help reduce electoral violence as players of the game would have some confidence in the electoral process and procedure so as not to defeat political participation. Elections are part of the democratic practices and has become the medium of appointing the right leaders for the management of the country. Therefore, credible and competent employees are recommended in building an enhanced political democracy.

### **5.3.11 Adequately Resourcing of NCCE and EC to engage in Effective Electoral Education.**





NCCE and EC should be resourced adequately and be provided with technical and logistical support to take it upon themselves as a mandatory responsibility to educate citizens on voters' rights and responsibilities. When voters are made to know their rights and duties it would help them exercise their civic duties diligently. Voters should be encouraged to leave voting centers after voting and probably wait for the election results at home. The electorates in every election have a role to play for the integrity and transparency of the elections and this understanding must come from the NCCE and EC in educating the electorates on their roles and rights that can enhance the electoral process. The EC and NCCE should also be interested in protecting electorates' rights in exercising their franchise in every election for purposes of promoting and consolidating good democracy. The education on voters' roles and rights must be meticulously conducted by the Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Civic Education to avoid tension and frustrations with the processes.



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**APPENDICES**

**DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT**

**FACULTY OF PLANNING AND LAND MANAGEMENT**

**UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (TAMALE)**

**Dear Respondent,**

This questionnaire is meant for data collection for a study on **MULTI-PARTY ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE JIRAPA MUNICIPALITY**.

This exercise is strictly for academic purpose only, hence information given will be treated with outmost confidentiality. Information given have no injurious implication on you or the institution.

Thank you,

Please indicate your response by ticking [] or circling ( ) response category or by writing in the spaces provided.

**Section I Information on the Demographic Background of Residence**

1. Gender

A. Male []                      B. Female []

2. Age of respondent in years

.....

3. Educational Status

A. Non - Literate []    B. Basic []    C. Secondary []    D. Tertiary []    E. Others [], kindly specify .....

4. How many times have you voted in national elections? .....



**Section II. Ascertains the pattern of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality.**

1. How long have you lived in this Municipality in years?

.....

2. Have you ever witnessed any election related violence?

A. No [ ]

B. Yes [ ]

3. Which period (s) did the violence take place?

A. During the election [ ] B. After the election [ ] C. Before the election [ ]

4. Which of the following forms did election violence in the Municipality take?

A. Protest/demonstration [ ] B. Intimidation and harassment of electorates [ ] C. Security forces breaking up rallies [ ] D. The use of macho men to snatch ballot boxes [ ] E. Boycott of elections [ ] F. Accusations and counter-accusations from politicians [ ] G. Other [ ], kindly specify.....

5. Who are the perpetrators of election violence in the Municipality?

A. Politicians [ ] B. Chiefs/traditional authority [ ] C. Young people [ ]

6. What is your estimation of the intensity of the violence witnessed?

A. Widespread physical attacks [ ] B. None-physical attacks [ ] C. Targeted murder [ ]

7. Has election violence ever resulted in fatality in the Municipality?

A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

8. Who are the victims of the election violence witnessed in the Municipality?

A. Electorates/residence [ ] B. Political opponents [ ] C. Election officers [ ] D. Supporters of opposition parties [ ] E. Pressure groups/Civil society organizations [ ] F. Women/children and other vulnerable groups [ ]



9. How long do election violence lasts in the Municipality?

- A. Less than a day [ ] B. 1-3 days [ ] C. 4-6 days [ ] D. 1 -4 weeks [ ] E. More than one month [ ]

10. Which type of election does record the highest election violence in the Municipality?

- A. Inter-party election [ ] B. Intra-party elections [ ] C. Local government elections [ ]

**Section III. Analyses of the causal factors of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality.**

1. What is the motive of the perpetrators of election violence in the Municipality?

- A. To delay an election [ ] B. To cancel an election [ ] C. To favor a particular candidate [ ] D. In order to discredit election results [ ]

2. Is election violence in the Municipality influenced by chieftaincy conflict or dispute in the Municipality?

- A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

3. Is there a particular polling station or area in this Municipality in which election violence is extremely rampant?

- A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

6. Using a five point Likert Scale, rank the factors encouraging electoral violence in the Jirapa Municipality by circling the number that best appropriate your views on the statement in the table.

<b>Factors encouraging election violence</b>	<b>Completely Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Completely Disagree</b>
Inadequate political education/ low political understanding	1	2	3	4	5



High level of youth unemployment	1	2	3	4	5
Greedy nature of politicians	1	2	3	4	5
Electoral fraud and injustice towards opposition parties	1	2	3	4	5
Support of hooligans by traditional leaders	1	2	3	4	5

**Section IV. Examine the effect of election violence on political inclusion in the Jirapa Municipality.**

1. Have you ever abstained from participating in any general election due to election violence?

A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

2. Have you ever been denied political education due to election violence?

A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

3. Do you think vulnerable groups such as women and the physically challenge are encouraged to participate in general elections in this Municipality?

A. Yes [ ] B. No [ ]

4. Using a five point Likert Scale, rank the effects of election violence on political inclusion in the Municipality?

A. Reduction in voter turnouts [ ] B. refusal of young people aged 18 to register [ ] C. Low turnout during political education [ ] D. Voter apathy [ ]



<b>Effects of election violence on political inclusion</b>	<b>Completely Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Completely Disagree</b>
Low voter turnout	1	2	3	4	5
Refusal of first time voters to register	1	2	3	4	5
Non-participation in voter education	1	2	3	4	5
Voter apathy	1	2	3	4	5

**Section V. Explore the effects of election violence on the socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality**

1. Using a five point Likert Scale, rank the effects of election violence on the socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality by circling the number that best appropriate your views on the statements in the table

<b>Effects of election violence on socio-economic development</b>	<b>Completely Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Completely Disagree</b>
Election violence results in the imposition of curfews	1	2	3	4	5
Election violence negates peaceful co-existence	1	2	3	4	5



Election violence lead to shut down of schools and hospitals	1	2	3	4	5
Electoral violence leads to insecurity and stagnates economic activities	1	2	3	4	5
Election violence breeds poverty	1	2	3	4	5
Election violence degenerate into sectoral or chieftaincy conflict	1	2	3	4	5



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Thank you,

**(Interview Guide for Organizers and Chairpersons of Political Parties)**

**To ascertain the pattern of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality**

1. How will you describe the existence of election violence in the Municipality?
2. Has your party ever been involved in election violence in the Municipality?
3. How does election violence exist in the Municipality?
4. Which persons/group perpetuates election violence in the Municipality?
5. Which group or persons are the victims of election violence in the Municipality?
6. How long election violence does lasts in the Municipality?
7. Has election violence ever resulted in fatality in the Municipality?
8. Which type of election is election violence recorded the most in the Municipality



**To analyze the causal factors of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality**

9. Why do you think election violence keep occurring in the Municipality?
10. What do you think are the root cause of election violence in the Municipality?
11. Why do you think conflict has become part of election wining mechanism in the Municipality?

**To examine the effect of election violence on political inclusion in the Jirapa Municipality.**

12. How will you rate the level of political inclusion in the Municipality?
13. How has election violence contributed to political inclusion or exclusion in the Municipality?
14. Which group or persons are affected most by election violence in relation to political exclusion?
15. Which aspect of political inclusion do you think has been affected by election violence in the Municipality?

**To explore the effects of election violence on the socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality.**

16. How has election violence affected social cohesion in the Municipality?
17. What do you think are the economic effects of election violence in the Municipality?
18. What do you think can be done by politicians to avoid or minimize election violence in the Municipality?



(Interview Guide for the National Commission for Civic Education and the Electoral Commission)

**DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT**

**FACULTY OF PLANNING AND LAND MANAGEMENT**

**UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (TAMALE)**

**Dear Respondent,**

This interview is meant for data collection for a study on **MULTI-PARTY ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE JIRAPA MUNICIPALITY.**

This exercise is strictly for academic purpose only, hence information given will be treated with outmost confidentiality. Information given have no injurious implication on you or the institution.

Thank you,

**(Interview Guide for the Electoral Commission & National Commission for Civic Education)**

**To ascertain the pattern of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality**

1. How will you describe the existence of election violence in the Municipality?
2. What is the nature of election violence in the Municipality?
3. Which persons/group perpetuates election violence in the Municipality?
4. Which group or persons are the victims of election violence in the Municipality?
5. In which period do you record election violence in the Municipality?

**To analyse the causal factors of election violence in the Jirapa Municipality**

6. Why do you think election violence keep occurring in the Municipality?
7. What do you think are the root cause of election violence in the Municipality?



8. Why do you think conflict has become part of election winning mechanism in the Municipality?
9. What type of education do you give to political parties and the electorates?
10. How has the political education affected election violence in the Municipality?

**To examine the effect of election violence on political inclusion in the Jirapa Municipality.**

11. How will you rate the level of political inclusion in the Municipality?
12. How has election violence contributed to political inclusion or exclusion in the Municipality?
13. Which group or persons are affected most by election violence in relation to political exclusion?
14. Which aspect of political inclusion do you think has been affected by election violence in the Municipality?
15. How has election violence affected civic/political education in the Municipality?

**To explore the effects of election violence on the socio-economic development of the Jirapa Municipality.**

16. How has election violence affected social cohesion in the Municipality?
17. What do you think are the economic effects of election violence in the Municipality?
18. What do you think can be done by stakeholders to avoid or minimise election violence in the Municipality?

**(Interview Guide for members of the District Security Coordinating Council)**



1. What is the rate of election violence in the Municipality?
2. What are the forms of election violence in the Municipality?
3. Who are the perpetrators and the victims of election violence in the Municipality?
4. What is the motive of election violence in the Municipality?
5. Which periods do you record the highest level of election violence?
6. How do you handle election violence in the Municipality?
7. What mechanism can we put in place to minimize election violence in the Municipality?

