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STUDIES

CONFLICT FINANCING AND PROTRACTED CHIEFTAINCY

CONFLICTS IN GHANA: EXPLORING THE YENDI CHIEFTAINCY

CONFLICT

BY

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DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

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OCTOBER, 2019

I hereby declare that this thesis is a result of my own original work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

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Chieftaincy conflicts are part and parcel of the social life of most Ghanaians. These conflicts however, become undesirable when they become protracted and destructive. In trying to understand the numerous protracted chieftaincy conflicts that have engulfed the country, various authorities have attributed the causes of such conflicts to improper democratic structures, competition and government interference, among others. Apparently, scholarly works on how conflict financing - the act of spending various resources on conflicts which invariably sustain them are very much limited in the Ghanaian situation. Against this background, the Yendi chieftaincy conflict was purposely selected with the view to examine the various resources invested by interested parties which invariably protracted the conflict. Fifty-one (51) respondents and 8 key informants were selected through purposive and quota sampling techniques in a case study design. Primary data gathered through interviews and focus group discussion revealed that resources invested in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict included; the purchase and supply of arms and ammunitions, cash donation to combatants and funding of legal battles in the court, free supply of fuel to combatants, provision of strategic ideas, and purchase and supply of machetes to the belligerents. To be able to sustain the resolved chieftaincy conflict and address the problem of conflict financing, it is recommended that there should be broad conflict analysis and sectorial collaboration between the police, the military, security analysts, the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI) and the Yendi Municipal Assembly to ensure effective disarmament exercise in Dagbon. The various forms of resources invested in the conflict requires experts from various fields including bankers, the police, military, conflict resolution experts and fuel dealers to help deal with the menace of conflict financing which the study found to have contributed to the fuelling of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict.



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my beloved Mom and Dad and to Alhaj Saani, Alhaj Baba, Uncle Faruk, Hajia Sadia, Hajia Sherifa, Hajia Rukaya, Fatima, Anita Dzifa Owusu, My Lovely siblings who have shown tremendous interest in my academic affairs.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAR	Central Africa Republic
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
FGD ...	Focus Group Discussion
GCA	Ghana Census of Agric
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MDG...	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Non-Gouvernemental Organisation
NR	Northern Region
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP...	National Patriotic Party
NPC	National Peace Council
PNDC	People National Democratic Congress
SSA.	Sub-Saharan Africa
UWR	Upper West Region



1.0. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Many scholars (Alli, 2006; Axe, 2006; Bacho, 2009) on conflict have suggested that conflicts are always present in any society. Galtung (1996) has stated that, conflict is an essential component of every human society because individuals, groups, clans, classes and different organizations have competing and conflicting interests. In support of this view, Duogu (2011) sees conflict as an integral part of human behaviour and there can be no movement or change without it. Certain kinds of conflicts are a necessary and healthy part of any society (Coser, 1956). For this reason, Nyong (2007) and Deutsch (1987) argue that, the challenge is not to do away or prevent conflict but rather to manage it, transforming its expression from violent to non-violent forms. Deutsch (1987) argues that conflict prevents stagnation, it stimulates interest and curiosity. He contends it is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at. He asserts that, the social and scientific issue is not how to eliminate or prevent conflict, but rather how to have lively controversy instead of deadly quarrels. Buttressing Deutsch's (1987) assertion, Nyong (2007) intimates' that conflicts are normal to everyday life and in themselves are not bad. He argues that it is the means that are often taken to resolve conflicts that pose threat to life and the environment.

Some conflicts are productive (Simmel, 1955), yet, violent conflicts however, are generally destructive of persons and property (Barash and Webel, 2009).



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According to a Common Report of British House (2005), violent conflicts have killed and displaced more people in Africa than in any other continent in recent decades which severely challenge the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the affected countries. The Report noted that an estimated cost involved in each conflict almost equals the value of annual development aid worldwide. It further stated that new aid commitments made in 2005 could have been cancelled out if not because of an increase in conflict and insecurity in the developing countries. Development and security are thus, intimately related, one cannot be achieved without the other.

The African continent has been plagued by all forms of conflicts - ethnic violence, civic wars and inter-state conflicts, among others. The African continent continues to be engaged in one conflict after another. Over the last quarter of a century, about 20 African countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced at least one period of conflict. It is estimated that 20 percent of the population of Africa now lives in countries which have experienced conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). Michailof, Kostner and Devictor (2002) similarly have expressed that the past two decades have seen violent conflicts take an increasing toll on the hopes for Africa's development. They asserted that almost half of all African countries, and over one in three African people, are affected directly or indirectly by conflicts. Scores of lives and property have been consumed by conflicts in a number of countries on the continent. Mention can be cited of Nigeria (1967-1970), Liberia (1989-1997, 2000-2003), Kenya (2007), Sierra Leone (1992-2002) and Rwanda (1994) among others, which Dowden (1994) described as 'a terrible genocidal madness' (cited in Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003:16) where as many as 1



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million people, mainly Tutsis, were shot, burned, starved, tortured, stabbed, or hacked to death in a spate of three months (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). According to Kusimi et al. (2006), these conflicts have impacted negatively on the development of most African countries. The consequences of these conflicts on the lives of people have been very inimical. These include a slowdown in economic activities, frequent losses of life and wealth, destroying of infrastructure and settlements, indiscipline, rural-urban migration as well as mass displacement of people.

According to Okunola (1998), while conflict is part of every human community, its nature and management severally determine its effects on the society. Somehow, violent (chieftaincy) conflicts have become part of the socio-political landscape of some nations in Africa since independence. Tsikata and Seini (2004) asserted that while conflicts are not on the scale of other countries in the West African sub-region, there are longstanding conflicts involving intra-and inter-ethnic rivalries, which periodically break into violence.

Ghana is a peaceful country in an otherwise volatile sub-region. Ghana has enjoyed relative national political stability and has not experienced recurring civil wars of the types that have occurred in neighboring countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (Sirleaf, 2011; Adedeji, 2005), Guinea and more recently Cote d'Ivoire. However, the country has had its share of violent chieftaincy and ethnic clashes (Kendie and Bukari, 2012). Mention of recent destructive chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts can be cited of Bawku, Dagbon, and Wa chieftaincy conflict (Tonah, 2007; Awedoba, 2009; Kendie and Bukari, 2012). Though violent clashes do occur in the country, they are not on a scale that is assessed to influence the general peace status of the entire country. The



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most perennial and potentially violent forms of conflicts in Ghana are chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts (Kendie and Bukari, 2012). These authorities have indicated that Ghana has often been described internationally as one of the most stable, democratic and peaceful country in Africa. However, this image as a beacon of peace in Africa is marred by internecine ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts that have negative implications for local level development in these conflict areas.

There have been violent conflict incidents across Ghana, especially in the Northern Regions of Ghana. In 1996, a conflict between Kotokoli and Dagomba at the Akim Oda Zongo resulted in six deaths, the burning of ten houses and destruction of property worth millions of cedis (Hafeez, 2012). Clashes have been reported between rival royal groups at Wa in the Upper West Region in 1997. The violence left four persons dead, twenty-four others were seriously injured and property destroyed (Tsikata and Seini, 2004). Mahama (2003) and Brukum (2006) asserted that the 1994 violent confrontation between the Nanumbas and the Konkombas, rooted in interest in land and claim to paramount chiefships resulted in the death of over 600 people with loss of property estimated at several Ghanaian Cedis. Buttressing the assertion of Mahama (2003) and Brukum (2006), Addah and Zezebi (2008) indicated that before the war between the Konkombas and the Nanumbas in 1994 nicknamed ‘the guinea fowl war’, every household owned livestock. However, during the conflict most feed and water resources were poisoned or destroyed, livestock stolen or indiscriminately killed or starved to death. They further indicated that after the conflict had subsided, 23%, 16%, 12% and 21% of households could not own any cattle, sheep, goats and poultry respectively.



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Toonen (1999) in an article on the Guinea Fowl War of 1994 in the Northern Region of Ghana asserted the conflict affected inter-ethnic cooperation in the region though the situation has improved. She also claimed that medical and educational facilities in the region were also affected. In congruence, Kusumi et al. (2006) indicated that violent conflicts in Northern Ghana have affected economic development - destruction of farms and produce; prevents cultivation of lands; disrupt economic activities; discourage investment, labor flow and tourism.

Jonsson (2007) claims that the link between development and conflict exists on different practical levels. She expresses that conflicts disrupt development, destroy resources and development projects. Sharing similar view, Brukum (2007) asserts that conflicts affect educational levels and divert government's attention from tackling pressing national issues relating to development and restoring peace and order. Duogu (2011) concluded that a lot of resources earmarked for meaningful development projects and programs to improve the living condition of people are rather expended on maintenance of peace and security as a result of conflicts notably chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts.

The Chieftaincy institution was and is still the highest indigenous governance authority within centralized state systems in Ghana. The situation was however different in acephalous societies where authority resided in the family heads (Nukunya, 2003). The importance of chieftaincy to many Ghanaians is illustrated by the series of chieftaincy conflicts which have erupted in the country both in the olden days and in present times. These conflicts reveal a depth of regard by Ghanaians for traditional political authority that goes beyond



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the numerous litigations over who should or should not be a chief. It is assumed that people engage in political struggle up to the level at which people are killed, injured, property burnt or looted, when their emotions are deeply stirred. In such situations people's conceptions of authority and legitimacy are sharply challenged. Sutton (1984) writes that one of the most striking features of the records of Ghana in the colonial time was the great number of chieftaincy disputes (stool or skin disputes). Sutton (1984) argues that almost the sole preoccupation of the Department of Native Affairs was with disputes of this nature. Sutton further asserted that the 'Native Affairs' in the Gold Coast was almost by definition chieftaincy disputes.

The foregoing discussions point clearly stated how pervasive violent conflicts across the African continent and their implication for development of communities. The sustained nature of most of these conflicts has serious consequences on the socio-economic development of communities. As noted by Salim (2002), conflicts have undermined the efforts made in Africa to advance the economic and the social development of the continent. He argues that, conflicts paint a terrible image about Africa and besides, result in colossal loss of life and destruction of property. Salim indicates that, in spite of the efforts made especially, through the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution since 1993, Africa is still known more for the conflicts that prevail than anything else as this is the thing that catches the headlines internationally. Salim asserts people talk about conflicts when they think of Africa. Salim (2002) however, argues that, where there is a determination to find a peaceful solution to a conflict, no matter how grave the



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crisis may be, it is possible to attain peace. Apparently, most conflicts on the African continent have become protracted, defiling various resolutions.

Protracted conflicts are not new in Africa and in Ghana. Many armed conflicts in history, probably the majority, have been long wars. One of the earliest works of European history, written in the fifth century BCE, is the detailed history of a protracted conflict. Thucydides' famous work, *The Peloponnesian War*, is a year-by-year account of a long and vicious conflict between Athens and Sparta that lasted for 27 years, from 431 to 404 BCE. (ICRC, 2016). Armed conflicts have not suddenly got long. Wars have typically been long as well as short. Non-international armed conflicts, or civil wars, are especially persistent. The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Peter Maurer, has described the effects of protracted conflicts in stark terms:

'The impact of protracted armed conflicts and violence today is systematic and all-encompassing in too many countries: From the implosion of essential public services like health, electricity, water and sanitation to the eradication of what keeps a society going – education for its children, jobs for its adults, security for its most vulnerable. The longer wars last, the deeper the crippling effects of war. Within just a few years, decades' worth of progress and development are wiped out' (ICRC, 2016 p.15).

There is not yet a commonly accepted international definition of what constitutes a protracted conflict, or how long a conflict should last to be described as "protracted". The phrase emerged in the 1970s in the work of the Lebanese Professor, Edward Azar, who distinguished protracted social conflicts



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by their intractability and longevity – the former characteristic being responsible for the latter. In the ICRC’s report (2016), these are the two distinctive features of protracted conflict, but several other key characteristics are also significant. A conflict could therefore be said to be protracted when it has negative effects on the people, property and the state at large.

The growth and sustained nature of conflicts in Africa makes it necessary to look deeply at the likelihood factors responsible for such escalation. Gregory (2018) has indicated that the interconnections between transnational organised crime and transnational terrorism financing are increasingly evident in most escalated conflicts across the African continent. This state of affairs has created stereotype of Africa as a doomed continent with inescapable violent conflicts. Sources of financing of conflict often vary with the agenda and size of the individuals and organisation and its operations. Gregory, (2018) had a view that terrorist organisations that control substantial territory such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab constantly require increasing financial resources to expand and sustain their operations. Understanding the sources and motives of financing of these conflicts which sustain the operation of combatants in these destructive conflicts is one creative way of resolving conflicts on the Africa continent and the creative means of improving the social and economic wellbeing of the people.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Various authorities in trying to understand the numerous protracted chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts that have engulfed Ghana have attributed the causes of such conflicts to improper democratic structures, competition and government

www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh interference, among others. Akwetey (1996) for instance, argued that the absence of adequate democratic institutions is to blame for the recurring chieftaincy conflicts in the country. To him, avenues for expressing interest and demands are non-existent. In analyzing the longstanding ethno-political conflict between the Kusasi and the Mamprusi in Bawku, Lund (2003) linked the conflict to government interference in the chieftaincy matters. He asserted a wide range of political and economic competition over chieftaincy, land, markets, names of places and other issues are cut to fit the ethnic distinction as conflicts are fought over rights and prerogatives.

Yendi the study locality has not been spared of violent and protracted conflicts, particularly chieftaincy conflicts. These chieftaincy conflicts undermine the socio-economic development and progress in the Yendi Municipality. This is a major concern to the people of the Municipality since financial resources which would have been used to develop the area are now being used to maintain security in the area. The struggle for the Paramount chief of Dagbon between the Abudus and the Andanis over the years has occasionally witnessed violent confrontations between the two royal gates (Wuaku Commission, 2002).

The Dagbon state over the years has been there without a substantive overlord, Ya Na. The Dagbon chieftaincy conflict has witnessed various levels of attempts of resolution. The attempts to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict had led to the establishment of various Commissions and promulgation of Legislative Instruments including; L.I 59 of 1960; L.I. 596 of 1967, N.L.C Decree 296 of 1968; Azzu Mate Kole Commission of 1968, Ollenu Commission of 1974 and Wuaku Commission of 2002 (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995; Wuaku Commission Report, 2002; Awedoba, 2009; Tonah, 2012). Besides, the



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courts, the police and the military had featured prominently in the Yendi conflict. Apparently, the findings of these committees and bodies largely could not resolve the conflict. The Yendi chieftaincy conflict by all standard has become protracted until 2019 when the chieftaincy conflict was resolved and a new Ya Na enskinned. Some analysts in trying to understand the sustained and protracted nature of the Yendi crisis has implicated the government for meddling in the affairs of the Dagbon chieftaincy (Awedoba, 2009; Tonah, 2007).

The preceding arguments suggest that an attempt to understand the causes of chieftaincy conflicts in contemporary Ghanaian communities, and the efforts to resolve them may demand an understanding beyond what is generally perceived to be the obvious. This explains the rationale for understanding the importance of conflict financing - the act of spending various resources on conflicts which invariably sustain them but often escapes scholarly works and the knowledge of people. The questions is, *'Why in spite of the numerous deliberate attempts to resolve the Yendi chieftaincy conflict at various levels as found in extant literature, the conflict sustained until 2019 when a new Ya Na was enskinned. Could this be attributed to the issue of conflict financing?'* The irony is that while there are plethora of information on the various interventions to the Yendi chieftaincy conflict and its overall destructive nature (Mahama, 2003; Wuaku Commission, 2002; Awedoba, 2009) among others, scholarly works done on the issue of conflict financing which sustains most destructive conflicts as espoused by Gregory (2018) in the Ghanaian situation is quite limited. Financing play a vital role in sustaining conflicts in most of the conflict zones



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yet this idea often escapes scholarly works especially in the Ghanaian context.

This is the niche of this study.

1.3 Research questions

1.3.1 Main research question

How did financing help in protracting the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

1.3.2 Specific research questions

The following specific research questions were posed to guide the study:

1. To what extent resources were invested in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?
2. What have been the motivating factors for financing the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts?
3. Which factors influenced the resolution of the Yendi protracted chieftaincy conflicts?
2. What policy measures can help sustain the resolved Yendi chieftaincy conflicts?

1.4 Objectives of the study

1.4.1 Main objective

The main objective of this study is to examine how financing helped in protracting the Yendi chieftaincy conflict.

1.4.2 Specific research objectives

1. To identify the form of resources invested in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict



2. To examine the motivating factors for financing the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts.
3. To analyse the factors that contributed to the resolution of the Yendi protracted chieftaincy conflict
4. To examine the various factors that can help sustain the resolved Yendi chieftaincy conflicts

1.5 Significance of the study

This study is considered very significant in that in spite of the plethora of scholarly works on chieftaincy conflicts, peace and development in general (Kendie and Bukari, 2012; Awedoba, 2009; Brobbey, 2008; Tonah, 2007; Wuaku Commission, 2002) among others, there is little scholarly work on the role that financing played in sustaining the Yendi chieftaincy conflict and its ramification on the socio-economic development of the people which is seen as a gap. As espoused by Gregory (2018), most escalated conflicts both within and across countries are sustained by financing. This study therefore seeks to explore beyond the already existing problems so as to unearth new insights and contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the areas of conflict and conflict finance, peace and development. The findings from the study would complement and build upon existing literature on factors which contribution to protracted chieftaincy conflicts.

This study will be of great importance to stakeholders including government, the chieftaincy institution, Non-Governmental Organizations, the security services and the general public who are concerned with the sustenance of peace and development in communities and Ghana at large. It is envisaged that the



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findings from the study will orient stakeholders about the broad factors that sustain conflicts. With this understanding, they would be in a better position to take keen interest in working jointly together with the view to galvanize efforts and resources to improve and sustain the peace and development of communities.

1.6 Scope of the study

The objectives of this study among others were to examine how financing helped in sustaining the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts. The study covers the period from 1959 to 2018 with much focus on the period from 2002 to 2018. This period was selected because in the first place, various writers on the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts put 1959 as the genesis or the baseline of the conflict in modern Ghana, even though the chieftaincy conflicts predates such period (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011; Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995). More so, the period witnessed various level of violence and numerous resolution attempts (Awedoba 2009; Wuaku Commission Report, 2002).

The second reason for the selection of this period is that, the period marks the genesis of the interference of the chieftaincy institution by post-independent governments of Ghana. For instance, according to Hagan (2006:663), Kwame Nkrumah, the first post-independent Nationalist President of Ghana was said to have hyped the confrontation between the radical nationalist and the traditional ruler and even threatened that, ‘The Chiefs would run away and leave their sandals behind’. The 1957 Constitution of Ghana emphasized the authority of the central government to endorse or withdraw recognition of chiefs and



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deliberately drew no formal difference between ordinary and paramount chiefs, thereby arrogating to itself the authority to elevate or demote any chief. Even though the government could seek the advice of the House of Chiefs, its consent was of less importance (Adjaye and Misawa, 2006). The Convention People's Party (CPP) government under Nkrumah's Constitutional Amendment Act of 1959 enabled the government to dabble in chieftaincy (specifically through the Minister of Local Government) matters without regard to the Regional Houses of Chiefs as provided in the Independence Constitution (Nyamekye, 2009).

The third reason for the selection of 2018 as the cutoff point stemmed from the fact it was the year which saw the agreement between the two antagonistic royal gates, Abudu and Andani paving the way for an enskinment of a new Ya Na in January, 2019. A study which sought to understand how financing helped in protracting the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts, using such period is considered appropriate. Admittedly, a study of this nature cannot be conducted without reference to historical facts as chieftaincy issues are grounded in the custom of the people (Owusu-Ansah, 2014). This study therefore made reference to historical facts relating to the causes of chieftaincy conflicts and their resolution.

1.7 Definition of terms

C. Combatants. Refer to those who engage in hostilities including chieftaincy conflicts. The term can be used interchangeably with parties and belligerents.

C. Customary Law. Established pattern of behaviour among a specific cultural group that can be objectively verified within a particular social setting.



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C. Civil Society. An aggregation of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens or individuals and organizations in a society which are independent of the government.

C. Conflict Escalation. Is the process by which conflicts of all forms grow over time.

C. Conflict Financing. The act of spending or investing resources directly or indirectly by interested parties which invariably sustain conflicts.

C. Chieftaincy. An indigenous political arrangement by which leaders with good moral standings are selected and installed in line with the provisions of their native custom and law.

E. Ethnic Conflict. This refers to disagreement expressly motivated by a distinct group of people having historical connection, shared norms and language. The conflict could be within the same ethnic group - intra-ethnic conflict, or between two or more ethnic groups - inter-ethnic conflict.

K. King makers. Group of people who traditionally have the legitimacy to enstool/enskin, dis-stool/dis-skin royals as chiefs/queenmothers, without themselves being viable candidates.

P. Protracted Conflicts. All forms of conflicts that persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence.



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T. Terrorism. The use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create panic among masses of people or specific group or sect, or fear to achieve a religious or political aim or objective.

1.8 Organisation of the study

The study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter focused on introductory issues. Chapter Two concerns with the review of related literature on the subject area while chapter three deals with the methodological aspect of the study. The fourth chapter contains data analysis and presentation. The study concludes with a fifth chapter on the summary of key findings, conclusions and recommendations.



LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a review of literature that has been done in the area of protracted conflicts and financing of conflict. In this regard concepts and terms such as conflict, chieftaincy, conflict financing among others were thoroughly reviewed. The chapter also focuses on theoretical and conceptual framework on protracted conflicts.

2.2 Conflict

Conflicts are always present in any society. As noted by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011), conflict is a universal feature of human society. It takes its origins in economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization – all of which are inherently conflictual. Ramsbotham et al. (2011), indicated that the identity of the conflict parties, the levels at which the conflict is contested, and the issues fought over (scarce resources, unequal relations, competing values) may vary over time and may themselves be disputed. Conflict changes overtime but this process does not mean that conflict develops solely in a linear fashion. It may recede, may not develop beyond its initial stages, or may display a repetitive or cyclical dynamic (Mitchell, 1981).

Conflict is viewed by most sociologists as a social fact in which at least two parties are involved and whose origins are different either in interest or in social position of the parties (Imbusch, 1999 cited in Christopher, 2018: 26). Conflict



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is therefore conceptualized as the disagreement or dispute between/among individuals which may promote understanding or disrupts societal stability.

Himes (1980) has indicated that conflict is a purposeful struggle between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources and other scarce values. Himes' (1980) explanation points to the fact that conflict is the product of conscious intention on the part of those who are involved. Conflict is thus construed as involving the use of social power not only to neutralize, but also to injure and even eliminate opponents. Kriesberg (1998) however, argues conflict need not necessarily be violent even though it has the tendency to be destructive if unmanaged or poorly managed. Conflict thus, could be peacefully waged whilst opponents need not necessarily be defeated or, it should not resort to the destruction of properties. A well-managed conflict can bring mutual benefits to all the parties involved in the conflict (Marfo, 2018).

The explanation of conflict suggests that, it is a dualistic or symmetrical social phenomenon. The duality of conflict implies that conflict can be constructive or destructive depending on the way it is handled or managed (Simmel, 1955). Conflict in this regard could be explained as situation whereby the ideas, interests, opinions and values of a person or a group diametrically opposed by another which may impact on the conflicting parties either positively or negatively or both. As indicated by Lederach (2003), conflict is normal in human relationships and it is a motor of change. It affects people both negatively and positively. Conflict is thus neither totally functional nor totally dysfunctional in nature. It simply has the potential for improving or impairing



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growth and development depending on how we act, react or both to conflict situations (Marfo, 2018). Conflict could therefore be internal or external. That is, it could occur within a character's mind or between a character and exterior forces or point(s) of view. Conflict is most visible between two or more characters. There may be multiple points of conflict in a single story (Anstey, 1993) as characters may have more than one desire or may struggle against more than one opposing force.

2.3 Chieftaincy

Chieftaincy is one of the enduring cultural heritage and institutions in Ghana, for that matter Africa, which is deeply rooted in the ethnic consciousness of communities, providing the scope for leadership and exercise of authority (Gyapong, 2006), though the institution is more deep in some communities than others (Abotchie and Awedoba, 2006; Nyamekye, 2009). According to Cheka (2008), the chieftaincy (traditional) institution is viewed as an institution emanating from indigenous authority that draws its legitimacy, whether wholly or partially, from tribal/ethnic/cultural values of a group of people that share them. Such traditional institution has either centralized or decentralized governance systems. Whereas the centralized system exhibits the concentration of political power in the hands of a single ruler (a centralized authority) with an administrative machinery or a bureaucracy (Nukunya, 2003), the acephalous communities are stateless societies. They are otherwise called egalitarian or non-stratified societies (Abotchie, 2006). Centralized systems such as the Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Buganda (Uganda) and Ashanti (Ghana) while decentralized systems comprise a council of elders found among the Kikuyu



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and Maasai (Kenya), the gada (age-set) system of the Oromo in Ethiopia, or the Ibo village assembly in Nigeria (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2007). Corroborating ECA (2007) assertion, Nweke (2012) writes that chieftaincy refers to the traditional or indigenous political arrangements by which leaders with good moral standings are selected and installed in line with the provisions of their native customs and laws. The main essence embedded in these definitions is the preservation of the customs and traditions of the people and also the management of conflicts among or between members of the community in accordance with the customs and laws of the people. In this case, chieftaincy could be seen as the custodian of the people's cultures, norms, and practices.

According to Brobbey (2008), chieftaincy is the noun form derived from the word 'chief'. Brobbey (2008) writes that in common parlance, the term chief means the head, leader or person in charge of any group or organization. Brobbey (2008) further indicates that chieftaincy is used to mean the institution through which the system of African traditional rule is conducted. Chieftaincy is defined as an institution in that it is an enduring collection of formal laws and informal rules, norms, customs, codes of conduct, and organized practices that shape and govern human interaction (Ray and Eizlini, 2004). Consequently, Chieftaincy is one of the major, important traditional institutions in contemporary Ghana, symbolizing socio-political and sacred power vested in Chiefs, Queen-mothers and Priests in many parts of the country. The impetus for Chieftaincy studies is given a further boost with respect to its legal and constitutional status in Ghana. The Chieftaincy Act of 2008 (Act 759), for instance provides guidelines for the functioning of the various Chieftaincy



institutions, namely the National House of Chiefs, The Regional Houses of Chiefs and the Traditional Councils.

According to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is...guaranteed. The Constitution also recognizes the establishment of a National House of Chiefs made up of elected representatives of Regional Houses of Chiefs (which are also recognised), and specific terms of reference, which emphasize the advisory nature of their roles. The constitution insulates chiefs from partisan politics, though not from appointment to public office. It defines a chiefs as a person, who, hailing from appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and en-stooled, en-skinned or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.

2.4 Chieftaincy, Conflicts and Development in Africa

Chieftaincy plays a vital role in the administration of communities in Africa. The institution of chieftaincy has gained prominence in the social and political life of Africa. The expansion of influence and the quality of office holders of the chieftaincy institution are verifiable facts. Obviously, the chieftaincy institution in Africa is modernising to a high degree, and at the same time is understood as being founded on the principle of tradition (Utsaha, 1997). Chieftaincy without reference to tradition is a contradiction in itself (Hafeez, 2012). Most Africa societies have elaborate chieftaincy institutions, whose occupants ruled effectively in the pre-colonial era. Equally, there are many areas of the continent where chieftaincy institutions did not exist in pre-colonial



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times, or were simply less significant. The largest single ethnic group of this kind in Sub-Saharan Africa is the Igbo in Nigeria (Utsaha, 1997). In some of these societies, chiefs as rulers emerged only during the colonial period.

Despite the controversies that arise as to its relevance, chieftaincy continues to play an important role in the leadership of most African countries. The State in some case relies on chiefs as mediators in their relationship with the people with regards to electoral mobilization, tax collection, law and order. Consequently, chiefs develop their own ways through which they become agents on the national and local arena. According to Ray, (1996) Chieftaincy structures have a long history across the African continent. In some cases the institution predates the arrival of colonial powers while others were their creation. However, change and flexibility are as fundamental as the maintenance of traditional customs and practices in ensuring their continued importance.

During the colonial period, many chiefs were co-opted by European administrations. In some instances, colonial powers actually created chieftaincy structures, where they did not previously exist, in an attempt to create local hierarchies through which they could exert power simply by controlling the rulers (Hafeez, 2012). This definitely generated considerable resentment. Manipulation of lines of succession in order to pave way for compliant candidates into the positions of power was also common (Brooks, 2011).

However, in other African countries the long history of chieftaincy structures which predated the colonial period, meant chiefs, still resonated with people as the embodiment of culture (Hafeez, (2012). The role of chiefs is constitutionally provided for in African countries such as Botswana, Ghana and South Africa (Morgan, 2007). The continued existence of chieftaincy structures has,



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therefore, raised questions regarding their legitimacy as political actors, as these countries moved towards democracy many expected that traditional institutions would fade into the background. Indeed, in many respects, chiefs are still the allies of successive state governments in whose name a variety of functions within the State are performed (Kwame, 2012).

The image of chieftaincy has attracted different opinions, in that, it is an institution which is bedeviled with controversy and conflicts (Hagan, 2006). Also, it is perceived as an outdated institution, which can hardly be reconciled with the basic principles of democracy, which is based on elective representation. In several African States, there exists a variety of forms of traditional authorities. Until recently, studies of chieftaincy were mostly concentrated in societies which were hierarchically organized like the Mossi Dima in Burkina Faso and the Asante kingdom in Ghana (Hafeez, 2012). In spite of this, there are many other types of chieftaincy which should merit our attention. These include not only village chiefs, ward heads, but also earth priests (Brooks, 2011).

Although a considerable number of people in some African countries live in rural areas, towns continue to expand rapidly with their form of chieftaincy. Thus specific modes of chieftaincy are created which cannot be ignored in the traditional authority system today. In recent times chieftaincy has to a certain extent become a partner of the State in the area of development. This has now become even more important in an era where chiefs are required to co-operate with government so as to bring the much-needed development to their localities.



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This indeed, suggests that chiefs have to lobby governments in order to bring such development projects to their communities (Kwame, 2012).

Apparently, In Africa, especially sub- Sahara, ethnic and chieftaincy based conflicts are very common and continue to threaten the stability of the region. Some of the conflicts in Africa include the Biafara war in Nigeria and the relatively recent ones such as the Liberian Civil war, the Sierra Leone Civil war, the great lakes conflict between the Tustis and the Hutus in Burundi and Uganda, the civil war in Cote d'Ivoire, and the civil war in the Sudan. Conflicts have rolled back the development successes made in both colonial and post-colonial eras in several African Countries. It is acknowledged that insecurity in Africa has made it impossible to realize the economic development potentials of the continent (Adetula, 2006). According to Africa Business (2004) (cited in Adetula 2006:34), the cocoa industry in La Cote d'Ivoire was not only disrupted, but it also weakened the domestic economy to the extent that the government could not invest in a proposed gas project.

Violent conflicts of all forms have the tendency to severely constrain development agenda by destroying infrastructure, interrupting the process of production as well as diverting resources away from productive uses. Enu-Kwesi and Tuffour (2006) have hinted that civil conflicts in the home of Africa between 1980 and 2000 hindered development by affecting state structures and the private sector. According to a World Bank Report (2002; cited in Adetula, 2006:36) in three decades, life expectancy reduced by 10-20 years, per capita income went down by 50%, famine became endemic, health and education worsened. The Report indicated that resources diverted from development by conflicts are estimated at \$1 billion per annum in Central Africa and more than



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\$800 million in West Africa. According to Enu-Kwesi and Tuffour (2010), donors and development agencies have stated that development assistance projects have been affected in many Africa countries due to conflicts. Conflicts have non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP, 2008). Conflict has major consequence in all aspects of human development. The concern is usually that, resources that are planned for the execution of development projects are increasingly channeled to conflict management and peace-keeping activities. The various conflicts on the continent have impacted negatively on the social, political and economic development of the continent. It is important that people involved in conflict resolution and management have a fair knowledge of the types of conflicts and adopt the appropriate strategies in managing them.

2.5 Chieftaincy in Ghana

Chieftaincy in Ghana is an institution that dates back several centuries, it remains the fulcrum of Ghanaian culture. Assimeng (1999) describes chieftaincy as a bedrock of the social structure of Ghana and chiefs are seen as the repository of culture. The history of the institution differs in the various metropolis and regions of the country. While among the matrilineal Akan-speaking people, the institution seemed to have evolved right from the inception of the establishment of their polities, the same cannot be said about their Guan speaking people who seemed to have adopted the Akan model of leadership (Donkor, 2001). While in certain chiefdoms in northern Ghana such as Dagbon and Mamprugu had centralised states with clearly defined rules of succession and titles, for the many other areas, the institution of chieftaincy in its present



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form is a relatively new phenomenon resulting from a colonial imposition as part of the British indirect rule system (Kusumi, et al 2006). The chieftaincy institution is revered and held in high esteem. It is the embodiment of the spirit of the ancestors as well as the living. It provides a renewed sense of belonging as well as being a powerful catalyst for social cohesion and harmony. It also mirrors the society over succeeding generations. While male traditional leaders often play a dominant role, their female counterparts play an important complementary role in such areas as resolution of marriage and domestic conflicts (Odotei, 2006; Fayorsey, 2006). Odotei (2006) noted that in Africa as in Ghana, traditionally, queenmothers are recognised as mothers of the monarchs at the various communities, yet the highest traditional positions of leadership are mostly occupied by men. In the words of Fayorsey (2006), although the queenmother in Ashanti for instance, occupies a very strategic position, yet the chiefs have formed a conclave of male autocracy which subjugates their female counterparts. Regardless of the dominance of males in the traditional political arrangements, females still play instrumental role. In Dagbon for instance, the Gundu Naa traditional political office is occupied by a female.

Chieftaincy in Ghana is the main institution in which traditional governance revolves. The term 'chief' is used for ruler in the traditional set up. The chief is the first citizen of the town or village (Abotchie, 2006; Dankwa, 2004). As the ruler of the town or village, the chief has other office-bearers under him. The authority gets down until the ordinary citizen or subject is reached. Whereas the paramount chief rules the whole traditional area, his divisional chiefs rule the divisions under them, each town is ruled by a chief. Thus each division is made



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up of a number of towns and villages each under a chief (Busia, 1968). With this structure of the chieftaincy institution in Ghana, all Ghanaians positively claim allegiance to stools or skins of one level or another (Assimeng, 1999). The authority of a chief is shown in the form of symbols. For example, in the southern part of Ghana, chiefs sit on wooden stools and also hold wooden swords some of which are covered with gold. They have linguists who hold their staffs on official duties (Simensen 1975 cited in Anamzoya, 2009:76). Chiefs in Northern Ghana, on the other hand, sit on skins of horses. They also usually hold horse tail whisks. The chieftaincy institution plays a very important role in the socio-political affairs of Ghana.

2.6 Overview of chieftaincy conflicts in Northern Ghana

The greatest danger facing the institution of chieftaincy is conflict. The recent past has witnessed a number of destructive conflicts in Northern Ghana. If care is not taken, chieftaincy could collapse under the weight of its own conflicts (Hagan, 2006). The most serious and explosive ones were Dagbon clash between the Andani and the Abudu Gates in Yendi (Awedoba, 2009). There has been the 1980 conflict between Konkombas and Nanumbas as well as the Konkomba on one hand and Nanumbas, Dagombas and Gonjas on the other hand which has come to be known as the Guinea Fowl War of 1994. In 2000, Mamprusis and Kusasis went to war in Bawku. Dagombas also fought among themselves at Voggu and Zabzugu (Brukum, 1999). As recent as in 2018, there was similar communal violence among the people of Cheriponi over a land issue which led to the destruction of properties. Chieftaincy is at the center of several types of communal conflicts in Ghana particularly those related to ethnicity,



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succession to traditional political office and the struggle over land (Kendie and Bukari, 2012).

An examination of the root causes of chieftaincy conflicts invariably reveals a number of factors. One major theme has been lack of or improper records on succession (Hafeez, 2012). The succession system in the chieftaincy institution in many parts of Ghana is not well defined. There is an over-reliance on oral tradition in chieftaincy issues and this lends itself to varied interpretations on what is right or wrong, leading to conflicts (Kufour, 2006). Charlatans are also the cause of chieftaincy conflicts, particularly over succession to thrones. According to Bofo-Arthur (2006), these people might not even be heirs to the throne but often influence kingmakers with money among other things to have access to thrones. Also the fact that chieftaincy has been enjoying a resurgence in Ghana in recent times might account for the renewal of conflicts of this particular nature (Hagan, 2006).

Gardner (2002) has stated that the prominent causes of conflict are insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions. These factors often work in tandem. In most conflicts, the elites have and continue to play a central role in fuelling the conflicts. They are often motivated by opportunities for private gains and use discrimination based on ethnicity to achieve power. Leaders become less important in the path to conflict when the potential advantages will be conferred directly on group members. Conversely, followers are most likely to support elites when they lack alternative sources of income. Conflict emerges from a combination of underlying insecurity and inequality, colored by perceptions and acted upon by individuals with private incentives. The



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institution of chieftaincy is subject to disputes and conflicts which may be inter-ethnic, inter-community and inter-community (Awedoba, 2010).

As a result of the prestige attached to chieftaincy (Abochie, 2006), many people seek to enter the office by whatever means possible for them (Hagan, 2006). One way or the other some individual or group of persons finance some conflicts to ensure that those who become chiefs are to a great extent under their influence and control. Some people try to buy their way into chieftaincy (Busia, 1968), while others resort to violence and intimidation (Hagan, 2006). Awedoba (2010) has stated that, Kingmakers make selections that are partisan and questionable because they may have been bribed. Kingmakers may be threatened with reprisals if they fail to elect a particular candidate. With regard to the conflicts and disputes that have engulfed chieftaincy, it is often forgotten that there exist norms, rules and regulations about who qualifies to be elected and enthroned as a chief. When the rules are twisted in favour of a person who is not qualified to be a chief, naturally the seeds of conflict are sown and they soon manifest (Awedoba, 2010). An unqualified candidate may get elected and enthroned but begin his reign with a low acceptance rate which could lead to conflict (Busia, 1968). The conflict can persist when the illegitimate occupant fails to increase his credit. In some instance, legitimate chiefs can by their mistakes and high-handedness squander their initial acceptability and goodwill by becoming a liability. At this point the chief's legitimacy becomes questioned resulting in dissenting upheavals and conflict.



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The selection of chiefs to occupy a stool or skin has resulted in countless number of conflicts in almost every part of Ghana, probably due to the prestige, the wealth, the power or other perceived benefits accruing to chiefs. Candidates resort to all manner of tactics to achieve their ambition of becoming chiefs (Abossey, 2010). The proliferation of small firearms in Northern Ghana is a major concern and a grave threat to the peace of the area. Most unregistered weapons are smuggled into the area from the neighboring countries as well as from the southern part of Ghana where there is a thriving illegal industry in the manufacturing and trading of firearms (Fuseini, 2009). The frequent chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana have raised calls for a reform of the chieftaincy institution. Some people are even suggesting the complete dissolution of chieftaincy in the face of modern constitutional democratic governance (Hafeez, 2012). Abossey (2010) however, has stated that, in spite of all the numerous conflicts around the chieftaincy institution, it cannot simply be washed away or eradicated. Chieftaincy is a very important element of Ghana's political structure. The fact that the 1992 Republican Constitution guarantees the existence of chieftaincy, attest to the fact that chieftaincy has a place of importance in Ghana.

2.7 Dagbon Chieftaincy Succession Conflict

As custom and traditions of the Dagbon people evolved, it became the practice that any son of a former Ya Na who occupied any of the royal gates of Mion, Savulugu and Karaga, be it an Abudu or Andani qualifies to be considered as Ya Na in a rotating manner (Brukum, 2004). However, the regent of Karaga gate cannot migrate to Yendi to become a Ya Na, King of Dagbon (Issifu, 2015). The reason is that, Yakubu, the grandfather of Abudus and Andanis gave birth



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to three sons; Abudulai (Abudu), Andani and Mahami. Abudulai and Andani managed to become the Ya Na of Dagbon in Yendi. But Mahami could not make it to Yendi before death; therefore, his children could not become a Ya Na over Dagbon since their father Mahami did not make it to the ultimate throne in Yendi as Na Ya. Nevertheless, Mahami's descendants can end and serve as a regent of Karaga because the successor of Mahami was able to migrate from where his father ended at Kore to Karaga (Aikins, 2012). This custom existed until 1954 when Abudus tried to import a strange practice of Primogeniture right of inheritance belonging exclusively to the eldest son into the Ya Na throne. This according to Aikins (2012) is purported to be the main source or cause of Dagbon chieftaincy conflict.

Significantly, manifestation of the conflict was seen in 1954 when Ya Na Abudulai III succeeded his father (Na Mahama Bla III) (Issifu, 2015; Owusu-Ansah and McFaraland, 1995). After fifteen years, Ya Na Abudulai III died and an attempt by some elders succeeded in imposing Mahamadu Abudulai IV, a regent from the Abudu gate as successor to his late father. Because of that, there were complaints that pro-Abudu strategy was adopted to protect the interest of the Abudulai family and ultimately eliminate the Andani family from the contest of the throne (Sibidow, 1970). Meanwhile, the Mion Lana Andani, a regent of Mion was the right person to have succeeded the late Ya Na Abudulai III as custom demands (Aikins, 2012). Later, impartial king makers from Dagbon Traditional Council had Mahamadu Abudulai IV from the Abudu gate deskinned based on recommendations of the Ollenu Committee in 1974 after sufficient evidence had been adduced and found that he was illegally enskinned



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(Mahama and Osman, 2005) to allow the Mion Lana Andani from the Andani gate to be installed as the Ya Na. *“Indeed, if the regent, Mahamadu Abudulai had been installed, this would have been the third time since 1948 that the Abudu gate would have occupied the throne to the exclusion of the Andani gate”* (Aikins, 2012: 21). The deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV is also one of the major sources of the conflict because, “You do not destool a Ya Na” in Dagbon (Tsikata and Seini, 2004: 33). According to Ahorsu and Gebe (2011), the Andani family called for the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV for not being properly enskinned according to Dagbon customs and traditions.

However, Mahamadu Abudulai IV and his Abudu allies did not recognise the Mion Lana Andani when he was enskinned as the Ya Na Yakubu Andani II (Tonah, 2012). After about three decades, the deskinmed Mahamadu Abudulai IV died and there was the need to bury him. The Abudus wanted to perform the funeral rites of the late Mahamadu Abudulai IV just as any other legitimate Ya Na and also bury him in the Gbewaa palace. Meanwhile, to benefit from such customary burial, one must have been a legitimate Ya Na who had passed on. The Andanis prevented the Abudus from performing late Mahamadu Abudulai IV funeral rites in the Gbewaa palace because according to them he was not a legitimate King before passing on (Issifu, 2015). This brought a severe clash between the two gates and it took the intervention of the Regional Security Council, District Security Council police, military National Peace Council and some Civil Society Organisations to ensure relative peace in the area (Aikins, 2012).

Nevertheless, the main issue that led to the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II actually began during the preceding Eid-ul-Adha and Bugum/Fire festival when



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the regent of late Mahamadu Abdulai IV (the deskinned) tried to perform certain rituals reserved only for the legitimate Ya Na. The legitimate Ya Na, Yakubu Andani II was not happy about this as he perceived was an affront to his authority as overlord of the Dagbon (Tonah, 2012). It is alleged that both gates paraded some weapons and decided that the Bugum/fire festival would determine who really controlled Yendi.

In March 2002, there were reports in the Ghanaian media that the two factions, the Abudu and the Andani gates were preparing for war (Tonah, 2012). Issifu indicated that on 23rd March, the government, acting upon the recommendations of the Northern Regional Security Council, imposed a curfew on Yendi and cancelled the celebration of the Bugum/Fire festival. The curfew was lifted by the then Regional Minister after consultation with the Ya Na for the celebration of the festival (Yakubu, 2005). Ya Na Yakubu Andani II also assured the then Regional Minister that there would be no disturbances during the celebration of the festival (Tonah, 2012). The Abudus on the other hand were embittered by the decision to lift the curfew and claimed that if they could not celebrate the Bugum/fire festival, nobody else should. Citing a police source the report indicated that as the time approached for the celebration of the Bugum/Fire festival at Yendi, Ya Na and his elders received threats from unidentified groups of people to the effect that they (the unidentifiable group) were planning to disrupt the festival scheduled for Monday night. As a result of this, tension started mounting in the Yendi Township thereby, prompting the Yendi District Security Council to hold an emergency meeting to decide to re-impose a curfew to avert any unrest (Ahiave, 2013).



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None of the sides was able to celebrate the festival which intensified their anger. On March 25th 2002 an attack on an emissary of the Ya Na by a group of Abudu youth and the destruction of his bicycle ignited violent conflict between the two sides (Tonah, 2012). This led to hostilities which continued for three days and eventually resulted in the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and forty (40) others including his elders on 27th of March, 2002 (Tsikata and Seini, 2004; Macgaffey, 2006). The Wuaku-Commission Report (2002), however put the death toll at 29. The news of Ya-Na's assassination was widely reported in the Ghanaian media. Reporting under the caption 'YA-NA KILLED', both The Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian Times reported on Thursday 28 March 2002 that Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, King of Dagbon, had been reportedly killed in renewed clashes between the factions in the Dagbon Chieftaincy Dispute on Tuesday night. Whereas The Daily Graphic reported that twenty-four (24) others were killed with him, The Ghanaian Times on the other hand put the figure at twenty-five 25 (Daily Graphic, 2002; Ghanaian Times, 2002).

2.8 Effects of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

Conflicts inflict human suffering through death, disrupt the production process and create conditions for insecurity. Since 1990, more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall, 2005). As noted by Enu-kwesi and Tuffour (2010), violent conflict is responsible for perpetrating misery and underdevelopment in the continent of Africa.

The Yendi violent chieftaincy conflicts have affected the people and Ghana as a whole in several ways. In 2002 alone, a number of people were murdered in



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the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict including the Ya Na as well as the destruction of 36 houses (Tonah, 2012). The atrocity generated a series of conflicts all over the region including Tamale, Yendi and Bimbila (Issifu, 2015). Properties valued at billions of Ghanaian Cedi's were destroyed. Hence, the government of Ghana had by the end of October spent more than six billion Cedi's on the Dagbon crisis which erupted in March 2002 and spent about 6.5 million Cedi's on the Dagbon crisis when Ya Na Yakubu Andani II was murdered (Brukum, 2007). The cost is just the tip of the iceberg, because there are many other expenses which could not be quantified. In 1994, the government claimed to have spent six billion cedis (C 6,000,000,000) in maintaining peace in northern Ghana alone (Brukum, 2006).

According to Dr. Addo Kuffour, former Minister for Defence, the government of Ghana spent over seven billion Cedi's (US \$9 million) in 2002 to maintain the fragile peace in Dagbon (IRIN, 2013). The money was used to feed security forces deployed in the area as well as for the provision of logistics and equipment to the security troops to help maintain peace in the area (IRIN, 2013). If it were not for the conflict, these monies could have been used for humanitarian and progressive services in the provision of social development like building of schools, clinics, market centers, libraries, job creation etc., and not for the constant peacekeeping efforts in the area.

More so, the Dagbon chieftaincy violence adversely affected production, marketing and investment in agriculture and most dominant economic activity in the Yendi and Tamale Metropolis. During the outbreak of the violence, farmers engaged in the cultivation of perishable foodstuffs such as watermelons, tomato, pepper, onions among others. Farmers abandoned their crops because



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they feared being attacked on their farms. Also, transportation networks were disrupted during the violent clashes as farmers were unable to transport their foodstuffs to the market centers. This resulted in the foodstuffs rotting on the farms, leading to a shortage of agricultural products (Anadani, 2015).

Besides, the severe violence and insecurity in the Metropolis resulted in most financial institutions being unwilling to grant loans to farmers to invest in food crop and livestock production. More so, livestock were looted by some conflict entrepreneurs (Issifu, 2015). According to Ziem (2012), Mr Dokurugu, a Board Member of the West Africa Network for Peace Building argued that the Dagbon conflict has now become a business to certain people in both the Abudu and Andani royal gates rather than a chieftaincy problem and many of them will not be able to feed themselves and their families when the two feuding families finally decide to reconcile.

It is also acknowledged that basic human rights were abused during times of violent conflicts which the Dagbon crisis is no exception (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). For instance, some of the soldiers who were called upon to restore calm and peace during the 2002 Dagbon chieftaincy conflict allegedly ended up brutalising people (Issifu, 2015). The police at some point in time refused to protect citizens. The police surprisingly turned away several fugitives seeking refuge at the police station during the conflict (Wuaku Commission, 2002).

Another effect of the Dagbon conflict is that it forced many youth, vulnerable women and children to migrate and settle in the cities of Accra and Kumasi (Wuaku Commission, 2012). Their presence in the cities added up to the already existing social and environmental challenges in the areas. Between the periods



of 2002 and 2003, the number of head porters popularly known as ‘Kayaye’ increased when the conflict was at its peak and curfews were placed on Dagbon (Issifu, 2015). As noted by Ahorsu and Gebe (2011), the conflict caused a relentless internal migration to the peri-urban periphery of southern Ghana including Accra. Additionally, the conflict affected social cohesion and community mobilisation. The two gates remain suspicious, do not trust each other and do not attend each other’s social functions. The violence in Dagbon has also affected health care delivery and education adversely, the health cost of the violent clashes included deaths, injuries, ill health and psychological disorders among the residents. The situation placed a lot of stress on the limited health infrastructure and personnel in the area. The frequent curfews imposed also affected academic standards because students could not go out to access the libraries; teachers who held evening classes for students were also affected since their movement was restricted (Issifu, 2015).

The destruction of infrastructure like schools, water and health facilities during the violent conflict also negatively affected social development in Dagbon (Canterbury and Kendie, 2010). Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) argued that the Dagbon conflict have been characterised by the wanton destruction of life and property, development reversals, serious abuse of human rights, and suffering, especially among the vulnerable.

2.9 Approaches to resolution of the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts

In the view of Nyong (2007), the challenge societies face basically is not about the occurrence of conflicts but most especially, how these conflicts are resolved when they evolve. Nyong (2007) intimates conflicts are normal to everyday life



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh and in themselves are not bad. He argues that it is the means that are often taken to resolve conflicts that pose threat to life and the environment. In a similar vein, Salim (2002) argues that, where there is a determination to find a peaceful solution to a conflict, no matter how grave the crisis may be, it is possible to attain peace. The Yendi chieftaincy conflicts have witnessed various levels of interventions including; military and police, Commissions and Committees of Inquiry, the court and the chieftaincy institution.

2.9.1 Military and police intervention

The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence through the National, Regional and District Security Councils, have been useful in conflict management and peace building in Dagbon over the years. Military and police were deployed to protect lives and properties in Dagbon. Following the exchange of gunfire in Yendi that lasted for three days (25th to 27th March 2002) leading to the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, and a military and police contingent were deployed to re-enforce the existing detachment. Their duty was to protect lives and properties as well as to monitor and enforce the state of emergency that was imposed on Yendi, Tamale and other catchment areas (Issifu, 2015).

2.9.2 Commission of inquiry

After the events of 25th to 27th March 2002 both the Abudus and Andanis as well as other individuals, institutions and groups, including opposition political parties, called on the government to institute an impartial and independent commission to investigate the conflict (Issifu, 2015). The Wuaku Commission of Inquiry was then set up by the then President, John Agyekum Kufuor, on



25th April, 2002. www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh
A three member Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Justice I.N.K. Wuaku was tasked to investigate the Yendi disturbances (Wuaku-Commission Report, 2002). The Commission in its findings indicated that, “The late Ya Na and all those killed within the Palace and its environs were killed by Abudu fighters”. The Commission also recommended the arrest and prosecution of several individuals for their alleged involvement in offences such as conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, causing unlawful damage, assault, illegal possession of weapons, and unlawful military training.

2.9.3 The role of civil society organisations

The complexity of conflict resolution demands the efforts of various actors and bodies. The Dagbon conflict has prompted the intervention of Civil Society Organisations including Faith-Based Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and specialised United Nations agencies. These bodies in their own initiatives and in collaboration with the state have played diverse and important roles in mitigating the adverse effects of the Dagbon conflict (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). Apart from the provision of relief services to the displaced during the crisis, they helped in organising sensitisation programmes aimed at educating people on the need for peaceful co-existence in Dagbon (Ahiave, 2013).

2.9.4 Committee of Eminent Chiefs

In 2003, the then President of Ghana, John Agyekum Kufour constituted a Committee of three Eminent Chiefs led by Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the King of the Ashantis. Their responsibility was to find a durable solution to the



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chieftaincy dispute in Dagbon. After a long period of deliberations and a series of negotiations, representatives of the two feuding gates in Dagbon signed a “Roadmap to Peace” on 30 March in 2006 which culminated in the burial of the remains of Ya Na (Awedoba, 2009).

The “Roadmap to Peace” enumerated five major benchmarks in the peacebuilding process to include the burial of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; the installation of the regent of the late king; the performance of the funeral of the deposed Mahamadu Abdulai IV; the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and finally, the selection and enskinment of a new Ya Na for Dagbon (Issifu, 2015). Eight years after the signing of the roadmap, only the first two proposals were implemented (Tonah, 2012) not until December, 2018 and January, 2019 when the last three agreements were fully implemented.

The Committee’s effort though seemed not totally successful over the years (Conteh, 2015), yet the recent agreement reached by the two factions culminating in the enskinment of a new Ya Na is a manifestation that conflict resolution is a complex phenomenon and has various levels of achievements. As argued by Mitchell (1981), conflict changes overtime but this process does not mean that conflict develops solely in a linear fashion. It may recede, may not develop beyond its initial stages, or may display a repetitive or cyclical dynamic.

2.10 Conflict Protraction

Protracted social conflict as Azar (2016) termed it, denotes hostile interactions between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh outbreaks of violence. The term refers to conflict situations characterized by prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation. Protracted conflicts in places such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Guatemala, Colombia, Cambodia, Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Afghanistan and Somalia have been recorded in world history since 1945 (ICRC, 2016). Short wars such as the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Arab States, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the 1991 Gulf War, and the international armed conflicts in Southern Lebanon in 2006 and in Georgia in 2008 have also characterized the period since 1945, often as particular episodes in the structure of longer unresolved conflicts. Today, conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Nigeria and countries of the Lake Chad region comprise international and non-international dimensions and look likely to form the next wave of armed conflicts that may run for many years (ICRC, 2016).

Communal groups may experience deep-seated cleavages based upon racial, religious, cultural or ethnic lines. These cleavages are characterized by continuing hostility with sporadic outbreaks of violence; and caused by the frustration of human needs for security, recognition, and distributive justice. Such identity-driven rifts are the result of an underlying fear of extinction that often grows within vulnerable ethnic groups which live with the memories or fear of persecution and massacre. Ethnic divisions and perceived threats often result in the domination of the state machinery by a single group or coalition of



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh elites who deny majority of the population access to basic human needs (ICRC, 2016).

ICRC (2016) stated that, the longevity of a protracted conflict can take two main forms. This can be marked by the longevity of one main conflict, or a series of many different conflicts. ICRC (2016) cited conflicts involved Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka and even Colombia, as linear protraction of a singular conflict. Many other protracted conflicts more typically involve a tangled history of several different and sometimes simultaneous conflicts over the same territory. Some of these conflicts have grand political aims. Others have very local goals. Many have strong criminal and economic dimensions, and many involve a range of micro conflicts that take advantage of a larger armed conflict to settle personal scores (ICRC, 2016).

Whereas protracted conflict in the last 30 years has involved a variety of distinct conflicts across different parts of these countries at different times, and with the involvement of different parties to the conflict, some other conflicts become frozen – suspended in stalemate for decades, sometimes to erupt in renewed violence at a later stage (ICRC, 2016).

2.11 The Effects of Protracted Conflict

ICRC (2016) has noted the humanitarian and other consequences of protracted conflict have been increasingly well documented over the last 30 years. Humanitarian organizations, social researchers, epidemiologists, food-security experts, human rights groups and journalists have reported regularly from the world's armed conflicts. New information technology also enables people



affected by armed www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh conflict to describe their situation directly. Many of these assessments, studies, reports and evaluations of humanitarian needs in armed conflict give very practical accounts of people's needs, vulnerability and resilience in long armed conflicts. People's experience of suffering and survival is increasingly understood, even if it is not yet equitably and reliably responded to in humanitarian appeals and operations.

In protracted conflicts, people have multiple and intersectional vulnerabilities and needs that affect different aspects of their lives. These needs extend over years and change over time during the course of the conflict. People's security and respect for their dignity remain essential needs, either continuously or episodically throughout protracted conflict, depending on changing patterns of conflict, threat and risk. As armed conflicts develop and spread, the civilian population can be exposed to direct physical threats of death, injury, rape, sexual violence, exploitation and slavery, forced displacement, family separation, unlawful detention, summary execution, unlawful conscription and forced labour (ICRC, 2016).

International policy typically describes States in protracted conflict as either failed or fragile. The analysis in much fragility theory coincides with the ICRC operational experience of State services in protracted armed conflict. Even if certain States enduring protracted armed conflict had strong and effective social and economic infrastructures before the conflict, these degrade fast because of damage, supply-chain problems, staff dispersal, brain drain, late salary payments and, sometimes, international sanctions. The inevitable rise in security budgets during conflicts frequently occurs at the expense of budgets for



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The effects of armed conflicts including humanitarian consequences, have always spread beyond national borders. The movement of large scale migrants as refugees across State borders means that neighbouring countries are often severely affected by the consequences of conflict, even when they play no direct part in hostilities. This situation has been familiar to many countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia for the last 50 years. Many States in Europe are once again experiencing what it means to cope with the humanitarian consequences of conflict (ICRC, 2016). The overspill of the humanitarian consequences of conflict from one country to another may put enormous social, economic and political pressure on neighbouring states far away from the armed conflict. This pressure and disruption can also last for decades.

The arrival of large populations increases costs and requires additional infrastructure investment in host countries. The arrival of people from countries experiencing protracted conflict may also cause significant national anxiety about the risks to social cohesion and economic opportunity. This anxiety can be politically manipulated to create new social conflicts within the host State. Without strong humanitarian leadership from governments and politicians, States managing the consequences of conflict may also become vulnerable to serious tensions (ICRC, 2016).



2.12 Preconditions to protracted Conflicts

Azar in 2015 argued that the denial of basic human needs to a large portion of the population initiated instances of protracted social violence. Four preconditions are isolated by Azar as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict namely; communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance and the State's role, and international linkages.

2.12.1 Communal content

This element, which contributes to the initial creation of protracted social conflict, consists of the fact that people involved in protracted social conflicts create their own identity groups. Azar notes that it is the relationship between identity groups and the states, which is at the core of the problem. He also cited the disarticulation between the state and society as a whole as a source of violence within a society. This precondition also involves the reliance that many people have on their social groups; because governments in areas that experience protracted social conflict are often unable, incapable or unwilling to provide basic human necessities to the population. In this regard, individuals turn to their social groups for finance and stability. As argued by Azar (2016), the resultant disconnection of society and the state as in Africa and elsewhere can be linked to the colonial legacy, which, artificially imposed European ideas of territorial statehood onto a multitude of communal groups. This results in the domination of certain identity groups over others. The dominant group isolates itself from the needs of other groups, leading to an even bigger separation



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between groups even within an ethnicity. In Azar's view, the way out is to stress national identity over individual group identity.

2.12.2 Deprivation of human needs

Azar points to the needs of security, development, political access and identity in terms of cultural and religious expression. Azar refers to these needs as non-negotiable; therefore, if these needs are not met, people will inevitably want a structural change to take place. Such a need for structural change is likely to result in a violent conflict. This in turn emphasizes Azar's theory that the deprivation of human needs is the underlying source of protracted social conflict where conflict is emphasized by the collective grievances of a group of people. To overcome this deprivation of human needs, Azar suggests that the government must offer security on a multiplicity of levels to all of the constituent population.

2.12.3 Governance and the State's role

With government being endowed with the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective goods, the government plays a leading role in the satisfaction or lack of satisfaction of minority and identity groups. Azar states that protracted social conflicts can be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs. It is said that governments, expected to be unbiased and impartial, tend to be dominated by the leading identity groups or those groups that have been able to monopolize



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power within a country or territorial entity. This creates a crisis of legitimacy in the governance of these countries. The structure of the government needs to be changed so that all citizens are equally cared for and equally represented without bias or corruption.

In Ghana, political maneuvering and implicit actions by influential individuals linked to the two gates and supported by ruling political elites who have held sensitive positions in the immediate past are said to have contributed to the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). People believe that the manipulations of historical memories to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment and hatred by some politicians and conflict entrepreneurs into the minds of the younger generation have contributed to the intractable nature of the chieftaincy conflict in Dagbon. Some politicians and conflict entrepreneurs from the two leading political parties in Ghana; the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress have aligned themselves to the Abudu and Andani gates respectively for political gains which in turn prolong the conflict (Issifu, 2015). Thus, the murder of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II on March 27, 2002, took place during a time when the New Patriotic Party government was in power for the first time (Tsikata and Seini, 2004). Hence, the Andani royal family and their sympathizers believe that they had a hand in the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II (Ahiave, 2013; Yakubu, 2005). It is also captured in the Wuako Commission's Report that, deeply intertwined with the local (Abudu–Andani) rivalry was the intrusion of national politics into chieftaincy matters in Dagbon. The Abudu royal gate, believed to be historically sympathetic to the Busia-Danquah political tradition from which the reigning New Patriotic Party emerged, considered their victory in the 2000 elections as



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an opportunity to boost political stature at the local front and re-launched grievance previously held in abeyance. This is why the Abudus had high expectations from the New Patriotic Party victory (Ahorsu and Gebe 2011). Thus, they started contesting the Ya Na's monopolistic control over certain events and ceremonies including the traditional Bugum/Fire and Eid-ul-Adha festivals, although, the Ya Na's sole control over these festivals had never been called to question (Wuaku-Commission Report, 2002). The National Democratic Congress used the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II as a key campaign message in the 2004 and 2008 general elections. Indeed, the party promised in its 2008 election manifesto to set up a new and truly non-partisan and independent presidential commission to look critically into the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and his elders in March 2002 and bring culprits into justice (Tonah, 2012).

Extant literature indicated that, the Abudus had refused to approach the Kuga-Naa to admit their guilt and apologise through him to the Andani gate in the form of peace making, as the then Kuga-Na refused to allow them to bury Mahamadu Abudulai IV in the Gbewaa palace (Ahiare, 2013). Also the Abudus accused the Kuga-Na of wanting to ignore and obliterate the legacy and memory of Mahamadu Abudulai IV by endorsing the decision of the Andani gate to install the regent in each other's social functions. There have also been allegations that both have been arming themselves for a possible showdown (IRIN, 2013).



2.12.4 International linkages

According to Azar (2016), international linkages involve the political–economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system, and the network of political-military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientage and cross-border interest. He maintains that weaker states, like those often involved in protracted social conflict, tend to be more influenced by outside connections both economically and politically. For example, many states are dependent on an external supply of armament. To overcome the dominance of the international economy, Azar 2015 suggested that countries of that nature should work to build institutions that can ease global dependency and stimulate domestic economic growth.

2.13 The Concept of Finance

The crisis in finance is leading to ever deeper repercussions in economy and society and has been subjected to various academic debates (Sylvia, 2013). Finance has diverse implications for work, employment and society: financial instability generates unemployment through economic recessions (Appelbaum, 2011); the rise of shareholder value leads firms to reduce the conditions of workers (Clark, 2009; O’Reilly et al., 2011); financial interests drive the political project of neoliberalism that seeks to marketize, financialize and de-democratize public services (Harvey, 2011). Finance should be analysed within a theory of society as well as of economy. Finance is not reducible to the economy, nor is it neutral in its workings (Wennmann, 2007). Keynes, Schumpeter and Minsky criticize the equilibrium nature of the orthodox economics that rests on Smith, Hayek and



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Friedman (Wennmann, 2007). But they underestimated the extent to which the social relations of finance were embedded in wider systems of power, contributions of the political economy and Polanyi-led schools. There is a specific question as to whether democratic forces can regulate finance in the wider social interest, or whether finance has defeated democracy.

The conceptualization of money as a social relationship enables a more effective analysis of the relations between finance and society that includes important institutions and dynamics, than does the conceptualization of money as an object that draws on misleading abstracted fictions of perfect markets. Finance capital is often considered to be different from industrial capital, which is fixed in buildings and machines. However, this analytic distinction has become blurred in practice. The rise of 'shareholder value' has increased the extent to which competition between firms to make profits occurs on finance and capital markets rather than in more productive activities (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). This increases the incentive to financialize assets and to drive down the position of suppliers and workers (Baud and Durand, 2012). Shareholder value helps to legitimize the predominance of shareholders over other stakeholders, and the predominance of a capital market view of the firm over an industrial one (Aglietta, 2000). This new approach to company ownership shifts the focus to realizing value through buying, restructuring and selling companies rather than through long-term investment and incremental improvement of a specific company (Clark, 2009). These processes increase the proportion of profits derived from financial rather than industrial activities while blurring the boundary between industrial and financial capital (Krippner, 2011).



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Finance is usually considered in relation to institutions and banks, but it is wider than this. The sphere of finance is extended by the financialization of everyday life (Martin, 2002). Individual (consumer or household) investment products claim to redistribute money across the life-course from times when most income is earned to those when it is least earned and most needed. This includes mortgages to access housing (Young et al., 2011), pensions to access income in old age (Blackburn, 2002), credit cards and other forms of consumer debt (Lapavitsas, 2011). These financial products are uneven in their class and gender effects; for example, women typically have access to loans under worse conditions than men, which means that they are more vulnerable to acquiring debts they have difficulty in repaying (Fishbein and Woodall, 2006). When the definition of finance is extended to include individual consumer products, many more individuals are seen to be incorporated into the web of financial interests.

2.14 Finance Frameworks of Analysis

Sylvia (2013) identified four major frameworks for the analysis of finance: orthodox economics, drawing on Adam Smith; political economy, drawing on Marx; heterodox, drawing on Keynes and Minsky; and societal, drawing on Polanyi. They differ along five major dimensions: whether finance is conceptualized as an object or a social relationship; whether finance is seen as neutral in its effects on the economy; whether the state can effectively regulate finance; whether civil society and other aspects of society are significant; and whether the social system, of which finance is part, is assumed to return to equilibrium.



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The orthodox framework draws on the heritage of Adam Smith (1776), Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962). Money is conceptualized as an object rather than as a social relationship. Finance (as money and investment) is either invisible or treated as neutral, with the implication that it is not important in shaping the economy. Money is treated as if it can and should be seen through, as if it has no impact on the rest of the economy, or society; the functioning of finance reflects the rest of the economy. Indeed, for Friedman (as for Hayek, 1944), since finance flows through free markets, which are self-regulating, there is no need or good purpose served by state intervention: political freedom is considered to follow economic freedom.

The lack of significance of finance is implicit in the work of many sociological writers on capitalism and modern society (e.g. Giddens, 1984), in which analysis of the economy is centred on employment, in articulation with the welfare state and occasionally with domestic care-work. The orthodox framework conceptualizes money as an object rather than a social relationship; treats finance as superficial and unimportant; considers that finance self-balances through markets without state intervention; considers that freedom in society is more likely when the state does not interfere; and assumes that the economic system as a whole is self-regulating and self-equilibrating.

The second framework, political economy, draws on Marx (1894) to offer an analysis of finance within a theory of a capitalist system. Finance is a distinctive form of capital that seeks profits from investments and is thereby understood as a social relationship rather than as an object. Capitalism is



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inherently unstable, with tendencies to produce more goods than there are wages to purchase them, producing regular crises of over-production of goods and services or under-consumption since workers do not have the money to buy them. Such crises have the potential to escalate, getting larger and more significant and, in the long term, to lead to system failure. Instability in the economy is understood as an intrinsic feature of a capitalist system (Brenner, 2006; Callinicos, 2010; Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Gamble, 2009). This is a consequence of the difficulties in continuously maintaining capital accumulation. There are variations within the framework as to the relationship between finance capital, industrial capital, the state and society.

The political economy framework conceptualizes finance as a social relationship rather than an object. The main driver of change is the regime of capital accumulation. Finance has implications for the economy and society and has varied relations with industrial capital, the state, war and society more broadly; there is no assumption of a system returning to equilibrium. The strength of the political economy framework stems from situating finance within the context of a wider social system and its weakness from the extent to which forces other than capital are neglected.

The third framework, heterodox, draws on Keynes and Minsky. It conceptualizes finance as a social relationship rather than as an object. It treats finance as a component of the economy that is distinct from productive capital. Finance has destabilizing effects on the rest of the economy. These effects can be mitigated by the state.



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Within this framework money, or finance, has important effects on the economy. Keynes (1936), demonstrated the significance of money for the social and economic system in his general theory of employment, interest and money. Noting the significance of the balance between financial and industrial capital, he argued that speculation had deleterious consequences for the economy if it became more important than productive capital: Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done (Keynes, 1936).

Polanyi includes an analysis of the state and civil society, thereby embedding finance in a theory of society. He offers a wide-ranging historical sociological account of changes in commoditization, its effects on society and the response of society to the effects of this commoditization. Sylvia (2013) came out with an assertion that a model of the relations between finance and society needs to address five issues: the conceptualization of finance; whether finance is neutral or has significant effects on the economy; the relationship between finance and the state; the relationship between finance and society; and whether the social system of which finance is part is assumed to return to equilibrium or not. The four frameworks differ in how they address each of these issues.

2.15 Finance and Democracy

The analysis of the relations between finance and democracy is presented in three parts: first, whether there is a repertoire of technical actions through



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which finance could be regulated; second, the nature of the political projects and forces engaged with finance; and third, the balance of power between democratic forces and finance.

The regulation of individual rogues depends upon the enactment of laws to make certain activities illegal or establishment of codes of practice that render practices illicit. The location of the boundary between legal and illegal activities varies over time and place and is determined variously by technical expertise, politics and power, as is the vigour and effectiveness with which these rules are policed (Conley, 2012; Dorn, 2010; Engelen et al., 2011). Rules include those concerning: theft and fraud; banking and financial markets; corporate governance; tax evasion; and government budgets.

2.16 Conflict Financing

Conflict financing is mainly considered in terms of the availability of natural resources and contributions from diaspora communities or third-party governments. Be it the notion of ‘Resource Wars’ (Klare, 2001, Le Billion 2005), the presence of natural resource has been considered to increase the risk of armed conflict.

Conflict financing is a recurring theme in historical work on armed conflict (Finley, 1985; Lachaux, 2000, Howard, 1976; Kindleberger, 1993). Living off the land of the conquered or the area of transit was an essential component to nourish and supply armies up until the beginning of the 20th century (Finley, 1985, 176; Howard 1976, 85, 98). Sources of financing war included booty, indemnities, taxes, loans, credits, the reduction of consumption or the depreciation of foreign assets (Finley 1985, 55; Tilly 1992, 85; Kindleberger



1993, 284). In the www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh 16th and 17th century, another form of conflict financing was the debasement of coins (Kindleberger, 1993).

The cost of maintaining armies were so extensive that the mercenary armies of the 16th century or the professional armies of the 18th century were mostly defensive as evidenced by sieges and the avoidance of battle being the prevailing military strategy (Howard 1976, Bean, 1973). The development of taxation systems was a reaction to these rising cost and part of the emergence of states in Europe between the 16th and 19th century. “Financial history cannot escape dealing with war” (Kindleberger 1993, 7). Taxes and credits were mutually reinforcing. As states became increasingly indebted, they needed to enact more effective extraction systems, which in turn increased the confidence in the future revenue of the state leading to further credits (Tilly, 1992). However, winning a war did not automatically imply national prosperity because the victors became increasingly indebted and in the case of global wars had to bear the cost of maintaining the international system (Rasler and Thompson, 1989).

The relationship between debt and taxes as a means of war finance was a central concern for economists. The main contention was whether war should be financed by the present generation through taxation or by future generations through debt (Crowther 1940, 5). Adam Smith argued that England’s war against France in 1793-1815 should be financed through taxation. David Ricardo concurred that financing a war through taxes may make governments more sensitive to the economic effects of war while borrowing may produce carelessness. In contrast, John Maynard Keynes advocated borrowing to finance



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the Second World War because a soldier could not be expected to fight and be a taxpayer at the same time (Lachaux, 2000).

In the 20th century, war ultimately became so expensive that taxation alone was considered not enough to finance it. A combination of taxes and debts became necessary (Crowther 1940). The financing of war found its apogee in the First and Second World Wars leading to an unprecedented level of indebtedness and to the near bankruptcy of major powers (Howard, 1976; Kindleberger 1993; Rasler and Thompson 1989). Kindleberger, (1993). In the First World War, both German and French political elites acted on the assumption that the war would be short and that the enemy could be made to pay once defeated. Moreover, financing war through borrowing was thought to be sound as long as the interest on debt and the annual amortisation were included in the budget. However, the German Minister of Finance, Karl Helfferich, failed to recognise that increasing indebtedness would no longer satisfy assumptions of a partial equilibrium. In consequence, he did not enact measures to balance the general equilibrium of the German economy contributing to the hyperinflation of the 1920s.

In the view of Crowther (1939), the total wars of the 20th century were marked by the mobilisation of entire populations and economies as well as the development of nationalism, social movements and industrialisation. Based on these factors, the availability of financial resources was deemed secondary. The central aspect was the mobilisation of resources by means of nationalism: The Second World War was fought with men and materials. Money could neither create nor destroy them (Crowther 1940). Nevertheless, nationalist fever alone



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could not maintain the wars leading to the explosion of debt. For example, France increased in public debt from 413 billion French Francs in 1938 to 1,800 billion French Francs in 1944 (Rasler and Thompson, 1989).

The foregoing discussion have points out clearly that financing conflicts involve various resources including, human resources and money. These resource invariable help in sustaining conflicts and often grow beyond their geographical location.

2.17 Conflict Recurrence from the Perspective of Conflict Financing

The phenomenon of conflict recurrence has become increasingly important after the end of the Cold War. Various studies suggest that the risk of conflict recurrence is between 20 and 50 percent (Suhrke and Samset, 2007). At the same time, increasing attention to peacebuilding has led to the investment of billions of Dollars into post conflict areas. The investment of both financial and political capital into peace building increased the interest of governments and multilateral donors to hedge against the risk of conflict recurrence. While the signature of peace agreements usually indicates that an armed conflict is over, the risk of conflict recurrence persists (Geneva, 2007).

The perspective of conflict financing in conflict recurrence remains so far unexplored. Conflict recurrence has been explained by the failure of peace agreements. They fail because negotiated settlements are used mainly in intractable armed conflicts and are, thus, more short-lived (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Moreover, peace agreements fail due to the challenge of implementation. Peace implementation is a high stake transition process with



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uncertainty, intangibles and set-backs. In these circumstances, it is difficult to maintain the commitment of belligerents and third parties to a peace process (Stedman and Rothchild 1996). Armed conflict also recurs because belligerents are often unable to create credible commitments to disarm and demobilise (Walter, 1997). Conflict recurrence is also fostered by disproportionately influential groups which have the resolve, opportunity and capability to spoil peacebuilding (Stedman 1997; Greenhill and Major 2007). Beside, armed conflict is likely to recur, if the conditions for rebel recruitment in a post-conflict period stay the same (Walter 2004).

By looking at conflict protracted from the perspective of conflict financing, this study will contribute a new angle to the literature on conflict protracted and dynamics. Geneva, (2007) indicates that conflict financing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict recurrence. The surplus of revenue sources is a necessary condition for conflict recurrence because without it armed conflict could not be started or maintained. The surplus of revenue sources is, however, not a sufficient condition because there have been episodes in which armed groups had the resources to fight, but did not. In order to understand conflict recurrence, conflict financing must be connected to its political context. Thus, the availability of revenue sources is not automatically associated to the onset and recurrence of armed conflict. The availability of revenue sources as noted by Geneva (2007) increases the risk of conflict recurrence if:

- A conflict entrepreneur manages to translate revenue sources into military capability. Revenue sources increase the risk of conflict recurrence if they are captured by a conflict entrepreneur, managed centrally, and



controlled by few stakeholders. In this way, potential revenue sources become effective methods of conflict financing.

- The amount of revenue covers the expenses for the type of conflict needed to achieve the objectives of the belligerent party. The cost of different types of armed conflict creates different barriers-to-entry for the recurrence of armed conflict. Revenue sources increase the risk of conflict recurrence if they generate enough to pay for the type of armed conflict needed by an organised armed group to achieve its objectives.
- A high incentive to use force increases the availability of revenue sources over time. A high incentive to use force can lead an organised armed group to innovate and diversify its revenue sources thereby changing from a shortage to a surplus of revenue sources and increasing its propensity to renew armed conflict and protract.
- Conflict financing is considered as a relational phenomenon. Associating conflict financing to conflict recurrence only makes sense when comparing the revenue sources and military capabilities of all parties.

2.18 Conflict Financing after the End of the Cold War

The dynamic nature of conflict financing has been emphasised in the transitions of conflict economies after the Cold War from patronage to self-financing strategies. However, the widely accepted claim that natural resources replaced declining support from Cold War patrons should be qualified in a number of ways (Geneva 2007).

Patronage payments during the Cold War tended to be a feature of Western power politics rather than a general phenomenon. Western powers were more



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involved in supporting guerrilla movements in comparison to the Soviet Union and China (Naylor 2002). Moreover, even during the Cold War, guerrilla groups were able to rely to some extent on natural resource extraction and the taxation as well as the operation of economic activity. (Geneva, 2007). Examples include guerrilla groups in Lebanon, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia and Angola (Picard 1996, Dietrich 2000c, Le Billon, 2001). Furthermore, it is misleading to assume that third party support stopped after the Cold War as the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates (Bojicic and Kaldor, 1997, Kaldor 1999). Patronage payments more so, were not only reduced for rebel groups but also for state armies. This contributed to the weakening of states which increased the relative strength of guerilla groups and the incentives for them to renew armed conflict (Herbst, 2000).

After the Cold War, some studies of conflict economies emphasized the multitude of methods available to insurgencies to finance conflict. These included taxation, extortion, diaspora funding, kidnapping or natural resources exploitation (Jean and Rufin, 1996, Kaldor, 1999).

2.19 Conflict Financing in War Economies

There are two kinds of war economies, as indicated by Tailor (2012). The first is the classic war economy that throughout history has been the mechanism through which economic resources were dedicated to the preparation for and conduct of war. These war economies are fundamental to national defence and as such have been variously described as the “arsenal of democracy” and, more menacingly, as a “military-industrial complex”. Whether viewed as a threat to



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democracy or a necessary evil, the classic war economy is a central part of the political economy of industrialised economies and, as such, most governments consider such an economy to be essential to national security. As a result, states have ensured that international law and relations formally permit such economies (Tailor, 2012).

The second kind of war economy is made up of the informal markets that co-exist with the armed violence of war. These are the economies that continue in conflict zones. These are the dominant form of warfare today – irregular warfare is often sustained by the informal and illicit markets that form these economies (Tailor, 2012). However, while economies of violence are sources of power for regime elites and non-state armed groups, they are also sources of jobs and livelihoods for households (Justino et al., 2013). Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate market based activity is not always easy, not least where weak state capacities and informal markets make information difficult to come by. To help, policy researchers from a variety of disciplines have turned to the concept of conflict financing (Tailor, 2012).

For the purposes of policy and law, conflict financing can be defined as activities or relationships that generate revenues and some form of power for armed groups or parties to sustain and possibly wining a conflict. The conflict-financing concept assumes that in irregular war economies the coincidence of armed violence and informal economies offers state and non-state users of force unique access to economic opportunities. In situations of conflict the limits of economic opportunity are defined, firstly, by the relative strength of the warring factions (Naylor, 2002). Options for outside sponsorship are always present,



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The point of this categorization is not to demarcate the geographic space of conflict zones on the ground, but rather to make the point that a decisive factor in determining the conflict-financing strategy is the relative balance of power between state and non-state forces. The strength of a group both influences and is partly determined by its power and ability to control territory (Tailor, 2012).

Ultimately, a group's choice of financing activities is determined by both its "relationship to the broader society and its relative strength via-à-vis the enforcement arm of the state (Naylor, 2002). In all of these situations, from contention through to control, the insurgents' and incumbent's objective is not just to control sources of financing, but also to undermine, deny or capture the financing of the opponent. Within those zones, financing activities by insurgent or state armed groups may be more or less violent. Looting, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom are prevalent forms of insurgent financing in contemporary armed conflicts. While some predatory acts are simple and violent, others are quite sophisticated and require more planning (Fanusie and Alex, 2017).

Nigeria has in recent times been labeled as one of the most corrupt countries in the world with money laundering being one of the major demons that the nation has to constantly battle with. The United States of America's Justice Department (2014) placed some Nigerian banks under the searchlight in the wake of growing terrorism in the country. Specifically, the banks are being



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According to Center on Sanction and Illicit Finance (CSIF, 2017).

In 2002 Osama bin Laden sends \$3 million to Nigerian Salafis, much of which is used to start Boko Haram.

- Also in 2012 there was support from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) includes financial assistance of \$250,000.
- February 2013 Boko Haram received a \$3-million ransom in exchange for a French family. (CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book)
- From 2006-11, Boko Haram made roughly \$70 million, or slightly more than \$10 million per year, according to the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
- In 2014-15 the group made about \$10 million per year, according to a British terror finance expert and a UN official.
- Boko Haram's 2016 funding likely declined from its 2014-15 level, as the group lost territory due to increased military pressure. This left the group unable to feed many of its soldiers. As of early 2017, Boko Haram was unable to pay all its fighters' monthly salaries (Tailor, 2012).



The conflict-financing framework identifies human agency in war economies, places this agency in a causal context, and provides a taxonomy of conflict-financing behaviour. This is a kind of criminology of war economies: it describes potentially criminal acts – such as looting, kidnapping or other predatory activities – and explains their causality in context. The categories of criminal activity in a war economy might include: the commission of predatory crimes by business actors, e.g. murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, theft, pillage, smuggling, forced labour or enslavement. Knowingly providing substantial assistance to those who commit predatory crimes, e.g. aiding and abetting a crime through commercial transactions or breaching laws governing the illicit global flows (e.g. anti-money-laundering laws) or the trafficking of conflict goods, e.g. rules governing the use of or trade in conflict minerals, violations of export-licensing regimes, UN sanctions among others (Wennmann, 2007).

Conflict financing may include violent and predatory acts. A regulatory strategy that targets obviously criminal acts should be the minimum basis for a broader regulatory approach to the global dimensions of conflict trade and the peace building strategies used to transform conflict or war economies (Fanusie and Alex, 2017).

2.20 Theories of Conflict Escalation

To be able to understand how conflicts grow both in intensity and scope, social scientists and conflict analysts use various conflict escalation theories. Conflict has been an overarching concept among nations and a popular vocabulary cutting across all spheres of human endeavour. Given its prominence and



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prevalence, all issues leading to its understanding and implication for resolution, have to be carefully examined. Conflict escalation is the process by which conflicts grow in severity over time.

While the word escalation was used as early as in 1938, it was popularized during the Cold War by two important books: 'On Escalation' (Karn, 1965) and 'Escalation and the Nuclear Option' (Brodie, 1966). In these contexts, it especially referred to war between two states with weapons of mass destruction. For the purpose of this study, Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation has been employed.

2.20.1 Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation

Social conflict is dynamic, meaning conflict changes overtime, but this process does not mean that conflict develops solely in a linear fashion (Mitchell, 1981). Not all conflicts are addressed through contentious strategies. While many conflicts are resolved through problem solving, many others are terminated due to outright yielding. Yet, others have to travel for a long time to a state of inaction or stalemate and or eventually resolution or termination. To be able to understand how conflict financing sustains chieftaincy conflicts, this study has adopted Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation. Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation highlights the phases of conflict escalation by looking at the various factors or conditions which give rise to both upward and downward movements thereby prolonging the process of waging and resolving conflicts. What is of much relevance to this study is how financing in terms of social mobilization- recruitment and training of combatants and allies, financial



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rewards to combatants and investment in weaponry help in prolonging the life span of conflicts which often are not noticed by the public.

According to Anstey (1993), conflict escalation is a self-perpetuating process during which chances of resolution or settlement are diminished. Conflict escalation stage does not mean that conflicts are not amenable to settlement. The problem however is that given the strong desire for each party to win at the expense of the other at this stage, makes the hope of resolution less possible. Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation has identified factors such as mobilisation of social support, financial investment in arms, the development of innovative contentious tactics, recruitment of people and allies and the sole objective of winning a fight as critical conditions which give rise to escalation and protracted nature of conflicts. Writing about the condition which gives rise to escalation of conflicts, Tjosvold (1993) asserted that the struggle for dominance as parties pursue their subjective interest and adopt win-lose strategies create a widening gap of misunderstanding which fuels conflict. The discussions above may suggest that various conditions result in conflict escalation of which financing plays a critical role. As noted by Nyong (2007), resources comprise those basic material and social, tangible and intangible assets which can be classified as natural, economic/financial, physical and social. These resources according to Nyong (2007), are required for survival and growth of human societies. The discussions also suggest that any creative attempt to understanding and approach a given conflict situation demands a thorough conflict analysis. Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation admits that escalating conflicts necessarily do not sustain forever, neither do



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they frozen perpetually. They may wax and wane, and terminate. This implies that in any protracted conflicts, various trends may develop depending on the condition of the conflict environment.

According to Pruitt and Rubin (1986), a stalemate may occur when parties in conflict lose social support for their actions. As noted by Pruitt and Rubin (1986), people in conflict often rely on the support of constituencies of backers in order to sustain a competitive struggle. Kriesberg (1998) writes that social conflicts generally involve many contending parties. Each adversary has many groups within it and there are many groups outside who are or might be induced to become allies. Thus, escalating conflict often end in stalemate because the protagonists are no longer able to secure the confidence and or support of the masses (Kriensberg, 1998). Sustained conflict itself has an element of fatigue and supporters may lose the courage to continuously support an action which may seem to generate no outcome (Kriensberg, 1998). This perhaps could explain why in chieftaincy conflicts, in order to sustain the action taken by the combatants, the leaders in the conflict at all point in time try all means possible to invest in the conflict in order to get the support for their actions from the immediate and outside the conflict environment even if an action is not justified or reasonable.

Pruitt and Rubin (1986) have indicated that stalemate may ensue when parties in conflict are no longer willing to continue their competitive struggle. This may arise when parties perceive that the cost of defeating an opponent may be exceedingly great, or there is the fear that unless escalation ends promptly, new issues and people will become involved, poisoning the broader relationship between parties. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) further argued that conflict escalation



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strives on tactics. In a situation where strategies adopted by parties are no longer effective in generating the needed results (to compel an opponent to surrender), a stalemate may be engendered (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). In simple terms, a stale may occasion when contentious tactics that were used with some success in the past begin to fail because they have lost their potency. Opponents have come to understand themselves in terms of the strategies adopted in waging the conflict making further move or escalation defective.

Kriesberg (1998) has suggested that money, time and energy among others are vital resources required to push the agenda of parties in conflict. However, like any resources, these are in limited supply. When these resources appear to be exhausted or expended, protagonists may develop the spirit of apathy or feel uncomfortable to find themselves in a renew clashes. This situation also contributes to stalemate (Kriesberg, 1998).

From the foregoing discussions, it could be deduced that stalemate is a condition of being but not a must. It is a state of inaction where parties are not able to press forward in their contentious tactics, yet none is prepared to withdraw. In such situation a meaningful intervention into the conflict situation could lead to de-escalation and final termination. An understanding of the factors resulting in de-escalation of conflicts is critical in designing the appropriate intervention to a given conflict situation. According to Kriesberg (1998), de-escalation means movement toward lesser magnitudes of conflict behaviour.

De-escalation in most instances is facilitated by decreasing commitment to the aim being pursued by parties. A decreased in commitment may shift the focus of parties from the use of a more intense coercive action to a more reconciliatory and realistic action given rise to dwindling in contentious tactics. Thus, coercive



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action may not only seem inappropriate but equally wasteful (Kriesberg (1998). This probably could explain why after a prolonged violent clashes between the Abudus and the Andanis, they saw the need for a reconciliatory action thereby paving way for an enskinment of a new overlord or Ya Na of Dagbon state in 2019, after 17 years without a substantive chief.

Heterogeneity of the conflict group in regard to the goal could condition the likelihood of de-escalation. As noted by Kriesberg (1998), if the segments of a conflict party differ about the goal's importance, potential leaders may have the basis for a constituency to support a more moderate means toward the end. As conflict grows, more people with different goals are likely to be roped into the conflict environment. This dynamic has the tendency to defeat the actual goal of the conflicting parties which hitherto might have been the motivating principle for the escalation. In such situation, the pursuance of a more moderate means toward the end may culminate in de-escalation

A major factor that increases the likelihood of de-escalation is the feeling for the survival of the organization (group). Once a conflict organization has developed, many persons, especially those in leadership positions, feel a commitment to the survival of the organization. This commitment as noted by Kriesberg (1998) limits the escalatory tendencies since continued escalation can threaten the continued existence of the organization. Thus, a sense of continuity of the group has the tendency to inhibit members in their use of a deadlier coercive tactics which has the likelihood to elicit similar response. As a conflict becomes protracted, opponents can develop new bonds even while they are struggling against each other. The emerging ties serves as a restraining force



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh resulting in de-escalation. Adversaries may develop mutual respect and understanding. Even though the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts has been waging on since 1959 as noted by Owusu-Ansah and McFaraland (1995), such prolong period of disagreement might have given rise to the development of new relations and mutual respect among the combatants thereby toning the destructiveness of strategies used in waging such conflict.

Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation as discussed is very useful in this study as it seeks to explain the dynamics of chieftaincy conflicts which normally grow from a humble beginning and eventually become destructive and protracted due to a number of factors notably conflict financing. Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation at least explains why some chieftaincy conflicts are successfully resolved yet others have been reeling on for years. Marfo (2018) has noted that, normally, what begins as a displeasure and contention over succession and destoolment would be creeping but steadily for some time in the various localities before they are brought before the various Traditional Councils within the region and if not resolved, further brought before the Regional House of Chiefs. According to Marfo (2018), a number of issues crop up in the process and resources are expended by parties with the view of winning the fight at all cost even if not justified. He further argues that parties take entrenched positions and adopt various strategies in waging the conflict including deliberate manipulation and misrepresentation of facts which invariably prolong the conflict and its resolution. Thus, understanding how people finance conflicts in diverse ways is one practical way of affording



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
society the power to constructively and expeditiously resolving chieftaincy conflicts without allowing them to travel the line of prolong destruction.

2.20.2 Conceptual framework on conflict financing and protracted chieftaincy conflicts

Based upon the insight gained from the literature as discussed, the researcher has come out with a guiding conceptual framework (Fig 2.1) which seeks to explain how various actors or parties invest in conflict which either help in escalating or terminating a given conflict. The conceptual framework is seen as a three-phase system with inter-connected parts. The first part shows the various actors or parties in conflict. These conflict actors include local fighters/combatants, individual interested parties and bodies both within and outside the conflict environment and the state.



Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Framework on conflict financing and protracted chieftaincy conflicts



Source: Author's Construct May, 2019



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The framework indicates, these conflict actors may finance conflict through various means including physical mobilization of people (recruitment of people), cash donations and meeting the immediate and future monetary needs of combatants, purchase and supply of arms and ammunitions, the making of promises to combatants including appointment and elevation of one as a chief, and sponsorship of training on war tactics among others. The framework shows that if these resources are effectively mobilised and utilized, they go a long way to sustain a conflict. Thus, the conflict becomes protracted and, in some situation, destructive. However, as various factors could creep into the process or conflict environment, the conflict may be de-escalated and terminated with the appropriate intervention.



2.21 Summary of Literature Review

Conflict and conflict financing is a phenomenon that is an important part of human existence and that conflict emanates from incompatibility and a potential clash of goals, interest or values. The review explored various schools of thought of conflict protraction, theory and finance. From the analysis of the various theories, it can be stated that conflict goes through a number of phases. It came out that the sources and categories of conflict have centred around two conflict approaches, the subjectivist and the objectivist approach. The absence of violence does not generally mean an absence of conflict. Conflicting interests can be pursued without violence or coercion. And also usually conflict is financed in so many ways both direct and indirect. From the review of literature, it emerged that different authors have different methods of determining the level of conflict, and also how conflict is financed. Clearly, there are a number of things over which two parties in conflict can have incompatible interest in. It is possible to reduce this perplexing variety by classifying these issues into three main sociological categories; wealth power, and prestige. The literature also shows that protracted conflict is usually characterized by prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation. The longevity of a protracted conflict can take two main forms. Protracted conflict can be marked by the longevity of one main conflict, or a series of many different conflicts. Protracted conflict has effect on the region, the state and basic services and also affects on people.



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There are many conflict preventive measures. In peace times preventive measures aim to strengthen the system structure, which is needed for peaceful dealing with conflicts. The new framework for the analysis of finance in society constructed draws on the best elements from the four major existing frameworks – orthodox, political economy, heterodox and societal. This includes: the conceptualization of finance; the relationship between finance, the economy, the state, violence and civil society; and the nature of the social system as a whole.

Finance should be conceptualized as a social relationship, as a social system, rather than as an object, as is argued in all frameworks except the orthodox. Finance is a form of profit-seeking and a form of capital, as noted by the framework. The distinction and relationship between the three stages of investment identified by Minsky, building on the work of Keynes, identifies the nature of the financial system that is simultaneously a necessary part of capitalism and a source of its instabilities, ranging from minor bubbles to major crises. Finance is a site of power struggles at the heart of capitalism, between the producers of goods (capital and labour) and producers of money (central and private banks and financial institutions); this challenges the notion that exploitation takes place primarily at the point of production. The significance of finance grows as processes of financialization spread its influence through economy and society. States can regulate finance so as to mitigate these instabilities, but the extent to which this occurs depends on wider social processes.



RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Profile of Yendi Municipality

The Yendi Municipal Assembly used to be a District Assembly until it was elevated to Municipality status in 2007 (GSS, 2012). It was established as a District in 1988 by PNDC Law 207, Act 462, and LI 1443. The Municipality is now one of the 54 Municipal Assemblies in the country (GCA, 2010). Yendi is the capital of the Dagbon Kingdom. The population of Yendi Municipality, according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, (GSS, 2012) stood at 117,780 representing 4.8 percent of the Northern region population of 2,479,461. Males constitute 50.0 percent and females also 50.0 percent. More than half (56.1%) of the population in the Municipality live in rural areas. The Municipality has a sex ratio (number males per 100 females) of 100.1. The age dependency ratio in the Municipality is 93.3. Males have a higher age dependency ratio (104.2) than females (96). The average household size in the Municipality is 9.3 persons. Children (48.3%) of head of household constitute the largest proportion of household members. (GSS, 2012).

The predominant religion in the Yendi Municipality is Islam, with more than two thirds of the population professing the Islamic faith. Traditionalists (13.2%) form the second highest, followed by Catholics (7.2%). More than 90 percent of the population in the Municipality are Ghanaians by birth, with less than three percent of the population having dual nationality. Less than one percent (0.8%) of the population are Ghanaians by naturalization while non-Ghanaians



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh constitute less than three percent (2.5%) (GSS, 2012). Apparently major conflicts in the area over the years have not been fought on the basis of religion. This could suggest that there is some level of religious tolerance in the locality. More than two thirds (70.9) of the population aged 15 years and older are economically active. Males (73.3%) are more likely to be economically active than females (68.6%). Of the economically active population, 95.8 percent are employed. More than half (55.1) of the unemployed population have worked before, seeking for work and available for work. Those seeking for work for the first time form 44.9 percent of the unemployed population. Some 42.9 per cent of the population not economically active are pursuing full time education. Close to one quarter of the population not economically active are house-helps performing domestic duties, with 21.3 percent being too old or young to work (GSS, 2012).

In terms of occupation of the employed population, majority (65.4) are engaged as skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. The second commonest (14.8%) occupation of the employed is service and sales. The major (65.3%) industry engaging majority of the workers in the Municipality is agriculture, forestry and fishing. This is followed by wholesale and retail trade (13.2%) and manufacturing (8.9%). Close to three quarters (72.9%) of households in the Municipality are engaged in agriculture. Most agricultural households (96.2%) are into crop farming. The majority (48.3%) of agricultural households are into livestock rearing with those in poultry (chicken) farming forming the majority (30.0%). The housing stock of Yendi Municipality is 10,872 representing 4.2 percent of the total number of houses in the Northern region. The Municipality has a household population of 116,602 representing almost 99 percent of the



total population. The average number of persons per house is about 11 (GSS, 2010). What the figures suggests is that any social activity like conflict which affects the environment (land), is likely to have a serious repercussion on the livelihood of the people. Matters relating to conflicts and land disputes therefore need to be given the necessary attention.

Figure Yendi in the National context




Figure 3.1 Map showing the Northern Region in the national context



Districts of the Northern Region.

Figure 3.2 Map showing some communities in the Yendi Municipality

MAP OF YENDI MUNICIPAL




Figure 3.3 the map of Yendi

3.2 Research design

A research design is a plan, structure and strategy of research conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions or problems. In other words, a research design is a procedural plan that is used by a researcher to answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically (Creswell, 2014). Opoku, (2002) argues that the choice of any research design is influenced by the study units available and what the design seeks to achieve. For the purpose of this study, case study design was adopted because the researcher had no intention of manipulating the variables of the study. According to Babbie and Murton (2004), qualitative research designs are referred to as generic research approach in social research according to which research takes as its departure point the insider perspective of the social actors themselves. This case study design was chosen in view of the fact that there was the need to learn in detail as much as possible from the respondents own perspective the problem that mooted the study.

3.3 Identification of study population

The study targets members of the two feuding groups, opinion leaders, local council officials and youth group members and leaders in the study locality. In the view of Tuckman (1985) defining the population enables the researcher to establish boundary conditions which indicates who is to be included in or excluded from the population.



3.4 Population and Sampling technique

The study population was categorized into two, namely, the respondents and the key informants. The respondents constituted the chiefs, the youth and elders in the Municipality. The key informants were selected from the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, Police Service, the Ghana Army, Yendi District Assembly and political parties' representatives.

For Kumekpor, (2002) sampling involves taking a portion of a unit of a sample for analysis from which the knowledge gained from the study can be generalized about the entire population. The rationale of sampling is therefore to make maximum use of the limited time available and reduce cost associated in sampling the entire population. In precise terms, the sampling technique focused on the technique used in selecting the respondents for the study. Purposive sampling technique was used to select Yendi. The merit of the method and its suitability for this study made the researcher adopt it. The justification for the selection of the Yendi community stemmed from the fact that it is the traditional capital of Dagbon and the centre of the Yendi crisis (Wuaku Commission Report, 2002). Getting the views of the people from such community was therefore considered critical. As noted by Maxwell (2005), purposive sampling is defined as a type of sampling in which, particular setting, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices.

The researcher operated with a sample size of 59 comprising 50 respondents and 9 key informants drawn from different backgrounds. All these categories of people were purposely selected with the exception of the 27 respondents from



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both the Abudu and Andani Gates who were selected through quota sampling technique. Purposive sampling in the opinion of Merriam (2000) is based on the belief that the researcher wants to discover, understand, gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can be learned. Similarly, Neuman (2004) has stated that, purposive sampling is used in situations in which an expert judgment is required in selecting cases with a specific purpose in mind. Purposive sampling is appropriate in three main situations (Neuman, 2004). The first situation is when a researcher uses it to select unique cases that are informative. The second is when a researcher uses it to select members of a group that are difficult to reach and finally purposive sampling is used to identify particular type of cases for in-depth investigation.

To be able to select the 17 respondents using quota sampling technique, the researcher defined the basis of selection notably: (1) the respondent should be either an Abudu or Andani, (2) should be a resident of Yendi and (3) of and above 40 years. Given the sensitive nature of the study and the purposes of objectivity, the researcher intentionally did not sample any of the immediate family members or spokes persons of the two feuding gates. Table 3. Below captures the summary of the selected respondents.



Table 3.1: Summary of selected Respondents

Identity	Males	Females	Total
Respondents from selected Abudu Line	8	0	8
Respondents from selected Andani Line	9	0	9
La'ambgagi Youth Group	11	4	15
Magajiye	0	4	4
Local Council Officials	2	1	3
The Military	2	0	2
Ghana Police Service	1	1	2
Political parties' representatives	3	1	4
Opinion Leaders	5	3	8
Market Women Association Executives	0	3	3
Northern Regional House of Chiefs	1	0	1
Total	42	17	59

Source: Field Study, 2019

3.5 Data collection methods

There are two major sources of data in social research (Miller, 1991). These are the primary and secondary sources. It is however, important to note that the selection of a particular approach to collect data must be decided upon in the light of one's problem, the purpose of the study, the resources available and the skills of the demographic characteristics of the study population play an important role.

For a number of reasons some population may not feel comfortable to express opinions in a questionnaire, therefore in making a decision on the type of data



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collection tools, the researcher must keep in mind the type of people he is dealing with, the nature of the social situation, the mood of the social environment and the psychology of the people (Obeng, 2009). Stewart and Kamins (1993; cited in Hamza, 2010) argued that using secondary data has an advantage over the use of primary data because the data already exist and can be evaluated before usage. They further argued that, time spent on evaluating potential secondary data is time well spent. In the light of this, previous works that provide the required information on the subject matter was reviewed. Analysis of secondary sources was used to complement the primary data.

The essence of this review of literature on the conflict and protracted conflict financing assisted the researcher in analyzing the implications of the financing of Yendi chieftaincy conflict protraction.

The conceptual framework served as an empirical base for the analysis of data collected. While secondary data were obtained through documentary sources such as books, journals, magazines, internets and other earlier researches on the subject matter data collected from primary sources were through interviews, and questionnaires. For the purpose of collecting data for this research, questionnaires (Appendix A), interviews and focus group discussions were used.

In support of this decision, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) identified interviewing, observing, documents, records and personal experience methods as data collection tools in qualitative research.



3.6 Interviews

In order to obtain comprehensive and dependable data pertinent to the research questions, interviews with the aid of interview guides (Appendix A) and audio device were used as the main method to elicit information from the respondents. Twumasi (2001) observed that interview technique creates a congenial learning environment for both the researcher and the respondents to engage in a purposeful discussion. In that way, the researcher learns a lot from the participants.

Conducting the interview this researcher made adequate preparations to maximize the chances for successful interviews; Key informants were written to, informing them of the purpose of the study and intended interviews with them. Copies of the interview schedules were attached to the letters of introduction to let the potential interviewees know the issues to be covered in the interviews. A day before each appointment, telephone calls were made to remind the participants of our meeting appointment. The interview guide had questions that were strictly based on the objectives of the study for easy categorization. Besides, all the three Megajeye's drawn across Yendi were equally interviewed using similar interview guides. In all 58 separate face to face interviewing session were held at different times for the selected respondents excluding the La'ambgagi Youth Group each lasting averagely 35 minutes. The help of a field assistant was sought who assisted in transcribing the data where necessary.



3.7 Focus group discussion (FGD)

A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) is an in-depth interview with a group of people. In this regard, community members with in-depth knowledge in the study area were contacted and those who expressed interest were selected to participate in the discussion process. As Varkevisser et al. (2003) have observed, FGDs provide immediate results within a short period of time at a relatively low cost. For Araoye (2003), FGDs provide an avenue for better understanding of issues pertaining to a particular community in terms of their belief system and their experiences and practices. A Focus group discussion was held with the La'ambgagi Youth Group (15 discussants). The focus group discussion afforded the researcher the opportunity to gather different views from different people at the same time. Discussions with groups were recorded using a recorder with the consent of participants. Notes were also taken and later cross checked with what was recorded to ensure the accuracy of the information.

3.8 Data analysis

The researcher used qualitative (descriptive) approach to examine the issues at stake. Strauss and Corbin (1990) have described qualitative research methodology as any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedure or other means of quantification. Analysis was undertaken to generate a descriptive picture of the data gathered. Simple percentages and frequencies were used to present the information where applicable. The qualitative data from interviews and focus group discussions conducted with all other categories of respondents were analysed manually by making summaries of the views of the respondents. The analysis was organized



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under themes derived from the data and the research questions that guided the entire investigation.

3.9 Ensuring validity and reliability of finding

It is important to test the validity and reliability of the research instruments to be employed in data collection. Validity refers to the extent to which the research instrument records what it is intended to record (Cohen et al, 2000). Neuman (2004) corroborates this opinion by mentioning that validity means truth that can be applied to the logical tightness of experimental design, the ability to generalize findings outside a study, the quality of measurements and the proper use of procedure. On the other hand, reliability of an instrument concerns its consistency of measurement. Thus reliability refers to the extent to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same conditions with the same subjects. Reliability is the degree to which a research instrument results in similar results whenever it is used to elicit data under constant conditions. In support of this position, Neuman (2004) has stated that reliability is the dependability or consistency of the measure of a variable. In order to ensure the validity and reliability of research instruments, Bums (2000:450) states that "research has a great investment in reliability and validity. If the data are not reliable and valid, if the assessment techniques are not reliable and valid, if the design features do not create satisfactory internal and external validity, then the research is worthless in scientific eyes." To achieve reliability and validity of research instruments, great care was needed and no effort was spared at ensuring that this was achieved. This researcher ensured that research instruments were valid and reliable that is why the interviews and focus group



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discussion were adopted to complement each other so as to come out with credible and reliable results.

The questionnaires were pre tested in Mion a section in the Northern Region that shares similar features as the sections where the study sampling shall take place, Since Mion is composed of both indigenes and non-indigenes it provided the researcher with the appropriate environment for the pre-testing. The outcome of the pre-testing ensured a proper arrangement of questions as well as knowing how to ask questions to facilitate interviewee understanding and knowing the average time to complete a questionnaire. The pre-testing facilitated the validity and reliability of the instruments. Validity and reliability have been identified by Neuman (2004) as critical to all measurement. Hence, pre-testing of the research instruments were done to check the clarity of the instruments as stated by Araoye (2003) pilot testing of instruments assists the researcher to refine the research instrument or tool to achieve his study objective. Varkevisser et al. (2003) claim that pre-testing questions is important because the researcher is able to identify potential problems in the process and adjust accordingly. Kumeorpor (2002) also in his view indicates that pre-testing is useful to assess the suitability of a research instrument or to test the target group's attitudes, or reactions to an impending survey. Pre-testing of questionnaires were administered to help reveal ambiguity so as to enable the researcher to come out with a questionnaire that is simple worded and easily comprehensible. The pre-testing, no doubt brought about an improvement in the instrument.



PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the presentation and analysis of the data of the research carried out. The focus of the data was to find out conflict financing and protracted chieftaincy conflict in Ghana.

4.2 Biographic data of respondent

4.2.1 Age distribution of respondents

Respondents were asked to indicate their ages. This outcome is in line with the aim of targeting a segment of the population who were matured and able to provide the information needed. The number of respondents per each age bracket is indicated in table 4.1.

Table 4. 1: Age distribution of respondents

Response	Frequency	Percentage
30-39	15	25.4
40-49	37	62.7
50 and above	7	11.9
Total	59	100

Source: Field Study, 2019

As Table 4.1 indicates, the highest number of respondents fall between the age brackets of 40-49 constituting a total number of 37. The next was the age bracket of 30-39 with a total of 15 respondents, whilst further seven respondents were



www.udsspace.uds.edu.gh of and above 50 years. The findings show that the respondents were at least fairly matured and appropriate for the study. The different age brackets of the respondents is an indication that the views of all the respondents of the different age brackets were represented. This could give a true picture about the problem at stake.

4.2.2 Level of education

Respondents were asked to indicate their level of education. The feedback is indicated in Table 4.2. The respondents were made up of persons with secular and other Arabic, traditional studies. There were persons with secular education from basic to the university level while others had Arabic knowledge. Aside, other respondents had no formal education.

Table 4. 2 : Level of education of respondents

Status	Frequency	Percentage
Non	6	11
Basic	22	37
Tertiary	19	32
Other (Arabic studies etc.)	12	20
Total	59	100

Source: Field Study, 2019

The table above indicates that 11 % of the respondents did not have any form of education, whilst 37% and 32% of the total respondents had basic and tertiary education respectively. About 20% representing 12 respondents had other forms of education that is Arabic studies and traditional studies among others that are not classified under formal education. This indicates that majority of the



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 respondents about 90% had attained some level of education and are in a better position to speak out.

4.2.3 Sex distribution of respondent

The Table 4.3 below indicates that 40 respondents representing 68% were males while 19 representing 32% were female. As conflicts affect virtually everyone in the society, the finding shows that both the views of males and females would be fairly represented.

Table 4.3 Sex distribution of respondent

Respondents	Frequency	Percentage
Male	40	68
Female	19	32
Total	59	100

Source: Field Studies, 2019

4.3 Resources spent on the chieftaincy conflict.

One major objective of this thesis was to establish the resources spent on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. In finding out as to whether people have been spending on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, 36 (about 70.6%) respondents affirmed in the positive while 16 (about 31.4%) had no idea. The overwhelming majority indicating that resources were spent on the conflict was an indication that people actually have invested in the conflict which probably sustained the conflict over the years.



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Probing further, the study found that some people physically engaged in waging the conflict as indicated by 30 respondents. On the other hand, according to 11 respondents, there were others who invested in the conflict without necessarily being part of the actual engagement in the conflict.

What this finding suggest is that financing in conflict may take two broad ways namely; direct and indirect. This revelation points out clearly that any creative attempt to resolve any given conflict of that nature should go beyond the immediate combatants who actually or physically engage themselves in mutual attack to include those from the immediate and outside the conflict environment who support the conflict but do not necessarily engage in direct attack or violence. This is what three respondents said respectively:

'For the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, a lot of people invested their resources in to it. Big men, politicians and the youth used to contribute weekly and sometimes monthly to fuel the conflict. You would be surprised to hear the people involved in the financing including women' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'Big men in the society and outside the Municipality spent a lot of resources on this our conflict that is why it could not be resolved early because they knew what they were deriving from it'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'We were all contributing monthly when we receive our monthly salaries to help one way or the other to resource the conflict. But we later realized it added no value to us'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

The views of the respondents were not different from that of the key informants.

This is what a key informant said:



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'People and even organisations spent their resources on the chieftaincy conflict for their selfish gains' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this thesis supports Kinyua's (2015) study. According to Kinyua (2015), some actors fund rebels and state officials in a bid to continuously destabilize countries for their own private commercial gains.

Probing further as to the forms of investment made by the people in connection with the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, seven responses were given as captured in Table 4.4 below.



Table 4. 4 : Respondents view about how people spend their resources on Yendi chieftaincy conflict (Multiple Responses).

Respondent	Frequency
Purchase of guns	36
Supply of bullet	24
Physical cash to participants	22
Support and funding of legal battle at court	20
Fuel for participants	12
Provision of ideas	9
Machetes'	7
Multiple response	

Source: Field Study, 2019

4.3.1. Purchase and supply of guns and bullets (ammunitions)

Small arms fuel major conflicts across the globe. According to Schroeder and Stohl (2006), approximately half of the international terrorist incidents documented in the 2003 Department of State report on global terrorism were perpetrated with small arms and light weapons. Capie (2004) has observed that Southeast Asia region, for instance, has been afflicted by civil wars and inter-communal violence due to persistence of armed conflict which creates a high level of demand for weapons and ammunition. In the view of Abdulai (2003), Small arms are a 'global scourge' and have contributed to the speedy globalization of insecurity, more specifically in Africa. Thirty-six (36) respondents indicated that the purchase and supply of guns was a major form or



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way of spending resources on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. This is what three respondents said respectively.

'Their aim was to provide arms for all their members so they were contributing weekly. Whenever the amount was sufficient they use it to buy arms for self-defense'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'It was easy for the financiers to give arms than even money when requested. At a point in time people in the Municipality were surprise of the kind of guns' civilians were using' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'I was surprise to see the kind of arms people from the two factions were using during the conflict in 2002 and wonder how they came by those arms. I was told the financiers usually supply them''. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

The views of the key informants were in line with that of the respondents. A key informant remarked:

'We cannot deny the fact that the guns used by the ordinary civilians were supplied by external parties. Let us be frank with this. None of the combatants will use their monies to buy such expensive guns. These guns were usually purchased by the financiers of the conflict' (A key Informant Interview, 2019).

The finding from this study corroborates CSIF (2015) study. CSIF (2015) has expressed that arms trafficking is a major source of Boko Haram's armament. CSIF (2015) noted Nigerian law enforcement arrested a Boko Haram member who reportedly trafficked weapons from Sudan to West Africa in supply trucks.



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This finding suggests how investment in small arms and other light weapons sustains various conflicts.

In furtherance, 24 of the respondents stated that the purchase and supply of bullets (ammunitions) was another form of resources spent on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. A respondent indicated:

'Anytime we were short of bullets, requests were made and they provided them. We have never used our monies to buy bullets. We were always supplied these bullets by people who were having interest in the conflict. It is surprising to know how they smuggled them into the Municipality'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

Corroborating, another respondent remarked:

'If we demand for bullets and they give us, they expect us to use it for the intended purpose' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

The view of a key informant supported what the respondents said. This is what a key informant stated:

'We have an idea as to the people who have been buying ammunitions and supplying to the local guys just to fuel the conflict here' (A Key Informant's Remark, 2019).

This thesis has found that people through various means have invested in arms and ammunitions to wage the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts. The implication is that attempts to ensure development in the study community will be an illusion without proper education and massive disarmament.



4.3.2 Physical cash to participants (combatants) and funding of legal battles

Cash plays an instrumental role in fueling and sustaining conflicts. As noted by Kriesberg (1998), cash among other resources fuel conflicts. Twenty-two (22) respondents expressed that combatants were given cash which motivated them to wage the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. Two respondents remarked respectively:

‘They were given us money to help in fighting our enemies’.

‘People use to get a lot from this financiers to sustain them and their families’.

In furtherance, 20 respondents indicated that support and funding of legal battle at the courts was another form of resource spent on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. Three respondents remarked respectively:

‘Why do you think we were going to court? Do you think we will use our own money to fight at the court? We had some people who were helping us when it comes to financing on legal matters’ (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

‘I was once told by an elderly that, we should do whatever we want, and when it comes to legal battle they have the money to pay and we have their support’ (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

‘We had legal experts who were ready to fight for us for free in the court of law without paying a penny’’. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

The finding from this thesis is in line with CSFI (2015) revelation. According to CSFI (2015), in 2002, Osama bin Laden, a financier outside Nigeria sends \$3 million to Nigerian Salafists, much of which was used to start Boko Haram militant activities. CSFI (2015) report further indicated arrested Boko Haram members have claimed that they received funds from foreign Islamic charities,



including charities based in the UK and Saudi Arabia, according to uncorroborated reporting in the Nigerian press.

The finding from this thesis indicates clearly that cash is critical in fueling (violent) conflicts. Creative conflict resolution therefore demands collaborative efforts from people from diverse fields including economists and accountants.

4.3.3 Fuel for participants

Conflict financing takes various forms. According to this thesis 12 respondents mentioned free supply of fuel to interested individuals or combatants as one way in which the Yendi chieftaincy conflict was financed. According to the respondents, members of the feuding gates and sympathizers were supplied with fuels for errands and also for burning of houses. This is what one discussant said:

'Supply of petro was not a problem in this community. You just needed to disclose your identity and you would be sorted out'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

Corroborating the assertion of free supply of fuel, this is what one respondent remarked:

'I have ever been given a coupon for fuel just because they thought I belong to a gate' (A Respondent Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study indicates that various resources influence and sustain conflicts of which free supply of fuel to combatants for errands and burning of houses and other property plays an instrumental role. What this



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means is that in making efforts to resolve and sustain conflicts, the activities of fuel (petrol, diesel and kerosene) dealers, both commercial and petty dealers have to be closely monitored especially in conflict prone communities.

4.3.4 Provision of ideas

Effective strategy in waging conflicts requires ideas in the form of coaching, education and training. Nine of the respondents were of the view that the needed resources in the form of ideas were given to combatants to make them effective in their operations. A respondent stated:

‘People were given ideas and coached on how to talk and also relate to people. In going to the battle field, the young ones needed ideas on how to conduct themselves and the experienced once were helpful’. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

A key informant had this to say in support of the assertion of the respondents:

‘Those with formal knowledge were able to help others in zoning and mapping the municipality. That was why some of their events took us as a surprise’ (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

4.3.5 Machetes

Instruments used as resources in waging conflicts come in many forms. According to seven respondents, cutlasses were provided to combatants and sympathizers to protect themselves from harm. A respondent in laughing mode stated:

‘They supplied us cutlasses to fight, but some of us used them in our farms’ (A Respondent Remark, 2019.)

Corroborating, another respondent remarked:



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'We were having blacksmith who manufactured any kind of cutlass we needed. For now he does not even want to hear anything like conflict'. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

Three of the key informants supported the assertion made by the respondents.

This is what one of them said:

'A vehicle was once stopped at Sang barrier and we realised the car was full of cutlasses. When the occupants were questioned, we were told they were sending them for farming purposes. This was funny especially given the situation in which we found ourselves at that time. In deed cutlasses were supplied especially to the young ones for self defence' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The information gathered showed that financing of conflict is not only limited to filling the pockets of combatants with cash. The broad forms of funding conflict is an indication that in trying to understand the conduct of a given conflict, a critical and a holistic conflict analyses has to be made. The findings support what Kriesberg (1998) theory of conflict escalation considers as condition given rise to escalation and prolong conflict. He (1998) cited cash, physical mobilization and tactics among other resources which fuel conflict. The revelation from the study could explain why the Yendi conflict was able to sustain for decades till January, 2019 when the standoff between the two antagonistic gates was resolved.

Even though the respondents could not identify the people who hugely financed the conflict. Nonetheless, the information gathered from them suggest that minor financial contributions were made by people from Yendi whilst large portion of the resources were invested by people outside the immediate conflict environment, probably kins and other sympathisers. The study found that



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among all the seven ways of investment or financing, the purchase of guns tops the list with 36 responses. This information indicates that guns, for that matter arms, play instrumental role in fueling conflicts with their attendance cost of misery. The high investment in arms as identified in this study is not different from Wuaku Commission's Report (2002). The Report indicated that the violent encounter in March 25 and 27 of 2002 was eventually fueled by deadly weapons. What the findings suggest is that to be able to sustain any gain from the resolved chieftaincy conflict in the study location, massive disarmament exercise should be carried out by the government through the various statutory security bodies.

Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation has identified factors such as mobilisation of social support, financial investment in arms, the development of innovative contentious tactics, recruitment of people and allies and the sole objective of winning a fight as critical conditions which give rise to escalation and protracted nature of conflicts.

4.4 Factors that motivated people's decision in financing Yendi conflict.

One of the objectives of the thesis was to explore the various factors motivating people to finance the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. As per the objective one, this thesis found that, various forms of investment were injected in to the Yendi conflict. Against this background, the researcher wanted to know what promoted the conflict investors/financiers to fund the Yendi conflict. Eight (8) responses were given namely: desire to be chiefs, protecting of one's gate, political votes, plots to sell, domination- controlling the community, recognition and respect and tarnishing the image of Dagbon.



Table 4. 5 factors that motivated people's decision in financing Yendi conflict. (Multiple Responses).

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Protecting of their gate	49	83
Political votes	41	70
Recognition and respect	32	54
Controlling the community when spoken	31	53
Plots to sell	30	51
Financial gains	30	51
Desire to be chiefs	21	36
Tarnishing the image of Dagbon	15	25
Total		

Source: Field Study, 2019

4.4.1 Protection of gates

Chieftaincy is a major heritage of the people (Hagan, 2006)), hence defending ones gate or factions has become a weapon of war. Forty-nine respondents attributed the motive of financing the Yendi conflict to the protection of Gates.

Three Respondents had this to say respectively:

'We are proud of our gate and we will not sit and watch people destroy it. Even if it is my last coin I will use it to sponsor it in all means. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

'Thank God we now have peace in Yendi, The only reason why people use to contribute in financing the chieftaincy conflict was to protect the image of their culture or gate' (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

'We could not have sat and watch them destroy the image of our gate' (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

An opinion of a key informant was in line with the respondents' view:



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'Most people believed that you can only protect your gate through financing or investing resource as far as the conflict was concern. This was the reason why they were financing it' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study agrees with that of UNESCO (2016). According to UNESCO (20116), the crisis suffered by the North of Mali since 2012 is attributed to protection of heritage of the people regarding their security which is inherent in the protection of human lives.

4.4.2 Political votes

The traditional political system is situated in a new political environment. The study found that, canvassing for votes by the two dominant political parties in Ghana the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and National Patriotic Party (NPP) was another factor influencing the financing of the Yendi conflict as expressed by 41 respondents. These respondents claimed that Politicians provided cash and food items to the people to win their support in elections and that each political party is attached to a gate (faction). Two respondents had this to say respectively:

'Whenever we were going to the court, the politicians usually supported us in so many ways including money and transport' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'During the season of politics, most of the politicians promised us jobs and also supported our activities. They did all these things to gain political votes' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

A key informant corroborated what the respondents said:



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'Most of our politicians meddle with the Dagbon chieftaincy affairs by pushing in resource just to win political votes' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study buttresses the revelation made by earlier writers including Kinyua (2015) and Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) who indicated that the Dagbon conflict became an election issue during the campaign for the 2000 elections and the political parties manipulated the system to gain an advantage.

4.4.3 Recognition and respect

Thirty-two (32) respondents representing 54% of the respondents asserted that most people spend their resources in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict in other to be recognised and respected by members of their gate in the society or in social gathering. It was revealed in the research that people were satisfied to splash huge sums of money in other to be recognized by their people. A respondent had this to say:

"The more you spend in the conflict the more you are recognized. We did not bother to spend on the conflict because we wanted to be recognised and gain popularity among the people".

The voice of a key informant buttresses what the respondents said:

"Most of the youth and business men in the municipality were pushing in resources in the conflict just to catch the eye of their people. They spent various sums of money simply to be recognized and respected" (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).



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The finding suggests that financing of conflict has assumed a status symbol.

This motivation probably could explain why the Yendi chieftaincy conflict became protracted.

4.4.4 Plots to sell

Awedoba (2009) noted the issue of contention involving the two ethnic groups, the Kusasis and Mamprusis in Bawku is grounded in chieftaincy and that such conflict has implication for land ownerships in the metropolitan area which continues to grow and where landed property commands considerable prices. Because of the value and prestige attach to land, people find all means to owe land and by so doing they find various ways by which they can secure these resource either for personal use or to sell. It was revealed from the study that people push resources in fuelling the chieftaincy conflict to be able to get some portion of land to sell or build when their gate are on the throne, or their section becomes the overload of Dagbon as indicated by 30 respondents. A respondent remarked:

'When you contribute or sponsor in the conflict, and is time for your gate to lead Dgbong, you will be giving a community so that you can also get access to sell lands' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

The finding from this study buttresses what Awedoba (2009) found to be a motivating factor of the Bawku inter-ethnic conflict between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis. To the African mind as Busia (1968) writes, his spiritual ancestors live on the land, which he considers himself under a sacred obligation to preserve. Misappropriation of such customary property and the



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 efforts to defend their God-gift asset has given rise to various litigations involving chieftaincy (Marfo, 2018).

4.4.5 Financial gains

The availability of revenue sources as noted by Geneva (2007) increases the risk of conflict recurrence if a conflict is managed and controlled by few conflict entrepreneurs. Thirty (30) of the respondents believed that people were sponsoring the chieftaincy conflict because of the financial gains or revenue they get in return. This is what two respondents said respectively in a focus group discussion:

“Why will you invest your money in to something you know you will not get anything, truly something comes out from financing the conflict in the municipality and some of us were gaining”. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

“The conflict situation here turned to be a business or entrepreneurial venture, because people were reaping profit out of financing it”. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

A Key informant supported the assertion made by the respondents and stated:

‘Some NGOs and business men were pushing resources into the chieftaincy conflict, with the view to secure operational permit and patronization of their services’ (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The literature indicated that Boko Haram group in 2014-15 made about \$10 million per year, according to a British Terror Finance Expert and a UN official. The finding from this research is in line with the extant literature. In January 2019 during the enskinment of the new Ya Na at Yendi, His Excellency the



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President of the Republic of Ghana Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffour remarked that people enjoyed in financing and benefiting from the Yendi conflict and termed them as conflict entrepreneurs. The finding suggests that different people have various reasons or motivation in financing conflicts. Understanding these reasons is one creative approach to effective conflict resolution.

4.4.6 Desire to be Chiefs

The strong desire for traditional political office or position by some members of the society has been found to be a major cause of chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana (Abotchie, 2006; Awedoba, 2009). Twenty-one (21) respondents asserted the desire to become chief motivated some people to finance the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. A respondent exclaimed:

Our leaders believe that if you are able to finance or contribute in the affairs of chieftaincy conflict, you have the power to push for someone to become a chief. And this is working". (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

A key informant supported the idea and expressed:

Some sub chiefs were enstooled because of their loyal support and resource contribution' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this thesis supports the work of Hagan (2006), who noted that chiefship has acquired such added value and repute that the institution has come under siege. He indicates that the wealthy have begun contesting for the office even where their claim or tittle to the office is obscure or cannot be demonstrated given rise to various chieftaincy conflicts.



4.4.7 Tarnishing the image of Dagbon

The study area houses people from various backgrounds, traditions and kingdoms. Some people in the study community had the idea that there were some elements in the municipality who sponsored the chieftaincy conflict because they wanted to tarnish the image of the Dagbon kingdom. Fifteen (15) respondents believed besides the combatants who hail from Yendi and its environs, there were also outsiders or non-Dagombas who pushed resources in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict with the view to dent the image of Dabgon. This was what a respondent expressed in a focus group discussion:

‘Most people were happy when we were fighting whilst others insulted us for our bad conduct so they kept pumping funds to sustain it’.
(*Courage Remark, 2019*).

A key informant supported the assertion made by the respondents and indicated:

‘We had NGOs, media houses and business men who were financing the chieftaincy conflict because they enjoy hearing the bad name of Dagbon’ (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study suggests that there are those whose consolation in financing conflicts is simply to see communities in destruction. As noted by Salim (2002), in spite of the efforts made to promote peace especially, through the creation of the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution since 1993, Africa is still known more for the conflicts that prevail than anything else. Salim (2002) expressed that people talk of conflict when they think of Africa because this is what catches the eyes of the international community.



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Other were excited when ever there were quarrelling in the communities or when they hear Dagombas were fighting, which triggered them to push resources in to these areas to keep them fighting.

4.5 Conflict financing and its implication on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict

Forty-one (41) respondents indicated that the use of resources on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict actually protracted the conflict and its resolution. Eight (8) of the respondents however, did not share the same sentiment. The respondents who indicated that the use of resources play a key role in protracting the Yendi chieftaincy conflict expressed that, because people or individuals usually invested in various ways through the supply of guns, bullets, physical cash or funding in legal battle, some people in the divided gate resorted to violence with little disagreement or go to court because they were capable as expressed by 28 respondents. Further fifteen (15) respondents expressed that those who depended on the resources invested in the conflict wanted it to persist so that they could earn some income. A benefactor of the conflict exclaimed:

'I have been feeding my family through the money I received from the financiers. Now that the conflict is resolved some of my children will not be able to continue their school. If the people wanted your support in all situation, then they needed to give you some money. This is how some of us benefited from the conflict. So to me the persistence of the conflict was good in disguise. (A Respondent Remark, 2019)

A key informant in support of the views of the respondents remarked:

'If you wake up from your sleep and realize of having a weapon with you, you are not afraid of anyone. At any point, if there is any misunderstanding, the first thing which comes in mind is to pick your



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gun and start fighting your opponent. This is why from time to time violence broke out in our communities' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

As Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation espouses, different factors contribute to the up and down movements of conflicts of which the Yendi chieftaincy is not an exception as the thesis has found. Attempts to understanding the protracted nature of conflicts as exist in Ghana demands deeper thought, reflection and analysis as well as collaborative efforts from various people with different knowledge and skills.

4.6 Motivating factors that contributed to the resolution of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict

Mitchell (1981) has expressed that conflicts changes overtime but this process does not mean that conflict develops solely in a linear fashion. It may regress, may not develop beyond its initial stages, or may display a recurring dynamic. Thirty-five respondents were of the opinion that there were some motivating factors that contributed to the resolution of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. Probing further as to what were some of the factors that led to the resolution of the conflict, respondents gave various reasons including; conflict fatigue, peace, employment, education, development and pressure from the government as captured in Table 4.5 below:



Table 4. 6 motivating factors that contributed to the resolution of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict (multiple responses).

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Conflict Fatigue	48	81
Peace	47	79
Employment	39	66
Education	37	62
Development	32	54
Force from the Government	18	31

Source: Field data, 2019

4.6.1 Conflict Fatigue

Forty-eight (48) respondents asserted that the people were fed up with the protracted nature of the Yendi conflict and had no option than to embrace conciliatory and peace gestures, because they perceived that nothing good was coming out of the conflict except destruction of life and property. Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation explains that social conflicts generally involve many contending parties. Each adversary has many groups within it and there are many groups outside who are or might be induced to become allies. So, escalating conflict usually end in stalemate because the protagonists are no longer able to protect the confidence and or backing of the masses. As noted by Pruitt and Rubin (1986), a stalemate may occur when parties in conflict lose social support for their actions. Respondents had this to say: Three respondents respectively stated:



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'The youth were fed up with everything about the conflict and the financiers were also short of funds' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'We have been fighting since 2002 and we are not gaining anything from the fight, so why should we continue with the fight?' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'We have been fighting for so long and we realize it was not putting anything on our table. We did not benefit from the fight and people were insulting us all the time. When you mention your tribe you are tagged as a violent person. Some employers denied us jobs because of the way we were branded' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

A key informant confirms what the respondents said:

'Both the financiers and the combatants were not happy about the trend of events in the municipality, so they had no option than to call for peace' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study supports Kriensberg's (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation which indicates that sustained conflict itself has an element of fatigue and supporters may lose the courage to continuously support an action which may seem to generate no outcome. In this study it was found that both the combatants, sympathizers and financiers were fed up paving way for peaceful resolution. As expressed by Pruitt and Rubin (1986), people in conflict frequently count on the support of constituencies of supporters in order to stand a competitive struggle and when such actions are no longer forthcoming, stalemate or resolution could be engendered.



4.6.2 Peace

Salim (2002) intimates where there is a determination to find a peaceful solution to a conflict, no matter how grave the crisis may be, it is possible to attain peace. According to 47 respondents, after long struggle and occasional violent clashes the people felt that they needed peace in Dagbon. This was what two respondents had to say respectively:

'We needed peace because our children were dying and they were also burning our properties' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'No one could go to work or market during the period of violent clashes. The conflict hampers the export and sale of our farm produce and that was causing us a lot' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

A key informant supported the views of the respondents and remarked:

'The chiefs, elders, big men, pastors and malams in the town and outside were all preaching for peace to prevail in the area' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

In buttressing the point above, Marfo (2016) indicated that the complexity of conflict and conflict resolution has necessitated for peace building, an approach which attempts to foster a peaceful co-existence especially among previously fractured communities.

4.6.3 Employment

People need to be paid for work done in order to help them meet their basic social necessities. Thirty-nine (39) respondent expressed that because of the conflict in the area, most of the youth were lacking jobs, as investors were not



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prepared to invest in the community and the public sector is also limited to some few category of people. The desire for employment according to the respondents was a motivating factor for the restoration of peace in Dagbon. Two respondents had this to say:

'We needed employment and the only way for us to achieve this was to welcome the call for peaceful resolution in the area' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'Prior to this violent conflict, I was working with an NGO with more than 10 other workers. When the conflict started, they had to leave the municipality and we were laid off. You cannot think of employment amidst violent environment as we found ourselves' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

Buttressing the point, this is what a Key informant stated:

'Most of our youth were depending on the private enterprises but due to the conflict most of them were laid off, and they needed employment' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding suggest that various factors influenced the peaceful resolution of the Yendi protracted chieftaincy conflicts of which the desire for employment was a key.

4.6.4 Education

Education enables people to be much aware and conscious of themselves and a given phenomenon. Thirty-seven (37) respondent attributed the resolution of the Yendi conflict to education they received from the authorities which impressed upon them to be fighting as one people and they needed nothing again but peace. Two respondent had this to say:



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'We were educated on the bad aspect of the conflict, so we had to surrender' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'Through the formal education, our children now know what is good and bad and no one can influence them' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

In support of the respondents view, a Key informant expressed:

'We educated a lot of people and they understood the implication of violent confrontation or conflict and we pray this exercise should continue' (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

4.6.5 Development

Violent conflict is inimical to development. Nicolas Stern the then Vice-President of the World Bank (cited in Collier, 2003, IX), refers to violent conflict, for that matter civil war, as development in reverse. Thirty-two (32) respondents were with the view that, Yendi community was under developed because of the chieftaincy conflict. These respondents indicated Yendi needed development because most investors shut down their businesses whilst others migrated to peacefully communities. They also asserted that those who were living in the community did not want to put any developmental projects for fear of destruction in case of outbreak of violence. Two respondent sated:

'Most of us needed development and we were fed up of the destruction and burning of houses and our stores' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

'We needed businesses and investors in the municipality and the villages around' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

Buttressing the need for development, this is what a key informant indicated:



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'You will realise that the atmosphere was calling for development and the youth were championing that. Most of the NGO's abandoned their projects and others failed to come to the community to start new ones. Business men and women were running away from the municipality and the surrounding village and this has greatly affected the development of Yendi and its environs. To me the quest of improving the development of the community largely contributed to the peaceful resolution of the chieftaincy conflict (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

The finding from this study corroborates Kriesberg's (1998) assertion that unmanaged conflicts consume much scarce resources of communities, that, actors and consumable resources are diverted from basic ends of the system for the purpose of violent action. Conflict thus wastes scarce resources; human, material, time and finances which otherwise could be channeled for effective production and development.

4.6.6 Pressure from the Government

Eighteen (18) respondents were of the view that the pressure mounted by the government on the people to embrace peace and implement the road map to peace of Dagbon which was signed by the contending royal gates was another factor which contributed to the resolution of the Yendi conflict. This is what one discussant said during a focus group discussion:

'We had no option than to surrender because of the pressure from the government. We were encouraged to embrace conciliatory spirit to enable peace to prevail in Dagbon and its communities' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).



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The role of government in promoting peace in Yendi and its catchment areas is in consonance with the suggestion made by Awedoba (2009). He opines that government cannot meddle in chieftaincy affair but equally cannot refrain from ensuring that peace prevail in communities. The role of the government in helping in resolving the Yendi chieftaincy could be seen in the right direction.

4.7: Measures that could sustain the resolved chieftaincy conflict

Respondents were asked to suggest measures that could be adopted to sustain the resolved chieftaincy conflict. This was necessary because sustainable conflict resolution depends on various factors and commitments from the parties involved. Six broad suggestions were made as depicted by Table 4.6:



Table 4. 7 Suggested Measures for the sustainability of the resolved Yendi chieftaincy conflict

Suggestion	Frequency	Percentage
Collaboration between the chiefs and elders and the youth	51	86
Consultation of the kingmaker by the overlord	48	81
Avoidance of the use of the social media in inciting violence	41	69
Peace education and sensitization by the Peace Council, Religious leaders and the NCCE	36	61
Codification of chieftaincy succession in Dagbon	32	54
Avoidance of meddling in chieftaincy affairs by the government and external bodies	29	49

Source: **Field study: 2019**

4.7.1 Collaboration between the chiefs and elders and the youth

Fifty-one (51) respondents believed that, collaboration between the chiefs, elders and the youth in matters affecting the chieftaincy would be helpful in sharing thoughts and ideas which in turn would help promote durable peace in Dagbon. A respondents expressed:

The chiefs should discharge their duties well. There should not be any favoritism in their dealings. They should as a matter of possible engage and involve the youth in decision affecting the chieftaincy institution. This to me



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will help in addressing the situation where the people violently disagree with the chiefs when it becomes necessary to enskin someone in any community.

A key informant similarly indicated:

'The problem usually starts when some of the elders notice they are sidelined. So, there is a need for all the people to work together to protect the peace in our communities (Key Informant Remarks).

The findings support Bukari's (2013) work. According to him strong disagreement ensued between the people of Wungu and Nayiri over Nayiri's decision to enskin someone as a chief (Wunaba) in Wungu. This as he found was due to lack of collaboration among the chiefs, elders and the youth.

4.7.2 Consultation of the kingmakers by the overlord

If people are involved in decision making process, they are more likely to ensure that the outcome is sustainable (Burns, Heywood, Taylor, Wilde and Wilson, 2004). Forty-eight 48 of the respondents believed that if the overlord consults the king makers, sub chiefs and some time the youth when taking decision especially pertaining to the installation of a chief in any community, it would help sustain the peace in that area, because they would love to protect the outcome.

A respondent had this to say;

'Before the Ya-Na installs someone as a chief, we the indigenes (elders) need to have a say or should be consulted to avoid imposition, rejection and resistance which often has been a major cause of controversies in most communities' (A Respondent Remark, 2019).



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A Key Informant in support of the respondents stated:

'There should be consultation by the overload with the kingmakers in chieftaincy matters especially, if this resolved conflict should be sustained. The promotion of peace is no one business and all those who matters should be brought on board' (A Key Informant Remarks).

4.7.3 Avoidance of the use of the social media in inciting violence

Social media are supposed to be an interactive medium for users to share ideas together to bring development to their localities or networks. Ironically, it has become an avenue for making violent and provocative comments about others and a platform to incite people to engage in violence. Forty-one (41) respondents asserted that the youth should desist from using violent and provocative words on social media as this causes confusion and tension in communities and puts threat to the peace of Dagbon. This is what one discussant indicated in a focus group discussion:

'We the youth have to desist from using harsh words on each other and also stop posting things on the social media that put threats to the peace of Dagbon. If we are able to desist from that I know we will forever swim in peace' (Mr. Intelligent Remark, 2019).

The use of the media as a medium to express views and sharing information is very healthy to democratic growth. However, if such medium is used as an instrument to chastise others as found in this study, then there is the need for the need for the youth who especially patronise such facility, to exercise much constrain as suggested by the 41 respondents.



4.7.4. Peace promotion

Sometime people do the wrong thing because they fail to get proper coaching, mentorship or education. Thirty-six respondents expressed that if a lot of education and sensitization is done or organised by the police, the media, Peace Council and National Commission for Civic Education to educate both the youth and the elderly in the community about the benefits of peace, it will help them to desist from engaging in violent acts that could undermine the peace of Yendi and its surroundings. All the key informants share similar view. This is what one of them said:

‘There should be frequent peace education and sensitization to the people about the need for peace. Peace is indispensable. We cannot think of jobs when the few existing ones are destroyed in conflicts. All relevant stakeholders have to join in the crusade for peace. I have not been to Rwanda and other war-torn countries but what happened in our own country has taught me about the need for peace and mutual respect. I have the conviction that the resolved conflict will be sustainable with the collaborative effort from everyone’ (A key Informant Interviewed, 2019).

4.7.5 Avoidance of meddling in chieftaincy affairs by the government and external bodies

Thirty-two (32) respondents suggested that the Yendi chieftaincy conflict would be sustainable if the government and other external bodies avoid interfering or meddling or politicizing the chieftaincy institution. A respondent had this to say:

‘If our own way of settling dispute is not utilised but resort to frequent court actions, then we will always have problems. Dagbon is peaceful and politicians should stop using Yendi in their campaigns to incite the



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people against themselves. This practice is very bad and we should not tolerate it as Ghanaians’ (A Respondent Remark, 2019).

A key informant supported the respondents view and remarked:

‘When the elderly people realise their systems are not properly utilised there will always be problem’ (A Key Informant Remark, 2019).

Tonah (2007) advocates for the use of indigenous methods in resolving chieftaincy conflicts. Buttressing the point, he cited how through indigenous conflict resolution mechanism, the conflict over the installation of Wungu in the northern Region of Ghana was successfully resolved.

4.7.6 Codification of chieftaincy succession in Dagbon

Thirty-two (32) respondents were of the view that the Yendi resolved conflict would be sustainable if the rules and process involving, selection and installation of the Nam skin are codified or documented. This according to the respondents would help prevent those who manipulate the system to their advantage due to the absence of clear rules and procedures. Sharing similar view a key informant remarked

‘If there are laid down procedures in the traditional area, the people will respect it and it will go a long way to protect the peace in the area. People have been given different accounts to suit their own interest in matters affecting chieftaincy. I think if the chiefs and elders will sit down and document what has been the practice or ought to be done, I believe I will prevent future struggles and disagreements’ (A Key Informant Remark, 2019).



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The various suggestions given by the respondents are indicative that sustained conflict resolution depends on various factors. What the findings suggest is that all factors that are relevant in ensuring the peace of Dagbon have to be cumulatively employed by the chief, elders and the people of Yendi with the assistance of stakeholders.



SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the summary of key findings and conclusion drawn based on the available information. A section of the chapter also captures suggested recommendation. The study sought to assess how conflict financing protracts chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana by exploring the Yendi chieftaincy conflict. The study specifically investigated: (i) forms of resources invested in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, (ii) the motivating factors for financing the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, (iii) factors that contributed to the resolution of the Yendi protracted chieftaincy conflict and (iv) the factors that could help sustain the resolved chieftaincy conflict.

5.2 Summary of key findings

It was established that people really spent their resources on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict through various forms of which the purchase and supply of guns and bullets were the dominant mode of investment. The finding from this study corroborates CSIF (2015) study. CSIF (2015) has expressed that arms trafficking is a major source of conflict financing which protracts various conflicts and terrorist activities including that of Boko Haram.

The study found that due to the various resources invested in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict, the combatants and their sympathizers at any point in time were well equipped and capable of engaging in violent confrontations and



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waging legal battles in the court. This as the study revealed helped protracted the conflict as expressed by 72% of the respondents.

This thesis has found that the motivating factors for people investing in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict were many and varied of which the desire to protect royal gates or heritage and political votes were key accounting for 83% and 70% respectively. The finding is in line with the work of Brobbey (2008). Brobbey (2008) indicated, to be a royal is a birthright and it is never lost unless the person takes positive steps to renounce his royal blood or does an act that by custom or by law can result in his being barred from the stool or being disqualified from the competition. According to Brobbey (2008), to give up such fights for their God-given asset is regarded not only as humiliating defeat but a sheer acceptance of cowardice. This as noted by Brobbey has been a major motivating factors in waging chieftaincy conflicts using various means.

The study found that the resolution of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict was motivated by various cumulative factors notably; conflict fatigue, need for peace, education, employment and development. The findings from the study buttress Kriesberg's (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation which indicates that various conditions or factors limit escalatory tendencies thereby paving way for termination and or resolution of protracted conflicts. Salim (2002) asserted that when where there is a determination to find a peaceful solution to a conflict, no matter how grave the crisis may be, it is possible to attain peace. This assertion by Salim was found to be relevant in this thesis.



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It was revealed in this study that for the resolved Yendi chieftaincy conflict to be sustainable, there should be collaboration and consultation involving the chiefs, elders and the youth in the community in matters affecting chieftaincy, promotion of peace education and sensitization by stakeholders, and codification of chieftaincy succession rules and procedures in Dagbon.

5.3 Conclusions

Conflict financing plays a major role in protracting conflicts of which the Yendi chieftaincy conflict is not an exception. As Kriesberg (1998) Theory of Conflict Escalation espouses, escalating conflicts necessarily do not sustain forever, neither do they frozen perpetually. They may wax and wane, and terminate. This thesis has found that various factors gave rise to the upward and downward trend of the Yendi conflict over the years. This as the thesis identified demands comprehensive conflict analysis in an attempt to consolidate the peace gained in Dagbon.

5.4 Recommendations

There should be broad conflict analysis and sectoral collaboration between the police, the military, security analysts, the BIN and the Yendi Municipal assembly to ensure effective disarmament exercise in Dagbon to free the area from deadly arms and ammunitions.

The various forms of investment in conflict requires expert from various fields including bankers, the police, military, conflict resolution experts and fuel dealers to help deal with the menace of conflict financing which the study found to have contributed to the fueling of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict.



To be able to sustain the resolved chieftaincy conflict, frequent consultation and collaboration between the chiefs and elders of the two royal gates, as well as the youth in the Yendi community in matters affecting chieftaincy should be encouraged. The process could be facilitated by the National Peace Council and the National Commission for Civic Education. This will afford the parties involved to jointly take decision and also commit themselves to any outcome. This will help prevent mist-trust, speculation, grumbling and ultimate use of violence by any section of people from the community.

Chieftaincy cannot be divorced from politics as it finds itself in a new political environment in Ghana. However, it is suggested that politicians who play political game or make inflammatory speeches about the Yendi chieftaincy conflict for their parochial political votes and ambitions, which invariably incite the populace against themselves should be sanctioned. In this regard, the law enforcement agencies especially the police and the court should be empowered to deal with such people. This would help promote peace and sustain the gains in Dagbon especially, Yendi and its immediate environs which over the years have been the center of violent confrontations.

5.5 Suggestions for further studies

The suggestion is that further in-depth studies should be conducted on conflict financing and protracted conflicts in various parts of Ghana. Such a research work will provide Ghana with a comprehensive data base for expeditious resolution and consolidation of the gains of resolved conflicts in the country.



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UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

GRADUATE SCHOOL – WA

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

This schedule has been designed for the collection of information on the topic “**Conflict financing and protracted chieftaincy conflict in Ghana: exploring the Yendi chieftaincy conflict**” the purpose of this study is to compile and submit a research thesis on the problem mentioned above to the University for Development Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of a master of philosophy in Development Studies. The cooperation of all is rightly solicited and confidentiality of identity and response assured.

PART I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF RESPONDENT

Introduction: please tick [] or write answer in the space provided where appropriate.

Sex: Male [] Female []

Age 18-29 30-39 [] 40-49 [] 50 and above []

Marital status: Single [] Married []

Formal Education; none [] Basic Level [] Tertiary [] others specify []



PART II

INSTRUCTION: Tick [] or write appropriate answer

1. How does financing helped in protracting the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

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2. What have been the motivating factors for financing the Yendi chieftaincy conflicts?

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3. What factors influenced the resolution of the Yendi protracted chieftaincy conflicts?

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4. What policy measures can help sustain the resolved Yendi chieftaincy conflicts?



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5. How do people spend their resources on the conflict?

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6. Do they drive any motive from resourcing the conflict? Yes

No

7. What kind of resources do they invest in to the conflict?

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8. Does the financing helps in protracting the conflict? Yes

No

9. What role does finance play in protracting the Yendi conflict

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10. Why do they spend their resources on the conflict?



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11. What motive do they drive from financing the conflict?

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12. Does the use of these resources on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict affect development?

Yes No

13. How does it affect development of the Yendi municipality?

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14. Does the Yendi chieftaincy conflict result in the lost of life?

Yes No

15. Do people lost their property because of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

16. How do people lost their property?



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17. Does Yendi chieftaincy conflict result in people leaving the

municipi

Yes No

18. Does the Yendi chieftaincy conflict effect the social life of the people in

the municipality? Yes No

19. If yes how does this effect the social life of the people in the

municipality?

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11. Does the chieftaincy conflict in Yendi have any effect on education in the?

Municipality? Yes No

12. If yes, how does the conflict affect education in the municipal? if yes why?

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13. Does the Yendi chieftaincy conflict have any effect on agriculture in the

Municipality? Yes No

14. If yes, how does the conflict affect agriculture in the municipality?

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15. Does the Yendi chieftaincy conflict affect economic activities in the?

Municipality? Yes No

16. If yes, how does the conflict affect economic activities in the municipality?

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17. Does the Yendi Municipal Assembly use its resources on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

18. If yes, how does the assembly use its resource on the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

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20. Do changes in educational level influence some people to finance the conflict? Yes No

21. Do changes in economic fortunes of some people influence them to desire to finance the chieftaincy conflict even though they may not be of royal decent?

Yes No

22. Do changes in political fortunes of some people influence them to finance the Yendi chieftaincy conflict even though they may not be of royal decent?

Yes No

23. Is chieftaincy restricted to a particular group of people in the Dagon traditional society? Yes No

24. If yes, which group of people is eligible to occupy chieftaincy positions in the Dagbon traditional society?

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25. Are there traditional procedures for filling vacant chieftaincy positions in the Dagbon traditional society? Yes No



26. If yes, what are the procedures for filling vacant chieftaincy positions?

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27. Are there traditional mechanisms for settling chieftaincy conflicts?

Yes No

28. If yes, how effective are those mechanisms for settling chieftaincy conflicts?

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29. Does the Yendi Traditional Council have any role to play in settling chieftaincy conflicts in the Yendi municipality? Yes No

30. How has the Regional House of Chiefs tried to settle the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

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31. How do you assess the national policy of resolving chieftaincy conflicts in



Ghana?

Effective Very effective Not effective

32. How do you assess the involvement of the courts in the resolution of the

Yendi chieftaincy conflict? Positive Negative

33 Do the police play any role in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

34. Does the military play any role in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

35. Do the media play any role in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

36. Do political parties play any role in the Yendi chieftaincy conflict?

Yes No

37. Does the settlement of the Yendi chieftaincy conflict have any impact on the development Dagbon and how?

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Thank you very much once again for taking time to help with the

Research.

Npagya.

