The African Union's Call for Global Pan-Africanism and the Ghana-Diaspora Relations in the 21st Century

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Abstract

One of the most outstanding initiatives that the African Union (AU) has taken that distinguishes it from its predecessor (the Organization of African Unity) is the adoption of the African diaspora as its sixth region. This article has two principal sections. First, by establishing the reasons for adopting the African diaspora as its sixth region from development perspectives, it explores how the African diaspora can engineer development processes in Africa and the challenges that the AU must address if the African diasporas are expected to play this role. In the second section, the article explores how Ghana provided a political base for Pan-Africanism and how Nkrumah laid an intellectual foundation for the movement. It also examines how Rawlings and Kufuor built on Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist legacy by creating incentives for the returnees/repatriates from the diaspora. While probing the character of the returnees/repatriates phenomenon and politics in Ghana, the second section also explores the controversies that center on dual citizenship, the right of return and abode, and voting rights of Ghanaians Living Abroad (GLA). Finally, the section investigates the receptivity of the traditional

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political system to the returnee/repatriate phenomenon in Ghana. The article concludes by making recommendations on how the Ghana-diaspora relations can be strengthened.

Keywords
pan-africanism, African Union (AU), African diaspora, the sixth region, development, citizenship, Ghana

> We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity. We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.
>
> —Kwame Nkrumah

Introduction

Between 16th and 19th centuries that Africa was the victim of the European slave trade, European and American slave traders sent millions of Africans to North America, the Latin America, and the Caribbean to work in farms and plantations under dehumanized conditions.[1] This is the historical root of what some scholars call "original African diaspora" to describe the descendants of enslaved Africans who are in the Americas and the Caribbean. Also, with the acquisition of the formal Western education that came with colonialism, there was an enhanced international mobility, in which some Africans who went for further studies and/or in search of greener pastures have not returned to Africa. Furthermore, the civil wars that plagued some African states, such as Nigeria, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, and Chad among others produced refugees some of whom the West accepted under political asylum. Therefore, the net effect of these involuntary migrations of "enslaved"[2] Africans that produced the "original African diaspora" and the voluntary migrations of Africans in pursuit of further studies or in search of greener pastures or political asylum (modern diaspora) has been to rob Africa a significant part of its human resources (Akyeampong, 2000).[3]

It is important at this juncture to state that the term *African diaspora* is highly contested both at the scholarly level and at the level of those that it attempts to describe (Alpers, 2001; Bakewell, 2008). The contestation is largely attributable to the fact that the term turns to subsume, under its rubric, the historical trajectories and contemporary factors of those it describes as

being homogeneous thereby denying the heterogeneity of those it purports to define (Alpers, 2001). Scholarly reactions to the use of the term *African diaspora* have been varied. There are scholars who think that the use of the term, which has been powerfully influenced by drawing a parallel to the experiences of some people, will reinforce the supremacist view of some people which may be counterproductive for race relations (Alpers, 2001). Other scholars are of the view that while the term gives a monolithic picture, the term's constituents are heterogeneous with varied historical experiences and different contemporary socio-economic circumstances. Therefore, the use of the term will mean different things to different categories of people. Also, there is the concern about appropriate methodology for such a vast area of study. As the constituency of the term is varied and versatile, one-size-fits-all methodology or scholarship will be incongruous for studies that need to account for some particularities within the larger picture (Palmer, 1998).

At the level of those that the term describes, there are also objections. First, the African American and Caribbean intellectuals—the original African diaspora—think that African diaspora should refer to them because they meet the historical condition of forced immigration just as the Jews to which the term initially applied. Therefore, they consider the application of the term to the recent African immigrants as an intellectual incongruity. On the other hand, the recent African immigrants—the modern African diaspora—reason that the African Americans, as a result of their historical experience that led to de-ethnicization of their identity and subsequent prioritization of race over ethnicity, have lost their ancestral links with Africa. Having lost links with Africa, they have no or little knowledge about Africa to make meaningful contribution to its development. Therefore, they think that the appellation African diaspora is not suitable for them (Alpers, 2001).

Whether the point of reference is the original or the modern African diaspora, the description of Zeleza (2005) that sees "Diaspora . . . [as] a process [its evolutionary aspect], a condition [its social aspect], a space [its geopolitical aspect] and discourse [its intellectual aspect]" is apt because it gives an overall framework within which the discourses on diaspora can be situated (p. 40). It is significant to note, however, that the contemporary discourses on what the African diaspora should constitute have entertained both exclusivist (either the original or the modern diaspora) and inclusivist (both the original and modern diaspora) perspectives. Nonetheless, in meeting the demands of the identity politics wrought by contemporary globalization, the African Union (AU) has adopted an all-embracing definition of diaspora that sees it as "consist[ing] of peoples of African origin living outside the continent [of Africa], irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the Continent and the building of the

African Union" (quoted in Nnaemeka, 2007, p. 131). Given the stigmatization, discrimination, and marginalization that the original diaspora encountered in their host communities and which the modern diaspora subsequently shared, issues of African diaspora have always occupied a central place in the Pan-Africanist discourses. The discursive resurgence of African diaspora, in recent times, has come about as part of the repackaging of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) whose charter and subsequent focus failed to institutionalize Pan-Africanism at a global level. The AU as a refurbished OAU has, among other things, the desire to promote Pan-Africanism at a global level. What then is Pan-Africanism?

Pan-Africanism is the idea—which had resulted in the past and continues to result in various forms of political mobilization and advocacy—that seeks the unification of all people of African descent in an attempt to initiate collective actions toward their emancipation from the unending ills of the European slave trade, colonialism, and neocolonialism and their embarkation on social development that brings self-reliance and dignity to them (AU ECHO, 2013). Pan-Africanism, as a concept, has been given different shades of opinion and emphasis. In analyzing the various versions of conceptualizing Pan-Africanism, three categorizations, which have taken different geographical foci that range from global, continental, to national, can be discerned. First, Pan-Africanism has fostered a generic and a global conceptualization that emphasizes the need for the Africans in the continent and Africans in diaspora to come together for their mutual benefits (see Adogamhe, 2008; M'Bayo, 2004; Murithi, 2007). This conceptualization, to borrow Ali Mazrui's terms, can be called a "global Pan-Africanism" (Mazrui, 1977, p. 69). Therefore, any Afrocentric project that cuts across continents can find meaning under this conceptualization. Second, Pan-Africanism has also been conceptualized as a mobilizational tool for separate projects either in the Americas or Caribbean or Africa. Under this conceptualization, the descendants of the deslaved Africans, in an attempt to restore their lost sense of dignity, used this to campaign for civil and political rights in the United States. In Africa, this was also used to campaign against colonialism. Continental Pan-Africanism that was institutionalized with the formation of the OAU in May 1963 found meaning under this conceptualization. The third conceptualization of Pan-Africanism is that it once took the form of state ideology. Some of the first crop of African leaders who campaigned to end colonialism in their respective countries tried to domesticate Pan-Africanism to suit their socio-cultural milieu and meet the aspirations of their people. These leaders believed that in order to decolonize the minds of their people, there was the need to provide the people with an alternative ideology for post-colonial state formation. Therefore, under this conceptualization, Pan-Africanism meant different things to these African

statesmen. "For Senghor it was *Negritude*, for Kenyatta it was *Harambee*, for Nkrumah it was *Consciencism*, for Nyerere *Ujamaa*, for Kaunda it was *Humanism*" (Momoh, 2003, p. 44).

The first section of this article seeks to establish the reasons why the AU adopted the African diaspora as its sixth region from development perspectives. It examines whether the African diaspora can play the role of engineering development processes in Africa. The section also explores the challenges that come with this role. In the second section, the article explores how Ghana provided a political base for Pan-Africanism and how Nkrumah laid an intellectual foundation for the movement. The section also examines how Rawlings and Kufuor built on Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist legacy by creating incentives for the returnees/repatriates from the diaspora. While probing the character of the returnees/repatriates phenomenon and politics in Ghana, it also explores the controversies that center on dual citizenship, the right of return and abode, and voting rights for Ghanaians Living Abroad (GLA). Finally, the section investigates the receptivity of the traditional political system to the returnee/repatriate phenomenon in Ghana. The article concludes by making recommendations on how the Ghana-diaspora relations can be strengthened.

The AU and Global Pan-Africanism: Designating the African Diaspora as the Sixth Region

The Charter that established the OAU on May 25, 1963, did not capture the Africans in diaspora.[4] How can one explain this lack of recognition of the Africans in diaspora in the OAU Charter when the majority of the OAU's founding fathers, besides drawing invaluable inspiration from the Pan-Africanists in the diaspora, had first-hand experience of the racial discrimination that Africans encountered in their host communities? This apparent lack of recognition of the African diaspora in the OAU Charter, as a Pan-Africanist organization, requires an investigation into the temperament of the politics under which the OAU was established. Unquestionably, the Pan-Africanists in the New World supported the campaign to eradicate colonialism in Africa (see Adogamhe, 2008; Uzoigwe, 2004). Nevertheless, the opinions of their foremost and outspoken leaders, particularly W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, differed in terms of approach and timing for ending colonialism. Du Bois favored a "gradualist approach" in which reforms would focus on training the educated Africans to participate in governing their people. This meant that it was premature to ask for independence. This "gradualist approach" may have caused some level of mistrust between the radical founding fathers of the OAU—such as Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya),

Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Modibo Keita (Mali), and Sekou Toure (Guinea) among others—and some Pan-Africanists in the diaspora. Conversely, Garvey's approach for ending colonialism in Africa was uncompromisingly radical. To Garvey, ending colonialism in Africa was the answer to restoring the Black man's dignity and putting him in his rightful place. Certainly, Garvey's radical approach should endear him to the radical African nationalists. However, his assertion that Africa must be for Africans and his "Back-to-Africa" project[5] had raised many concerns among colonial masters in Europe such that associating with Garvey's radicalism could endanger their agitation for ending colonialism in Africa. With this, the founding fathers may have thought that capturing the Africans in diaspora in the OAU Charter may do more harm than good to the cause of ending colonialism in Africa. Therefore, the struggle for independence in Africa overshadowed the plight of the Africans in the diaspora (Erhagbe, 2007; M'Bayo, 2004). Ikome (2009) rightly summed up the atmosphere between the continental African leaders and the African diaspora when he stated that

> While the OAU sped up the independence of African nations, it did not reach out to the African Diaspora in a meaningful way. Despite the longings of African descendants on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, Africa and the Diaspora did not unite as envisioned by the founding fathers of the Pan-African movement [such as Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and George Padmore among others]. This was partly because of the impact of the Cold War and African leaders' obsession with newly acquired sovereign power, nation-building, and political self-aggrandisement. During much of the post-independence era, engagement between Africa and its Diaspora was reduced to courtesy visits and near-passive identification with the aims and objectives of the OAU by the Diaspora. (Ikome, 2009, pp. 2-3)

Nevertheless, with the Leon Sullivan Summit, which was inaugurated in Cote d'Ivoire in 1991 and held biennially since then, the gap that had existed between the continental Africans and the Africans diaspora began to close. What had facilitated the closing of ranks between the two groups was the Leon Sullivan Foundation's philosophy that "the development of Africa is a matter of global partnership" between the continental Africans and the African diaspora. The emphasis that this philosophy received in the subsequent Summits strengthened the need to work together for the development of Africa ("The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation Brings 'Summit of a Lifetime' to Tanzania," 2008). However, while the Sullivan Summit was carrying out this important bridge-building role, the ineffectuality of the OAU as a continental body in tackling many of the continent's problems had become apparent by the late 1990s. In Europe and Asia, the globally driven pressures were

compelling their progressive minds that softening political sovereignty was the surest way to achieve economic prosperity (General Report, 2002). Therefore, the unanimity of the African heads of state on the need to refurbish the OAU in order to accelerate Africa's economic development was not hard to achieve at the Sirte Extraordinary Session in July 1999. The new continental body that emerged from the OAU was the AU. At the Lome Summit of 2000, they adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union and inaugurated it at the Durban Summit of July 10, 2002. However, contrary to the Browne's (2005) contention, just as the OAU Charter did not capture the African diaspora, the AU's Constitutive Act did not make any mention of the African diaspora.[6] In fact, it would appear that the spirit of bridge-building role, which the Sullivan Summit had spearheaded, was lost in the Constitutive Act. The African heads of state drafted and adopted the AU's Constitutive Act without much prudence as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of some issues whose presence would have meant a real transformation of the OAU. Nevertheless, the Act had not lasted for 1 year when its poverty became apparent to the African leaders who wanted a continental body that could meet the challenges of the contemporary global politics. Therefore, in the amendment that followed the Constitutive Act on February 3, 2003, the African diaspora was captured under Article 3 (q), which states that the AU shall "invite and encourage the full participation of the African diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union" (AU Report, 2003b).

Even with this amended provision, the "full participation of the African diaspora" as contained in the amended Constitutive Act is imprecise and vague as it does not say much about the nature of their participation. However, during the deliberations on how Africa could harness the potential of her intellectuals in meeting the problems that confronted her, a participant suggested that there was "the need for the Diaspora to organize itself to become the 6th Region of the African Union . . ." (see African Union, 2004, p. 11). The thematic Committee, which addressed the *Relations Between Africa and Its Diaspora*, later endorsed the establishment of the diaspora as the sixth region of the AU.[7]

It is significant to note that the AU's desire "to face more effectively the challenges posed by globalization" (African Union, 2001) through seeking an integration with the African diaspora, among other things, has overridden the administrative difficulties that the irregularity of adopting the African diaspora as the sixth region might create. The sixth region is irregular in many respects. First, in contrast with the five regions which are within Africa, the sixth region is in dispersal "in terms of its nearly global spread, in continental Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East" (Ikome, 2009, p. 9). Second, the constituents of the sixth region are citizens of different countries/

continents under different social, economic, political, and cultural conditions. Third, as the AU has adopted an inclusivist membership of the African diaspora, it means that the modern diasporas of the other five regions, which are within Africa, are also constituents of the sixth region. Their citizenship status and their connections with their home regions make the heterogeneity of the sixth region unique. As one analyst has rightly observed that ". . . the Diaspora itself is not monolithic; rather, it is quite heterogeneous and contains diversities within itself as well" (African Union, 2004).

Nevertheless, the urgency of a globally driven integration that the AU is seeking with the African diaspora should not obscure the implications of the heterogeneity of the sixth region for the administration and operations of the AU. This calls for a thoroughly worked-out mechanism for the integration of the sixth region. However, the suggestions that have come up about how the integration of the African diaspora can be achieved are neither clear nor concrete. Some are of the view that "a coordinator and a representative to the AU in charge of relations with the Diaspora" can do the onerous task of integration. Others think that "a representative body including the major regions of the world" should be charged with the task of integrating the African diaspora into the AU. Yet, there is another exclusivist opinion that thinks that "the Diaspora [the modern diaspora only] should be integrated into the countries to which they belong" (African Union, 2004). These suggestions are not only simplistic, but they do not say much about how the heterogeneity of the African diaspora can be turned into advantages for the AU.

In pursuance of its vision of a people-centered union in sharp contrast with its predecessor (the OAU), which analysts have criticized for its elitist structures (Momoh, 2003; Muchie, Habib, & Padayachee, 2006; Murithi, 2007), the AU has seen civil society organizations (CSOs) as the surest vehicle to involve the diverse peoples of African descent (Muchie et al., 2006). The CSOs are expected to be the key players of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). It is important to state that of the 150 seats of the General Assembly of ECOSOCC, 20 have been allocated to the African diaspora. Article 5 (3) of ECOSOCC Statute states that, "African Diaspora organizations shall establish an appropriate process for determining modalities for election and elect 20 civil society organizations (CSOs) to the ECOSOCC General Assembly" (see ECOSOCC Statute in African Union [undated]). Nonetheless, there has not been any consensus on how the 20 seats of ECOSOCC General Assembly allotted to the African diaspora should be filled. Proposals from various stakeholders on the distribution of the 20 seats among the African diaspora have not only varied, but have not also emerged from any clear-cut criteria. Unless a more balanced distribution of seats is arrived at, the adoption of any of these proposals is likely to be met with

protestations of unfairness by some diasporic communities that may feel underrepresented in the future (Ikome, 2009). Such protestations can not only cause serious cracks in the sixth region as a constituency, but can also undermine the integration that the AU is seeking with its diaspora. Given that the AU will get its act right as regards the integration it seeks with the African diaspora, is the African diaspora capable of engineering development processes in Africa? In what immediately follows, the article addresses this question.

African Diaspora as Engineers of Development in Africa

African leaders have expressed a great deal of confidence about the hope that the adoption of the African diaspora as the sixth region offers to a continent whose numerous grave problems have led to Afro-pessimism among Africans and non-Africans alike.[8] Grave problems such as extreme poverty and deprivation and their concomitants, alarming unemployment, and low infrastructural development have all strengthened Afro-pessimism. In addition, lack of adequate capital with its resultant low investment has been a serious obstacle to industrial development in many African countries. As if these are not enough while the level of human capital is generally low, the situation is worsened by the increasing brain drain. Furthermore, HIV/Aids epidemic has severely hit the continent, while diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and others, which are largely curable, remain life-threatening to the majority of people. There is also the issue of poor governance that is largely characterized by weak institutions, low popular participation, poor accountability, rising criminality, and poor human rights record among others. What can the African diaspora do to engineer development process that can tackle the foregoing problems?

From the onset, it is important to acknowledge the locational advantage of the African diaspora, especially those in the global north of the world economy. The comparative advantages of these centers in terms of knowledge, scientific advancement, and technological facilities can shed light on what the African diaspora can bring to Africa. As Davies (2007) aptly advises, "any investigation of diaspora politics and activities must be sensitive to the fact that diasporas comprise an integral and distinctive part of the globalized political economy" (p. 67). Coupled with this locational advantage is the availability and accessibility of cheap telecommunication that have unprecedentedly connected Africa and its diaspora. Therefore, this locational advantage can easily be turned into a host of opportunities for the continent.

Given that a substantial amount of world's capital is located in the core states, the African diaspora can play major roles in mobilizing resources for Africa. With the African diaspora's knowledge of the capital market, lending opportunities, and philanthropist organizations, they can considerably help to raise and channel funds for Africa's development. They have the capability to improve Africa's negotiating capacity with the international donor community thereby increasing foreign direct investment in Africa (Araya, 2007; Kapur, 2001). Also, Africa's experience with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) has shown that the conditions that normally accompany international donors' investments in Africa are often antithetical to African's structural temperament (Muchie et al., 2006). With their connection, the African diaspora can play a meaningful intermediary role to soften some of the stringent conditions that are attached to these foreign investments.

At another level, what the African diaspora have been doing, which needs to be strengthened, is their contribution to Africa's development through remittances. Shinn (2008) has succinctly shown how remittances to Africa are astonishingly on the increase:

> [R]emittances to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 reached $20 billion, more than the total foreign direct investment flow and nearly equal to foreign aid. Remittances to North Africa were even higher—about $35 billion with Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria the leading recipients . . . Remittances amount to between 10-50 percent of GNP in Lesotho and 25-50 percent of the value of exports in Malawi. One study indicates that the Ghanaian diaspora remits about $400 million each year . . . In 2003, remittances totalled $462 million and constituted about 70 percent of Eritrea's GDP . . . The Ethiopian Central Bank reported that formal remittances reached $500 million in 2006. Including informal remittances, the total is probably about $1 billion . . . The UN Development Program estimated remittances to Somalia at $500 million. The estimated total for much less populous Somaliland is also an astounding $500 million annually.

It is significant to indicate that remittances have positive bearing on standard of living—consumption, housing, clothing, and hygiene—and investments. Meeting the basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing from the remittances means that the recipients can actively participate in community development (Abdul Raheem, 2007; Kapur, 2001). Nonetheless, analyses that are not only overly bourgeois economic in tones, but which are also narrow in their focus, have criticized remittances "for exacerbating inequalities, skewing consumption patterns toward imported luxury items, and fuelling inflation" (Chikezie, 2000). Although the percentage of remittances that goes into income and employment generating activities is admittedly small, these studies have underrated the multiplier effect that remittances can generate in

the recipient economy (Okele, 2008). Also, studies on remittances in Kenya have shown that a substantial amount of remittances goes to paying school fees and meeting health needs thereby closing the gaps that exist in accessing education and health facilities. Furthermore, besides that remittances support projects that close important gaps in the development process, which the sponsors normally attribute to government's neglect, the African diaspora and their representatives utilize "decentralised political structure" in executing their projects as a study on Ghana shows (Zan, 2004).

In addition, there are advantages that come with the "culturally hybridized" nature of the African diaspora in a world in which transnationalism has transformed human relations by softening and crisscrossing the barriers of culture, nationality, religion, and race among others (Gueron & Spevacek, 2008, p. 4). In the case of the modern diaspora, the advantages of knowing their host countries and their countries of origin fairly well—as compared with Western donors who do not often appreciate the socio-cultural arrangements in Africa—can translate into positive development for Africa. While the original diaspora may not know Africa fairly well, their search for engagement with their roots may call for attitudes of accommodation, commitment, and dialogue, which may not be forthcoming in the Western donor-sponsored projects. Mohamoud (2007) clearly explains the comparative advantage of knowing the two worlds when he notes that

> After all, diasporas occupy a vital strategic position giving them a particular kind of a worldview intimately framed by socio-political realties across countries and continents. Diasporas therefore view many of these issues from perspectives quite different from those advanced by the more traditional parties in host countries . . ., and that their contributions thus add value in the process that leads to the generations of ideas, knowledge and information. (p. 15)

Also, what used to be an exclusive domain of national governments and their agencies has now been powerfully replaced with what some analysts see as "co-development" (Gueron & Spevacek, 2008, p. 3) in which the African diaspora perform an indispensable role in international development. In the past, the mainstream development pattern had been between governments of the global north and the global south. However, the fact that Africa has earned a notoriety for poor governance—in which its corrupt leaders enrich themselves and their sycophants—has energized increasing agitation in the core states for judicious use of tax-payers' money for overseas development (Fowler, 2000). If given their rightful place in Africa's development, the African diaspora can initiate the necessary convergence between national politics and grassroots development. So far, their "grassroots driven and

transnational . . . nature" has not only brought "a multiplicity of development interventions," but has also introduced credibility, hope, and results in the development network (Mohamoud, 2007, p. 31).

Given their accumulated experience, their connection and interaction with the political establishment in the West and United States, which is more transparent and more accountable than what pertains in Africa, the African diaspora can help to put up programs of reform that can make African institutions more transparent, more democratic, and more accountable. Involving the African diaspora in Africa's development would give them the urge to campaign for institutionalizing democracy, initiating electoral reforms, stopping human rights abuses, strengthening security of the citizenry, increasing public-spiritedness, and encouraging accountability and probity in public life (Mohamoud, 2007).

The unjust global order remains one of the principal problems that militate against Africa's development. The global political economy is structured in ways that cripple development in Africa through factors such as: the dominance of the West in the management of the global economy, the protectionist policies of the West that undermine the comparative advantage of the global south, the imposition of unrealistic development/aid policies, the overburdening debt problem, and the support for puppet governments in Africa in order to maintain the global status quo among others (see Finnin, 2008). How do the African diaspora come in? In the past, the African diaspora and their organizations, such as the Council for African Affairs (CAA), the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA), the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC), Trans-Africa Inc. among others organized rallies, demonstrations, and boycotts in the United States that were instrumental in dismantling colonialism and the White minority regimes in Africa (see Erhagbe, 2007; Nesbitt, n.d.). Given this record, the African diaspora can launch campaigns that would call for a just global order. Also, due to the African diaspora's insiders' insights into the politics of their host communities, they can lobby the legislators of their host communities to pass favorable bills on issues of foreign policies and international development that affect Africa (Araya, 2007). Furthermore, given the negative images that the Western media have largely painted about Africa, which by extension have negative readings on the development process in Africa, the African diaspora can do a lot to change these images through "public education and sensitization of the wider public in their respective regions" (AU, 2003a).

One of the gravest problems that many African countries face in their attempt to develop is the issue of brain drain. Brain drain is a prominent factor in the continent's underdevelopment as no country can develop without adequate human capital (see Chimanikire, 2005; Shinn, 2008; Wadda, 2000).

Whereas Africa countries try hard to train their nationals for various professions and standards out of their meager public resources, they lose between 20,000 and 23,000 trained professionals every year (Kapur, 2001; Tebeje, 2005). This does not only widen the gap between the North and the South in terms of the availability of professionals, but it does also stifle the development process of many African countries (Kapur, 2001). Ironically, while Africa lacks sufficient number of scientists and engineers to chart her technological development, "[t]here are more African scientists and engineers in the USA than in Africa" let alone to talk of those in Europe (Tebeje, 2005). As a result of these short-comings in generating and retaining human capital that is necessary for her development, Africa has to hire between 100,000 and 200,000 expatriates at the cost of about US$4 billion a year (Tebeje, 2005).

The number of African diaspora (modern) who are returning to their countries of origin is increasing. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) through its "Return of Qualified African Nationals Program," succeeded in returning more than 2,000 professionals since 1983 (Migration for Development in Africa [MIDA], 2004). But this figure is not likely to increase in future because of the worsening situations in many African countries (Kapur, 2001; Tettey, 2003). Many analysts stress that the push factors that, in the first place, drove the modern African diaspora outside the continent must be addressed if they have to be encouraged to return (Shinn, 2008; Tebeje, 2005). As Burk (2005) rightly observes, " (r)esolution of conflict, improved governance, and sound economic policies would help increase productive employment and attract skilled Africans back home. The attitude of Africans abroad toward returning home is likely to change as their countries develop and opportunities improve."

Given that it is entirely impracticable to ask all skilled African diaspora to return to their countries of origin, some analysts have approached the issue of brain drain with a great deal of realism. These analysts have suggested that brain drain can also produce positive effects on the countries of origin through "virtual participation" (Tebeje, 2005; Woldetensae, 2007) and "brain circulation" (Hewitt, 2006) without physical relocation. In applying the concept of "virtual participation" to the African diaspora, it means they can contribute to the development of their countries of origin while maintaining active presence in their host communities. The African diaspora can engage in capacity building and institutional development of their countries of origin through "activities such as module preparation for distance teaching and e-learning, sharing of information with local counterparts, collaboration on researches and other development projects" (Woldetensae, 2007). This medium, if properly explored, can open a host of opportunities for African countries by "channel[ling] untapped intellectual and material input from the African

Diaspora" (Tebeje, 2005). Also, the African diaspora can play significant role in mobilizing expertise needed in the "diffusion of knowledge and technology" (Kapur, 2001).

Related to virtual participation is "brain circulation" (Hewitt, 2006). Brain circulation can be described as brain representation. Brain circulation refers to a set of policies that a country puts in place to professionally develop its diaspora emigrants in the global north so as to equip them in their attempt to mobilize and channel resources back to their countries of origin. Some Asian countries and Mexico have successfully used this strategy in initiating development in their countries (Hewitt, 2006). The application of this concept to the African brain drain problem might pose a huge problem because of the heavy financial overheads it requires. However, African governments can make the scholarships schemes they currently run to be amenable to the tenets of the brain circulation. For example, scholarships can only be granted in strategic sectors where the countries concerned have insufficient human capital. Also, upon completion of their courses, the scholarship beneficiaries should not be compelled to return immediately, but should rather be encouraged to penetrate their field of expertise in the core states. By penetrating their discipline, the African diaspora would be able to mobilize financial, technological, and human resources for their countries of origin. In addition, for the brain circulation approach to work, there must a strong attachment between the African diaspora and their countries of origin. Surely, the modern African diaspora are not lacking in this as this article has shown earlier on. It is significant to state emphatically that for the African diaspora to perform the foregoing roles in energizing development processes in Africa, the AU must provide an enabling environment by overcoming some challenges.

The AU's Call and the Challenges of Integration

For the African diaspora to engineer development processes in Africa, the AU will need to address some key challenges. Four principal challenges are noted here, namely the need to carry out institutional overhauling, the need to provide good governance, the need to grant political and civil rights to the African diaspora, and the need to harmonize economic policies of the African states through economic integration. First, many, if not most, of the African institutions are low performing if not dysfunctional. Therefore, they suffer from "reputational handicaps" (Kapur, 2001, p. 270), which make them and their professionals second-rate as compared with their counterparts in the global north. The AU should strive to move beyond rhetoric and tackle the root causes of the institutional decay in Africa such as low funding, patrimonialism, eroded state legitimacy, and clientelism among others. African

leaders should seek reputation worthiness for the African institutions by equipping them with adequate facilities, instilling professionalism and public confidence in them, making them enabling, facilitating their optimal performance, and turning them into arenas of job satisfaction and professional attainment.

Second, if the AU seeks genuine partnership with the African diaspora, there is no substitute for good governance in Africa. Promisingly, Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the AU states that the AU shall "(g) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; [and] (h) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments." Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that its precursor, the OAU failed not because it did not have laudable objectives, but because it failed to implement its objectives that could have prevented "violent conflict; political corruption; economic mismanagement; poor governance; lack of human rights; lack of gender equality; and poverty eradication" (Murithi, 2007). Good governance must be anchored on sound democracy. Muchie et al. (2006) were emphatic on the democratic credential of the African states during the OAU era when they stated that

> For the entire period of the OAU's existence, democracy has been seriously deficient in African governance. The absence of democracy is not incidental. It is systemic and structural. The post-colonial states that me [an]t to accelerate integration had indefensible records in human rights and democratic governance. (p. 13)

Therefore, the AU will need to show a real commitment to good governance. In its efforts to establish good governance in Africa, the AU must see the governments that resulted from the 2003 and 2007 Nigerian elections, the 2007 Kenyan elections, and the 2008 Zimbabwean elections as a compromise between democracy and the return to authoritarianism. Therefore, the AU must put in place mechanisms that will initiate credible electoral reforms in African states so as to pave the way for free and fair elections. To achieve good governance in Africa, the means must be as important as the end. Thus, it is important to note that "a dysfunctional government, even if produced democratically, cannot provide the transparent and accountable decision making needed to achieve economic progress" (Kilgour, 2009). The question that arises from the call for these reforms is: Are African leaders prepared to face what Corrigan (2009) terms the "political economy of development," if even they will be the losers of the new changes that the era of opening up with the African diaspora will bring?

Third, for the integration that the AU is seeking with the African diaspora to bring meaningful development results to Africa, the AU must reach out to the African diaspora with adequate political and civil recognition. This integration should not benefit Africa alone. As the former president of South Africa, Thambo Mbeki rightly stated that, "[o]ur relationship with the Diaspora should not be a one-way affair that focuses on financial support for Africa, but a reciprocal relationship" (Cilliers, 2003). Araya (2007) also thinks that the envisaged integration will also bring to the African diaspora benefits such as "a measure of credible involvement in the policy making processes; some corresponding level of representation; symbolic identifications; . . . [and] moral and political support of Diaspora initiatives in their respective regions . . . " among others. However, the most important thing, which can make the integration that the AU is seeking with the African diaspora rest upon a solid foundation, is granting the African diaspora dual citizenship. Dual citizenship will not only invoke a sense of patriotism in the African diaspora, but it will also open opportunities for them to vie for the Union's position without restrictions, be they formal or attitudinal (Kapur, 2001).

The exclusivist citizenship, which characterizes the politics of many nation-states in Africa, will not augur well for the sort of integration that the AU seeks with its diaspora. This type of citizenship does not only dichotomize between indigenes and settlers and place the latter as second-class citizens, but also denies the so-called non-indigenes civil and political rights. Adejumobi (2001) has powerfully argued how this exclusivist citizenship is at the heart of many internal conflicts and civil wars in Africa. If the adoption of African diaspora as its sixth constituency will make any meaningful contribution to Africa's development, then Africa will need to learn from the Western countries in which citizenship is used to integrate society, to create opportunities for individuals, to avoid punishing individuals for their conditions of birth, and to enforce the individuals' rights to fundamental human rights (Abdul Raheem, 2007; Murithi, 2012).

Fourth, if the African diaspora are to make any meaningful contribution to Africa's development process, the AU would need to harmonize the economic policies of its member states through an economic integration of the continent. Although an economic integration may be premature at this stage of Africa's development, the Abuja Treaty's recognition of an appropriate gradualist approach to economic integration in Africa is in the right direction (AU, 2002). Nevertheless, the AU will need to harmonize the fiscal and money policies of its member states (see Kapur, 2001). This harmonization is imperative in order to spread the impact of the African diaspora's presence in Africa reasonably evenly thereby discouraging "certain competitive

situations [that are] detrimental to Africa" in general (see African Union, 2004). The AU should learn lessons from how African countries jettisoned the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980—which aimed at "the long-term structural transformation of the African economy,"—and adopted the structural adjustment approach that considered each country individually (Muchie et al., 2006, p. 13). Sadly, the structural adjustment approach has largely failed to initiate development processes in Africa. The rest of the article will now examine the specific case of Ghana-diaspora relations in the 21st century.

Ghana as the Root of Pan-Africanism

That Ghana is the root of Pan-Africanism is not an overstatement, but a deserving acknowledgment of the pioneering roles that Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah played in forging Pan-Africanist interests throughout the world. Nkrumah's political ideas, particularly his Pan-Africanist interest, can be traced back to his association with the celebrated ace journalist, the late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his patronage of the latter's renowned anti-colonial newspaper, the *West African Morning Post* before he went to the United States for further studies (Azikiwe, 1959). Certainly, Nkrumah's subsequent exposure to racism as a student in the United States and the contacts he made with personalities such as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, and Martin Luther King, Jr. among others must have played an instrumental role in strengthening his interest in, and engagement with, Pan-Africanism (Asante, 2003).

Acting upon the advice of those who knew Nkrumah during his student days as a material *par excellence* for the struggle to end colonialism in Africa, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), which was under the leadership of J. B. Danquah, hired him as the General Secretary of the party. On assuming the post in 1947, Nkrumah soon realized that the party was bogged down by too much respect for the colonial establishment. Eventually, in 1949, Nkrumah broke away and formed his own political party, the Convention People's Party (CPP). With the "Positive Action" that he launched under his new party, the colonial administration could not cope with Nkrumah's radicalism that resulted in mass strikes and rebellion throughout the colony. In forestalling further disturbances, the colonial government conducted a general election in 1950. The overwhelming victory of the CPP in the elections resulted in a power-sharing arrangement in which Nkrumah emerged as the Leader of Government Business. This arrangement eventually led to Ghana's independence on March 6th, 1957 (Gocking, 2005).

The independence of Ghana brought Pan-Africanism to where "it truly belonged" (Momoh, 2003, p. 45) and provided the long-awaited political

base for the movement. Why was Ghana's independence unique when there were independent states in Africa before its birth? First, the Arab Africans have never accepted a total integration to any Pan-African movement that would diminish their connection with the Arab world (O. Agyeman, 2003). Therefore, the fact that leaders of independent countries such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan "emphasized their Arab connection rather than their African connection" did not make any of these states a congenial political base for Pan-Africanism in Africa, particularly that "the black equation was still central to the ideals of Pan-Africanism" (Uzoigwe, 2004, p. 12). Second, the pressure that the United States mounted on the Liberian government to pull out of the Garvey's "Back-to-Africa" project was enough to tell any Pan-Africanist that Liberia was unfit to provide a political base for Pan-Africanism. At any rate, its leaders would not have done anything that would compromise the American interest in their country (M'Bayo, 2004). Third, Ethiopia too could not be a base. The Ethiopian leaders would not want to involve in any political association or movement that would rekindle or justify the interests of their attempted colonizer, Italy. Therefore, with Nkrumah's unquestionable commitment to Pan-Africanist cause, there could not be any better place than Ghana as the political base of Pan-Africanism.

True to his declaration that Ghana's "independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent," Nkrumah used his government to promote Pan-Africanism in various ways. First, no sooner that Ghana gained independence than Nkrumah started the campaign for African unity. In 1958 alone, he organized two important conferences that, in consequential terms, led to the formation of the OAU in 1963 (Uzoigwe, 2004). Second, owing to the deep-rooted hatred that Nkrumah had for colonialism, he "gave material and financial assistance to numerous African liberation movements and allowed African freedom fighters to seek sanctuary in Ghana" (Biney, 2008). In fact, Nkrumah was eagerly preparing the Ghanaian Army to go and fight the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia when the National Liberation Council (NLC) suddenly toppled his administration in February 1966 (Kraus, 1966). Also, when Guinea stood vulnerable to a come-back by France because of some overwhelming financial difficulties in her early days of independence, Ghana quickly loaned her £10 million. Third, Nkrumah's engagement with the Congo crisis was encouraged by the fact that he did not want Belgium to re-colonize the country. Nonetheless, the forces of the superpowers (the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), which capitalized on the crisis to realize their respective interests, overwhelmed Nkrumah's negotiation to proffer an African solution to the crisis (Nwaubani, 2001; Nyang, 2005).

In an attempt to disentangle the complex web that had surrounded his ideology about Africa's emancipation, Nkrumah explained the various dimensions of his Black revolution, as an umbrella concept. While at the developmental level, it aspired to an African version of socialism, at the political level, it aimed at a union government for the whole of Africa. Also, at the cultural level, it targeted all people of African descent irrespective of their locations in the globe (Nkrumah, 1970). Encouraged by the need to address the likely apathy that such a gigantic project of emancipation may attract, Nkrumah called upon those he referred to as "revolutionary outsiders" to join the struggle. These were those who disengaged with the "conservative ideology" and also those who were not of the African ancestry, but sympathized with the African cause (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 89). Besides these moves, Nkrumah also used Ghana to lay an intellectual foundation for Pan-Africanism. To pragmaticize his ideology of Africa's emancipation, Nkrumah felt that there was the need to decolonize the minds of Africans that had been polluted with the colonial historiography. To him, intellectual endeavors must be made to deconstruct the socially constructed and Eurocentric interferences that had blurred the intellectual appreciation of Africa and the Africans. In furtherance of this intellectual pursuit, Nkrumah established the Institute of African Studies (IAS) and Encyclopedia Africana. These institutions have been, and continue to be, powerful platforms in correcting the distorted images of Africa and Africans. For the cultural rejuvenation they represent, these institutes have attracted renowned musicians, sociologists, novelists, dramatists, historians, and political scientists among others from diaspora (Botwe-Asamoah, 2004; Nkrumah, 1964).

Instigated by the belief that intellectual content must have a prominent place in politics, Nkrumah established the Young Pioneer Movement in 1960 and the Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba in 1961. The movement and the institute sought to spread the ideals that were necessary to forge the African liberation struggle ahead. While the former made some impact on domestic politics, it also generated intergenerational tensions (D. K. Agyeman, 1988, p. 9). The impact of the latter spread far and wide across Africa. The Institute's walls, at one time another of its existence, accommodated a variety of personalities that ranged from Lateef Jakande, who was acclaimed the best state governor in the Nigerian's Second Republic (1979-1983), and Ndabaningi Sithole, a freedom fighter for the African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia, to the controversial Robert Mugabe, whose politics of Africa's emancipation has raised many questions even among well-meaning Africans (Poe, 2003). Besides these institutional frameworks, Nkrumah devoted much of his time to writing, and through his prolific writing he laid a solid intellectual foundation for the Pan-Africanist movement.

Surprisingly, most of his writings, whose relevance is unquestionable till today, were done during his active political life.[9] Therefore, it is as a result of the political base which Ghana provided for Pan-Africanism in the late 1950s and the 1960s, and the intellectual foundation that Nkrumah laid for the movement that Ghana continues to enjoy some sort of patronage from a segment of the diaspora. The article now addresses the nature of the returnee phenomenon and politics in Ghana.

The Character of Returnee/Repatriate Phenomenon and Politics in Ghana

In recent times, the Ghanaian state has shown a phenomenal interest in African diaspora issues to the extent that one author refers to Ghanaians Diaspora as the 11th region of Ghana (Manuh, 2006). It will be academically rewarding to examine the trajectory of Ghana's interest in diaspora issues. The overthrow of the Nkrumah regime by the NLC in 1966 was a significant setback for Pan-Africanism. No sooner did political power shift to the NLC and later to Progress Party (PP) than the foundation that Nkrumah built for Pan-Africanism began to crumble. The PP, through its 1969 Aliens Compliance Order,[10] reversed the Pan-Africanist enthusiasm that had turned Nkrumah's Ghana into a Makkah, to which many Africans flocked. Besides their commitment to the OAU, the subsequent governments did not take any significant steps toward global Pan-Africanism. However, by the late 1980s, a global Pan-Africanism started to have a new breath of life in Ghana. Besides that Rawlings, in his second coming to power on December 31st, 1981, pursued the development policies of Nkrumah, he "buil[t] upon the ideas of cultural nationalism of the Nkrumah era to advocate a renewed form of Pan-Africanism" (Pierre, 2009, p. 68). Rawlings' energization of Pan-Africanism first took the form of creating monuments, namely, the W. E. B. Du Bois Memorial Centre for Pan-African Culture (1986) and the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park (1992). In 1992, Pan-Africanism received a further boost when the Rawlings' administration institutionalized the celebration of the Pan-African Historical Theatre Festival (PANAFEST). This celebration that takes place biennially aims at creating a forum for all peoples of African ancestry through showcasing African culture, arts, and music, and conducting lectures on contemporary problems of Africa. Central to the PANAFEST celebration are Cape Coast Castle and Elmina Castle and other slave forts. While these forts might be reinventing the historical meaning of the European slave trade to many African Americans, they are simultaneously serving the globally driven tourism in line with their designation as United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world heritage sites. In 1998, Emancipation day, whose objective was to celebrate the historic abolition of the slave trade in British empire in 1834, was added to the PANAFEST celebration (Abban, 2005).[11] Nevertheless, these celebrations have raised concerns and invoked criticisms among Ghanaians, African Americans, and White Americans.

These celebrations have been implicated in the Ghanaian politics in ways that invigorate the North/South divide in Ghana. The Southern elites who have hegemonic control of economic and political power are wary of the "Diasporas' settlement and local incorporation" (Hasty, 2003, p. 67), which has the potential of destabilizing the status quo in terms of ethnic and regional power relations. The influx of middle-class American diaspora, some of whom have expressed interest in staying permanently in Ghana, threatens these hegemonic elites who think that they may lose out in the elite realignment that may result from the influx. The Southern elites see the African Americans' zeal to redress many of Africa's problems as a powerful motivation for elite realignment which may favor the Northern elites who are clamoring for an appropriate development that will bridge the gap between the North and the South. On their part, the Northern elites feel that the celebrations, whose activities are concentrated in the South, are widening the historical gap between the North and the South. The argument that, "the North does not yet have the infrastructure or the amenities to ensure the security and enjoyment of so many tourists on a regular basis" (Hasty, 2003, p. 89) has not convinced the Northern elites, who believe that the Southern elites are hiding their intentions to strengthen what has been the normal pattern of development in the country since the colonial era.[12]

Also, the influx of the African diaspora, which these celebrations have encouraged, once caused some degree of disquiet in the Ghanaian religious terrain. The Nation of Islam capitalized on the influx to establish an office in Ghana. Encouraged by the goodwill it enjoyed from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government, the Nation of Islam forayed into the Ghanaian political landscape by hijacking the print and electronic media to spread its brand of Islam not only to the chagrin of the mainstream Islamic sects,[13] but also to the disappointment of the Christian groups. To the extent that its controversial leader, Louis Farrakhan emphasized how Islam broke racial barriers, he was tolerable to the Muslims. However, his reference to Elijah Mohammed as a divinely appointed prophet was not acceptable to the Muslim groups in Ghana, particularly the Sunnis. Neither did the Christian groups welcome his indirect references to Christianity as being responsible for the European slave trade and colonialism in Africa (Azumah, 2000).

Furthermore, these celebrations have put the various stakeholders at cross purposes. First, the interactions between the African diaspora and Ghanaians have not always created a convergence of interests. The African diaspora have often complained that the Ghanaian claim of providing them with events that could spiritually connect them to their roots during these celebrations is not realized as the preoccupation with "mundane" things dominates the celebration (Hasty, 2003, p. 49). In the African Americans' spiritual undertaking to reconnect with their roots in Ghana, they encounter, among others, mass poverty, and the typical Ghanaian perception of seeing the African Americans as people who are comparatively wealthier. It is important to note that these interactions produce vulnerabilities at both ends: the African Americans' desperation to reconnect on one hand, and some Ghanaian's desperation to design narrow means to meet the practicality of the harsh life on the other. While many African Americans understand that their "spiritual mission" cannot be achieved without some sort of cost, they are often shocked at the keen interest with which some Ghanaians interact with them in order to optimally use the "money-making machine" from the diaspora. It is this contradiction that compels Hasty to conclude that the celebrations represent "a spiritualized form of Western materialism" (Hasty, 2003, p. 58). However, in ways that provoked self-criticisms, some Ghanaians have severely criticized these activities as "dark tourism" because they oppose the fact that tourism is normally promoted in order for people to spend in exchange for pleasure. The events in the celebrations invoke anger and revenge. Ghanaians are hiding the part that their forebears played in the trade through "commodification of grief with the revenues accruing to the perpetrators, collaborators, arbiters . . ." (Lukaz, 2006).

At another level, there is also the issue of culture shock which African Americans experience in these celebrations. Their unfamiliarity with the African cultural landscape coupled with their stigmatization, discrimination, and marginalization in their host communities, which have always been attributed to their involuntary migration status, often lead to nostalgic feelings of a pristine life in Africa with cultural authenticity. Nevertheless, they have expressed their disgust about the ways Africans have adopted the White man's culture to the extent of shunning anything that is African. Inferiority complex, as a colonial legacy, has eaten deep into the Africans' contemporary way of life and facilitated the "ubiquity of Christianity and the diabolization of African religion" (Hasty, 2003, p. 52).

The celebrations have also raised concerns among White Americans. The first concern is that the character of these celebrations reinforces divisiveness—they the perpetrators and we the victims—at a time that the world needs integration. The critics maintain that the events at the celebrations are

particularly conducted to invoke the emotions of the African diaspora tourists thereby heightening racial animosity and consciousness (Pierre, 2009). Second, there is also a concern about the way the celebrations renew the "time-honored tradition" of blaming the White race for any that goes wrong in Africa, including the AIDS epidemic. Third, given the expensive nature of the participation in the celebrations, the White American critics maintain that the celebration should acknowledge rather than deny the fact that the participants from America "lead far more privileged lives in America—privileged enough to afford the $1,500 roundtrip airfare to Ghana—than those left behind in Africa" (Kavulla, 2005). While these sentiments may not be representative of the White Americans, however, they may have shown the sentiments among some White Americans about the celebrations.

Nonetheless, while the celebrations continued to draw many African diaspora to Ghana, the Kufuor administration added another dimension to the returnee/repatriate phenomenon by organizing a Home Coming Summit in July 2001. Among the laudable objectives of the Summit were: setting up institutional structures or secretariat to enhance dialogue and provide advice, support, and assistance; operationalizing and harmonizing contradicting provisions in the Dual Citizenship Law; mobilizing resources from GLA; (and) simplifying the process of land acquisition (Ankrah, 2008). However, despite these laudable objectives toward integrating the African diaspora into Ghanaian state, the Summit made a bad start because it lacked the broad-based participation across the political spectrum that such a move deserved ("Bagbin Causes Stir at Homecoming Summit," 2001). Notwithstanding this organizational hiccup, the Summit made a modest achievement in establishing a Non-Resident Ghanaian (NRG) Secretariat. Although the Secretariat was able to establish contacts with some Ghanaian Associations abroad, efforts have not been made to "institutionalize the homecoming as well as widen the gates enough" ("Bagbin Causes Stir at Homecoming Summit," 2001).

It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that before the shift of political power from the NDC to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in January 2001, the plan to organize the Summit had advanced. The question that begs for an answer is: Did this non-partisanship, which the Kufuor administration demonstrated in organizing the Summit, emanate from a truly Pan-Africanist interest? Two principal explanations can be given here. First, the Summit received a high publicity among the diasporic communities in North America and Europe such that its cancellation would have clearly shown that the Kufuor administration was continuing the Danquah/Busia political tradition's negative attitudes toward Pan-Africanism. The second explanation, possibly a more cogent one, is that by the time the NPP took over from the

NDC, tourism had become the third foreign exchange earner (after minerals and cocoa) for Ghana. In 1998, for instance, tourism contributed US$285 million to Ghana's export receipts. Its contribution, which was approximately 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rose to US$650 million with about 600,000 tourists in 2004 (Teye, n.d.; Tsagbey, Mensah, & Nunoo, 2009). Therefore, in the face of economic expediency, the increasing popularity of tourism and the rising revenue that the government was accruing from it could easily turn a hardened opponent of Pan-Africanism to an enthusiast. Ankrah (2008) was right when he noted that the NPP's enthusiasm in organizing the Summit "was triggered by the significant level of remittances in the economy at that time."

Another feat of the Kufuor administration was that it elevated diaspora issues to a ministerial level by creating the Tourism and Diaspora Relations Ministry on April 28, 2006. This initiative was accompanied by the opening of Diaspora Issues Desks in many capitals of the world. In an attempt to invoke a religion-inspired emotion among the African diaspora, the Kufuor administration established the Joseph Project as part of the 50th anniversary celebration of the Ghana's independence. The Joseph Project, whose main objective was to present Ghana as a "true gateway to the Homeland for Africans in the Diaspora," analogizes the experiences of the African diaspora and continental Africans with those of Joseph and his brothers in the Bible. This analogy highlights the extraordinary interplay among African diaspora's experiences of enslavement, imprisonment, freedom, empowerment, and reconciliation (King, 2007).

Nonetheless, taking the project as the analogy suggests, there is a number of inaccuracies. The fact that the victims and the perpetrators are dead and gone makes the analogy an imagined reunion by the descendants of those who were sold as slaves and their African perpetrators. How do we account for the historical and political discontinuities as their forebears were sold into slavery? The question that is also worth asking is: Does a reconstruction by the descendants of enslaved Africans and their African perpetrators make it comparable with the Bible account? First, the comparison counters the Joseph Story in that the victims (African diaspora) are running to the perpetrators (Africans) for forgiveness and reconciliation. Neither did the fact that Africans in diaspora are not coming to Africa to look for food supports the Biblical account. It is as a result of these contradictions that King has stated that "the well-meaning intention of the Joseph Project's invitation for us [African Americans] to return to these shores was much more complex than tourism could have possibly handled or even imagined" (King, 2007). The article now addresses the citizenship issues that have surrounded the politics of opening up with the African diaspora.

African Diaspora and Citizenship Issues in Ghana

The late 1990s witnessed "the highest level of investment and repatriation" in Ghana, thanks to the gains of the PANAFEST (Abban, 2005). It is worth stating that whatever the inaccuracies of the foregoing celebrations may be, they have instilled in some African diaspora a "sacred mission" to emancipate the local Africans from their socio-economic problems. Thus, this "sacred mission" (Hasty, 2003) has manifested in a series of development projects such as sponsoring orphans' education, funding orphanages, constructing schools, providing potable water for rural communities, building clinics and health facilities, and supporting small businesses among others. Besides these various development initiatives, Ghanaians in the diaspora remit about US$400 million to Ghana each year (Akyeampong, 2000). In consolidating the gains from these development projects and the remittances to the economy of Ghana, the Rawlings administration, in March 2000, signed a new law, which the Kufuor administration implemented in July 2001. In this new law, there are two Acts that address the status of African diaspora in Ghana, namely, the Citizenship Act 591 and the Immigration Act 573. Whereas the former addresses the possibility of dual citizenship, the latter examines the situation as regards the right of return and abode (see Ghana, 2000a, 2000b).

In connection with dual citizenship, Act 591 16 (1) allows dual citizenship in that Ghanaians "may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his citizenship of Ghana." By extension, any person of African descent who is already a citizen of any country may, by registration or naturalization, become a citizen of Ghana (see Ghana, 2000a). Nonetheless, while many have welcomed this provision as a positive response to the contribution that the Africans in diaspora are making to Ghana's development, it has created a great deal of disquiet among GLA. The main issue, which has caused an interminable controversy between the political class and GLA, centers on Section 16 (2) of Act 591 that lists certain offices that a holder of dual citizenship cannot qualify for. Section 16 (2) of the Act states that

> Without prejudice to article 94 (2) (a) of the Constitution, no citizen of Ghana shall qualify to be appointed as a holder of any office specified in this subsection if he holds the citizenship of any other country in addition to the citizenship of Ghana. These are: (1) Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court; (2) Ambassador or High Commissioner; (3) Secretary to the Cabinet; (4) Chief of Defense Staff or any Service (5) Inspector-General of Police; (6) Commissioner, Custom, Excise and Preventive Service; (7) Director of Immigration Service; (8) Commissioner, Value Added Tax Service; (9) Director-General, Prisons Service; (10) Chief Fire Officer; (11) Chief Director of a Ministry; (13) The

rank of a Colonel in the Army or its equivalent in the other security services; and (14) Any other public office that the Minister may by legislative instrument prescribe.

The main argument of the spokespersons of GLA is that the limitations contained in Section 16 (2) appear to have nullified the essence of the dual citizenship that Section 16 (1) permits as they leave dual citizens with truncated civil and political rights. Also, they maintain that although the dual citizenship allows an individual to possess two passports and travel freely between two countries, these limitations place a dual citizen in a second-class status. Furthermore, they argued that these limitations do not only contradict the equal protection clause of the 1992 Constitution that extends equal opportunity to all citizens without discrimination, but are also contrary to the UN Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments (Djaba, 2008). Apart from these limitations, they complain that while the 1992 Constitution empowers the Parliament to formulate policies regarding renunciation of citizenship, no procedures have been put in place yet. In addition, they maintain that it is not also clear how voluntary renunciation of citizenship, as specified in Article 8 (1) of the Constitution, affects second-generation Ghanaians who have dual citizenship. Neither did the Act make this clearer (Boateng, 2008c).

Furthermore, in a way that has divided the diaspora into the original and the modern, GLA have also criticized the way the 1992 Constitution and the 2000 Citizenship Act have failed to make any distinction between Ghanaians by birth on one hand, and Ghanaians by registration and naturalization on the other. While underplaying the issue of dual allegiance that gives strength to the restrictions of Section 16 (2), they argue that Ghanaians by birth should not face the restrictions. However, the way this constitutional wrangling plays out in politics would suggest the use of dual citizenship by some politicians and their supporters as an elimination tool in their struggle for power. The cases of Mr. Adamu Daramani (Bawku Constituency) and Dr. Samuel Amoako (Abuakwa North Constituency) attest to this. The electoral process allowed these two returnees to vie for parliamentary seats and then, upon complaints instigated by their opponents, the court nullified their seats after their victory because of dual citizenship. Even at a higher political level, the elimination resonates at screenings for ministerial appointments where candidates who are suspected of having dual citizenship are asked to show proofs of renunciation. (Boateng, 2008b; "High Court Disqualifies Bawku MP From Holding Seat," 2009).

On the other hand, the political class acknowledges the contribution that the African diaspora are making toward Ghana's development. According to

Hon. Alhaji Alhassan, it was to consolidate these gains that the NDC government pushed the Citizenship Act 591 through the parliament. He stated further that to show that the political class was united on the issue, the NPP implemented the Act without any problem. The philosophy that guided the insertion of these limitations of 16 (2) was that these are sensitive positions in the state's bureaucracy and as such if the national interest of Ghana is not to be compromised, their operation should not suffer from a divided loyalty that dual citizenship is likely to create.[14]

The Immigration Act 573 grants African diaspora residency in Ghana. It allows them to come to Ghana without visa and remain indefinitely. The Act also allows them to work, either as an employee or self-employed, without work permit. However, the restrictions that surround the right of return and abode of people of African descent in diaspora have also ignited criticisms from African Americans. Section 17 (3) of the 2000 Immigration Act 573 requires that any person of African descent who wants to be granted the right of return and abode must satisfy the following conditions:

A. Is of good character as attested to by two Ghanaian who are notaries public, lawyers, senior public officers or other class of person approved of by the Ministers.
B. Has not been convicted of any criminal offense and been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 12 months or more.

However well-intentioned these restrictions may be, the African Americans accused the Ghanaian government of putting in place restrictions that emanate from "stereotypical association of African Americans with crime." They argued that the Ghanaian government should not been seen to be perpetuating "the [American] criminal-justice system [that has been] . . . a tool of white oppression [of African Americans] in the United State" (Hasty, 2003, p. 89).

Another issue that relates to the voting rights of GLA is the controversy that surrounds the Representation of the People's Amendment Act (ROPAA). Nonetheless, this controversy lacks the unanimity with which the political class approached the limitations that the Citizenship Act 591 imposes on the African diaspora; the political class in Ghana is divided on the issue of extending voting rights to GLA. On February 26, 2006, the NPP government amended the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) Law 284 and extended voting rights to GLA. In order to show its disapproval, the main opposition party, NDC boycotted the parliamentary session that passed the law. Since then the politics of ROPAA has led to recriminations and suspicions among the main two political parties and their supporters; each party accusing the other of having ulterior motives for its respective stand (Boateng, 2008a).

It is noteworthy to state that the ROPAA controversy is not without constitutional technicalities. The NPP maintained that the PNDC Law 284, which regulated elections in Ghana, denied GLA of their voting rights in direct contravention of Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution, which states that, "Every citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections and referenda" (Ghana, 1992). As if the 1992 Constitution has no limit in terms of its operationalizing area, they indicated that the residency requirement of the law disenfranchises the GLA (Ghana News Agency [GNA], 2006). Conversely, the NDC and their supporters stated that GLA, by their choice to relocate outside Ghana, burden the enjoyment of their constitutional right as enshrined in Article 42 of the Constitution. They stated further that those who could vote are those whose constitutional rights are burdened by responding to the government's call to serve in military missions abroad or in Foreign Service or study through government-sponsored scholarship (Antwi, 2005).

It is important to state that the NDC elites are not entirely against extending voting rights to GLA, but are more concerned about its practicability at this stage of Ghana's development. Their position is based on the report that the Electoral Commission of Ghana submitted when it was consulted on the issue. First, Ghana as a state does not have the structures to implement it. Its registration of births and deaths has a great deal of imperfections. Second, it is almost impossible to reach every Ghanaian in every country in the world. Therefore, there is no way the exercise can be carried out without some form of discrimination. This is against the background of the fact that the battle to completely enfranchise resident Ghanaians in the rural areas has not yet been won. Third, the cost of organizing election for GLA would be almost unbearable for the Ghanaian government. It cost Tanzania not less than US$3,000 to reach a Tanzanian Living Abroad. Apart from the fact that voter turnout in overseas voting is normally low as experienced by Senegal and Mexico, the votes of GLA are insignificant, thereby incapable of changing the outcome of the overall results.[15] Furthermore, extending voting rights to GLA may also be fraught with fraud. In the first place, if possessing a country's passport is the only means of establishing citizenship, people who acquire passports illegally would be able to vote thereby increasing the likelihood of fraud. Also, free and fair elections may be unattainable if the ambassadors, as appointees of the government of the day, are the Returning Officers. In addition, in the case of parliamentary elections, identifying the votes of GLA with constituencies in Ghana would be problematic. Moreover, in case of disputes about the results coming from abroad, it is not clear whether it is domestic court or a foreign court that would adjudicate (Antwi, 2005). It was against this

background that the Mills administration promised to constitute a multi-party committee that will review the totality of electoral policies and propose appropriate amendments (see Note 15). In what followed, the article addresses the receptivity of the traditional political system of the returnee/repatriate phenomenon and politics in Ghana.

Development-Driven Inclusion: Incorporating African Diaspora Into the Traditional Political System

The PNDC government brought a new breath of life to the traditional political system in Ghana by creating a healthy relationship between the state and the traditional political systems. The creation of a Chieftaincy Ministry, the involvement of traditional leaders in politics, and the key role the state assigned to the traditional leaders in the decentralization reforms characterized the new political fortunes that the traditional authority began to enjoy since the late 1980s. With the fact that the PNDC was pro-Pan-Africanism, it was not difficult for the healthy relationship between the state and the traditional system to invoke a positive response from the traditional system to the politics of the African diaspora that had saturated the political landscape. Nonetheless, realizing that the unenviable contribution that their forebears had made toward the European slave trade would always come up in the increasing diaspora politics thereby creating uneasiness for them, the traditional leaders were quick to organize an atonement ceremony. In the atonement ceremony at the Jamestown Mantse Palace in December 1994, animal sacrifices were made and a libation was poured. This was to cleanse the stools and skins of Ghana, which were contaminated by the role that their ancestors played in the slave trade.[16] The purification ceremony was also extended to the James and Ussher Forts for their role as slave forts (Bob-Milliar, 2009; Mwakikagile, 2005).

Another groundbreaking initiative that had preceded this purification ceremony was the creation of the Fihankra (compound house) community in the Eastern Region for settlements and other development purposes. The Akwamu Traditional Authority allocated 30,000 acres of land for returnees' purchases. In order to create a sense of self-rule among the African diaspora who were pouring there, Nana Kwadwo Oluwale Akpan, an African American himself was installed as their chief. Bob-Milliar (2009) has adequately examined the sociology of the Fihankra chieftaincy vis-à-vis the chieftaincy historiography in Ghana. Nonetheless, what is missing is an analysis that places the initiative of the Akwamu traditional authority within the context of the

political economy of land to the traditional political system in Ghana. The traditional political systems control 80% of the land under their traditional jurisdiction in trust for their people and community. However, the contemporary thirst for land for various development purposes has transformed this trusteeship into massive sales of land to non-natives. The proceeds from these sales, which besides serving community interests, have also attracted unwholesome practices of multiple sales, corruption, and sustaining the ostentatious lifestyles of many traditional leaders among others. With this perspective, therefore, whether the initiative to create a community for African diaspora came from the Akwamu Traditional Authority or the government, the generosity could be a disguise to create a ready market with a hard currency for their unused land. This thesis gained a lot of support from the refusal of the Akwamu Traditional Authority to allow the body of the late Nana Kwadwo Oluwale Akpan to be buried in Fihankra in line with Ghanaian customs (Bob-Milliar, 2009).

The chieftaincy institutions in Ghana have also responded to the integration of the African diaspora through conferring chieftaincy titles on the African diaspora. What has innovatively become part of the chieftaincy institutions is what is called the Nkosuo stool (development chieftaincy). This is not to suggest that before the African diaspora issues hijacked the political landscape, the Ghanaian traditional chieftaincy institutions did not know the concept of development. To the contrary, the Ghanaian institutions had tackled development in various ways. What it does mean, however, is that the traditional authorities are simultaneously responding to the national and the local politics. By conferring chieftaincy titles on the African diaspora, the traditional authorities respond to the national politics that sees the integration of African diaspora as one of the key contemporary issues, and at the same time they meet the challenges of community development at the local level through the assistance they get from the African diaspora. With this initiative, numerous African American academics, musicians, and politicians have been honored with various chieftaincy titles in many traditional authorities, especially in southern Ghana. Although many of them are absentee chiefs, they support the development of their new adopted communities in various ways (Bob-Milliar, 2009).

While many may rush to describe the conferment of chieftaincy titles on the African diaspora as a genuine move to incorporate them into the traditional political system, two important factors put this in doubt. First, the selection process of African Americans for conferment of chieftaincy titles is flawed. While skipping the crucial screening process may be understandable as checking on the lineage or the personality of the African Americans may invoke bad memories of slavery. But the initiation process should not be

compromised. However, most of the African American chiefs are not properly initiated in the traditional ways. The oath taking that forms the central part of the initiation is mostly not carried out. Also, they do not know the norms and customs that guard their offices. Neither do they know the necessary protocol in their dealings with other chiefs and their subjects. As far as these chiefs can mobilize funds for development, what can be described as their second-class status does not matter. Also, the laxity in the selection and the initiation process of the African diaspora has allowed unscrupulous leaders who do not have the authority to confer chieftaincy titles to do so (Nunoo, 2004). Furthermore, where the Nkosuo chiefs have not responded positively in terms of development, the story has been of regrets and disappointments (Davies, 2007). The confusion that arises from these arrangements has often led to some embarrassing situations for the traditional leaders and the honorary chiefs alike. Second, conferring chieftaincy titles on the African diaspora, especially the descendants of the enslaved Africans, may be accepted as a way of showing them warm reception. However, extending this honor to "some white Westerners (Americans, British, Germans, Dutch, and others)" (Bob-Milliar, 2009, p. 542) raises critical questions. Therefore, while the extension of honorary chieftaincies to White people contradicts the notion of using chieftaincies to welcome people of African descent to the fold of Africans, it shows the fluidity of the traditional system in its quest for development.

Conclusion

There is an underlying assumption that forcefully comes with the idea of inviting the African diaspora to participate in Africa's development. This assumption is that the African diaspora is seen as a collectivity that can bring the necessary funds, influence, and knowledge among others to Africa's development process. There has also been the talk or the promise of a reciprocal relationship between Africa and the African diaspora. However, neither the assumption is flawless nor the reciprocal relationship unambiguous. The assumption fails to capture the fact that many Black communities in the diaspora live under deplorable social and economic conditions. Due to the degradation and emasculation of poverty, many African Americans, especially in the Southern states, think of meeting the basic necessities of life as their priority. Therefore, making a pilgrimage to Africa in order to reconnect with their past is an exercise that would be carried out only by those who have gone beyond meeting the basic needs of life. There are also many modern African diaspora whose initial dreams of greener pastures have been shattered and are, therefore, struggling to let ends meet. How will the reciprocal

relationship affect these categories of African diaspora? It is, therefore, difficult to see how the integration that the AU is seeking with the African diaspora will not be elitist. This calls for more research to uncover mechanisms that can really make the integration truly reciprocal.

As regards Ghana-diaspora relations in the 21st century, it is important to state that the sort of integration that the AU is seeking with the African diaspora has implications for the Ghanaian state. The near-monopoly which Ghana enjoys in attracting the original African diaspora may be over as many African countries would now put in place programs that will attract African diaspora. Nigeria, for example, has not only been coveting how Ghana has been able to effectively capture the attention of the original African diaspora, but it actually made some abortive moves in the past to organize a festival similar to the PANAFEST (Ajirire, 2009). Nonetheless, the initial political base which Ghana provided for Pan-Africanism, the intellectual foundation which Nkrumah laid for the movement, "the biggest number of accounted legacies and relics of the slave trade (with . . . about 80 forts and castles)" (Lukas, 2006) are the comparative advantages, which Ghana has over other African countries in realizing its goal of serving as a "true gateway to the Homeland for Africans in the Diaspora" (King, 2007). Ghana-diaspora relations in the 21st century will depend on how the political class utilizes these comparative advantages. Also, it is a good development for Ghana-diaspora relations that the Pan-Africanist enthusiasm that has caught up with the Danquah/Busia tradition, a tradition that was initially opposed to Pan-Africanism. In addition, it is noteworthy that Ghana's democratic credentials, its stability, and economic progress are already attracting a good number of people from the West African sub-region, who want a more secured environment for their families and children. Sustaining these feats will positively affect Ghana-diaspora relations in the 21st century.

In connection with the limitations imposed on dual citizenship, the political class would need to reconsider their position and grant GLA full citizenship. The thinking, albeit implicit, that GLA want to have the good of the two worlds—their host communities and Ghana—is unfortunate. It needs to be understood that many GLA normally take citizenship of other countries for convenience while maintaining, with the least of doubt, their attachment to Ghana. Despite taking the citizenship of their host communities, they still face stigmatization, discrimination, and marginalization in their host communities. In fact, the natives of their host communities still identify them with their place of origin. Therefore, to give them truncated citizenship at home is to deny them the benefits of the identity for which they have been stigmatized, discriminated, and marginalized in their host communities. In addition, it is not entirely correct to assume that GLA stand to benefit and not

Ghana if they hold political offices in Ghana while maintaining their dual citizenship. In fact, maintaining the citizenship of other countries could translate into maintaining their influence, connection, and networking that can bring a host of opportunities to Ghana.[17] Furthermore, the suspension of the implementation of the ROPAA due to the apparent partisanship by the two main political parties will need to be addressed as part of the review of the electoral policies in general as the NDC government has promised. It is important that the review committee, if constituted, has a broad-base representation across the political spectrum for its recommendations to be acceptable.

In order to strengthen the relationship between the traditional political system and the African diaspora, certain issues must be addressed. First, it is important that the appetite for development should not compromise the need to have laid down procedures for nominating, screening, and conferring chieftaincy titles on the African diaspora. This will ensure that unscrupulous individuals would not be able to abuse the system for personal gains. Also, it is important that the potential honorees are thoroughly educated on the values, traditions, and expectations of the offices.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Notes

1. Historians are divided on the actual number of Africans that European Slave Traders shipped to the Americas. Nonetheless, most historians agree that between 10 and 12 million Africans were shipped across the Atlantic between 1450 and 1850. For more information, see Akyeampong (2000);
2. In this article, I avoid the use of "slaves" and prefer to use "enslaved" or "deslaved" Africans because of my ardent belief that no-one is born a slave.
3. The word diaspora was originally used to describe Jews' dispersal as a people, but it is now used to describe any group of people who are outside their place of origins. For more information, see Reis (2004).
4. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter, May 1963, http://www1. umn.edu/humanrts/africa/OAU_Charter_1993.html[accessed 26 January 2012].
5. Through his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), Garvey planned to resettle about 20,000 Black families from the United States and the

Caribbean in Liberia in the 1920s. The Liberian government, conscious of the racial problems that the move may cause, finally pulled out of the deal. For more information, see M'Bayo (2004).

6. Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), July 2000 http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf [accessed 26 January 2010].

7. In its operations before the invention of the sixth region, the AU had five regions, namely, North Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa.

8. This notion that there is no hope for real transformation in Africa gained much currency in the 1980s. It is a notion whose recurrent referral has fed on a mixture of feelings that range from genuine despair, stereotypical tendencies to an excuse for inaction. For more information see Momoh (2003).

9. Kwame Nkrumah had more than 20 publications to his credit. Principal among them are the following: *Africa Must Unite* (1963); *Revolutionary Path* (1973); *Towards Colonial Freedom* (1962); *Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* (1964); *African Socialism Revisited* (1967); *Class Struggle in Africa* (1970); *Towards Colonial freedom* (1947); *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (1961); *Dark Days in Ghana* (1968); *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (1957); *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* (1968); *The Struggle Continues* (1973); and *Voice From Conakry* (1967).

10. In 1969, the Busia administration passed the Aliens Compliance Order that required all aliens to have valid stay. While one may argue that this was a just demand by the government, the Order gained its notoriety from the fact that there were no clear-cut procedures for acquiring valid stay. Moreover, due to the lack of proper education that surrounded the exercise, many aliens left Ghana, under vulnerable conditions, before the actual implementation of the Order.

11. This idea came up as a result of Former President Rawlings' personal participation in the celebration of the Emancipation Day when he visited Jamaica in 1998. He thought the celebration would add meaning to the slave monuments in Ghana that have been central to the celebration of PANAFEST.

12. The gap between the south and the north has origins in the British colonial policy. The British administered the north separately from, but not as a coordinate with, its southern counterpart. Therefore, the British development policy for the Northern territories (as the three regions in the north were then called) was as good as sustaining the north as the source of unskilled labor for the wealthier south.

13. One of the cardinal beliefs of the orthodox Muslims is that Prophet Muhammad is the Seal of Prophethood. Therefore, to profess a prophet after him is a heresy that sends one outside the fold of Islam.

14. I am grateful to Hon Alhaji (Dr.) A. Y. Alhassan, Mion Constituency MP for this vital information.

15. Phone Interview with Hon Alhaji (Dr.) Alhassan (21 February 2010).

16. In southern Ghana, the Kings and Chiefs sit on stools, whereas in northern Ghana the Kings and Chiefs sit on skins.

17. I am grateful to Humu-Haira Halidu for sharing her thoughts on dual citizenship with me.

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