UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, TAMALE

TRADITIONAL LEADERS' AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TAMALE METROPOLIS: LAND DEVELOPMENT AT THE CROSS ROAD

BY

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DECLARATION

CANDIDATE'S DECLARATION

I, Abdul-Basit Danjoe Munkaila, hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and that

it has not been previously published, neither has it been submitted anywhere for the award of any

degree. All references cited here are duly acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

The concept of decentralization essentially is about public administration that is based on local government at the local level. Ghana has been practicing local government which has been embraced generally by the citizenry. The study examined the roles traditional leaders play in local government system in the Tamale Metropolis. A triangulation approach was used for the study and both primary and secondary data were collected. Questionnaire and interview guide were used with a sample of 198 respondents was used in the gathering of data. Tables were generated through the analysis of the data. The findings revealed that the marginalization of traditional leaders' in local level development in the Tamale Metropolis is attributable to local government in the Tamale Metropolis. It also found out that traditional leaders have not been effectively involved in the local government system, except during local elections. The study found out that the people supported that the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities within the Tamale metropolis. The study recommends that there should be a working relationship between government institutions and the local stakeholders. Therefore, opportunity must be given to all to participate in the local government system especially the traditional authorities. It further recommended that the state should take a second look at the constitution to give a mandatory representation of traditional leaders in the MMDAs.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

DEDICATION

To all students who are struggling on their own to make ends meet in Ghana.

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ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AM	Assembly Members
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CLSs	Customary Land Secretariats
DA	District Assemblies
DC	District Council
DDs	Decentralized Department
GoG	Government of Ghana
HDD	Heads of Decentralized Departments
ILGS	Institute of Local Government Studies
LAP	Land Administration Project
LEAT	Lawyers' Environmental Action Team
LI	Legislative Instrument
MAS	Municipal Assembly Staff
MCEs	Municipal Chief Executives
MFOs	Municipal Finance Officers
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MMDAs	Metro Municipal and District Assemblies

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

This chapter covers the background, research problem, research objectives and research questions, significance of the study and organization or scope of the work. The background is on traditional leader's participations in local governance process in the Tamale Metropolis (T. M. A.). The objectives and research questions make an attempt to raise questions of district assembly structures and traditional authorities' interaction in local government system in Tamale metropolis. It further looks at the factors impeding traditional leader's participation in the structures of the assembly as well as the differences in participation between Traditional leaders in the metropolis.

From colonial times, traditional authorities have been involved in local level development by participation in governance in various capacities, ranging from the "indirect rule" approach adopted by the British colonial government to the current situation in which they participate in the District Assemblies (DAs) – as appointed members. The chieftaincy institution has endured in Ghanaian society and is still a vibrant force in many ways critical to local level participation in decision making in local government and sustainable development (Ayee, 2007).

The last decades of the 20th century saw the emergence of decentralization as the major public administration strategy in Ghana. Decentralization became a significant policy objective during the 1980s and 1990s in Ghana. The decentralization process is intended to make local government more efficient, accessible, participatory and beneficial to the individual. It is an arrangement which brings governance closer to the people at the grassroots level of society, thereby enabling them to participate in the administration of their locality (Ekpeh, 2012).

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Ghana, like many other developing countries, has been engaged in efforts to develop participatory governance at the local level for a long time. Pike et al (2006) suggest that much of experimentation with these new forms of participatory government appears to be taking place at the local level, where questions about the quality of development seem pressing.

There is growing global interest in decentralization because of its identification with such benefits like development, popular participation, accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness, equity and stability (Ayee, 1994). Even though Ghana's attempt at local self-government or decentralization has a long history, evolving from indigenous rule (Rattray 1929) to territorial and local councils (Zanu, 1996), the major attempt at real decentralization started in 1988 with the promulgation of Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) Law 207, which is now superseded by the Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993.

Ghana's attempts at local government system since independence have not generated the desired benefits. This is due to various reasons such as inadequate competent personnel, negative attitudes, poor co-ordination, and reluctance of central government to devolve power to the districts, as well as the inability of local government law to define the roles and functions of the various actors, resulting in conflicts in the decentralization implementation system (Zanu, 1996; Ayee, 2000; USAID 2003; Crawford 2004). The discourse on the poor functioning of the district assemblies in Ghana often overlooks the possible clash of different world views and power dynamics between traditional authorities and local government structures. Local government administration in Ghana, as is the case with many other bureaucracies in Africa, is to a large extent influenced by Western ideas and values like rationalism, individualism, positivism, and a technocratic approach to development (Ogwo & Andranovich 2005). Such values may be inconsistent with the traditional value system and world view. Consequently, the interaction

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between the local government structures and traditional authorities is likely to generate conflict and a clash of world views, something which obviously has implications for local level development. This situation has not engaged sufficient research attention in the past. Even though Ayee (1994) reported conflicts among traditional authorities and decentralized structures, his study did not examine the wider interactive processes among these two systems of local governance, highlighting the underlying factors that strengthen or weaken their relationships.

Furthermore, decentralization, especially devolution, is co-extensive with shifts in power relations among the various actors which might influence the type and quality of decentralization. For example, central government may be reluctant to opt for devolution for fear of losing power or control. Similarly, the decentralized units at higher levels will also be reluctant to transfer resources and power to lower-level structures. Additionally, elected assembly members may like to exert their power and authority in the locality, which may be challenged by the traditional authorities in their desire to have more power over their subjects. Such conflicts reflect the diverse interests of groups competing for power and scarce resources, and this can be detrimental to local area development efforts. Various authors have commented on this trend (Crook, 2003; Berry, 2004; Falleti, 2005). Such power dynamics are part and parcel of the local development culture, but their implications for decentralization and development are poorly understood.

There is general consensus among many writers that as the main custodians of culture and because they wield so much influence at the local level, traditional authorities in Africa should be brought in to play a greater role in local development (Ray 2003; Sharma 2003; Kendie & Guri 2004; Alhassan, 2006; Abotchie, 2006). The literature, however, is silent as to the appropriate institutional framework or conditions to effectively tap the potential of traditional

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authorities in the development process, especially within the context of local government system, where the local government structures are expected to be agents of local level development. It is this knowledge gap that this study seeks to redress by exploring the development implications of an interactive process between traditional authorities and local government structures. Based on this process, an appropriate institutional framework could be utilized to strengthen development potential and strengths of traditional authorities in Ghana's local government system. The relevance of this kind of study, which seeks to improve functional collaboration between local government structures and indigenous social structures like traditional authorities, is reflected by Jutting (2003: 7) as follows:

"Research that finds solutions to improve the links between existing indigenous social structures and formal institutional set-ups such as governance structures would not only address a currently under researched area, but also promise to yield highly relevant policy results."

Notwithstanding the moves made by the state to harness the potential of traditional authorities, concerns have been expressed about challenges emanating from the co-existence of the traditional authorities and local governments. These concerns have largely been informed by the continuing lack of clarity in the roles of traditional authorities. For instance, the African Peer Review Mechanism (2005) and the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy raise serious concerns about the ill-defined role of traditional authorities in local government in the areas of protocol at the local level and issues of precedence representation of traditional authorities on Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) relations between traditional authorities, unit committees and other local government sub-structures. The African Peer Review Mechanism (2005) and the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy issue a number of points to consider as clear engagement and participation of traditional leaders in local government structure in

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Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) as follows: Platforms of engagement between local authorities and traditional authorities, Infrastructure management, monitoring and evaluation, Peace-building, security and conflict prevention, Natural resource management, Internal revenue mobilization, Human rights observance and reduction of negative socio-cultural practices, and Capacity building and knowledge for traditional authorities.

Therefore, to gain the potential advantages of effective collaboration for planning, accountability to the people, effective community mobilization and optimum use of local resources, the relationship between local government and traditional authorities needs to be streamlined and harmonized. It is against this background that a study on partnership modalities between MMDAs and traditional authorities is being undertaken.

1.2 Problem Statement

Since independence in 1957, there has been little, if any, effective participation of chiefs in local government in Ghana. Currently there is two chief representing so many chiefs with deferent land holding in northern regional coordinating council, and about 10% of traditional leader's representation at MMDAs, which is inadequate (Kessey, 2006). Indeed, the relationship between chiefs and local government units has been ill-defined, even though the history of local government cannot be written without the institution of chieftaincy. Chiefs were involved in local government functions like local development under the Native Authority System during the colonial days. Similarly, during the post-colonial period, the role of chieftaincy in local government and development has not been questioned (Ayee, 2007).

In Ghana, there are two parallel local government systems at the district level, namely: the district assembly structures, designed along the lines of the British functional model of field administration, with its attendant bureaucracy and poor co-ordination in the field, and deriving

legitimacy from democracy and constitutional legality. Also traditional authorities modeled on tradition, and they derive their legitimacy from custom and sacredness which predate the conventional system of governance.

The local government system is largely influenced by Western values like rationalism, technocratic approach to development and individualism, which may be at variance with traditional values like consensus building, communalism and peaceful co-existence even at the expense of economic gain. Consequently, the two systems of local government with different world views and power bases interact with each other and with the community in various ways which have implications for local development but which are poorly understood. As a result, Ghana's local government system could not effectively tap into the traditional government system, leading to frequent conflicts and lack of synergy between the district assembly structures and traditional authorities, thereby stifling local development. Example land is fundamental to any development enterprise and land is often owned by traditional authorities which sometimes release to the state, groups and individuals. The indiscriminate sale of lands by traditional authorities without recourse to local governments breeds tensions in Ghana. For example, the people of Adaklu traditional area in the Volta region of Ghana declared public that they have disassociated themselves from the Adaklu-Anyigbe District Assembly because of disagreement over the sitting of the District capital (Dialy graphic Monday, Augus 22 2005 cited in Kessey, 2006). Also the Northern Regional Command of the Ghana Armed Forces in 2012 demolished some houses at the Kamina Barracks in Tamale and over 50 houses were been earmarked for demolition as result of conflicts between traditional leaders in the area who were claiming the land as against state agency (Ghanaweb, thursday, 12, January, 2012).

Even though there is growing recognition in Ghana of the need to tap the development potential of chiefs by involving them in the local government system, there is no clarity as to how far they should be involved and under what conditions this could be done to optimize their benefits.

The search for such an institutional framework for Ghana's local government system to tap into the potential of the traditional authority system requires systematic and scholarly studies, which have not attracted the necessary research attention in the past. The focus of this study is to fill this knowledge gap. The research assesses the ineffectiveness in interactive processes between the traditional authorities, as a basis of participation in local government system.

1.3 Main Objective

The main objective of the study is to determine the roles that Traditional leaders play by participating in local government system in Tamale Metropolis.

1.3.1   Sub-Objectives

The specific objectives of this study are:

i.   To explore how the Metropolitan Assembly structures and Traditional leaders interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis.

ii. To determine the factors impeding Traditional leaders participating in decision making process (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis

iii. It further explores how the current local government system supports Traditional leaders in their local level development in Tamale Metropolis.

1.4 Main Research Question

What roles do Traditional leaders play in local government structures in Tamale Metropolis?

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1.4.1   Sub-Research Questions

i.   How do the Metropolitan Assembly structures and Traditional leaders interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis?

ii. What are the factors impeding Traditional leaders participating in decision making (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis?

iii. Does the current local government system support Traditional leaders in their local level development in Tamale Metropolis?

1.5 Significance of the Research

This micro level study provides insights which are useful to political administrators, civil society and theorists on ways to enhance the local government system. The study highlight views from the field about the traditional leader's experiences with the local government system. It therefore, produce knowledge that is useful for future planning and any future reorganization of the local government system. It has generated knowledge at a micro level that provides a basis for large-scale studies to unearth challenges that underline the local government system.

The results may serve useful information that might be the basis for national policy options on traditional leader's participation in the local government system. Therefore, the Ministers responsible for Local Government and Rural integration and related departments will find the results useful. The entire research product shall provide useful information that will add to the store of knowledge on the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly. It will be useful as a working manual in enhancing citizens' participation in local government system.

1.6 Limitations of the Research

There was constraint of easy accessibility to some of the selected respondents because of the vast nature of the Assembly and socio-economic activities of the people. Access to respondents such

as The Chiefs, Municipal Chief Executive (MCE), Municipal Finance Officers (MFOs), Head of decentralized departments (HODDs), and Past and Present Presiding Members (PMs) and Assembly Members were particularly difficult. The study is limited in scope, since it did not cover the whole country so as to generalize the findings.

The research is confined to the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly of the Northern Region of Ghana. As a case study, it does not draw on a large sample of the study population. The findings are largely contextual and specific to Tamale Metropolis based on the experiences of the participants.

1.7 Reflexivity of the study

Apart from been a tutor in Local Government Administration for the past three years, the field has deepened my interest in the subject of local government and its broader concept and meaning. There are two main reasons which motivated me to undertake this study. My first motivation stems from my rural background, having been born in urban area and bred in a rural area and witnessed the situation of many rural people deteriorate over the years, despite the promise of local government to improve their lot. I have witnessed misunderstanding and difficult relationships between district assembly structures and traditional authorities, apparently due to their different worldviews and power dynamics which are poorly understood. In my view, such a dysfunctional relationship between traditional authorities and local government structures could be one of the major factors militating against the ability of local government to deliver the promise of improved living conditions for the rural poor. This experience gives me a strong desire to contribute to the search for more effective mechanisms of addressing rural poverty. As a point of entry, I have chosen to investigate the institutional structures and processes that govern the lives of the rural poor, since the quality and performance of institutions have a positive

correlation with development outcomes (Jutting 2003; Jain 2007). I am of the view that rural development and poverty reduction take place in a political and institutional context which might not always be favourable and changing or transforming such structures could accelerate rural development (Pearse & Stiefel 1979; Hettne 1982). This dimension of development has not been conspicuous in past efforts, as the emphasis tends to be on technical issues to the detriment of organizational and social processes. It is therefore a grey area which merits research attention.

My second motivation is rooted in my previous professional practice as a development worker. During my one year at Mobility Foundation as Programme Manager in charge of a project title effective participation of Traditional leaders in Nanumba North and South District Assemblies, I have come across many failed development projects initiated by various district assemblies or government agencies, partly due to inadequate involvement of the traditional authority of the area. A classic example was a building project in a village to process cassava into *gari* that was stopped by the village chief because he controlled the land and had not been consulted before the project was started by the district assembly. Since then, I have not been in any doubt that traditional authorities have tremendous influence and potential in promoting rural development if properly engaged. This thinking is shared by Kendie & Guri (2004) and Abotchie (2006). The inability of Ghana's local government efforts to recognize and tap into this development potential of the traditional authorities may be due to inadequate knowledge of the workings and capacities of these traditional authorities, as well as of their proper role in the local government process.

1.8 Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one constitute introductory chapter which give the background of the study, the specific problem under studied, the research objectives and

questions, the significance of the study and the limitations of the study. Chapter two consists of review of relevant literature. Chapter three looked at the approach and methodology of the research. Chapter four present and discuss the field data. Chapter five covers the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research topic by briefly describing the lack of commitment and cordial relationship between Traditional leaders and local level governance, and development, Traditional leader's participation in local government system through the local level structures. The primary objective was discussed concerning the effectiveness of these structures in Tamale Metropolis. The next chapter will review literature on the concept and definitions of decentralization, local government, theories of local governance and empirical evidence relating to the study.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter reviews literature on decentralization and local government, it identifies various concepts that have shaped the thinking and practice of local government by local actors and institutions. It also attempts to explore the varied theories and perspectives that underpin contemporary practice and thinking on local government system, decentralization and link to the concept of political accountability as a normative outcome of the decentralization policy reform in Ghana. It highlights typologies, drivers and abuses of decentralization and basic models of local government.

To gain further insights on the process of local government system, the role that power relations and other traditional structures play in shaping the outcomes of decentralization was illuminated. Specifically, this chapter draws on actor-oriented perspectives and historical institutionalism of the decentralization policy reforms that involve participation in decision making at the local level.

2.2 Related Works

The search for appropriate institutional framework for local governance and development has been difficult task in Ghana. Although traditional Authority are authentic and time tested in situation of governance, their role has been politically, administratively, and financially marginalized since the introduction of Morden local government system (Kessey, 2006).

A study conducted by Dawda & Dapilah (2013) and title "Challenges of the Collaboration between Formal Local Government Actors and the Chieftaincy Institution in Ghana: Lessons from the Sissala East District of the Upper West Region of Ghana". The results of the study

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show that, notwithstanding the constitutional limitations on chiefs not to take part in active partisan politics, chiefs have collaborated with local and formal local government actors to bring development to their people in the areas of infrastructural development, dispute resolution, revenue mobilisation, good governance and the management of natural resources. However, there exist challenges that do not bode well for collaboration between the District Assembly system and chiefs. The lack of a direct role of chiefs in Ghana's local government structure has been identified as a challenge to the collaboration between chiefs and formal local government actors. The study concludes that, by their various roles, chiefs have collaborated in numerous ways to bring development to their areas and recommends that in order to enhance their contribution to local level development, efforts should be garnered to give chiefs a formal recognition in the current decentralised system to make way for effective collaboration between chiefs and formal local government actors.

Taabazuing et al (2012) in their study and title "The Relationship between Traditional Authorities and Decentralized Structures in Ghana: Conflicting Roles or a Struggle for Power and Legitimacy". The study results revealed that the interaction between traditional authorities and government decentralized institutions within Ghana's emerging democracy are characterized by competition for power and legitimacy. This has led to mistrust and the inability to take advantage of the potentially synergistic effects between the two systems of local governance for accelerated development. Furthermore, the findings reveal that a predominant culture of fear of authority within different hierarchical levels, is stifling genuine participation, further reinforcing a lack of accountability by authorities from both sides. They conclude that if decentralization policies are to be effective in Ghana, it may be imperative for government to strive for more open

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governance processes that are capable of blending the traditional systems with the emerging democratic dispensation depending on the context.

Campion & Acheampong (2014) Also in their study and title "The Chieftaincy Institution in Ghana: Causers and Arbitrators of Conflicts in Industrial Jatropha Investments". Some of the conflict issues revealed in the study include loss of farmlands or other communal lands, disagreements on the land acquisition processes, the quantum and mode of execution of compensation payments and the existence or contents of social responsibility agreements. Furthermore, the use of negotiation, mediation and courts by people in these communities' relative to arbitration by chiefs is increasing. The Government of Ghana needs to strengthen the public sector land institutions and put in place stronger and binding mechanisms for resolving disputes arising from large-scale acquisitions of land to cushion the effect of the weakening confidence in the chieftaincy institution.

2.3 Concept and Definitions

2.3.1   Defining Decentralization

The last decades of the 20th century saw the emergence of decentralization as the major public administration system in most Third World Countries (Gibson, Lacy & Dougherty, 2004). From the Latin American states through the Asian countries to African states. As a result, one of the challenges in the new millennium was to find successful ways to engage the public (citizens) in shaping the communities for the future. Decentralization became an important policy objective during the 1970s and 1980s in developing countries.

As Crook (2003) noted, decentralization is a complex political and institutional process. There are varied definitions of decentralization as assigned by the experts. Smith (1985) observes the concept of decentralization as reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and

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conferring powers on local government. Ahwoi (2006) looks at it as a tool of public administration reform that involves the transfer of functions, powers, means, resources, skills, and competence to lower levels of governance, normally, structures of local government. In its most basic definition, decentralization is the transfer of part of the powers of the central government to regional, district or local authorities. A more comprehensive definition of decentralization as a concept is the general view held by experts, as the transfer of responsibility (authority), resources (human and financial), and accountability from central government to the local self-governing entity.

Scholars generally identified three forms of decentralization (Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli, et al., 1989; Prud'homme, 1995). To them this involves a long process of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization. When only responsibility or authority is transferred but not resources-, there is deconcentration. When responsibility and resources are transferred, there is delegation. When there is the transfer of responsibility, resources and accountability (partially or completely) there is the devolution or democratic decentralization (Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli, et al., 1989; Prud'homme, 1995; Conyers, 1985; Smith.1985; Mawhood, 1993) (Cited by Ayee, 2002).

Others further explain that decentralization is a means to local democratization through bringing government closer to the people, with increased political participation and more accountable and responsive local government (Crawford, 2009; Crook, 2003; Ahwoi, 2006; Boateng, 1996). Ahwoi (2000) alleges that the academic and other writers on decentralization very often confuse the term decentralization with other concepts that look like decentralization but could at best be described as variants of administrative decentralization. He maintains that deconcentration, devolution, delegation are alternatives to decentralization.

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However, decentralization is upheld to be a local knowledge and interest brought to bear more freely upon local administration, which aim at bringing governance closer to the people and making them more participatory in the administration of the locality. It enhances local democracy and leads to government that is more responsive. Therefore, decentralization processes are partly or complete efforts and actions that are directed to involve the local people in administering their locality.

2.3.2   Reasons for Decentralization

Different governments have different political purposes and motives for introducing decentralization in their countries. These intentions are embodied in the structures and form of decentralization or more subtly are revealed in how the system function after it is introduced.

In the case of Ghana, the decentralization process is to democratize the public administration system among others. The decentralization process (local government system) was and is to make the local government more efficient, accessible, accountable, beneficial and participatory to the citizens.

Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT, 2009) reported that in Uganda decentralization has been a device for consolidating central power by enabling the President to manipulate and fragment rival ethnic claims and head off demands for multi-party system.

Meanwhile, the Center for Democracy and Governance (2000) observes that the prime motivations behind countries opting for decentralization reforms vary. To the center, some countries are emerging from dictatorships seeking to disperse power among smaller governmental units. Others are reducing the size of central government as part of a transition to a more efficient market economy. Many others seek to increase public involvement and accountability in government decision-making.

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Crook (2003) is of the opinion that decentralization enhances political and fiscal autonomy of territorial sub-units and for poverty reduction. He further states that decentralization reforms could have diametrically opposed purposes according to whether they aim to reinforce vested `interest in existing patterns of patronage and central-local linkages, or involve challenges to local elites from groups using decentralized institutions to 'draw down' central resources to bolster local power struggles.

The World Bank Reports (2000) advanced the following reasons for states shifting from centralized system of public administration to decentralized system of governance:

➢ The gradual appearing of a new distribution of responsibilities among the national, regional and local levels of government through the process of deconcentration (an initial and limited form of decentralization);

➢ The disengagement of the state and economic liberalization, which favoured a new wave of decentralization through devolution;

➢ Increased involvement of local jurisdictions and civil society in the management of their affairs, with new forms of participation, consultation, and partnerships.

2.3.3 Types of Decentralization

The Center for Democracy and Governance: United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2000) and Ayee, (2003) recognize three types of decentralization: devolution, deconcentration, and delegation. Devolution is the creation or increased reliance upon sub national levels of government, with some degrees of political autonomy, that are substantially outside direct central government control yet subject to general policies and laws, such as those regarding civil rights and rule of law. Deconcentration is the transfer of power to an administrative unit of the central government, usually a field or regional office and Delegation

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is the transfer of managerial responsibility for a specific defined function outside the usual central government structure.

Also Deconcentration is a form of network of central power and sub-state institutions comprising the elites of those constituencies. As Assibey (2000) puts it, deconcentration is a power sharing strategy where power is transferred from central operating agencies to regional ones. The central government under such a concept uses the local governments to improve efficiency and effectiveness of delivering services (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). Rondenlli (1981) argues that deconcentration takes place as long as the central government disperses certain responsibilities of services to the regional and local governments. On delegation, Ayee (2000) states it is the transfer of services and responsibilities from the central government agencies to specialized organizations with some degree of operating autonomy.

Devolution is the transfer of power and authority to a sub national level of public authority that is autonomous and independent from the devolving authority. This is the strongest form of decentralization as it implies the transfer of authority for decision making, finance and management responsibility (Robertson, 2002; Olowu, 2001). However, Ahwoi (2003:9) contests this position stating "rather, those concepts, Devolution, Deconcentration and Delegation are alternative attempts at achieving an efficient and effective public administration system; they are not forms/types of decentralization".

2.3.4 Historical Background of Decentralization in Ghana

Local government in Ghana started with the introduction of Native Authorities by the colonial government in 1878 (Institute of Local Government Studies, ILGS). The then traditional rulers served as central figures in the local government. Several, forms of Local Governments were practiced over the years in Ghana. Between 1950 and 1957, the two-tier local government

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system (ILGS, 2006), Local Government (Amendment) Act 359(1971) amended in 1974, the National Redemption Council Decree (NRCD) 258, the District Council (DC), (ILGS, 2006) and the current District Assembly (PNDC LAW 207) 1988 (Model A, Decentralization, Policies and Practices, 2003).

Ayee & Amponsah, (2002) in a survey, enumerated a more elaborated history of the District Assemblies, unit committees and area councils (Ghana's decentralization process) in Ghana. To Ayee & Amponsah (2002), decentralized government in Ghana began with the introduction of Indirect Rule by the British Colonial Authorities in1878. Native Authorities (NAs) (a council of traditional chiefs) carried out decisions of the British government conveyed through district commissioners to the indigenous people in the Gold Coast. In 1952, a new form of decentralized authority based on the recommendations of the Watson Commission (1948) and the Coussey Committee (1949) was introduced. The local government councils were composed of two-third elected membership and one-third chiefs with paramount chiefs as presidents of the councils (Ayee & Amponsah, 2002).

In 1974, another attempt at reform of decentralization resulted in the establishment of 65 district councils. Membership of the council remained same as at the 1952 reforms. In 1978, another attempt was made by the then General Akuffo's Supreme Military Council (SMC) government to further decentralize the public administration in Ghana by holding a district council election throughout Ghana. However, the decentralization process was short-lived because of a coup d'état that overthrew the SMC government in 1979 led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings.

Ghana's current decentralization programme was the brainchild of Rawlings' Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that toppled Dr, Limann's People's National Convention

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(PNC) in 1981. In June 1982, the PNDC passed the PNDC Law 14 that dissolved the district councils elected in November 1978 (Ayee & Amponsah, 2002).

2.3.5 Contextual Issues Impacting on Decentralization Outcomes

The outcomes of decentralization are greatly influenced by the political, social, economic and cultural context which vary from place to place (Smoke 2003; Bankauakaite & Saltman 2006; Dauda 2006; Lauer 2007). This echoes the commonly used phrase that "context matters". There is a growing recognition that decentralization takes place within a particular political context, and therefore evolves differently in each country (Crook 2003; Dauda 2006). Consequently, the prevailing political culture in a country has great influence on the functioning of public institutions, including the decentralization process (Bankauakaite & Saltman 2006), which needs to be carefully studied and analyzed. This view is alluded to by Lijphart (1999) who utilized empirical evidence on 36 countries from 1945–1996, and found that the existing political context influenced institutional configuration, which in turn affected the performance of various policies. African political culture has been greatly influenced by Western constructions in terms of both the vocabulary and the practice of the political system, with some aspects like the concepts of justice, democratic consensus, community responsibility and patriotism being inconsistent or alien to traditional African worldviews, thereby making the practice of these concepts problematic within the African context (Bankauakaite & Saltman 2006; Lauer 2007). This is particularly true of most African elites and bureaucrats who, through formal education, have been indoctrinated in their former colonizers language (English, French, German, and Spanish) and at the same time had their initial socialization, as they were growing up, rooted in traditional African values, thus making them both modern and traditional in their outlook. The histories and nature of both the indigenous African societies and the intensity of the colonial experience of

each country have led to the emergence of various forms of political cultures which shape the general governance system and institutional framework of these African countries. For example, Lauer (2007) reports that in East Africa, the political cultures of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda vary considerably, despite having been ruled by the same colonial power, the British, and despite adopting a liberal democracy. The differences can be related to the different history and the indigenous social system and values of each country.

Many Third World countries inherited a largely centralized political (Falleti, 2005) and bureaucratic culture (Leftwich 2000; Jain 2007) from their colonial masters and some of these post-colonial governments still hold on to this central control with little power or authority devolved to the lower levels (Cloete, 2002), thereby making decentralization ineffective. In this regard, the political willingness of central governments to transfer more power to decentralized units will positively influence decentralization outcomes (Crook 2003; Mitchinson 2003). Indeed, Crook (2003) reports of positive decentralization outcomes in Uganda as a result of political willingness to transfer more power to the local level.

The other contextual issues point to the fact that the economic and cultural realties in Western nations compared to African countries are different (Jain 2007; Lauer 2007). Consequently, the borrowed Western political systems which informed the decentralization process in many African countries may be incompatible and ineffective unless adapted to reflect the unique cultural and economic realities of these African nations (Leftwich, 1993; Rao & Walton 2004; Jain 2007). There is merit in this line of thinking which should be explored further. Whilst Western democracy might be a fine idea for developed countries where there is a high literacy rate and better understanding of democracy, with more developed democratic institutions and higher income levels, developing countries like Africa may find democracy unsuitable for

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various reasons. In the first place, the high poverty levels and illiteracy in many African countries tend to eliminate many people from effectively engaging in formal political processes, which are then hijacked by a few elites motivated purely by self-interest.

These elite politicians at national and local levels often use their money, power and party platform to capture the votes of rural people so as to represent them in democratic institutions like the District Assembly or Parliament. Consequently, there is the tendency for these rural people to vote masse for reasons which may not be related to their long-term development and wellbeing. In this regard, democratic elections may become a blunt instrument for ensuring political accountability in many African countries, with implications for decentralization outcomes. In other words, if the citizens are incapable of holding their elected representatives to local government accountable, then decisions and development administration will not be responsive to the people, particularly the poor. Besides, the political institutions in many African countries are not well developed which means that they are vulnerable to being abused by self-seeking-politicians. No wonder many democratic elections in Africa are prone to disagreements and conflicts.

Decentralization is a multidimensional process that entails political bargaining over the content and implementation of different types of policies (Montero & Samuels 2004; Falleti 2005). Clegg (1990), as well as Blunt & Turner (2005), have also emphasized how decentralization can be shaped, positively or negatively, by existing institutions, social and cultural traditions. For example, the struggle for power and resources between decentralized institutions and traditional authorities could negatively affect decentralization if not well managed. Again the differences in perceptions and worldviews as to how local government and development should be conducted can negatively affect the outcomes of decentralization. Such interactive processes between the

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traditional authorities and the implications of such processes for local government and development have been given little scholarly attention.

From the above analysis, it sounds reasonable to search for ways that can ensure that the decentralization process going on in many African countries is grounded in the culture and in African realities. Political inclusiveness and diversity may provide the key to generating more innovative and effective decentralization that is responsive to the local context (Blunt & Turner 2005; Jain 2007). How this can be done given the entrenched Western pressure for liberal democracy in African countries needs serious reflection by researchers.

2.3.6 Decentralization and the Promise of Participation in Local Government and Development

As stated earlier, democratic decentralization is often associated with virtues like participation in governance and development that can improve the well-being of citizens (Blair 2000, OECD 2004; Smith 2007). The assumption is that devolution will empower people to participate in decisions that affect them, thus enhancing accountability and improving service delivery (Golooba-Mutebi 2005). This section explores the concept of "participation" and how it relates to local government and development.

The concept of participation defies definition: However, three main interpretations of participation can be identified (Biekart 2005; Cornwall & Gaventa 2006):

Participation as merely Involving People in Project Implementation: Here decisions about a project are taken by the development agent and the beneficiaries are asked to participate in the implementation such as by providing cheap labour.

Participation as mere Involvement or Co-optation: Here people are merely consulted in the decision-making process, but do not influence the outcomes of such decisions.

Participation as a means of Empowering People: Here people are actively involved in decision-making and have the power to influence the outcomes of such decisions, as well as taking part in their implementation. In this regard, people are empowered to take control of their destiny.

The first two interpretations of participation are considered a form of tokenism rather than furthering real participation, since people are merely involved but cannot influence decisions (Cornwall & Gaventa 2006). Consequently, such tokenism has little benefit in local government and development, since people cannot influence decisions that reflect their priorities and neither can they demand accountability from various service providers (Golooba-Mutebi 2004). Real participation in governance or development means going beyond tokenism to empower people to influence decisions and to take control of their destiny. In this way, everyone is given a stake, a voice and a choice (Cornwall 2003).

Arnstein (1969), (cited by Khisty (2006: 14) defines citizen's participation in terms of the degree of actual control they have over policy decisions. She depicts citizen's participation as a ladder ranging from no control to complete control.

From the point of view of goals and their relationship to participation, Khisty (2006) distinguishes three types:

Teleonomic (or goal determined), where by the goals to be pursued by the citizens are externally determined.

Teleozetic (or goal selecting), where by the goals to be pursued by the citizens, are selected from a repertoire of goals provided by an external agent.

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Teleozotic (or goal generating) where by citizens are in control of generating their own goals to be pursued. These goals could previously have been non-existent, thus implying the generation of innovative ideas.

Based on the ladder of participation, Arnstein (1969) and Khisty (2006) argue that without actual redistribution of power, citizen participation is an empty ritual, and that the only way of achieving any significant social reform is to encourage citizens to operate as high up the ladder as possible. It is clear, therefore, that participation connotes power sharing, making its realization very complex. Those with institutional or structural power, like decentralized structures may be reluctant to devolve their decision-making powers to those they serve. As pointed out by Cooke & Kotari (2001: 14), proponents of participatory development have generally been naïve about the complexities of power and power relations which underpin much of participatory discourse. Participation that fails to address such a power imbalance by allowing for greater involvement of community members to influence decisions that affect them is not likely to offer much in terms of furthering the community development process (Hildyard et al. 2001; Bierkart 2005).

In recent times, "participation" has become a fashionable word that many development agencies and local government units profess to use, even though each uses the word "participation" on their own terms, with a different understanding and application (Biekart, 2005). For some people, the word "participation" is used merely as rhetoric to reflect political correctness, or to satisfy some donor conditionality, but without really applying participatory practices whereby citizens can exercise real control in the decision-making process.

Whilst participation may sound attractive at a theoretical level, some writers question its utility and feasibility on various grounds. In the first place, participation may require that people sacrifice their time at the expense of investing their energies in other beneficial livelihoods

(Cooke & Kotahari 2001; Kapoor 2002; Golooba-Mutebi 2004). Additionally, Cooke & Kotahari (2001) argue that the use of terms such as "community participation" tend to mask power relations within the community, as well as biases in interests and needs, based on factors like ethnicity, sex and age. For example, in some communities, tradition does not permit women to talk publicly in the presence of men, as the women are expected to listen and the men to decide on their behalf. Such a power imbalance is not readily visible during community meetings, and what could pass as a participatory community decision, is likely to be the decision of a few dominant people.

Furthermore, Golooba-Mutebi (2004) questions the assumption that people are willing and have the capacity to participate in public affairs and that the only requirement is that there are opportunities for their participation. His study of local councils in Uganda showed that the initial enthusiasm for people to participate in local council meetings faded over time due to participation fatigue and doubts about the utility of such participation. Pryor (2002) observed similar apathy on the part of parents to participate in their village school management at Akurase, a village in Ghana, due to doubts about the relevance of the school to their welfare. Cooke & Kothari (2001) contend that the motivation for people to participate in public decisions or not is poorly understood. For example, participation in some communities may be alien to the prevailing development culture, and people may fear to speak publicly in the presence of their leaders.

The other critique of participation is the likelihood of raising unrealistic expectations among community members (Guijt, 2003). Such members often have high expectations when participating in development related discussions, which may not be realistic. If this situation is

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not well managed it could easily lead to disillusionment when, after a process of participation, these expectations are not met.

2.4 Local Government and Local Governance

Local government refers to specific institutions or entities created by national constitutions (Brazil, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden), by state constitutions (Australia, the United States), by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government (New Zealand, the United Kingdom, most countries), by provincial or state legislation (Canada, Pakistan), or by executive order (China) to deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small geographically delineated area. *Local governance* is a broader concept and is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level (Shah, 2006).

Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services. Local governance, therefore, includes the diverse objectives of vibrant, living, working, and environmentally preserved self-governing communities. Good local governance is not just about providing a range of local services but also about preserving the life and liberty of residents, creating space for democratic participation and civic dialogue, supporting market-led and environmentally sustainable local development, and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents.

2.4.1 Structure of Ghana's Local Government System

It is important to note that since the local government structure of Ghana is in several tiers/phases/levels, co-ordination will be a key facilitating measure in the whole structure to

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ensure its practicality and effectiveness in terms of implementation. The presidency, cabinet and civil service are at the centre and connected to the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies through the ten (10) Regional Coordinating Councils popularly called the 'RCCs' located in the ten (10) administrative regions of Ghana. Beneath the level of the Metropolitan Assemblies are the Sub-Metropolitan District Councils as well as the Town Councils. Under the Municipal and District Assemblies are the Zonal Councils and Urban/Town/Area Councils respectively. The very lowest level to the bottom is the Unit Committees which represent the last stage in the structure. It is generally called a four-tier system, even though that depends on the way one looks at it. Below is the structure for administrative local government of Ghana.

Figure 2. 1: The Local Government Structure of Ghana

Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (1996)

The decentralized structure is expected to support community participation as planning is supposed to start from the lower level which is the unit committees. Being close in touch with people, decentralized sections have to play the important roles in project planning and implementation.

2.4.2   The Regional Coordinating Council

The membership of the regional coordinating councils varies from region to region owing to the differences in population, number of district assemblies, size of region among other factors even

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though Amanfo suggests that it is between seventeen (17) and fourty five (45) members (Amanfo, 2003). Regions with very dense populations like the Ashanti and Greater Accra regions have a lot of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies as well as constituencies created for Members of Parliament. Others, though huge by land mass or geography, as is the case of most of the regions in the Northern sector have fewer Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, parliamentary constituencies and even sometimes, deputy Regional Minsters. When a region has a bigger population density, it will definitely have more members on the regional coordinating council since its membership is made up of the Regional Minister who serves as chairman of the council as legally required, the deputy Regional Minister (ex-officio member), a career civil servant in the person of the Regional Administrative Officer (appointed), all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives, all Presiding Members and finally, all Members of Parliament who are ex-officio members (1992 Constitution of Ghana: 141-142). On the part of the Ex-Officio members, though they are entitled to participate in all deliberations they do not have the right to vote on matters that have to be voted for by the members because of controversies or lack of consensus. Even though Regional Coordinating Councils are basically administrative bodies and not necessarily concerned or pre-occupied with policy making, it is clear that there may not be enough women on these councils if a lot of females are not made Members of Parliament, Ministers, deputies, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives as well as Presiding Members since membership to these regional councils is automatic.

2.4.3   Functions of the Regional Coordinating Council

Section 113 of the PNDC Law 207 establishes the Regional Coordinating Councils and prescribes the following functions for them.

1. Co-ordination and review of various public services in the region.

2. Supervision and monitoring of all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies as well as their corresponding sub-structures.

3. Monitoring, supervision, co-ordination and evaluation of the activities and performance of all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies within the region.

4. Supervising and monitoring the expenditure of all financial resources allocated to all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies from central government agencies.

5. Planning for all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies and any such functions as may be assigned to it by government.

2.4.4   The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies

District Assemblies in Ghana come in the forms of Metropolitan, Municipal and Districts. When the assembly's population is about two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) or more, it is called a Metropolitan Assembly. On the other hand, if the assembly's population is ninety-five thousand (95,000) or more, it is called a Municipal Assembly. Furthermore, if the assembly's population is below ninety-five thousand (95,000), then it is a District Assembly (75000 and above). There are six (6) Metropolitan Assemblies and it is suggested by Offei-Aboagye that their population will be reviewed to about three per cent (3%) of total national population. Metropolitan Assemblies are based on a One-Town/City arrangement with Sub-Metropolitan District Councils being under or part of the main structure. Their functions include administrative, legislative, executive, planning and rating among others (Ofei-Aboagye cited in Agyeman-Duah:243) even though as many as eighty-seven (87) functions have been assigned to District Assemblies by PNDC Law 207 (Ghana, 1988:2).

There are equally about ten (10) Municipal Assemblies with their population to be reviewed

one and a half (1.5%) per cent of national population based on a One-Town arrangement with functions also ranging from administrative, legislative, executive, planning and rating among others (ibid). There are about a hundred and three District Assemblies (103) whose population is to be reviewed to 0.6 % of national population containing Urban/Town/Area Councils with administrative, legislative, executive, planning and rating functions among others (ibid).

However, there have been some changes regarding the distribution of assemblies falling under various Metropolitan, Municipal and District levels since the number of assemblies were increased from one hundred and ten (110) to over one hundred and seventy (170) in total.

2.4.5 Functions of the District Assembly

As a matter of fact, the PNDC Law 207 of 1988 has been harmonized into Chapter 20 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana. The general functions of the District Assemblies include administrative, legislative, executive, planning and rating among others making up the eighty-seven (87) functions as stated below (ibid). However, section 6(3) of the 1988 Local Government Law states that the Assemblies shall;

1. Take responsibility in terms of the total development of assemblies including the preparation and forwarding of assembly budgets and assembly plans for central government approval.

2. See to it that public tribunals and other courts are available to the people to facilitate the administration and promotion of justice in the jurisdiction of the assembly

3. Ensure the comprehensive development of infrastructure and all other related public works and services for the assembly.

4. Take steps towards the effective mobilization and use of available resources including financial, human, among others.

5. Ensure administrative and political guidance by providing the requisite direction and supervision of all other administrative authorities in the assembly.

6. Harmonize, co-ordinate and integrate plans, projects and programmes within various approved development plans and streamline them with those executed by NGOs, public corporations, ministries and other departments.

7. 'The formulation and execution of plans, programmes and strategies for effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district' (1992 Constitution of Ghana, 139).

8. 'The levying and collection of taxes, rates, duties and fees' (ibid).

2.4.6   The Urban Councils

Urban councils are supposed to assist in the execution of some assembly responsibilities and programmes serving above the Town/Area and Zonal councils. These councils are usually peculiar with District Assemblies and formed for populations of above 15000. There are about thirty-four (34) of these councils and all thirty-four (34) of them were created in district capitals with the exclusion of eight (8) (Amanfo, 2003). Eight (8) elected members from respective assemblies, a number of Unit Committee representatives not exceeding twelve (12) and not more than ten (10) ordinary members in urban areas form a council (ibid).

2.4.7   Zonal Councils

Zonal Councils are associated with Metropolitan Assemblies that have about 95000 residents. There may have been more than four (4) Municipal Assemblies now in view of the addition of sixty new assemblies by the New Patriotic Party administration. However, there were about one hundred and eight (108) of these Zonal Councils based on the four (4) Municipal Assemblies. Constitutionally, the Electoral Commission sets out criteria for the establishment of these

councils taking into consideration the population (usually about 3000), common interests, streets, land marks among others (Amanfo, 2003). Not more than five (5) people resident in the area, about ten (10) representatives of the unit committees and five (5) elected members from the respective assembly are drawn to form the membership of the council which is supposed to have between fifteen (15) and twenty-five (25) members (ibid).

2.4.8   Town/Area Councils

The Town and Area Councils have a similar composition as the Zonal Councils having not more than five (5) people resident in the area, about ten (10) representatives of the unit committees and five (5) elected members from the respective assembly are drawn to form the membership of the council which is supposed to have between fifteen (15) and twenty (20) members. It is important to note that Metropolitan and District Assemblies are the ones that accommodate Town/Area councils which are created for population of between 5000 and 15000 for the Town Councils and not less than 5000 for the Area Councils respectively (ibid).

As the names will imply, Town councils are bigger in terms of population and other features whilst the Area councils are usually identifiable with rural populations.

2.4.9   Unit Committees

The Unit Committee is the last tier of the local government structure placed fourth to the bottom. This actually forms the base of decentralization and is more connected with everyday lives of the people. Such essential activities and services like communal labour, revenue mobilization, sanitation, education, health and others are executed by the Unit Committees which are established in rural populations of about 5000 and between 5000 and 15000 for urban areas respectively. In terms of the general membership of these Unit Committees, five (5) Members resident in the community and other ten (10) elected members form the membership of the Unit

Committee (Amanfo, 2003). In other words, the membership of the Unit Committees should not exceed fifteen (15) members.

2.4.10 Who Is Eligible?

Subject to the 1992 Constitution, 'the qualifications for membership of a District Assembly, the procedures of a District Assembly and other local government units lower than a District Assembly that may be created shall be provided by law' (Amanfo, 2003). As noted before, all citizens or inhabitants are allowed to participate or contest in local government elections when they satisfy the criteria laid down in section 16 of the PNDC Law 207. The person or persons must be:

1. Ghanaian citizen and not below the age of eighteen (18) years.

2. Permanent member of the respective district he or she seeks to be part of or represent.

3. Must be sane or of sound mind

4. Paid all his or her liabilities relating to rates and taxes

2.4.11 Nominations

1. Any person qualified to vote can be voted for as well. So logically, all qualified voters in the area can be nominated.

2. At least a nomination form picked by a candidate has to be endorsed by 25 people resident in the area.

3. Some two small-sized passport photographs should be submitted to officials of the electoral commission.

4. Organizations including political parties cannot nominate, support or oppose candidates. 'A political party shall not endorse, sponsor, offer a platform to or in any way campaign for or against a candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or any lower government unit' (ibid).

5. A lot of information including the use of pictures is provided for the electorate to acquaint themselves with the candidates and electoral processes.

6. Unlike other positions, filing fees/monies are not supposed to be paid to the Electoral Commission before a candidate's nomination is successful.

7. Aspirants are not discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity, creed, religion, profession, status etc (Amanfo, 2003).

2.5 Traditional Authorities (T.A.)

Weber (1964) addresses the issue of legitimacy of governments by identifying three types of authority, namely charismatic, traditional and legal authority. He defines traditional authority as authority based on everyday belief in the sacred traditions in force since time immemorial and the legitimacy of those who are called to govern by the said traditions. T.A, according to Kendie, et al (2004), are vested in the chieftaincy institution tasked to exercise spiritual power and provide secular leadership. However, the pattern of traditional authority varies from community to community.

The word "tradition" itself is defined by Fleishchaker (1994) as a different customs passed down over generations, and a set of beliefs and values endorsing those customs. However, norms, values and beliefs are not enough to determine the role traditional authority play. The roles played by traditional authorities are sensitive, especially when it comes to the relationship between traditional and modern structures and powers of governments. Millar & Bonye (2005) argue that traditional authorities are indispensable in the governance process and it is almost impossible to achieve sustainable development without situating development plans in the culture of the people which is built on the institutions, the rules, the norms and the life pattern of

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the society. Most often than not, traditional authorities in Ghana have been treated as if the concept is synonymous with the institution of chieftaincy.

2.5.1   Traditional Authorities and Local Government

In the view of Mukyala-Makiika (1998), there exists some form of duality of authority at the local level of government. One form of the authority consists of people who derive their legitimate right to govern from the fact that they have been elected and they consider the people as collection of individuals, each with a set of specific rights. The other group comprises those who derive their right to govern from inheritance and tradition and perceive people to be part of a cultural unit with collective rights. T.A belong to the latter group and continue to remain important in areas such as cultural leadership, control of natural resources, community identity and political leadership.

Arguments advanced for the institutional representation of traditional rulers in the local government system have been demonstrated by their ability to mobilise support for local level development projects. They also have the capacity to encourage participation at the grassroots level. This is evident in their democratic credentials where they are seen as the last resort when the central government and the district Assemblies have failed (Ayee, 2006). Closing the gap between the district assemblies and the sub-district structures on one hand, and the traditional authorities on the other, has the potential of reviving the enthusiasm of the traditional rulers in the operations of the DAs and the sub –district structures. As has been explicitly expressed by Ayee (2006:57) "the moment one talks about grassroots governance one is already making overtures to chieftaincy, because in Ghana, implementing a successful programme without the involvement of the traditional authorities is nearly impossible".

Coussey's Constitutional Commission of 1949 emphatically stated in reference to the institutional representation of chiefs in local government that chiefs are closely intertwined with the life of the communities and that their disappearance would spell doom for the country. Despite this caution, critics have argued that the representation of chiefs in the DAs system would be in contravention of the constitutional provision that debars chiefs, especially from participating in active partisan politics even though in principle DAs are supposed to be non-partisan (Ayee, 2006). However, Kendie et al (2008) maintain that the non-embracement of ideas from the traditional sources could explain the neglect of traditional indigenous knowledge systems that are essential for sustainable development.

2.5.2   Role of Traditional Authorities

A traditional authority is composed of the chief and the elders. The chief is at the apex of the hierarchy. Elders include the chief priest and the 'magazia'. The hierarchy of Traditional Authorities is not homogenous since every locality has its peculiar structure due to varied culture and traditions. For instance, chieftaincy in Ghana is ascribed. This means the chief who must necessarily be a male must hail from a royal family and must be duly selected and appropriately en-skinned.

In particular, a chief is supposed to help fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the community (Dankwa III, 2004). These hopes and aspirations of the community over which a person is a chief, in simple terms, is development, and it has been found that the success of a chief is judged on performance in terms of the level of development they are able to bring to their area (Dunn & Robertson, 1975; Oomen, 2005). Therefore, embedded in the chief must be wisdom, authority, dynamism and respect to be able to be the agent of development that his community expects.

Chiefs pursue grassroots mobilization of community labour to bring about holistic change in their localities.

To engender the desired development in communities while avoiding abuse of powers by the TAs, "the roles of the government and the governed in the traditional society were thus clearly defined, and maintain strict accountability to ensure sound government (Dankwa III, 2004). Therefore, the TA (whether in northern or southern Ghana) has to perform for and on behalf of its subjects the following roles and responsibilities (among others):

➢ Exercise the people's mandate (those on whose behalf the chief rules) to settle disputes of all kinds, and most particularly land disputes among his subjects

➢ Make and enforce customary by-laws and punish offenders of the laws

➢ Preside over the stool lands and permit settlers and other investment partners including the Assembly to acquire land

➢ Discuss, initiate and monitor community development projects.

These roles above and many others make every Traditional Leader concerned with qualitative and quantitative development of their communities (Ayee, 2006). This concern makes every chief seek to collaborate with other development partners in and around their localities in order to reap the benefits of partnerships. One such partner is the MMDAs.

2.5.3 Contemporary Roles of Traditional Authorities in Ghana

In the decentralized system of government, some traditional leaders continue to be agents of development in their communities and areas through mobilizing human and material resources for development projects. They also ensure that peace and tranquillity prevail in their areas of authority. Without peace and social order, there cannot be development. One way of ensuring this is through avoiding and settling quickly all chieftaincy disputes which tend to divide the

people. Most traditional leaders today are development oriented and are hence very active in mobilizing their people to initiate and implement self-help projects, as well as facilitating the implementation of projects emanating from the District Assemblies. At times on their own accord, they initiate development projects and spearhead fund raising activities for implementation. One good example is the Okyehene's environmental project that has led to the establishment of a university college. Thus, TAs continue to form important links between the government and the people, acting as channels of communication and disseminating government policy and decisions. In this way, they participate in local government and thereby help to bring government closer to the people. Moreover, in recent times quite a number of TAs have been able to mobilize their citizens living away or abroad to contribute in cash and in kind to development projects at home. Some communities have fairly active associations of non-resident citizens.

2.5.4   Chieftaincy and Decentralization

Western-style democracy and traditional institutions of chieftaincy – co-exist for long periods in relative peace and calm, but occasionally, conflicts arise either between or within the two institutions. Ghana has been confronting this challenge since it started its decentralization process in 1987. To further exacerbate the dual system of governance in Ghana, conflicts also exist within the decentralization process itself (Adjepong et al, 2003). These tensions can compromise peace both at the macro and micro levels, such as between the political elites of the dominant parties (Frempong, 2007). Subsequently, we need strategic conflict resolution mechanisms to pre-empt these debilitating strains. Some African countries have been able to blend formal and informal rules to benefit them.

In Burkina Faso, traditional leaders have appropriated the decentralization process to combine the legal status previously denied them with their customary legitimacy (Ouedraogo, 2003). The immediate problem arising is how to delimit customary functions of chiefs from state functions of elected officials; a recurring issue that always accompanies involvement of chiefs in partisan politics as witnessed in recent events in Burkina Faso in local natural resource management. As Ouedraogo (2003) points out, implementers of decentralization should be wary of attempting to replace or undermine pre-existing institutions familiar to the local population with government reforms based on a legal and institutional framework. This is especially important when the traditional institutions themselves are in a state of flux, as is happening in both Burkina Faso and Ghana.

The relevance of the interplay of formal and informal rules becomes more revealing when we juxtapose meanings of decentralization by English speaking countries and French speaking countries. In the former, decentralization connotes 'devolution of resources and powers of the central state to local or private decision-making bodies' (Ribot 1999 in Ouedraogo 2003). Ouedraogo directs us to the French tradition of a more legalistic understanding of decentralization as indicated by Kiemde (2001): 'state recognition of the existence of autonomous local governments endowed with specific competencies and managed by autonomous bodies.' Decentralization here means "reorganizing the state and only involves governmental players at the local level (local government, public enterprises, etc.)" (Ouedraogo 2003, 98).

In Botswana, customary law has been co-opted into the modern legal system, a key factor in the overall peace and stability in Botswana (Dzivenu 2008). Owusu (2006) supports the view that Botswana and Ghana epitomize two successful African cases where the continuation of

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chieftaincy and Western democracy have been mutually beneficial in deepening democracy as opposed to cases such as Rwanda and Burundi where monarchical rule and chieftaincy were abolished (with resultant civil war and genocide).

Owusu and others contend that democracy was "inherent" with the Setswana tradition of consultation in Kgotla (traditional courts) in the case of Botswana, and in the case of Ghana, 'the Akan chieftaincy model' of power-sharing involved broad community involvement in political decision making" (Mmusi 1981, cited in Owusu 2006, 19-20). Owusu (2006) contend that the totality of chieftaincy models in Ghana, not Akan alone, should form the basis for framers of constitutional reform, as a means of eradicating conflicts in the state-tradition interface (Owusu, 2006).

Akans constitute the plurality in Ghana, but are less than fifty percent of the population. and as Owusu (2006) rightly declares that Botswana's second chamber, House of Chiefs, is a constitutional provision very different from Ghana's National House of Chiefs, which is not a legislature.

Further, it is pertinent to note that Botswana's National House of Chiefs is a clear example of informal formalized institutions (i.e., mix), whereas Ghana's National House of Chiefs is not formalized (no mix) – and this is a pointer to the parallel operation of formal and informal rules (Owusu, 2006). In Botswana, the customary courts have been integrated into formal delivery systems. Unlike in Ghana, the British succeeded in diminishing the power of chiefs from state affairs.

It is instructive to note that successive governments in Ghana since 1957 have not followed a consistent policy regarding the role of chiefs in local government. Currently under the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993 (specifically, Article 242 (d) and Act

462 Section 5(d) respectively), there is provision for two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs (elected by the chiefs at a meeting of the House) to serve on their respective Regional Coordinating Councils. However, the services of chiefs become available only if they are included among at most thirty per cent of the total membership of the DAs, appointed by the President. Even then, this membership is contingent on the President's consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district. I argue that this marked the beginning of conflict and non-cooperation between officials of the District Assembly – especially District Chief Executives and the chiefs, who are interested in influencing the political agenda of the district as well. Similarly, under Legislative Instrument (LI) 1589 1994, chiefs have no automatic membership or participation in the sub-district governance structures.

According to Ayee (2006), the absence of institutional representation of chiefs in the structures of local government is a recipe for non-cooperation between chiefs and officials of the DA, especially DCEs. This represents clash of formal and informal rules.

Some central leaders and politically active citizens recognize the need for chiefs to be an integral part of the decentralization process. One of the most recent calls is from a former minister of state, who is of the opinion that government cedes the right to appoint thirty percent of the membership of District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies to traditional authorities (Ghana News Agency 09.29.09). At the same forum, a traditional leader, emphasizing the role of chiefs as agents of development, suggested an increase in the representation of traditional authorities at the district assemblies, with the objective of making chiefs active participants in the democratization process for sustainable development. To buttress the emerging "Little Man politics," the GNA reported that the devolution of this presidential function to chiefs was treated with disdain by the DCEs present at the workshop.

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Chiefs in Ghana, irrespective of hierarchy are perceived as "social and cultural leaders different from self-imposed or elected leaders and officials of the state, including the District Chief Executives, the pivots of the present decentralized system of administration who operate, or are expected to operate at the grassroots level" (Nana Arhin Brempong, 2006). According to Ayee (2006) any attempts to position chiefs as politically-neutral leaders is a nonstarter, since they had institutional representation in colonial Native authorities and governance structures after independence in 1957.

Informal rules or tradition comes into prominence during special occasions that are specifically presumed to be customary, for example, festivals. It is traditional councils that determine modes of celebrating their festivals. During such festivals, chiefs are carried in palanquins to signify their authority over the land, and a dance performed by a chief has symbolic meaning. Besides these, other traditional usages include the power of chiefs in mobilizing their subjects for development-oriented projects, resolving disputes, authorizing ban on agricultural practices such as farming and fishing at specified periods of the year, approving ban on drumming and noise making at specified periods of the year, deciding on burial periods in their area of jurisdiction, etc. These traditional legacies are deemed to be the preserve of chiefs, but sometimes there are cases of government interference based on state legalism, and increasingly religious oppositions. Litigations easily arise as to who has power to decide ban on drumming within the context of religious freedom in Ghana; chiefs, pastors or government leaders? During festival celebrations, can government interfere especially if it borders on the security of the country or its citizens? Which traditional areas are restricted for government, and how does government come to respect these norms? These questions highlight the fundamental reality that in contemporary times, the

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social and political space of Ghana is inundated with many institutions struggling hard to find their niche – state, chieftaincy, religious institutions, etc.

In the struggle for space between government officials and chieftaincy, none sparks violent disagreements and conflicts than interference in succession rules and traditional land management. It is in these two areas that the resistance to central government interference is the greatest and the potential for instability and violent conflicts is high. Succession of a chief arises when the incumbent dies, abdicates or is dethroned. Succession rules differ from one traditional area to another, but may appear similar among clans or ethnic groups. For instance, in the Asante Kingdom, it is the queen mother (normally the mother of a previous chief), who has authority to appoint a succeeding chief. The successor necessarily has to come from the royal family, but it is not uncommon for a brother of a deceased chief to succeed him (e.g., MacDonald 1898). In the Dagomba Kingdom, there appears to be a rotation system of succession between two families. These two examples of succession rules and their variations across the length and breadth of Ghana are inviolate, and any attempt to alter them can lead to chaos. The murder in 2002 of the king of Dagbon, this was a clear manifestation of the interaction between state interference and traditional customary norms. The question we are confronted with is whether the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II was a random violent act or a failure of mediation among state and traditional actors. What was the level of government interference in the traditional succession rules? Do we have instances of similar interferences in other parts of Ghana? If so, what was the outcome (murder)? These questions would help us to identify the parallel operation of formal and informal rules. Insofar as interactions exist between the two institutional systems, we need to find out whether history and acceptance of institutional bargaining are absent or not to impact

success or failure of mediation among state and traditional actors. This state-tradition interaction is also seen in traditional land management.

According to Article 257 of the 1992 Constitution, all public lands in Ghana and mineral rights are government-owned. Yet, chiefs as well as clans, families or individuals own customary lands. The customary sector manages 80 to 90 percent of land in Ghana (Kasanga & Kotey 2001). That so much land is under customary management results from agriculture being the single largest industry in Africa (Bates 2008). Respondents knowledgeable in land issues also reiterated and confirmed the high percentage of customary-owned lands in Ghana. This vast ownership of land by the customary sector also reflects the urban-rural divide, where majority of the population resides in the rural areas. For instance, in Ghana, the rural population hovers around seventy percent. Further, a historical trace by Amanor (2008) shows how British indirect rule unwittingly placed land under chiefs, which was then managed customarily. This was a liberal ideology promoted by the British colonial administration under the Native Authority system. The theory of communal land tenure was the premise on which the British supported their liberal position, which in Ghana meant that chiefs, especially paramount chiefs, acquired not only allodial rights over land, but also hegemony in land transactions.

In further clauses of the same article, i.e., Article 257 (3, 4 and 5), we clearly see a manifestation of the use of both statutory and customary laws in governing the country.

Clause 3 states:

For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that all lands in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana which immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution were vested in the Government of Ghana are not public lands within the meaning of clause (1) and (2) of this article.

Clause 4 states:

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all lands referred to in clause (3) of this article shall vest in any person who was the owner of the land before vesting, or in the appropriate skin without further assurance than this clause.

Clause 5 states:

Clauses (3) and (4) of this article shall be without prejudice to the vesting by the Government in itself of any land which is required in the public interest for public purposes.

Article 267 (1) states, "All stool (or skin) lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool (or skin) in accordance with customary law and usage."

A careful examination of the articles shows how central government divests itself of land – land covering almost half the land mass of Ghana – and yet maintains its future hold. The government continues to hold onto public lands. However, only lands in the northern part of Ghana are reverting from public to the customary sector. One could conjecture that this continued acquisition was probably an affirmative action to promote development in the northern sector, since the three regions are still the poorest in the country. However, the point to note is that there is a pluralistic land tenure and management system in Ghana, but is more manifestly expressed as a dual relationship.

Kasanga & Kotey (2001) note that "dual tenure and land management systems (*statutory and customary*) currently prevail in the country. The two systems run parallel to each other, with the customary system being the more robust in practice. However, as and when the state land machinery is applied and enforced, the customary is weakened and extinguished for all practical purposes" (Kasanga & Kotey 2001, 20). Kasanga & Kotey (2001) contend that since post-

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independence Ghana, the application of specific legislative instruments regarding land tenure and management has had two general shadow objectives. One is the gradual elimination of traditional and customary institutions and authorities in land management for economic and financial ends, and the second is the state acquisition of land from political opponents, which would cripple local revenues that could accrue to opposition parties or groups.

Instead, plots of state-managed lands were given to political allies, top civil servants and military and security forces as a reward for their loyalty. The dynamics here are similar to what transpired in Zanzibar that Myers (2008) discusses. The general assumption has been that formalizing informal lands according to the 'de Soto argument' would reduce poverty.

However, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that formalization of land management systems benefitted state elites. Myers also recounts that soon after Zanzibar's independence in 1963, the revolutionary leaders of 1964 seized all lands belonging to the fleeing Omani and Indian elites. Under the guise of nationalizing all lands, the Zanzibar government politicized the reallocation and favored their cronies, members of the Afro-Shirazi Party that had led the revolution. The unintended outcomes of the original laws suggest imposed formal rules over informal rules, which always had the potential for conflict.

Land disputes are becoming a perennial feature in Ghana and other African countries, because a pluralistic land tenure and management system has come to be maintained owing to the power and influence of chiefs and traditional rulers (Gough & Yankson 2000, Kasanga & Kotey 2001). Ghana's 1999 National Land Policy seems to reinforce this trend. Gough & Yankson discuss how the parallel operation of indigenous land tenure systems and European based systems in the colonial period in most African countries has been transformed after independence. The main alteration has been in more expansion of state rights over land in land tenure. Again, under the

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guise of nationalizing lands for development through compulsory acquisition, state elites promoted clientelizm and corruption.

However, recent research by others such as Quan et al (2008) and Tonah (2008) show that new land reforms such as the Land Administration Project (LAP) introduced in 2003 with the support of the World Bank is reinvigorating chiefs to assume the control they previously had over land in the colonial period before their powers were whittled away soon after independence.

The nature of landholding in Ghana shows that "Ghana operates a dual land rights regime, but the link between administration of interests in land created through customary practice and formal titles to landed property is tenuous to non-existent" (Quan et al 2008, 187). Consequently, LAP was instituted to address this anomaly. In a move to ensure that government divests itself of responsibility for the management of stool lands, Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) were established to create more community-based approaches (bottom up) to the management of customary land. The CLSs were not only to ensure community-level participation, but also to promote transparency, greater equity and accountability in the use of stool lands and the accompanying revenue generation.

Contrary to the intended objectives of the CLS, government had a strong hand in placing the CLSs under the control of traditional authorities; a clear political choice to perpetuate the marginalization of the poor peasant landholders and maintain the opportunistic status quo of a patronage environment controlled by an alliance of powerful, politically influential chiefs and the national political elite. In the final analysis, the bargaining and negotiations that ought to be the preserve of the local people in customary land relations is compromised. Rather, these interactions are seized by the elites, who further decide what constitutes custom. Amanor (2008, 56) states:

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Customary relations are frequently constructed around an alliance between local power elites and the state, which comes to redefine what constitute custom in a situation of change. Thus, the definition and redefinition of the customary frequently…is associated with an adaptation to changing conditions rather than resistance to change.

What this means is that customary law (chief's local authority), which is the result of continuous bargaining and renegotiation between chiefs and community is now redefined by interactions between local power elites (who may not necessarily be chiefs, but local state actors) and the state (center) actors. Once the interaction shifts post from a bargaining and negotiation among customary (chiefs) and constitutional (state actors) to one between quasi formal (local power elites) and formal (state actors), conflict management and resolution fails. Chiefs, who were "Big Men" under the Native Authority system, and were gradually assuming same position after the promulgation of 1992 Constitution are now in limbo.

However, Tonah (2008) shows how the involvement of post-independence governments in local power structures and customary land management in the North eastern Ghana has created a different parallel land management regime. This time around, it is opportunistic chiefs and state officials on one hand against the earth priests who were the religious and political leaders of settlements, but were displaced with the introduction of chiefs during the colonial period.

Land Administration Project is an offshoot of Ghana's 1999 National Land Policy, which seeks to give a policy direction as to how best to administer and manage land in the country. LAP is a 15-25-year program, divided into phases. The first phase, 2003-2008, was extended to December 2010. Government of Ghana in conjunction with donor partners –World Bank, Department of International Development (DFID), GTZ and other development partners were the initial funders of the project. The objective of the LAP is to stimulate community development, reduce poverty,

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promote social stability and prudent land resource management, and develop an efficient land market. Phase I of the LAP has four components: 1) harmonizing land policy and deliberative framework; 2) institutional reform and development; 3) improving land titling, valuation and land information systems; and 4) project management and development, i.e., project management, monitoring and evaluation. Institutional development embodies both the public institutions and the local institutions regarding land administration and management. Customary Land Secretariats form part of the institutional restructuring, and DFID funded this sub-component to the tune of over nine million dollars up to 2009. The Office of the Administrator of the Stool Lands has taken over the management of this sub-component.

Customary Land Secretariats are local structures, which have been developed by landholding communities supported by the government to see how best they could manage and administer their lands. The observation had been that maladministration and mismanagement of land ended up in conflicts. The development of CLSs could also be said to be a response to scholarly findings. For instance, Sarah Berry had observed that in Ghana "where conflicts over land and belonging played directly into state politics, connections between chieftaincy, state and local governance…are multi-faceted, operating in overlapping but parallel spaces of political engagement and contestation (Berry 2008, 50). According to the LAP official, the focus on CLSs is "because eighty percent of land is owned by the traditional authorities in landholding communities and twenty percent by government" (August 6, 2010).

The functions of the CLSs are three: - 1) to keep and maintain accurate records of land transactions within their local areas; 2) to serve as a link between the landholding communities and other stakeholders and between the landholding communities and land sector stakeholders, and 3) to serve as a link between an applicant for land and land management committee of the

various areas. These functions were to enhance good governance in land administration and resolve land disputes. A case in point is the resolution of disputes in the Gulkpe-Na's17 palace in the Northern Region using Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms. With peace follows investments to help develop the local communities. In what appears to be a critique of Amanor's assertion about shifting of the bargaining and negotiation posts among chiefs and government leaders to one between quasi formal (local power elites) and formal (state leaders), whereby conflict management and resolution fails, this LAP official decried the lack of collaboration between the District Assemblies and CLSs. The District Assemblies are responsible for land planning schemes, and yet do not value the inputs of the CLSs. District Assemblies do not see themselves as partners with the CLSs despite the growing awareness that CLSs are pivots in the land sector and help in the revenue mobilization of the District Assemblies.

The LAP official also debunked in no uncertain terms the issue relating to politicization of the CLSs. According to him, what the literature presents as a form of elite capture and connivance of state leaders with some influential chiefs to subjugate the bargaining and negotiation interactions in customary land relations were all perceptions.

In some areas, they are seeing the CLSs as coming to usurp the powers of the chiefs and owners of the land. It's all about power; land is power – political power, financial power, social power. So if these structures are being set up, is it not a cunning way of the government trying to clamp down on traditional authority power at the local level? All these are perceptions, but these perceptions can be erased if there is intensive awareness creation telling the people the functions of the CLSs. They are not to come and usurp power, but to strengthen the existing system, and if possible, improve upon what is there. (August 6, 2010).

Rather, he corroborated the success of the CLS at Gbawe much touted in the literature. He lauded the decentralized system of the Gbawe model, success of which really hinged on it being a family institution as well as the confidence the family had in their head. Additionally, the Gbawe secretariat has a staff (such as surveyors, attorneys) well versed in land matters, and exhibited attributes essential in good governance at the local level – accountability, transparency and equity. Generally, there was a clear observation of enforcement of the rules at Gbawe Kwatei family.

Gough & Yankson further contend that land management in Ghana differs from other countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, lands were seized for settler farmers, eroding indigenous tenure systems. "In Tanzania…indigenous rights holders…are only recognized informally by the administration system…in Ghana the traditional system is formally recognized and incorporated" (Gough & Yankson, 2000), a trend typical in most West African countries. However, Myers points to an instance in Zambia when the city council attempted to locate solid waste management sites in Lusaka's peri-urban areas.

This time round, the indigenous chief retained control over their land rights (Myers, 2005). Kasanga & Kotey, who also examined the interactions between customary and state land management systems, compare changing tenure in four regions of Ghana – North, Western, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti. They identified the Northern sector as an area very prone to conflict.

A major finding is that despite the abundance of land in the Northern region, land disputes, litigation and related problems continue to arise from the "current land administration and acquisition practices, emanating mainly from legislative interventions…. which have radically affected customary land tenure systems" (Kasanga & Kotey 2001, 14).

In sum it is observe, that where there are no interactions, there is no mediation and little conflict resolution mechanisms. But when the interaction among institutional systems marginalizes the previous institutional bargaining and historical contexts with one of the groups (either formal or informal), mediation among state and traditional actors fails. An example is the implementation of decentralization process that now means there is greater interaction of central officials with chiefs. Traditional management of land is then renegotiated and redefined to provide political opportunity structures for a coalition among state officials and chiefs to challenge traditional labor divisions or chiefs come into direct conflict with state officials, both at the local and central levels. In the former, earth priests who may regard themselves as more in tune with traditional norms and usages are marginalized. Further, Tonah (2008) correlates this division among the priests and chiefs as a breeding ground for chieftaincy succession conflicts. This division expresses as a split among the inhabitants and local lobbying groups. Besides more intrusion of state actors into customary relations, chiefs are not to actively participate in politics and yet can be appointed to any public office (Article 276 of the 1992 Constitution). This situation may further exacerbate the parallelism between formal and informal rules. Unlike England where churches are not currently subsidized, some chiefs of status continue to receive salaries from the state, and their allegiance to tradition may be compromised if the state is able to use salaries as leverage for subjugating customary relations.

This is because the secondary clauses under Article 267 (2 to 9) provide for an Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to oversee traditional land management. In Ghana, there is no doubt that the simple institutional bargaining that takes place between and among formal and informal institutions becomes very complicated when a nuanced analysis of the prevailing situation is done. The burning questions are why chieftaincy issues should escalate into violence

and murder in Dagbon and why land litigation should be more pronounced in the Northern region and northern parts of Ghana, which is home to Dagbon. What is peculiar about the Northern region, which may not be found in the other nine regions, since research carried across the country still highlight the region? It will be instructive to take a brief look at the Northern region and why it is an anomaly.

2.5.5 Participation of Traditional Authorities in Local Government System in Ghana (For the paper)

The lack of consistent polices regarding representation of traditional authorities in local government units by successive governments in Ghana bread conflict. For instance, the 1957 Constitution reserved one-third membership of local government units for chiefs; the Local Government Act of 1961, however, "banished" traditional authorities from local government units. Local government units, then, were deemed to have been completely constituted of elected members, although in practice, they were actually composed of CPP appointed members. The 1969 Constitution (which made the provision for the establishment of a National House of Chiefs) not only reserved one-third of the membership of District Councils for chiefs but also provided for the inclusion of not more than two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs in the Regional Council. Under the 1979 Constitution, however, one-third membership of District Councils was to be chosen from traditional authorities in the district without membership in Regional Councils. Under the Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207), 1988, the PNDC government regarded the representation or active participation of chiefs in decentralized institutions, such as the District Assemblies (DAs), or in organs of power, as undemocratic and counter-revolutionary. Hence, in the composition of the DAs, the chiefs, unlike previously, lost their one-third membership usually reserved for them by previous governments. In other words,

the PNDC decentralization reforms did not set aside a place for chiefs within the structures of local government. The chiefs, however, were only one of the groups to be covered by the clause permitting the central government to appoint one-third of district assembly members (Ayee, 1987; Ayee, 1994)

The Report of the Committee of Experts set up to draft proposals for a Constitution in 1991 took due "cognizance of the institution of chieftaincy at the local level" and made the following recommendations to the Consultative Assembly to ensure effective participation of traditional authorities in the work of the District Assemblies:

i. A paramount Chief as the ceremonial head of the District Assembly, with the right of address;

ii. Setting aside a certain percentage of the total membership of the District Assembly for traditional authorities;

iii. Cooptation of a number of chiefs as members of the District Assembly, without the right to vote (Republic of Ghana, 1991: 150).

It is instructive to note that the Committee of Experts "does not consider any of the above measures to be incompatible with democracy" (Republic of Ghana, 1991: 151).

The recommendations of the Committee of Experts were not included in the Constitution because it was felt that they would not only make the District Assemblies undemocratic but also stripped them of their populist inclinations. Moreover, inserting the recommendations in the Constitution would undermine the so-called "continuity" of the PNDC government's policies and programmes. Consequently, under the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993, (specifically, Article 242 (d) and Act 462 Section 5(d) respectively) while there is provision for two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs (elected by the chiefs at a meeting

of the House) to serve on their respective Regional Coordinating Councils, there is no provision for the automatic membership of chiefs on the District Assemblies. They can only serve if they are included among the not more than 30 per cent of the total membership of the DAs appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district.

Similarly, under Legislative Instrument (LI) 1589, 1994 there is no provision for the automatic membership of chiefs in the sub-district structures such as the Urban, Zonal and Town Councils as well as Unit Committees. They are, however, to be consulted by the Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executive acting on behalf of the President in the appointment of not more than five persons ordinarily resident in the urban area, zone, town or unit. It is instructive to note that this consultation is done only not with the chiefs but also the Presiding Member of the District Assembly and organized productive economic groupings in the urban area, zone, town or unit.

The main implication of the constitutional-legal provisions is a vision of traditional rulers as politically-neutral leaders able to work with all political leaders in the areas of local government, whose main concern is the qualitative and quantitative development of their communities. However, the lack of institutionalized representation of traditional authorities in the local government structure has resulted in strained relations between some traditional authorities and functionaries of the DAs and their sub-district structures. In some districts, the District Chief Executive and the chiefs are not in good terms while in other districts it is the chiefs and the Assemblyman or Unit Committee members who are at loggerheads.

Even though successive governments have acknowledged the crucial role that traditional authorities continue to play in local government and administration, there has not been any

practical demonstration of their commitment to institutionalize the representation of chiefs in the structure of the District Assemblies (DAs). The National House of Chiefs, Regional Houses of Chiefs and Traditional Councils have made repeated appeals to the government to restore the one-third representation of chiefs in the local government units. These appeals have not been heeded because of the fear of the government that the institutional representation of the chiefs in the DAs and their sub-district structures may lead to lack of democracy and participation.

This is attributable to the ingrained perception of successive governments about traditional authorities as their competitors and their seeing chiefs as partners may be regarded as a public relations hoax. It has been pointed out that chieftaincy as an institution can be adapted to encourage increased popular participation at the grassroots (Ayee, 2007). This is because Ghanaian chiefs do not, as a rule, see central authority as their adversary but as a partner. In the words of Owusu (1996: 335 cited in Ayee, 2007):

There is no defined relationship between traditional authorities and local government units: There is a "lack of specificity" in the nature of the consultations with traditional authorities in the appointment of 30% District Assembly members and the "inherent weakness in the institutional anchoring of the traditional authorities. An assessment of the current situation confirmed that there is no structured and formalized arrangement that seeks to foster partnership and participation of traditional institutions in local government system in Ghana. Relationship between the District Assemblies and traditional authorities is generally restricted to consultations on the release of land and participation in ceremonial functions" (MLGRD, 2004: 16).

There are numerous traditional authority disputes as a result of the following: (a) indeterminate lines of succession; a classic one is friction between the two royal gates of Dagbon, the Abudu and Andani, which led to the assassination of the overlord of Dagbon, Ya-Na Andani II and the

killing of 30 others in March 200 in addition to the properties worth millions of cedis destroyed; (b) land creating inter-ethnic conflict, for instance, in the Northern Region, conflict over land has resulted in conflict between the Nchumurus, Nawuris, Konkombas, Basaare, Gonjas and Nanumbas and in the Volta Region between Tsito and Peki, Alavanyo and Nkonya (Ayee, 2007). The disputes over stools and skins and land have created factions at the local level, where one needs a concerted effort for development. As a result of the disputes, there is the perception that the traditional authorities will bring them into the operation of the local government units if they are given institutional representation.

2.5.6   The Structure of T.A.

According to Ayee, (2007) the Constitution of Ghana establishes a Houses of Chiefs system which consists of three levels, namely, (i) the National House of Chiefs; (ii) Regional House of Chiefs; and (iii) Traditional Councils.

The National House of Chiefs consists of five paramount chiefs elected by each Regional House of Chiefs. In other words, it has 50 members. Where in a region there are fewer than five paramount chiefs, the Regional House of Chiefs is mandated to elect such number of divisional chiefs to make up the required representation of chiefs for the region (Ayee, 2007).

The functions of the National House of Chiefs are:

(a)   to advise any person or authority charged with any responsible for any matter relating to or affecting chieftaincy;

(b)   to undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compiling the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin;

(c)   to undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful;

In addition to these, the National House of Chiefs has appellate jurisdiction in any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which has been determined by the Regional House of Chiefs and appeal can be made to the Supreme Court. This appellate jurisdiction is exercised by its Judicial Committee, which consists of five persons appointed by the House and assisted by a lawyer of not less than ten years' standing appointed by the National House of Chiefs on the recommendation of the Attorney-General.

The National House of Chiefs performs some functions especially when it comes to issues such as succession disputes and outmoded and socially harmful customs and usages which have been the bane of traditional authorities.

The Regional House of Chiefs, on the other hand, consists of such members as Parliament may, by law, determine. Its functions are complementary to those of the National House of Chiefs. Specifically, it is enjoined to:

(a)   Hear and determine appeals from the traditional councils within the region in respect of nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief;

(b)   Have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or skin or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queen mother to a paramount stool or skin;

(c)   Undertake a study and make such general recommendations as are appropriate for the resolution or expeditious disposition of chieftaincy disputes in the region;

(d)   Undertake the compilation of the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin in the region.

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The Traditional Council, the third layer, consists of a paramount chief and divisional chief. Its main function is to determine, in accordance with the appropriate customary law and usage, of the validity of the nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief. In other words, it performs functions similar to those of the National House of Chiefs and Regional House of Chiefs at the paramountcy level (Ayee, 2007).

2.5.7   Chiefs and Active Party Politics

A unique feature of the Constitution is the provision in Article 276 that "A chief shall not take part in active party politics; any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin". This notwithstanding, a chief may be appointed to any public office for which he is otherwise qualified. These two provisions are contradictory. On one hand, a chief is debarred from active party politics while on the other, he can be appointed by a government to hold a public office. There is an implied partisanship in this since in practice, governments have appointed chiefs who are either sympathizers or owe political allegiance. This has compromised the neutrality of some traditional authorities. Even though barring them from party politics is an infringement on their right, the neutrality of traditional authorities is important because of the father-figure role they play in society.

2.6 Ownership of Lands in Ghana

The ownership of land in Ghana is generally communal in nature and this has determined the nature of land administration over the years. Land is generally believed to be owned by the "Tendana" who are priests among northern ethnic groups in Ghana. In the Akan states, land is regarded as a feminine spirit, "Asaase Yaa", which in the words of Asiamah (1983) is "helpful when appropriated and harmful when neglected". Again, in the Akan states, land is seen as an ancestral trust which must be passed on to succeeding generations, with the chief, being the link

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between the living and the departed, and the administrator of this heritage. In the Ga states, land is said to be owned by the lagoon gods and its administration is in the hands of the "Wulomei", who are the priests of the lagoon gods. These religious notions of land ownership have doubtlessly determined the administration and manner of usage of land. To a large extent, these underpinnings have gradually been marginalized or even ignored in the urban economy owing to the growth of urbanisation and its concomitant effects of industrialization, education and Christianity (Asiamah, 1983). Nevertheless, the tenurial system of land in Ghana is defined by the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. The Constitution recognises two (2) tenurial systems namely: public and customary.

2.6.1 Public Lands

Public lands are vested in the President, on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana based on the relevant provisions of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, (Act 123). Public lands also include any other land acquired through the State Lands Act, 1962, (Act 125) or through any other statutes, in the public interest. Public lands are administered by the Lands Commission and its secretariats, as provided in the Lands Commission Act, 1994, (Act 483). Public lands can be grouped into two categories –state lands and vested lands.

State Land refers to land that the Government have compulsorily acquired for a specified public purpose or in the general public interest by the lawful exercise of its constitutional or statutory power of eminent domain. All previous interests are extinguished and persons who previously held recognizable interests in such lands are entitled by law to compensation either monetary or replacement with land of equivalent value. Laws governing the compulsory acquisition of land by the government include Article 20 of the 1992 Constitution, Administration of Lands Act

1962, (Act 123,) the State Lands Act 1962, (Act 125) the Land Statutory Wayleaves Act 1963, (Act 186) and regulations made under these statutes.

Vested Land is a unique situation brought about by statutory intervention where the landowner retains the customary land ownership but the management of the land is taken over by the state in trust for the owners? The management responsibilities cover legal (e.g. prosecution), financial (e.g. rent assessment, collection, disbursement) and estate management (e.g. physical planning and its enforcement and administration of the property). Vested lands are administered under the Administration of Stool Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767).

2.6.2   Legal Contradictions of Land Ownership

The key contradiction in the legal framework for land ownership in Ghana centres on customary ownership and public administration of such lands on the other to the practical exclusion of the customary custodians and land holders. Article 267 (1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana states that "all stool lands shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf of and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage". This implies that the indigenous owners take all management decisions and exercise the powers that go with ownership – the right to own, sell, receive payment, manage, decide on who is allocated a plot, terms, conditions and price for a particular grant, etc. However, Article 267 (2) sets up the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) and charges the office with the collection and disbursements of all stool land revenues, defined to include all rents, dues, royalties, revenues or other payments whether in the nature of income or capital from stool lands. This sharing formula ignores customary land owners who have rights and interest in land throughout the country. It

rather transfers all land management functions to the Administrator of Stool Lands. Article 267(6) further prescribes the formula for the disbursement of the moneys so collected as follows:

"10 percent of the revenue accruing from stool lands shall be paid to the OASL to cover administrative expenses and the remaining revenue shall be disbursed in the following proportions: twenty-five percent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status; twenty percent to the traditional authority; and fifty-five percent to the District Assembly, within the area of authority of which stool lands are situated"

Based on the formula, only 25 percent (out of 90 percent of the price money) is to be paid to the customary landowners whilst as much as 55 percent (out of 90 percent of the price money) is retained by the state. The remaining 20 percent (out of 90 percent of the price money) is paid to the traditional council (which is only an association of heads of traditional groups) where the land is situated. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of traditional rulers owning land and managing it from day to day including its defence in court and sometimes in battle and war whilst all management functions are controlled by state institutions (Kasanga, 2002).

Article 267(3) also provides that there shall be no disposition or development of any stool land unless the Regional Lands Commission of the region in which the land is situated has certified that the disposition or development is consistent with the development plan drawn up or approved by the planning authority for the area concerned. This implies that where the Lands Commission is unable to give the requisite certification then any disposition by the indigenous owners is invalid, pushing all such grants into illegality with its consequent development.

Furthermore, Article 267(5) prohibits the grant of freeholds in any stool lands however so described. It is not too clear what the full implications of this clause is, especially the extent to

which it affects land rights of subjects of the landowning communities and other customary freeholders. But if the meaning of the clause is to be taken at face value, then all customary freeholders of stool lands and 'strangers' (absolute purchasers or renters) are being turned into tenants of the chiefs as landlords.

Another area where a legal contradiction exists is with respect to the control of physical development. Even though the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) grants MMDAs the power to demolish unauthorised physical development, Section 9 of the National Building Regulations (LI 1630) gives a developer the power to proceed with development where approval for development is not given within three (3) months of the date of application. This provision creates some practical difficulties with the exercise of development control functions by MMDAs.

Again, while the National Development Planning (Systems) Act, 1994 (Act 479) elaborates the framework for decentralised planning in Ghana including physical/spatial planning, its provisions and plan preparation processes are at variance with the provisions in the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945 (CAP 84). In addition, while Act 462 recognises MMDAs as planning authorities within their respective areas of jurisdiction, there is no subsidiary legislation spelling out physical planning functions and standards. In the performance of planning functions, MMDAs have had to rely on CAP 84 which is outmoded and at variance with processes under Act 462.

2.6.3 Customary Lands

Customary lands are lands owned by stools, skins, families and clans usually held in trust by the chief, head of family and clan or fetish priests for the benefit of members of that group. Section 36 (8) of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana recognises customary ownership of land.

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Private ownership of customary land can be acquired by way of a grant, sale, lease, gift or marriage. Ownership is by way of outright purchase from customary land owners or private individuals. Customary lands support the livelihoods of the majority of the population in the country and therefore sustainable management of such lands is critical to the overall socio-economic development of the country.

2.7 Land Litigation

Another major source of conflict in land use is land litigation. Agyapong (2006) identifies that the unwarranted behaviour of some land owners especially about the sale of land can trigger litigation. People buy land in Accra Kumasi and Tamale that have already been sold to many other people; the practice is well embedded even in the minor towns. Agyapong (2006) again suggests the following as a way of addressing this challenge. Firstly, the private agencies in various communities should be licensed to be the sole authority required to sell land to the public, whether new allocations or resale of existing plot. This will reduce the incidence of multiple sales of plots. Secondly, in a situation where a chief has a land to sell to the public, he must employ his surveyors to do the demarcations, which must be approved by the Town and Country Planning Department. Resale of existing plot/ land must be the sole duty of the agencies to sell on behalf of the existing owners for a commission. Land litigation causes damage to properties and can even claim lives (Agyapong, 2006).

2.8 Conceptual Perspectives on Local Government and Central-Local Relations

Several accepted theories provide a strong rationale for decentralized decision making and a strong role for local governments, on the grounds of efficiency, accountability, manageability, and autonomy through participation.

Stigler (1957) identifies two principles of jurisdictional design:

➢ The closer a representative government is to the people, the better it works.

➢ People should have the right to vote for the kind and amount of public services they want.

These principles suggest that decision making should occur at the lowest level of government consistent with the goal of allocative efficiency and participation. Thus, the optimal size of jurisdiction varies with specific instances of economies of scale and benefit-cost spillovers.

2.8.1   The Principle of Fiscal Equivalency:

A related idea on the design of jurisdictions has emerged from the public choice literature. Olson (1969) argues that if a political jurisdiction and benefit area overlap, the free-rider problem is overcome and the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of production, thereby ensuring optimal provision of public services. Equating the political jurisdiction with the benefit area is called the *principle of fiscal equivalency* and requires a separate jurisdiction for each public service.

2.8.2   The Correspondence Principle

A related concept is proposed by Oates (1972): the jurisdiction that determines the level of provision of each public good should include precisely the set of individuals who consume the good. This principle generally requires a large number of overlapping jurisdictions. Frey & Eichenberger (1995, 1996, and 1999) have extended this idea to define the concept of functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ).

They argue that jurisdictions could be organized along functional lines while overlapping geographically, and that individuals and communities could be free to choose among competing jurisdictions. Individuals and communities express their preferences directly through initiatives and referenda. The jurisdictions have authority over their members and the power to raise taxes

to fulfill their tasks. The school communities of the Swiss canton of Zurich and special districts in North America follow the FOCJ concept.

2.8.3   The Decentralization theory

According to Oates (1972, p. 55), each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize benefits and costs of such provision, because

> ➢ Local governments understand the concerns of local residents;
>
> ➢ Local decision making is responsive to the people for whom the services are intended, thus encouraging fiscal responsibility and efficiency, especially if financing of services is also decentralized;
>
> ➢ Unnecessary layers of jurisdiction are eliminated;
>
> ➢ Inter jurisdictional competition and innovation is enhanced.

An ideal decentralized system ensures a level and combination of public services consistent with voters' preferences while providing incentives for the efficient provision of such services. Some degree of central control or compensatory grants may be warranted in the provision of services when spatial externalities, economies of scale, and administrative and compliance costs are taken into consideration. The practical implications of this theorem, again, require a large number of overlapping jurisdictions. This theory is in line with this study, where local decisions are made through the decentralize structures. But the question is how does the traditional leaders are in the Tamale metropolis participate in decision making process of the Assembly? The literature review of the local government structure of the Tamale metropolis does not provide a specific point where traditional leaders are made to participate by law, but with discretion of the officials of the metropolis.

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2.8.4 The subsidiarity principle

According to this principle, taxing, spending, and regulatory functions should be exercised by lower levels of government unless a convincing case can be made for assigning them to higher levels of government. This principle evolved from the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and was first proposed by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. Subsequently, Pope Pius XI highlighted the principle of subsidiarity as a third way between dictatorship and a laissez-faire approach to governance. The Maastricht Treaty adopted it as a guiding principle for the assignment of responsibilities among members of the European Union (EU). This principle is the polar opposite of the *residuality principle* typically applied in a unitary country, where local governments are assigned functions that the central government is unwilling or thinks it is unable to perform.

2.9 Alternative Models of Local Government and Central-Local Relations

Local governance historically predates the emergence of nation-states. In ancient history, tribes and clans established systems of local government in most of parts of the world. They established their own codes of conduct and ways of raising revenues and delivering services to the tribe or clan. Tribal and clan leaders developed consensus on the roles and responsibilities of various members. Some tribes and clans with better organization and skills then sought to enlarge their spheres of influence through conquest and cooperation with other tribes. In this way, the first Chinese dynasty, the Xia, was established (2070 BC to 1600 BC) (Zheng & Fan 2003). A similar situation prevailed in ancient India, where in the third millennium BC (about 2500 BC) a rich civilization was established in the Indus Valley (now Pakistan). This advanced civilization placed great emphasis on autonomy in local government and enshrined a consensus on division of work for various members of the society. This emphasis led to the creation of a

class society in which each member had a defined role: upholder of moral values, soldier, farmer, tradesperson, and worker. Each community formed its own consensus on community services and how to accomplish them.

Native American tribes in North America and tribes and clans in Western Europe also enjoyed home rule. Subsequent conquests and wars led to the demise of these harmonious systems of self-rule in local government and to the emergence of rule by central governments all over the world. This development (roughly around 1000 BC in Western Europe) ultimately led to the creation of unique systems of local government and central-local relations in most countries. Those systems can nevertheless be classified into the following broad categories for analytical purposes.

2.9.1   The French Model

In the French model, the primary role of local governments is to allow citizens at the grassroots level a sense of political participation in decision making at the national level. The system embodies the thinking of Rousseau and Voltaire on rationality and social cohesion and that of Napoleon on a sense of order and an unbroken chain of command. The national government and its agencies represent the apex of this system, with an unbroken chain of command through regional and departmental prefects to chief executives and mayors of communes at the lowest rung of the system. There is a similar chain of command through line and functional ministries. Therefore, the model is sometimes referred to as the dual supervision model of local government. The system permits cumul des mandats (concurrent political mandates or holding multiple offices or positions concurrently) to provide elected leaders at lower echelons with a voice at higher levels of governments. Public service delivery remains the primary responsibility of the national government, and its agencies may be directly involved in the delivery of local services.

The average size of local government jurisdiction is small (covering fewer than 10,000 inhabitants), and local governments have a limited range of autonomous service delivery responsibilities. Local governments use a mix of local revenue instruments and rely significantly on central financing.

This model, with its focus on strong central command and dual supervision, proved very popular with colonial rulers from France, Portugal, and Spain, as well as with military dictators, and was widely replicated in developing countries (Humes, 1991).

2.9.2   The British Model

Historically, Great Britain's local government system is into four periods;

First period. England's local government, following the historic Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, was still characterized by "a plethora of single purpose agencies managed by boards that were appointed or elected in various ways" (Schelcher, 2003:10). It was through the secular reforms of 1888 and 1894, that the territorial basis of England's modern two-tier local government structure was put in place that persisted until the 1970s. The local councils exercised their political and administrative functions through government by committees. Thus, well into the early twentieth century, England experienced the "golden ages of local self-government" and presented a type of politically strong and multi-functional local government unparalleled elsewhere in contemporary Europe.

Second period.   Since the 1920s the Victorian model of local self-government has undergone continuous change as central government. In the course of the 1940s, English local government experienced a sequence of dramatic shifts in range and composition of its responsibilities. The historical multi-function model of local government was significantly curbed.   In a major territorial reform, in 1972, the counties were redrawing and the number of district was cut.

Third period. Since the 1980s, the English local government system has been changed by two waves. The first of these was performed after 1979 when the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher took office. Two main conceptual thrusts pursued by central government can be discerned (centralized system and market-tasting policy).

Fourth period. After office in 1997, the New Labour government under Tony Blair pursued two different tracks (development of NPM system and revitalize Victorian local government system). In sum, the main directions which English local government reforms have taken in the past 25 years can be summarized like this:

1. The centralization which was triggered by Tory government has hardly abated under   the New Labour government, and has been transferred to "performance management"

2. The multi-function scope for action of traditional elected and politically accountable local government has been reduced, while the scope of non-elected single prpose actors as well as private single purpose service providers has expanded. The consequence is transition from unitary to a multiple system for governing local communities – from local government to local governance.

3. Initiatives have been undertaken by New Labour government to revitalize the political model of local government by providing new institutional arrangements for effective local political leadership and to instill some new localism.

The British model has elements of the French dual supervision model. It emphasizes a stronger role for centrally appointed field officers and sectorial and functional ministries in the provision of local services. Local governments must coordinate their actions with these officials. Local governments are given substantial autonomy in purely local functions, but they can access only a limited range of revenue instruments. Local governments play a dominant role in such property-

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oriented services as road maintenance, garbage collection, water, and sewerage and a limited role in such people-oriented services as health, education, and social welfare. Property taxes are the mainstay of local governments. Local governments typically derive two-thirds of their revenues from central transfers. They do not have access to personal income taxes. The role of the chief executive is weak, and local councils play a strong role in local decision making. The average local government is large, covering about 120,000 inhabitants, and local expenditures account for about 12 percent of GDP (McMillan forthcoming). In former British colonies, the role of field officers was strengthened to provide general supervision and control of local governments on behalf of the central colonial government.

Just like the British model of local government, there are two parallel local government systems at the district level in Ghana, namely: Firstly, the district assembly structures, designed along the lines of the British functional model of field administration, with its attendant bureaucracy and poor co-ordination in the field, and deriving legitimacy from democracy and constitutional legality. Secondly traditional authorities modeled on tradition, and they derive their legitimacy from custom and sacredness which predate the conventional system of government.

The local government system is largely influenced by Western values like rationalism, technocratic approach to development and individualism, which may be at variance with traditional values like consensus building, communalism and peaceful co-existence even at the expense of economic gain. Consequently, the two systems of local government with different world views and power bases interact with each other and with the community in various ways which have implications for local development but which are poorly understood. As a result, Ghana's local government process could not effectively tap into the traditional government system, leading to frequent conflicts and lack of synergy between the district assembly structures

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and traditional authorities, thereby stifling local development. Even though there is growing recognition in Ghana of the need to tap the development potential of chiefs by involving them in local government process, there is no clarity as to how far they should be involved and under what conditions this could be done to optimize the benefits.

2.10   Conceptual Framework

Prior to colonization, local government was characterized by traditional leadership rule. Traditional leaders and institutions dealt with all sorts of issues which were related to the communities. The colonial and post-colonial eras have brought an awakened emergence of a dual governance society which is characterized by traditional rule on one hand, and the modern system of government on the other. Local government must be seen as a system of values, policies and institutions by which a society organizes collective decision-making and actions related to political, economic, social, cultural and environmental affairs through the interaction of the state, civil society and traditional authorities. It must also encompass both the modern and the traditional institutions and mechanisms that ensure development.

Kasangbatas model fits into this study since it expresses the relevance of the interaction between external agents and local agents which may be likened to government actors and traditional authorities respectively in this study. As shown in Figure 1, Kasangbata (2006) contends that the interaction between participation, transparency, empowerment and accountability is the path to local government.

Figure 3. 1: Determining Factors for Sustainable Local Level Development

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➢ Chiefs ➢ Land owners ➢ Family heads ➢ Opinion Leaders ➢ Fetish priest	Traditional Institution A	Government Institution (External)

➢ Parliament
➢ MMDAs
➢ Decentralize departments

Interaction

Transparency

Participation

Accountability

Empowerment

Local Government

Sustainable Local Development

Source: Adopted from Kasangbata (2006:44) frame work of participation

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examine the approaches adopted in collecting the data. It describes the study area, research design, study population, sample size and the sampling procedure used in the study. It further discusses the research instruments, pre-testing, and data collection procedure and data analysis as well as ethics of the study.

3.2 Research Design

Triangulation approach was adopted for the study. Triangulation is a process of verification the increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and methods. In the social sciences, it refers to the combination of two or more theories, data sources, methods or investigators in one study of a single phenomenon to converge on a single construct, and can be employed in both quantitative (validation) and qualitative (inquiry) studies (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012). Triangulation' can also be achieved by using different research techniques. Triangulated techniques are helpful for cross-checking and used to provide confirmation and completeness, which brings 'balance' between two or more different types of research. The purpose is to increase the credibility and validity of the results. Often this purpose in specific contexts is to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of different perspectives.

There have been mixed views on the use of 'triangulation' in research. Olsen (2004) views some authors' argument for 'triangulation' is just for increasing the wider and deep understanding of the study phenomenon, while Web (1966 cited in Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012). Creswell (2003), have argued that 'triangulation' is actually used to increase the study accuracy. In this case, 'triangulation' is one of the validity measures. Triangulation is typically perceived to be a strategy

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for improving the validity of research or evaluation findings. This study view triangulation as validity measure or evaluation of the findings. The findings from the household heads, Assembly representatives and the unit committee members have been verified by the interview of the traditional leaders and the Coordinating Director.

3.3 Study Area Profile

Profile of the study area is very important to the final conclusion of this research. It gives the boundaries and target group which can be refers to in terms of drawing conclusion. Study setting gives detailed information about the characteristics of the people within the location and their qualities that make them unique from others. It gives direction to the researcher in terms of locating and the type of people to deal with. Tamale Metropolis is one of the metropolises with high revenue base in Ghana this calls for higher expectation of development in terms infrastructure to improve on the people access to sustainable development and improvement on their day to day economic performance in the metropolis.

Tamale Metropolis (TAMA)

The TAMA is one of the 26 districts in the Northern Region. The Metropolis is located in the central part of the Northern Region and is bounded by Sagnarigu to the North, Mion District Assembly to the East, Tolon to the West, Central Gonja to the South West and East Gonja to the South.

The Metropolis also have a total estimated land size of 550 km sq which is about 12% of the total land area of the Region. The Metropolis is located about 180 meters above sea level with some few isolated hills. It has a single rainfall season (May - October) in a year, characterized by dry Harmattan winds from November to February. Maximum temperature: – 40°C and minimum is -25°C. The Metropolis have a limited number of water bodies. The Metropolis lies

within the Savannah woodland Region of the country. The main soil types are sandstone, gravel, mudstone and shale that have weathered into different soil grades. Due to seasonal erosion, soil types emanating from this phenomenon are sand, clay and literite Ochrosols.

The Metropolis is a cosmopolitan area with Dagomba as the majority. Other minority ethnic groupings are Gonjas, Mamprusis, Akan, Dagaabas, and ethnic groups from the Upper East Region. The area has deep-rooted cultural practices such as festivals, naming and marriage ceremonies.

The Metropolis has about 42% of the working class in agriculture related activities. Majority of the workforce in the Metropolis (58%) is engaged in Sales, Services, transportation and Production. This is as a result of the increase in Marketing, Banking and other Non-governmental activities in the Metropolis.

The 2010 Population Census gave the population of the Tamale Metropolis as 371,351. This is made up of 185,995 males and 185,356 females. This figure shows an increase of 75 percent over the 1984 population of 167,778 and represents an intercensal growth rate of 3.5 percent. This is far higher than the national and regional rates of 2.7 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively. With an urban population of 67.1 percent, the Metropolis is the only district in the region which is predominantly urban. The population density of 318.6 persons per square kilometre for the Metropolis is about 12 times higher than the Regional average density of 25.9 persons per square kilometre. There exists vast difference between the densities of the urban and rural areas. This is an indication of influx of people to urban Tamale, and gives credence to the assertion that facilities and opportunities for modern employment are concentrated in few central places. The structure of the population of the metropolis indicates a broad base that gradually tapers off with increasing age due to death. The youthfulness of the population implies that the metropolis has

an important human resource potential and that this tremendous potential will determine the strength and resilience of the metropolis in pursuing social, economic and political development goals.

On the other hand, the proportion of people aged sixty years and above is about 4.1 percent lower than the regional and national averages of 4.5 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, an indication of a comparably low life expectancy (GSS, 2000). Islam is the predominant religion in the Metropolis with 84 percent of the population affiliated to it. Christians follow with a proportion of 13.7 percent while the traditionalists constitute 1.6 percent of the population. All other religious denominations constitute 0.7 percent of the population in the Metropolis.

There are 240 nurseries, 274 primaries, 89 Junior High, and 11 Senior High schools in the Tamale metropolis. In addition to these, there are two vocational and Technical schools, one Polytechnic and one campus of the University for Development Studies. The total primary school enrolment in 2005/2006 was 53,889 comprising 29,303 males and 24,586 females. The pupil- teacher ratio was 1:33 for the primary and 1:21 for the Junior High schools.

The Tamale Teaching Hospital, Tamale Central Hospital and the West End Hospitals are the main health institutions in the Tamale Metropolis. But there are several health centers and clinics in the metropolis. The high level of illiteracy and poverty as well as limited access to safe drinking water and poor sanitation have combined to expose many people to health hazards which accounts for the low standard of living of the people.

Malaria and diarrhoea are among the top five diseases in the metropolis and these have severe effect on the lives of the people. Malaria alone contributes about 25 percent of total deaths in the metropolis.

3.4 Study Population

The population for this study involved institutions and communities. The institutional level included all members of the various structures of the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, namely; the Assembly members, Area Council Chairpersons, Unit Committee members, the District Assembly core staff and heads of Decentralized Department (DDs). At the community level, heads of households, chief and elders and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) constituted the community members in the study.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

This study used both probability and non- probability sampling methods. For probability sampling, each member has an equal chance of being selected to respond to the research questions. It is often associated with surveys (Saunders et al, 1999). The probability sampling method was used to select the community members (heads of households, Unit committee members, Assembly members, and Community Based Organizations) while non probability sampling was used to select key informants like the chiefs, Traditional leaders and Department heads.

The sample size of the study is 0.5 percent of the study population. The justification for this was that there are certain non-definitive practices among social researchers that could be adopted. One such practice suggests that if the population is a few hundreds, a 40 per cent or more samples is desirable. If many hundreds, a 20 per cent would be alright. However, if a few thousands a 10 percent will do, and if several thousands 5 percent or less will do (and this applies to the size of this study's population) a 5 per cent or less could be used (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2000, Rubin & Rabbie, 2001).

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Table 3. 1 Type of Respondents, Population and Sample Size

Type of respondent	Population	Expected sample	Actual sample	Response rate (%)
Community members	371,351	18567	125	100
Traditional leaders				
Chiefs	15	15	15	100
Magajiya	5	5	5	100
Family Heads	11	11	11	100
Local government Actors				
Unit Committee Members	25	25	25	100
DA Core Staff	7	7	7	100
Heads of DDs	10	10	10	100
Total	371424	1930	198	

Source: Author Construct, 2015

A sample was drawn from the population of heads of households (community members), Traditional leaders, District Assembly core staff, and Heads of Decentralized Departments (key informants). Following the characteristics of the population, a stratified random sampling method was used to select the sample. Indeed, stratified sample random sampling is a modification of a simple random sampling in which the population is divided into two or more strata based on one or more attributes of the population (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2000). At the community level, the district was divided into two constituencies with Tamale Central, and Tamale South as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3. 2: Name of Community and Number of Respondents

Community	Sample	Percent
Sakaska	30	15.2
Zogbely	18	9.1
Abouabu	28	14.1
Lamashegu	22	11.1
Changle	27	13.6
Key informants	73	36.9
Total	198	100

Source: Auther Construct, 2015

The stratified random sampling was adopted in selecting the sample for the study at the community level so that the study could cover both Tamale Central and Tamale South. In all, five communities were covered by the study. The simple random sampling, the lottery method, was used to select five communities out of 244 **c**ommunities.

In this method, pieces of paper were cut using the same measurement and the names of the communities were written on them. Each piece of paper was folded, rolled and put in a container. The pieces of paper were then thoroughly mixed. The rolled papers were then picked one by one without the selector looking into the container. This was, however done with replacement in order to maintain the same probability for each community to be selected. When one was picked, it was recorded and put back into the container. In the event of the same community being picked twice, the second picking was ignored and the rolled piece of paper returned to the container. This process went on until the targeted five communities were selected.

At the institutional level, the District Assembly core staff, Heads of Decentralized Departments and Traditional leaders were purposively selected because their numbers were too small for

random selection. Convenient sampling was used to select the family heads, where each of the community selected, the researcher and the assistants were following the plan lay down of the communities from one line to the other and any family member who was available and ready to respond to the questionnaire was conveniently selected for the study. In all, 198 respondents from the five communities including heads of households, Traditional leaders, District Assembly core staff, and Heads of Decentralized Departments were selected for the study.

The technique used for collecting data from the traditional leaders was interviews and desk research. The interview questions were based on the stated objectives of the study. The semi-structured interviews allow for some comparison, but also additional qualitative information about the process of participation in decision making in the local government system in the Tamale metropolitan assembly. Interviews were mainly done in the local language (Dagbani). The semi-structured interviews targeted traditional leaders, coordinating Director and the MP. The rationale was to get data both at individual and group levels in order to compare emerging patterns, both vertically between subjects in the metropolis and horizontally across Traditional Leaders, Unit committee member, Assembly representatives, the coordinating director and other department heads.

3.6 Perspective of the Research Instrument

The tool is design to elicit the views of stake holders including traditional leaders play in participating in local government system in the Tamale Metropolis? Section A provides the socio demographic characteristics of the people in terms of sex age, marital status and level of education. Sex looked at gender participation and views with regards to traditional leader's effective participation in local government system in the Tamale metropolis, as local government

system calls for citizen's participation in local level governance without discrimination against minority and the vulnerable groups in society.

Information on Age brought out the age groups which are actively or not actively engage in the local level development and their role in promoting traditional leader's participation in local government system. It also examined at which groups of people are well informed as to the role of traditional leaders and as to what they expect from traditional leaders in the local level development.

Their level of education also informed the study as to the level of education of the people within the metropolis, as to which group of people are well educated as against those who are not educated and their views with regards to traditional leader's participation in local government system in the Tamale metropolis and as to how the metropolis position itself in terms of planning and strategizing to meet the development needs of the various groups of people in the metropolis. Section B of the questionnaire examined the Assembly structure and the traditional leaders interacting in local government system to bring local level development within the Tamale metropolis. It finds out the knowledge level of the people as to the role of traditional leaders in the structure of local level development. Whether there is cordial relationship between traditional leaders and the local level structures of the local government. Also whether they should be fully and not partial representation of the Traditional authorities in the decentralize structure where traditional leaders have only a representation by appointment to the district Assembly.

Furthermore, Section C of the questionnaire examined traditional leader's participation in the local government system in the Tamale metropolis. It finds out the people understanding of decentralization and functions Traditional leaders play in that process. It also finds out the level Traditional leaders involve in the planning and decision making in the local level development.

This informs the study as to the level at which the people understood local government and as to how they participate and make decision regarding local level development.

Additionally, Section D determined the factors affecting Traditional leader's participation in local government structures of the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly. The study finds out if really there is setting structures available for traditional leaders to participate in local level development and the factors affecting those structures for which traditional leaders are not been effectively participate in the local level development. Do the structures allow for effective participation by Traditional leaders? This informed the study some of the factors that lead to low or high level of participation in local level decision making, which affect total development of the people within the metropolis.

Finally, Section E determined how the local government system is supporting traditional leaders in their local level development. With this, the study finds out the views of the people on the legal backing of traditional leaders in initiating development projects, collect taxes within their jurisdiction for local level development. Are traditional leader's legitimate authority recognized by the Assembly structures in dealing with the people? If so are the people aware of that? Are they in support of Traditional leaders effectively participating in the decision making in Tamale Metropolis?

In conclusion the various sections above look at the TL concerning local level development and the challenges they face, trying to find out the views of stakeholders in the local level development. The understanding of the people in local government system and its challenges affect local level development within Tamale Metropolis. This concern makes every traditional leader seek to collaborate with other development partners in and around his locality in order to reap the benefits of partnerships in the local government structure for local level development.

3.7 Research Instruments

In this study, data were collected through the use of survey, questionnaires and interview guide. The researcher engaged two experienced Research Assistants (Field Assistants). They were trained to administer the instruments for the study. The researcher was however, available to explain the meaning of the items that were unclear to the respondents.

The questionnaire designed for the study was a survey instrument to elicit people's points of view and establish a profile of local government in Tamale Metropolis. The work of Bobson (1999) was considered during the development of the questionnaires. The modifications and additions to the questionnaire were made within the context of the study. In the case of the concept of local government and structure at the local level, roles of the various stakeholders in the local government system, the understanding of Traditional leader's participation in local government in the Metropolis and respondents were asked to respond to rating scales to indicate their level of agreement with each response.

The opportunity for written responses was provided in some parts of the survey, requesting the respondents to share any achievements and challenges of local government system and traditional leader's participation in decision making in the Metropolis.

3.8 Data Collection Procedure

Both primary and secondary data were used for the study. Primary data were collected from the answers respondents gave in the questionnaire. The secondary data were also collected from published documents on decentralization and local government in Ghana and other countries.

Data were collected from heads of households by the use of questionnaires. The tow field assistants posed the questions and filled in the questionnaires while the heads of households provided the answers. In the case of non-availability or unwillingness of a head of household to

accept to be interviewed at the time of the survey, the next available household head in the same house willing to be interviewed was considered.

At the institutional level, the Budget Officer, Planning Officer and Finance Officer), heads of the Decentralized Departments, Presiding Member were the respondents and the data collection instrument was the questionnaire.

The field work started on 24th February, 2015 and ended on 20th March, 2015. The first day was devoted to the recruitment and training of two field offices. The rest of the period of fieldwork was devoted to the actual interviewing of the respondents and editing of the data by both the field assistants and the supervisors. During this period the researcher was in the field to coordinate activities and to provide the needed logistical support for the field assistants and the supervisor.

3.9 Data Analysis

Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered for the research using questionnaires. The data were coded, graded and fed into the Scientific Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for the analysis.

3.10   Pre-test

The researcher conducted a pre-test at Savelugu and Nanton following the development of the questionnaire. These two communities in the Savelugu Nanton District were selected for the pre-test based on the similarities they share with communities within the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly. The initial questionnaire models were administered by two field assistants who were recruited from the Tamale Polytechnic, who understood and could translate the instruments into the local Dagbani dialect. The field assistants were given a day's training on the instruments.

The questionnaire were administered to a representative sample of five chiefs, ten elders, ten heads of households in the two communities and eight officials from the Savelugu Nanton Municipal Assembly with the view of detecting problems associated with question wording, format and relationship. The pre-test study revealed inconsistency and inaccuracy in the responses for certain questions indicating that perhaps some of the questions were not properly framed or translated to elicit the right responses. For example, respondents did not understand who a government actor was but they were quick to identify government officials. The final schedule was revised based on the findings of the pre-test; the revised version helped a lot to increase the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments.

3.11   Validity and Reliability

The term validity implies how well the measuring instruments in the study fill the demand to measure what it means to measure. Researcher's poor memory can affect the validity of the study. To avoid this problem as much as possible, the research assistant was asked to take notes during the interviews.

Directly after the interviews they have to compile data from the interviews and transform it into precious information. Furthermore, the validity of the result has been discussed with my research assistants with valuable feedback.

Reliability is a measure of how well the study actually measures what it is supposed to measure, i.e. the absence of random errors (Duranic, 2005). This could be measured by conducting the study again in order to see if the same results were to be obtained. Because of the lack of time, I have not had a possibility to conduct the study more than once. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the reliability of this study.

3.12   Ethical Issues

Ethical matters are very important for every research adventure or study. Therefore, respondents and interviewees were assured of confidentiality as their consent was appropriately sought in respect of all information that they provided. To assure them further, recording devices were not used in order to give informants/interviewees the confidence to speak to the issues without any fears and suspicions. In fact, Ghanaian public officials are exceedingly skeptical with audio recording devices because some Ghanaian journalists have the habit of recording public officials sometimes without their knowledge only to replay their voices in the electronic media to create problems for them. Some officials will not even respond to your greetings when they see you with such a device as you could possibly pass or sell information to the media for money even if you are not a journalist.

Interviewees were informed that the work was purely for academic purposes and not for other reasons either than that. All documents used and sites visited have also been properly acknowledged and documented to avoid issues of plagiarism. When the need arose for some pictures to be taken during the direct observation of assembly and committee meetings and also in interviews, permission was duly sought from the authorities of the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, Traditional leaders, and community members before that were done.

3.13   Conclusion

The chapter discussed the conceptual frame work and described the research design, study population, sample and sampling procedure, research instruments, data collection techniques, how data was analysed including validation of instruments. The next chapter presents analyses of the data gathered.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FIELD DATA

4.1 Introduction

The study determines the roles traditional leaders play by participating in local government system in Tamale Metropolis. In order to ensure comprehensive and logical output, this chapter presents the findings of the study in sections. It present, respondent's characteristics such as sex, age, and educational status, the chapter also present respondent's views on how the metropolitan assembly structures and traditional leaders interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis. It further presents the factors impeding traditional leaders participating in decision making process (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis and also determines how the current local government system supports traditional leaders in their local level development in the Tamale Metropolis.

4.2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

This section presents the demographic characteristics of respondents who participated in the research work, in terms of age and other relevant socio-cultural data pertinent to the study. This information is very important for the interpretation of the results emanating from the analysis made in respect of Traditional Leaders participation in local government system in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly.

4.2.1   Sex Distribution of Respondents

Table 4.1 shows the sex and the category of respondents for the study. On gender, males dominate as compare to females. The male is made up of 86.9 percent whiles female is 13.1 percent.

Table 4. 1: Sexes of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Valid Percent
Male	172	86.9
Female	26	13.1
Total	198	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

4.2.2   Age Distribution of Respondents

From the study, data on age distribution revealed that 1.0 percent of the respondents were between 22 and below, 32.1 percent were between the ages of 23 and 33 years, 34.7 percent between the ages of 34 and 44 years, 19.4 percent were between the ages of 45 and 54 years, 5.1 percent were between the ages of 55 and 64 years, 7.7 percent 65+ years (See Table 4.2 below).

Table 4. 2: Age of Respondents

Age	Frequency	Valid Percent
22 and below	2	1.0
23 - 33 years	63	32.1
34 - 44 years	68	34.7
45 - 54 years	38	19.4
55 - 64 years	10	5.1
65+ years	15	7.7
Total	196	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

4.2.3   Respondents Level of Education

Education is very   important in   creating the awareness of people. With this awareness the Traditional Leaders could participate actively in the process of governance and leadership roles of their communities. Education plays a vital role in creating the awareness of people and the ability to understand issues relating to their duties and responsibilities as leaders who make

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decisions for their mases. With higher education, professionals could participate actively in making decision in their day to day running of their communities. From the study 34.9 percent of the respondents had no formal education, 24.6 percent had education up to SHS, 20.64 percent of the respondents had their education to the JHS/MSLC and 11.90 percent of the respondents had their education to the Diploma and above certificates (See figure 4.1 below). It is assumed that, successful development of any community depended on the level of literacy of the Traditional Leaders, decision makers and its citizens.

Figure 4. 1: Level of Education

Field Survey, 2015

4.3 Interaction between the Metropolitan Assembly Structures and Traditional Leaders

The structure of Traditional Leaders with respect to local government in the Tamale Metropolis, the study reveal that 44.4% agreed that the structure of the Traditional leaders is good in the Tamale metropolis. Out of the total number of 198 respondents, 48 respondents representing (24.2%) indicate that the structure of the Traditional Leaders with respect to Local Level government in the Tamale Metropolis is very good. The data also indicates that 43 (21.7%) respondents said is bad and 19 (9.6%) of the respondents indicate that the structure of Traditional

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Leaders with respect to local government in the Tamale Metropolis is very bad. This means that there exists a structure of government for the traditional leaders, but which is not supported by law in the Tamale Metropolis, thus making it difficult for traditional leaders to effectively participate in decision making process of the assembly.

The results indicate that if there is interaction between Traditional leaders and the Metro Assembly structures, then it is not supported by law but negotiation on the part of the Metro Assembly to have the traditional leaders participate in the management of the metropolis. This is supported by Kasangbata (2006) who argue that governance must be seen as a system of values, policies and institutions by which a society organizes collective decision-making and actions related to political, economic, social, cultural and environmental affairs through the interaction of the state, civil society and traditional authorities. It must also encompass both the modern and the traditional institutions and mechanisms that ensure development.

Table 4. 3: Structure of Traditional Leaders with Respect to Local Level Government

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Very Good	48	24.2
Good	88	44.4
Very Bad	19	9.6
Bad	43	21.7
Total	198	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

Table 4.4 shows data on the relationship between Traditional Leaders and Local government within the Tamale Metropolis. Majority of the respondents that is 96 out of 198 (48.5%) are of the view that the relationship between Traditional Leaders and Local government in the Tamale Metropolis is cordial, 30 out of 198 (15.2%) of the people think that it is very cordial, 29 out of 198 (14.6%) of the respondent indicated that they don't know whether there is a relationship between Traditional Leaders and local government in the Tamale Metropolis, 24 out 198

(12.1%) of the people said its fairly cordial while 19 out of 198 (9.6%) of the people indicate that there is no cordial relationship between the Traditional Leaders and local government in the Tamale Metropolis.

The findings indicated that there exists a relationship between Traditional leaders and local government where traditional leaders are consulted during decision making. However, the result shows that 14.6% of respondents could not indicate whether there is a relationship between Traditional Leaders and local government in the Tamale Metropolis, suggest that some citizens still do not have confidence in the process. It is, therefore, an indication that a significant number (14.6%) of the citizens in the Tamale metropolis do not have sufficient information about the relationship between Traditional leaders and local government in the metropolis. This finding is consonant with the views of Ayee (2007), who says that the absence of chiefs in the structures of local government is a recipe for non-cooperation between chiefs and officials of the DA, especially DCEs. Chiefs in Ghana, irrespective of hierarchical levels, are perceived as "social and cultural leaders different from self-imposed or elected leaders and officials of the state, including the District Chief Executives, the pivots of the present local government system of administration who operate, or are expected to operate at the grassroots level" (Nana Arhin Brempong 2006, 27). According to Ayee (2007) any attempts to position chiefs as politically-neutral leaders is a nonstarter, since they had institutional representation in colonial Native authorities and governance structures after independence in 1957.

Table 4. 4: Relationship between Traditional Leaders and Local Government

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Very cordial	30	15.2
Cordial	96	48.5
Fairly cordial	24	12.1
Not cordial	19	9.6
Don't Know	29	14.6
Total	198	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

The existence of conflicts in organization and institutions is inevitable and thus people should always anticipate this when they are dealing with individual, institution and organization. On the issue of existence of conflicts between traditional leaders and Metro Assembly Structures, data from the study reveals that 66 out of 198 (34.2%) of the people agreed that there exists conflict between Traditional Authorities and Metro Assembly Structures in the Tamale Metropolis. It further reveal that 44 out of 198 (22.8%) of the people were uncertain, and 37 out of 198 (19.2%) of the people disagreed that there exists conflict between Traditional Authorities and Metro Assembly Structure within the Tamale Metropolis (See table 5 below).

The study found out that there exists conflict between Traditional leaders and the metro assembly structures. Aapproximately 22.8% of the respondents who were uncertain is a sizable percentage. A probable explanation for this could be that the respondents' expectation of the concept was not met. This might suggest some more work by local government institutions to explain the concept to the citizenry and to elicit their support and participation in the process. This finding is similar to the views of Ayee (2007) argues that litigations easily arise as to who has power to decide ban on drumming within the context of religious freedom in Ghana; chiefs or pastors or government leaders, as in the case of Accra Metropolis? During festival celebrations, can government interfere especially if it borders on the security of the country or its citizens? Which traditional

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areas are restricted for government, and how does government come to respect these norms? These questions highlight the fundamental reality that in contemporary times, the social and political space of Ghana is inundated with many institutions struggling hard to find their niche – state, chieftaincy, religious institutions, etc.

Table 4. 5: Existence of Conflict between Traditional Authorities and Metro Assembly Structures

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Strongly Agree	33	17.1
Agree	66	34.2
Uncertain	44	22.8
Disagree	37	19.2
Strongly Disagree	13	6.7
Total	193	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

Traditional leaders in Ghana play an important role in the development of their community they function as a riling point for organizing the people. Data from the study revealed that (89.9%) of the respondents agreed that it is important to have representation of all the Traditional Leaders in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, (6.1%) of the respondents did not agreed, indicating that it's not important to have representation of all traditional leaders within the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly.

It can then be concluded that the majority of the citizens of Tamale metropolis understood the local government process and agreed that it's important to have representation of all the Traditional leaders in the Tamale Metropolitan assembly. It can then be inferred that 89.9%, (178 out of every 198), citizens of the Tamale Metropolis agreed that it's important. This finding is similar to the findings of Ouedraogo (2003) where he found out that in Burkina Faso, traditional leaders have appropriated the decentralization process to combine the legal status previously

denied them with their customary legitimacy. The problem arising was how to delimit customary functions of chiefs from state functions of elected officials; a recurring issue that always accompanies involvement of chiefs in partisan politics.

Table 4. 6: Importance to have Representation of all the Traditional Leaders within the Metropolitan Assembly

Item	Frequency	Valid Percent
No Response	8	4.0
Yes	178	89.9
No	12	6.1
Total	198	100.0

Field Survey, 2015

Table 4.7 presents views on whether Traditional Leaders in the Tamale Metro Assembly know their local terrain better. Item 1 shows that 107 (56.0%) respondents, strongly agreed that Traditional Leaders in the Tamale Metro Assembly know their local terrain better while 11 (5.8%) disagreed. The data also show that 7 (3.7%) were uncertain that Traditional Leaders in the Tamale Metro Assembly know their local terrain better.

Another reason why traditional leaders should be incorporated in local government in the Tamale metropolis is that they know the culture of the people very well. Analysis of result in Table 4.7 shows 128 respondents representing 68.4% strongly agreed, 10 (5.3%) and responses strongly disagreed. The trend as shown in the responses is rather an interesting one. None of the respondents was uncertain. The question to be asked is the respondents who strongly disagreed do not have trust in the traditional leader's knowledge about their culture. However, the result indicates that majority strongly agreed that traditional leaders should be incorporated in local government in the Tamale Metropolis.

Traditional leaders have the duty to control and maintain the natural resources within their communities they are the custodians of the land and other resources within their jurisdiction.

Item 3 reveals that 123 respondents representing 62.8% strongly agreed that Traditional leaders are the custodians of resources e.g. land in the Tamale Metropolis, while 8 (4.1%) and 20 respondents representing 10.2% were uncertain and disagreed, respectively. Even though majority of the citizens strongly agreed that Traditional leaders are the custodians or resources in the Tamale Metropolis, there are also varied views as indicated in the summary shown below.

One duty of the traditional leaders is to represent the interest of the people within the Metropolis and also to consult the people on issues that will lead to the effective management of the resources within their community. Thus to discuss and collate their views, opinion, and proposals in the management process. They also present the views, opinions and proposals to the district assembly.

The findings also revealed that the majority of the respondents affirm that Traditional leaders are the custodians of resources (eg land in the Tamale Metropolis). From the findings there appears to be an overwhelming acceptance by the people that traditional leaders are the custodians of resources in the Tamale Metropolis. This is supported by nearly 62.8% of the respondents indicating that majority of the people strongly agreed to that. The finding was corroborated with the assertion of Quan et al (2008) and Tonah (2008) argue that new land reforms such as the Land Administration Project (LAP) introduced in 2003 with the support of the World Bank is reinvigorating chiefs to assume the control they previously had over land in the colonial period before their powers were whittled away soon after independence. The nature of landholding in Ghana shows that "Ghana operates a dual land rights regime, but the link between administration of interests in land created through customary practice and formal titles to landed property is tenuous to non-existent" (Quan et al 2008, 187).

Table 4. 7: Reasons Traditional Leaders Should be Incorporated in Local Government

Items	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Total %
They know the local terrain better	107(56.0%)	62(32.5%)	7 (3.7%)	11(5.8%)	4(2.1%)	191(100)
They know the culture of the people	128(68.4%)	45(24.1%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.1%)	10(5.3%)	186(100)
They are the custodians of resources e.g. land	123(62.8%)	33(16.8%)	8(4.1%)	20(10.2%)	12(6.1%)	196(100)

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Table 4.8 presents the findings on the decision making process of the decentralize structures in the Tamale metropolis. Item 1 reveals 131 respondents representing 66.2% agreed DCE, are very important in decision making process of the decentralize structures, whiles 17 of the respondents representing 8.6% are of the view that DCEs are less important in the decision making process of the decentralize structure, none of the respondent indicates that DCEs are not important in the structure of the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly at all. Item 2 finds out whether the Assembly representative is active in the decision making process of the Assembly structure. The data in Table 8 depict that majority of the citizens who responded to the questionnaire agreed that they are very important in meetings and decision making process organized by Tamale Metropolitan Assembly. Out of the 198 responses 127 representing (64.1%) indicated that they are very important, 66 representing (33.3%) important and 5 (2.5%) indicated that they are less important. Item 3 revealed that majority of the citizens that responded to the questionnaire agreed 103 (52.0%) that Unit Committee Members are important in decision making process in their various units for that matter the Metro Assembly as a whole. Besides, 66 respondents representing 33.3% stated that they are very important, 18 (9.1%) stated that they are less important whiles 11 respondents representing 5.6% indicated they are not important in the decision making process of Tamale Metropolitan Assembly structures. Item 4, on the issue of Traditional leaders been part of decision making in the decentralize structure. The study reveals that majority of the

respondent stated that they are very important in the structure of the metro assembly, out of 198 responses 129 representing (65.2%) respondent indicated that they are very important, while 7 respondent representing (3.6%) said they are less important.

Item 4 asked a specific question whether the Traditional leaders are in the decision-making process of the local government structure. Table 8 shows that out of the 198 responses 69 (34.8%) indicated they are important, 56 (28.3%) very important, 39 (19.7%) less important and 34 (17.2%) not important. From the data there are varied views expressed by the respondents.

The results show that majority of the respondents largely accept that DCEs are very important in decision making process of the decentralize structure, that is (66.2%) of respondents agreed that DCE are very important in decision making process of the decentralize structures. This means that the citizens have confidence in the DCE as he functions as the representative of the president within the Tamale metropolis. It suggests the Municipal Chief Executives have credibility and can lead the Municipal Assembly to mobilize support for development agenda for the metropolis. But it's not clear as to citizens wish the electorates to elected the Municipal Chief Executive of the metropolis to make him more accountable to the electorates. The findings, therefore is in line with the constitutional provision that upholds that "there shall be a Municipal Chief Executive for every district who shall be appointed by the President with the prior approval of not less than two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly present and voting at the meeting" (Ghana's Constitution, 1992: Article 243 (1)).

The results further revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that Assembly members are very important in meetings and decision making process organized by Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, which is 64.1%, responded indicated that Assembly members are very important. This means that the citizen has confidence in the works of the Assembly representative within

the Tamale metropolis, however, 2.5% of the people indicated that they are less important. In summary the findings conclude that the citizens accept all the stake holders as important in the decision making process of the decentralize structure of the Tamale metropolis, thus see them as development partners.

"According to the traditional leaders "the assembly is different and we are also different so we don't need them in our business. They work for the government and we work for our people, so it's you the educated people (Karaches) who mix up this issues and we have problems these days in selling our lands. We don't need approval from any couthers to sale our lands, the lands belong to us and we release it whenever we feel we are ok with the transactions".

On the part of the coordinating Director, he indicated that "we have a lot of challenges with regards to the involvement of the traditional leaders. Some of them before you could say jack, they have already finish selling their lands and sometime even in multiples times for the same people because of lack of records keeping and adequate planning. As soon as they realize that Tamale metropolis is closer to them, then they begging to sale of their lands to people without the knowledge of the Assembly".

Table 4. 8: Decision Making Process of the Local Government Structure

Item	Very Important (%)	Important (%)	Less Important (%)	Not Important (%)	Total %
1 The District Chief Executive (DCE)	131 (66.2%)	50(25.3%)	17(8.6%)	0(0.0%)	198(100)
2 The Assembly Member (AM)	127(64.1%)	66(33.3%)	5(2.5%)	0(0.0%)	198(100)
3 The Unit Committee Member (UCM)	66(33.3%)	103(52.0%)	18(9.1%)	11(5.6%)	198(100)
4 Traditional Authority (TA)	129(65.2%)	62(31.3%)	7(3.5%)	0(0.0%)	198(100)
5 The Ordinary Citizen (OC)	56(28.3%)	69(34.8%)	39(19.7%)	34(17.2%)	198(100)

Source: Field Survey, 2015

4.4 Traditional Leaders Participating in the Local Government System.

This section presents traditional leaders participating in local government system in Tamale Metropolis. On the question of local government encourages traditional leaders in their communities to find solution to their everyday problem. Data from the study revealed that out of 198 responses 75 (37.9%) respondent agreed that local government encourages traditional leaders in the communities to find solution to their everyday problems, 35 (17.7%) out of 198 responses were uncertain, while 25 responses out of 198 respondents disagreed that local government encourages traditional leaders in the communities to find solution to their everyday problem within the Tamale Metropolis (See table 4.9).

It can be observed from the data that respondents clearly suggested that local government system encourages traditional leaders in their communities to find solution to their everyday problem. As majority of the respondents that is 37.9% believe that local government system encourages traditional leaders in their communities to find solution to their everyday problem by been part of the decision-making process. This might be due to status as they are influential members of the metropolis and in their communities and the nation at large.

Table 4. 9: Local Government System Encourages Traditional Leaders in the Communities to find Solution to their everyday Problems

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Strongly Agree	59	29.8
Agree	75	37.9
Uncertain	35	17.7
Disagree	25	12.6
Strongly Disagree	4	2.0
Total	198	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Sustainability and cost effectiveness is very vital when it comes to project design monitoring and execution. Thus the call for stake holder's involvement in decision making process within the

Tamale Metropolitan assembly for proper accountability. On the question of how local government can make development projects more sustainable and cost effectiveness because traditional leaders are involved in project designs execution and monitoring. Data from table 4.10 shows that 59 (29.8%) of the respondents agreed that decentralization has made development project sustainable and cost effectiveness because traditional leaders involvement in project design , execution and monitoring, 48 (24.2%) of the respondents strongly agreed, 47 (23.7%) were uncertain, and 38 (19.2%) of the respondents disagreed that decentralization has made development project sustainable and cost effectiveness because traditional leaders involvement in project design , execution and monitoring within the Tamale Metropolitan assembly.

There are conflicting views by the people on the issue of how local government has made development projects more sustainable and cost effectiveness because traditional leaders are involved in project designs execution and monitoring in the Tamale Metropolis. 24.2% of the respondents strongly agreed, so closed to this is 23.7% of the people were uncertain and 19.2% disagreed. This means that majority of people do not trust that, traditional leader's involvement in project design, execution and monitoring within the Tamale Metropolitan assembly make projects more sustainable and effectiveness. Contrary to this finding by Dankwa III, (2004) in particular, a chief is supposed to help "fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the community" by enstiling. These hopes and aspirations of the community over which a person is a chief, in simple terms, is development, and it has been found that the success of a chief is judged on performance in terms of the level of development they are able to bring to their area (Dunn & Robertson, 1975; Oomen, 2005). Therefore, embedded in the chief must be wisdom, authority, dynamism and respect to be able to be the agent of development that his community expects. Chiefs pursue

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grassroots mobilization of community labour to bring about holistic change in their localities to bear on the sustainability and cost effectiveness of various projects within their communities. To engender the desired development in our communities while avoiding abuse of powers by the TAs, the roles of the government and the governed in the traditional society were thus clearly define and maintain strict accountability to ensure sound governance (Dankwa III, 2004).

Table 4. 10: Local Government and Development projects more Sustainable and Cost Effective in Project Design Execution and Monitoring

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Strongly Agree	48	24.2
Agree	59	29.8
Uncertain	47	23.7
Disagree	38	19.2
Strongly Disagree	6	3.0
Total	198	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2015

On the question of Traditional leader's effectiveness in service delivery like dispute settlement is as a result of local government shows that 84 (42.4%) of the respondents agreed to that effect, 80 (40.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed, 21 (10.6%) of the respondents were uncertain and 9 (4.5%) of the respondents disagreed that traditional leaders are effective in service delivery like dispute settlement is as a result of local government within the Tamale Metropolis (see table 4.11).

It could be concluded that majority of the people in Tamale Metropolis agreed that Traditional leaders are effective in service delivery like dispute settlement as a result of local government. It can then be inferred that (82.8%), citizens in the Tamale Metropolis accept the fact that Traditional leaders are effective in service delivery although as little as (4.5%) of the people do not accept that fact.

Table 4. 11: Traditional Leaders Effectiveness in Service Delivery like Dispute Settlement as a result of Local Government System

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Strongly Agree	80	40.4
Agree	84	42.4
Uncertain	21	10.6
Disagree	9	4.5
Strongly Disagree	4	2.0
Total	198	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Citizen involvement in local government process at the grassroots is supposed to be led by the unit committee members in collaboration with assembly members, traditional authorities and more so the willingness of the citizens themselves.

Under this subsection, the study looked at traditional leader's involvement in local government process, and the assessment of the work of local government based on the work of the traditional leaders in the Tamale Metropolis. The results are presented in Table 4.15. The first analysis in Table 4.15 shows the respondents' perspective on whether they think the Unit Committees members organize meetings in the traditional leader's communities:

Table 4.15 presents the findings on the extent to which unit committee members organize meetings to enable traditional leaders to be involved in the local government through meeting attendance. Item 1 reveals 171 respondents representing (60.0%) agreed UCMs organize community meetings occasionally whiles 50 of the respondents representing (25.6%) disagreed they do not organize meetings at all. Item 2 finds out whether the traditional leaders often participate in such meetings if they are organized.

Item 2 on the question of traditional Leaders taken part in local elections since the beginning of the district assembly concept in the Tamale Metropolis. The results show that 108 (55.4%) respondents said they always take part in local elections since the beginning of the district

assembly concept in the Tamale Metropolis, 61 (31.3%) occasionally, 9 (4.6%) seldom and 17(8.7%) not at all. The finding is an indication that the respondents agreed that traditional leaders take part in local elections since the beginning of the district assembly concept in the Tamale Metropolis.

The research reveals that 60.0% of the people agreed UCMs organize community meetings occasionally whiles 25.6% disagreed they do not organize meetings at all.

This is suggestive of the rationale for the finding which indicated respondents have varied views and understandings on the notion that the UCM organize meeting in their communities. It is worthy to note that there is a problem based on Ayee's (2002) observation that the impact of local government can be measured not only by representative government, administrative capacity, the legitimacy of local structures such as UCM, the contribution of civil society (citizens) and developing a local political process but more so by accountability and responsiveness of the UCM. As such, it could be hypothesized that the impact of local government cannot be realized without accountability and responsive representation. This could probable be the explanation for what brought about the varied views expressed by the respondents, and might have been measured against the factors proposed by Ayee (2002).

The results show (55.4%) respondents said they always take part in local elections since the beginning of the district assembly concept in the Tamale Metropolis. The finding was corroborated with the assertion of one HODD when he stated that:

> "The involvement of the citizens in the decentralization process is seen as, just in voting. They vote to elect assembly members and unit committee members and they think that is all".

This is a confirmation of what Crook (2003) stated: "Ghana's District Assemblies introduced in 1989 under military rule were successful in enhancing electoral participation and giving access

and representation to normally excluded groups, such as the uneducated, farmers, traders and artisans". The question has been whether this electoral participation and giving access and representation is all that involve local government system.

Article 42 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana gives the right to vote to all citizens of voting age in Ghana. 'Every citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections and referenda' (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

Table 4. 12: Traditional Leaders Involvement in Local Government System

Item	Always	Occasional	Seldom	Not at All	Total%
1 U C M Organize meetings in your community?	2(1.0%)	117(60.0%)	26(13.3%)	50(25.6%)	195(100)
2 TL take part in local elections since the beginning of the district assembly concept	108(55.4%)	61(31.3%)	9(4.6%)	17(8.7%)	195(100)

Source: Field Survey, 2015

4.5 Factors impeding Traditional Leaders Participating in Decision Making Process (Local Government system) in Tamale Metropolitan Assembly

This presents perspectives of respondents on the factors that affect Traditional leader's participation in local government in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly of Northern Region.

There shall be a Municipal Chief Executive for every district who shall be appointed by the President with the prior approval of not less than two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly present and voting at the meeting (Ghana's Constitution, 1992: Article 243 (1)). Items 1 asked the respondents to indicate whether they believe the non-performance of the Municipal Assembly (MA) is not functioning well because the Municipal Chief Executive is not accountable to the electorate. The findings in Table 4.16 depict that, majority of the respondents that is 32.2% disagreed that the Municipal Assembly is not performing to expectation of the

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citizens because the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by the Traditional leaders, yet 47 (23.7%) and 37 (18.7%) uncertain and disagreed respectively.

In Item 2 respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed that the Municipal Assembly will be better off if the entire membership of the assembly is made up of Traditional leaders and elected members rather than the current arrangement when one-third of the assembly is elected. According to the analysis from Table 4.16, 43 of the respondents representing (21.7%) strongly agreed that the Municipal Assembly will be better off if the entire membership of the assembly is made up of Traditional leaders and elected members rather than the current arrangement where one-third of the assembly is elected, 20.7% disagreed and were uncertain respectively.

Item 3 is on the less representation of Traditional leaders at the municipal assembly affect the local government process. The results show that 64 respondents representing (32.3%) strongly agreed, 60 (30.3%) agreed, 33 (16.7%) uncertain and 29 (14.6%) disagreed that the less representation of Traditional leaders at the municipal assembly affect the local government system in the Tamale metropolis.

Item 4 shows the various responses as to how Unit Committee Members does not consult Traditional leaders in the development plans of their communities in the local government process in the Tamale metropolis. The results show varied responses, 56 representing (28.3%) of the respondents were uncertain, 31 (15.7%) strongly agreed while 47 representing (23.7%) disagreed.

Item 5 show the non-functioning of Unit Committees is due to Traditional leaders not supporting them to do their work. The study reveals that 56 responses representing (28.3%) of the respondents were uncertain that the non-functioning of Unit Committees is due to Traditional

leaders not supporting them to do their work, 47 (23.7%) disagreed and 31 (15.7%) strongly agreed that the non-functioning of Unit Committees is due to Traditional leaders not supporting them to do their work in the Tamale metropolis.

Item 6 in table 4.16 shows the various responses as to how the respondents agreed or disagreed that the inability of the Municipal Assembly to generate internal funds is due to the lack of involvement of Traditional leaders in the collection of the taxes of the citizens as their obligations. The data analysis reveals that about (30.3%) of the respondents strongly agreed that the inability of the Municipal Assembly to generate internal funds is due to the lack of involvement of Traditional leaders in the collection of the taxes of the citizens as their obligations, and (10.6%) disagreed.

 One factor that affects the realization of the objectives and the goal of local government system is the understanding that stakeholders are to cooperate with one another rather than compete with one another. Respondents were asked whether AMs, TAs and UCMs of the District Assembly compete rather than cooperate with one another for item 7. The analysis shows that 57 respondents representing 29.1% strongly agreed while 23, (11.7%) disagreed and 43 (21.9%) are uncertain. Item 9 shows the views of the respondents whether they agree or disagree that the policies of any ruling government affect the local government system largely. The breakdown of responses is 73 respondents representing (37.2%) strongly agreed, 27 (13.8%) disagreed and 43 (21.9%) were uncertain.

Item 8 presents the views of respondents on whether the apathy of citizens of non-involvement in the local government process is due to lack of information or education by the stakeholders of the programme. Out of the 196 responses received 70 respondents representing (35.7%) strongly agreed while 13 (6.6%) disagreed and 40 (20.4%) were uncertain. The results indicated majority

of the respondents believed that one factor that affects the local government system is lack of education or adequate information to the citizens on the demands and details of the local government system implemented by the government of Ghana since its inception in 1988.

The findings of the study show that effective implementation of the local government system in Tamale Metropolitan Assembly is affected by a number of factors. These include the office of the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by traditional leaders, less representation of Traditional leaders, Assembly Members and Unit Committee Members of the Municipal Assembly does not consult traditional leaders, stake holders competing rather than cooperating, lack of involvement of traditional leaders in the collection of taxes.

From the findings there appear to be varied views expressed by the respondents that the Municipal Assembly is not performing to expectation of the citizens because the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by the traditional leaders. This is supported by (32.2%) of respondents agreed that the Municipal Assembly is not performing to expectation of the citizens, yet (23.7%) and (18.7%) uncertain and disagreed respectively. Because traditional leaders are not part of the structure of the assembly they do not care or concern about accountability of the Assembly, citizens do not feel the need to give the necessary support in terms of cooperation and revenue generation to the assembly which shows how the people of the metropolis value traditional leaders. The findings, therefore, question why there is not constitutional provision that upholds the representation of all traditional leaders to be part of the Assembly within each defined District, Municipality and Metropolis and not appointment of selected few. This revelation could mean that majority of the people believe there are structural defects of the present local government programme of Ghana. In contrast, it could mean the people seem not to understand reasons why traditional leaders are not mandated but rather appointment to the

assembly besides, what are the real expectations of the citizens that Metro Assembly is not meeting their current performance target. These issues call for further investigation.

The results further revealed that majority of the respondents strongly agreed that is (21.7%) of the Metro assembly would be better off if the entire membership of the assembly is made up of traditional leaders and elected Assembly representatives rather than the current arrangement where one-third is appointed. The results therefore, question the constitutional provision of the local government. Article 242 establishes that:

> A District Assembly shall consist of the following members (a) one person from each local government electoral area within the district elected by universal adult suffrage; (b) the member or members of Parliament from the constituencies that fall within the area of authority of the District Assembly as members without the right to vote; (c) the District Chief Executive of the district; and (d) other members not being more than thirty percent of all the members of the District Assembly, appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district (Ghana's Constitution, 1992).

Also in an interview with the traditional leaders their views as to what they think is responsible for them not been part or invited to deliberate on issues surrounding development in their area of jurisdiction. The following are some of the responses they gave as to the reasons why they are not being invited to take part in decision surrounding development in their area of jurisdiction.

"We are not educated and it's for those who are educated"

"Also the assembly is for government workers who he/she pays to do work for the state"

"There is too much process in the way they carry out their business in the assembly and I don't have time for that".

"Educated people like cheating and going there to take part in their meeting they will end up by cheating me either through my land or any development in my area".

"One of the chiefs even use me as example that this research that I am conducting will at the end come with money but I will call on them even to let them know that I have been rewarded with money after I have interview them".

This revelation goes to shows how the traditional leaders do not trust the system and which goes to confirm why they sale their lands without involving the local assembly.

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Table 4. 13: Factors Impeding Local Government System

Item	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Total%
1 The Municipal Assembly is not performing to expectation because the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by the Traditional leaders	34(17.2%)	64(32.3%)	47(23.7%)	37(18.7%)	16(8.1%)	198(100)
2 Municipal Assembly will be better off if the entire membership of the assembly is made up of Traditional leaders and elected members	43(21.7%)	35(17.7%)	41(21.2%)	41(20.7%)	35(17.7%	198(100)
3 The less representation of Traditional leaders at the municipal assembly affect local government process	64(32.3%)	60(30.3%)	33(16.7%)	29(14.6%)	12(6.1%)	198(100)
Unit Committee Members Does not consult Traditional leaders in the development plans of their communities	51(26.3%)	34(17.5%)	55(28.4%)	35(18.0%)	19(9.8)	194(100)
4 The non-functioning of Unit Committees is due to Traditional leaders not supporting them to do their work.	31(15.7%)	31(15.7%)	56(28.3%)	47(23.7%)	33(16.7%)	198(100)
5The inability of the Municipal Assembly to generate internal funds is due to the lack of involvement of Traditional leaders in the collection of the taxes	60(30.3%)	50(25.3%)	54(27.3%)	21(10.6%)	13(6.6%)	198(100)
6 The Assembly members, Traditional Authorities and Unit Committee Members of the Assembly compete rather than cooperating	57(29.1%)	55(28.1%)	43(21.9%)	23(11.7%)	18(9.2%)	196(100)
7 The policies of any ruling government affect local government process	73(37.2%)	44(22.4%)	43(21.9%)	27(13.8%)	9(4.6%)	196(100)
8 The apathy of Traditional leaders of non-involvement in the decentralization process is due to lack of information or education by the stakeholders	70(35.4%)	70(35.4%)	40(20.4%)	13(6.6%)	3(1.5%)	196(100)

Source: Field Survey, 2015

4.6 Local Government System Support Traditional Leaders in their Local Level Development

The main reason why the concept of decentralization was developed as the national policy is to see the local level developed based on the participation of the local stake holders, thus ensuring that their understanding in decision making is paramount to the development of the area as whole. Table 5.6 presents the findings on the extent to which traditional leaders as a structure can relate to local level development within the Tamale Metropolis. Item 1 reveals that 61 respondents representing 32.3% agreed that traditional leaders have the legal power to dealing with disagreements among citizens in their community within the Tamale Metropolis always, 71 respondents representing 37.6% Occasionally, whiles 44 of the respondents representing 23.3% indicated that Not at all does traditional leaders have the legal power to deal with disagreements among citizens in their community within the Tamale Metropolis. Item 2 finds out whether through decentralization traditional authorities are responsive or accountable to local needs as the local governments.

The data in Table 5.6 depict that majority of the responded to the questionnaire agreed that its occasionally that through local government system traditional authorities are responsive or account-able to local needs as the local governments. Out of the 195 responses 37 representing 19.6% responded always, 62 representing 31.8% occasionally, 40 (20.5%) seldom and 50 (25.6%) not at all.

Item 3 revealed that majority of the citizens that responded to the questionnaire disagreed that Through the local government system traditional leaders are allow to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their jurisdiction. Besides, 43 respondents representing 21.2% stated always, 35 (17.7%) stated occasionally whiles 41 respondents representing 21.2% seldom and 41 (21.7%) not at all.

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Item 4 asked a specific question whether the local government accept traditional authorities as the legitimate authority for development in some parts of their communities. Table 4.19 shows that out of the 195 responses 49 (25.1%) indicated always, 74 (37.9%) occasionally, 20 (10.3%) seldom and 52(26.7%) not at all. From the data there are varied views expressed by the respondents. Item 5 look at the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities in the Tamale Metropolis. Majority of the people who respondent to the question agreed that the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities. The data from the study shows that out of 195 responses 119 respondents representing 61.0% indicated that Always, 50 (25.6%) Occasionally, 19 (9.7%) and 7 (3.6) not at all that the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities in the Tamale Metropolis.

The results reveal that they are varied views by the people with regards to traditional leaders having the legal power to deal with disagreement between citizens in their communities. Majority of the people that is 37.6% of the people believe that occasionally traditional leaders have the legal power and not constitutional mandated which is always and constant for the traditional leaders. Closely followed by 32.3% of the people believe that traditional leaders always have the legal power to deal with disagreement within their communities. Looking at this tow views, one can conclude that there is great respect for tradition in the Tamale Metropolis which is why the people in their own wisdom assume that traditional leaders occasional can have legal power to deal with disagreement among the citizenry, because legal power can never be occasionally but rather always and constant mandated by the constitution or act of parliament.

The study further reveals that majority of the respondents indicated that occasionally traditional leaders are responsive or accountable to local needs as the local government. This is supported by (31.8%) of the citizens, this means that the people are of the view that occasionally traditional leaders need to account to the people just like the local government. But this is not so because the local government is mandated by law to be accountable all the time to the needs of the local people and not occasionally, example provision of the basic needs like water gas, schools and electricity etc. Equal the traditional leaders need to be accountable by protecting the interest of his/her subjects at all cost and to defend his/her community and thus shows the perception of the people of Tamale Metropolis as to the role and function of the traditional leaders. It thus calls for further education on the function and limits of the traditional leader within the communities and the metropolis at large so as to inform the masses on that issue function of traditional leaders.

The study also finds out that majority of the people indicated that through decentralization traditional leaders are not allow to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their communities within the Tamale Metropolis. That is (21.7%) of the citizens indicated that not at all does traditional leaders through decentralization are allow to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their communities. This means that traditional leaders are not part of the day to day running of the planning and development of the Assembly in terms of strategic decision making through revenue collection. This is an indication of how the metro assembly will find taxes collection very difficult in the sense that people respect traditional leaders within the Tamale Metropolis as data from the above shows. It means that with the involvement of the traditional leaders more people will be willing to pay their taxes without any hindrance or state involvement. This finding is line with the view of Ayee (2006), which indicate that with the absence of institutional representation of chiefs in the structures of local government is a recipe

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for non-cooperation between chiefs and officials of the DA, especially DCEs. This represents clash of formal and informal rules. In the same vain one of the most recent calls is from a former minister of state, who is of the opinion that government cedes the right to appoint thirty percent of the membership of District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies to traditional authorities (*Ghana News Agency* 09.29.09). At the same forum, a traditional leader, emphasizing the role of chiefs as agents of development, suggested an increase in the representation of traditional authorities at the district assemblies, with the objective of making chiefs active participants in the democratization process for sustainable development. To buttress the emerging "Little Man politics," the *GNA* reported that the devolution of this presidential function to chiefs was treated with disdain by the DCEs.

Chiefs in Ghana, irrespective of hierarchical levels, are perceived as "social and cultural leaders different from self-imposed or elected leaders and officials of the state, including the District Chief Executives, the pivots of the present decentralized system of administration who operate, or are expected to operate at the grassroots level" (Nana Arhin Brempong 2006, 27).

The local government Acts –the traditional leaders Act, Rural District Councils Act and the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act provide powers for decentralized planning to local authorities. This is a way of enhancing community participation in planning at the District level as well as at the village level. The process of finding the needs of the grass root and what they think about the needs make planning more relevant.

On how the current local government system supports traditional leaders in their local level development in the Tamale Metropolis

Interview of the metropolitan coordinating Director reveals that there have been consultations by the traditional leaders on issues affecting the development of their areas, for example during the

budget consultations and final consultations of the draft plan by the assembly before the approval by the full council meeting.

The coordinating Director stated that consultations are done at least once a year only during the budget consultations compared to the past years would meet with the council officers three times a year. The invitations for the assembly meetings for consultations would sometimes not reach some of the traditional leaders on time because the Council sent the messages through the assembly representatives. Therefore, assembly members who fail to inform the traditional leadership of the communities sometimes result to this indifference between the metropolitan assembly and the traditional leaderships.

But the coordinator agreed that sometimes financial constraints faced by the council and the shortage of transport for the council officers to visit the entire community's metropolis. The coordinating Director also confirmed that the time given usually for the consultations in the communities is very short that some proposals will be passed by the full council before the community views and objections reach the traditional leaders.

In formulating the local plans, the local Authorities shall ensure that they conform generally to the Regional and National Plan Regional, the National Development Planning (Systems) Act, 1994 (Act 479) elaborates the framework for decentralised planning in Ghana including physical/spatial planning, its provisions and plan preparation processes are at variance with the provisions in the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945 (CAP 84). In addition, while Act 462 recognises MMDAs as planning authorities within their respective areas of jurisdiction, there is no subsidiary legislation spelling out physical planning functions and standards. In the performance of planning functions, MMDAs have had to rely on CAP 84 which is outmoded and at variance with processes under Act 462.Town and Country Act states that the district plans

should be sent to the Minister of local government for approval. This we might say is a way of consolidating the powers of Central Government Officials "not of the citizens" for they retain all the powers and rights to determine which plans to adopt in the districts. According to the National Plan Regional, Town and Country Act, local Authorities have to publicly exhibit the draft plans in time for the community to pass agreements or objections and be forwarded to the council two months before the district plans are passed by the full council and then forwarded for the Ministerial approval. The council sometimes delay the holding of their committee meetings due to the shortage of funds for the transport allowances and sitting allowances for the committee members that the drafting of the plans end up being hurriedly produced that some procedures according to the planning act end up not being followed .The consultation period and public exhibition time end up being very short for the community to comment on the draft plans and send back to the council their recommendations or objections.

Table 4. 14: Traditional Leaders and Local Level Development

Item	Always (%)	Occasionally (%)	Seldom (%)	Not at All (%)	Total%
1 Does Traditional leaders have the legal power to dealing with disagreements among citizens in his community	61(32.3%)	71(37.6%)	13(6.9%)	44(23.3%)	189(100)
2 Through decentralization traditional authorities are responsive or account-able to local needs as the local governments.	37(19.6%)	62(31.8%)	40(20.5%)	50(25.6%)	195(100)
3 Through the decentralization Traditional leaders are allow to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their jurisdiction	41(20.7%)	35(17.7%)	41(21.2%)	43(21.7%)	198(100)
4 Does local government accept traditional authorities as the legitimate authority for development in some parts of their communities	49(25.1%)	74(37.9%)	20(10.3%)	52(26.7%)	195(100)
5 The allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities.	119(61.0%)	50(25.6%)	19(9.7%)	7(3.6%)	195(100)

Source: Field Survey, 2015

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4.7 Conclusion

Chapter four present analysis of findings of the study. The perception of the citizen about the local government process was explored, Traditional leader's participation and involvement in the local government process was examined and factors that affect Traditional leader's participation in local government process in the Tamale metropolis were sought.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of major findings of the study, conclusion and recommendations of the study. The study determines the roles traditional leaders play by participate in local government in Tamale Metropolis and out to achieve the following objectives. Firstly, the study explores how the metropolitan assembly structures and traditional leaders interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis. Secondly, the study determines the factors impeding traditional leaders participating in decision making process (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis. It also determines how the current local government system supports traditional leaders in their local level development in the Tamale Metropolis.

5.2 Summary

5.2.1 How do the Metropolitan Assembly Structures and traditional Leaders Interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis?

Various stake holders within development circles need to interact with each other in order to bring meaningful development to their local communities thus call for the policy of local government where the policy spelt out the structure of the stake holders that are involved in decision making process of the MMDAs. The study shows that majority of the people that is (48.5%) are of the view that the relationship between traditional Leaders and Local government in the Tamale Metropolis is cordial indicating that respondents were convinced that the relationship between traditional leaders and local government is cordial. Similarly, the study finds out that (34.2%) of the people Agreed that there exists conflict between traditional

Authorities and Metro Assembly Structures in the Tamale Metropolis, this seems to be the root of why participation in local government is problematic by traditional leaders. Also the study reveals that (89.9%) of the respondents agreed that "Yes" it's important to have representation of all the traditional leaders in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly. In the same vain the study finds out that (44.4%) of the people agreed that the structure of the traditional leaders with respect to local government system is good in the Tamale Metropolis.

5.2.2 What are the factors impeding Traditional leaders participating in decision making (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis?

The findings of the study show that effective implementation of the local government system in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly is affected by a number of factors. These include the office of the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by traditional leaders, less representation of traditional leaders, Assembly Members and Unit Committee Members of the Municipal Assembly does not consult traditional leaders, lack of involvement of traditional leaders in the collection of Taxes, and the long process of doing business in the assembly and traditional leaders don't have time for that.

5.2.3 Does the current local government system support Traditional leaders in their local level development in Tamale Metropolis?

Local level development depends on the full participation of all stake holders within the communities. This will ensure that local government will work to perfection, if Traditional leaders are constitutionally mandated to be part of the local level decision making. The study reveals that (37.6%) occasionally and (23.3%) indicated that Not at all does traditional leaders have the legal power to dealing with disagreements among citizens in his community within the Tamale Metropolis. The study also revealed that majority of the citizens that responded to the

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questionnaire disagreed that through the local government system traditional leaders are allowed to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the study found out that majority of the people who respondent to the question agreed that the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities. The data from the study found out that (61.0%) of the respondents indicated that allocation of communal land to individual and the rights to duties connected to land allocation among the traditional function of the traditional leaders.

5.3 Conclusions

The study can conclude on the following issues discussed as follows:

5.3.1 How do the Metropolitan Assembly Structures and Traditional Leaders Interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis?

It was established that there exists a relationship between Traditional Leaders and Local government in the Tamale Metropolis. Similarly, the study concluded that there exists conflict between Traditional Authorities and Metro Assembly Structures in the Tamale Metropolis, which is the root of why participation in local government is problematic by Traditional leaders.

5.3.2 What are the Factors Impeding Traditional Leaders Participating in Decision Making (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolis?

There is a fair understanding of the local government process in the metropolis. However, decentralization process has not provided the necessary impetus for Traditional leaders to participate fully in the process. Traditional leaders have not been effectively involved in the local government process, except during local elections. These issues have been related to certain factors. Those factors include Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by Traditional leaders, The entire Assembly should made up of elected members and all Traditional leaders within the

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metropolis, less representation of Traditional leaders, Assembly Members and Unit Committee Members of the Municipal Assembly do not consult Traditional leaders, stake holders, lack of involvement of Traditional leaders in the collection of Taxes, and long process of carry out their business in the assembly and traditional leaders don't have time for that.

5.3.3 Does the Current Local Government System Support Traditional Leaders in their Local Level Development in Tamale Metropolis?

The study further concluded that occasionally or Not at all do Traditional leaders have the legal power to deal with disagreements among citizens in their community within the Tamale metropolis. It also concluded that Traditional leaders are not allowed to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the study concluded that majority of the people supported the allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities within the Tamale metropolis.

5.4 Recommendations

A study of citizen participation in the decentralization process with no recommendation on how to make the citizens more participatory would be seen to be incomplete. From the findings, the following recommendations are proposed:

➢ That the local government philosophy calls for a working relationship between the government institutions and the local stakeholders. Therefore, opportunity must be given to all to participate in the programme especially the traditional authorities.

➢ There is the need for some more education in the local government Process for all citizenry in the Tamale metropolis.

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➢ The state should take a second look at the constitution to give a mandatory representation of Traditional leaders to the MMDAs as to the current arrangement where they will have to be appointed by the president.

➢ District Assembly Staff, Assembly Members and Unit Committee Members should be given induction on ways to effectively involve their constituents in the local government system.

➢ The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Integration should establish monitoring mechanisms to assess the extent of citizens' engagement/participation in the decentralization process in the Tamale metropolis and beyond.

➢ Assembly members should engage more with their constituents and electorates to promote their interest in local government.

➢ Municipal Chief Executives and elected representatives should have regular consultations with their people as prescribed in the local government system.

➢ Finally, citizens must be encouraged to plan for their own development projects.

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Appendix I

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Survey Questionnaire

Dear Respondent

I am conducting a research entitled "*Traditional Leaders Participation in Local Governance in Tamale Metropolitan Assembly*" as part of my master degree studies and you have been selected as part of the respondents to respond to the survey questionnaire. I will sincerely ask for your participation to fully help me acquire a higher level of understanding of Decentralization practices.

I do understand that your time is valuable; I believe that this survey will only take about 25-35 minutes of your time. Be assured that, the individual respondent results will remain confidential at this stage. Only the final results will be made public through the academic report.

Thank you for your time and expertise

Sincerely,

Singed

Abdul-Basit Danjoe Munkaila **0209251355/0248658996**

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Please choose the option that applies to you by placing a tick in the bracket of your choice.

Please give only ONE answer.

Section A: Bio Data

Name of Interviewer ………………………… Date ……………………………..

Name of Respondent …………………………………………………………………...

Name of Community …………………………………………………………………...

1. Sex: 1. Male [ ] 2. Female [ ]

2. Age: [ ] 22 and below [ ] 23 – 33years [ ] 34 - 44years [ ] 45 – 54years [] 55-64 [ ] 65 and

above

3. Marital status [] Single [] Married [] Divorced [] Widowed

4. Which of the following best describes your level of education?

Degree holder [ ] HND [ ] Postgraduate [ ] SSS/SHS [ ] JSS/ JHS [ ] No formal education [ ]

Section B: Metropolitan Assembly Structures and Traditional Leaders Interacting within

Local Government Structure.

5 How would you rate the structure of Traditional leaders with respect to local level governance

in the Tamale Metropolis? Very Good [ ] Good [ ] Very Bad [ ] Bad [ ]

Explain answer in Q5

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

6a What is your view about the relationship between traditional authority and local government

structure? (Tick appropriate cell)   Very cordial [ ] Cordial [ ] Fairly cordial [ ] Not cordial [ ]

Don't know [ ]

b) Explain your answer in Q6a

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

7 There exists conflict between traditional authorities (TA) and the Municipal assembly structures (MA)? Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

8 What type of relationship in your view can facilitates good relationship between the traditional leaders and the local government system (DA)?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

9a Do you think it is important to have representatives of Traditional leaders in the Metropolitan Assembly? No Response [ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Uncertain [ ]

b. Explain answer in Q9a

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

10 Indicate whether you agree or disagree that the following are good reasons why Traditional leaders should be incorporated in local governance 1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Agree 3 = Uncertain 4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree

	Questions	Response rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
A	They have rich experience in local governance					
B	They know the local terrain better					
C	They know the culture of the people					
D	Traditional knowledge and wisdom are tried and tested					
E	They are the custodians of resources e.g. land					
F	They represent the interest of the people					

11 How relevant are the following in the decision making process of the decentralization process? Rate in order of importance

PERSONALITIES	(1) Very Important	(2) Important	(3) Less Important	(4) Not Importance
A) The District Chief Executive (DCE)				
B) The Assembly Member (AM)				
C) The Unit Committee Member (UCM)				
D) Traditional Authority (TA)				
E) The Ordinary Citizen (OC)				

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Section C: Traditional Leaders participating in Local Government Process

12 What is your understanding of decentralization?

………………………………………………………………………………………………

13 Please, indicate any two main roles/function of Traditional leaders in the ongoing local

government process in Tamale metropolis?

………………………………………………………………………………………………

14 Indicate how Traditional leaders are involved in the local government process in your
locality. Tick the appropriate box.

QUESTIONS	(1) Always	(2) Occasionally	(3) Seldom	(4) Not at all
A) How do Unit Committee members organize meetings in your community?				
B) How do you often participate in those organize meetings?				
C) How do you see yourself participating in the decision making process				
D) I take part in the decision making process in the community				
E) I attend meetings organize by Unit Committee members in my community				
F) I have taken part in local elections since the beginning of the district assembly concept				
G) I take part in making decisions on community development projects				
H) I attend communal works organized for				

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developmental project in my locality				
I) I pay my taxes and other levies to the Municipal Assembly				
J) I am part of the development planning in my community				

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following most basic requirement of decentralization and good governance statement;

15 As a result of participation in decentralization, the District Assembly's response to Traditional leaders developmental needs more quickly now than before. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

16 The marginalization of Traditional leaders in various communities to participate at the local level development in the Metropolis is attributable to the decentralization process. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

17 Traditional leader's participation in decentralization has enhanced transparency and accountability in the away money which has wrongfully been diverted away from development activities has declined. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree []

18 Local government process has helped Traditional leaders to increase their effectiveness in service delivery like dispute settlement in the Metropolis. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

19 The introduction of the decentralization concept has enabled Traditional leaders and government officials to bring development to their traditional area. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

20 Local Governance has made development projects in this Metropolis more sustainable and cost effective because Traditional leaders are now involved in project design, execution and monitoring. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

21 Local Governance in this Metropolis has encouraged Traditional leaders in the communities to find solutions to their everyday problems. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

Section D: Factors Impeding Traditional Leaders Participation in the Local Government Structures

22 Indicate how you agree or disagree on the following issues. Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]

QUESTIONS	1	2	3	4	5
A) The Municipal Assembly (MA) is not functioning well because the Municipal Chief Executive is not accountable to the electorate					
B) The Municipal Assembly is not performing to expectation of the citizens because the Municipal Chief Executive is not supported by the Traditional leaders					
C) The Municipal Assembly will be better off if the entire membership of the assembly is made up of Traditional leaders and elected members rather than the current arrangement when one-third is appointed					
D) The less representation of Traditional leaders at the municipal assembly affect the decentralization process					
E) Unit Committee Members Does not consult Traditional leaders in the development plans of their communities in the decentralization process					

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F) The non-functioning of Unit Committees is due to Traditional leaders not supporting them to do their work.					
G) The inability of the Municipal Assembly to generate internal funds is due to the lack of involvement of Traditional leaders in the collection of the taxes of the citizens as their obligations					
H) The Assembly members, Traditional Authorities and Unit Committee Members of the Municipal Assembly compete rather cooperate with one another					
I) The policies of any ruling government affect the local government system process to a greater extent					
J) The apathy of Traditional leaders of non involvement in the decentralization process is due to lack of information or education by the stakeholders of the programme					

23 In your view, what other factors affect the local government system in Tamale Metropolis?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Section E: Local Government Processes is Supporting Traditional Leaders in their Local

Level Development

24 In your view does local governance support Traditional leaders in developing their local

communities? Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Uncertain [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree []

25 How often are the following issues discussed at meetings organized by the Traditional leaders for local development?

TOPICS/ISSUES	(1) Always	(2) Occasionally	(3) Seldom	(4) Not at all
A) Does Traditional leaders have the legal power to dealing with disagreements among citizens in his community				
B) The allocation of communal lands to individuals and the rights and duties connected to land allocation are among the traditional functions of traditional authorities.				
C) Through local government system traditional authorities are responsive or account-able to local needs as the local governments.				
D) Through the local government system Traditional leaders are allow to collect taxes/levies for any development project in their jurisdiction				
E) Does local government accept traditional communities and traditional authorities as the legitimate authority?				

Appendix II

UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Survey Questionnaire for Traditional Leaders and Coordinating Director

Dear Respondent

I am conducting a research entitled "***Traditional Leaders Participation in Local Governance in Tamale Metropolitan Assembly***" as part of my master degree studies and you have been selected as part of the respondents to respond to the survey questionnaire. I will sincerely ask for your participation to fully help me acquire a higher level of understanding of Decentralization practices.

I do understand that your time is valuable; I believe that this survey will only take about 25-35 minutes of your time. Be assured that, the individual respondent results will remain confidential at this stage. Only the final results will be made public through the academic report.

Thank you for your time and expertise

Sincerely,

Singed

Abdul-Basit Danjoe Munkaila **0209251355/0248658996**

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Please choose the option that applies to you by placing a tick in the bracket of your choice.

Please give only ONE answer.

Section A: Bio Data

Name of Interviewer ………………………… Date ……………………………..

Name of Respondent ……………………………………………………………...

Name of Community ………………………………………………………………...

1. Sex: 1. Male [ ] 2. Female [ ]

2. Age: [ ] 22 and below [ ] 23 – 33years [ ] 34 - 44years [ ] 45 – 54years [] 55-64 [ ] 65 and above

3. Marital status [] Single [] Married [] Divorced [] Widowed

4. Which of the following best describes your level of education?

Degree holder [ ] HND [ ] Postgraduate [ ] SSS/SHS [ ] JSS/ JHS [ ] No formal education [ ]

To explore how the metropolitan assembly structures and traditional leaders interact within the current local government system in Tamale Metropolis

1) What role did the traditional leadership play in the assembly during decision making?

2) Are you involved in the planning of lands for development in your area of jurisdiction?

3) Do you involve the Tamale metropolitan assembly when you are planning land in jurisdiction for sale or any development you intend to undertake?

4) How do you release lands in your jurisdiction for sale?

5) What role did the District Assembly play in planning development in your area of jurisdiction?

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6) Do you involve unit committee and assembly members in the sales or release of land in your jurisdiction?

7) Are you aware that the assembly is supposed to planed lands under your control for sale or release?

To determine the factors impeding Traditional leaders participating in decision making process (Local government system) in Tamale Metropolitan Assembly

1) In your view what do you think is responsible for you not been part or invited to deliberate on issues surrounding development in your area of jurisdiction?

It further explores how the current local government system supports Traditional leaders in their local level development in Tamale Metropolis

1) Which way are you involved in development in your community?

2) How many times have you organize meeting/call meetings and invite the traditional leaders to participate?

3) How does the leadership of the metropolitan assembly support traditional leaders in development of their community?

4) Which ways do you involve traditional leaders in taken decision with regards to the planning of lands in their area of jurisdiction for sale/development?